

## **ADVANCED PEACE GAME TRIALS, 2021-2023**



### **Briefings on the Prospects for Peace**

# **The People's Republic of China**

Peter M. Southwood

**International Peace Project**

11 September 2022

© International Peace Project<sup>2000</sup>, September 2022

The content of the web site (and any material on the web site) is copyright International Peace Project<sup>2000</sup> ('IPP') or third parties. All rights reserved. It must not be reproduced in any medium without the prior written consent of IPP.

You may, however, download one copy of an individual Briefing for your personal use as a private individual but not in any circumstances for any commercial purpose or re-publication.

Briefings on the Prospects for Peace: The People's Republic of China – ebook only at [www.ipp2000.uk](http://www.ipp2000.uk)

Published by: International Peace Project<sup>2000</sup> (IPP) 110 Purves Road, Kensal Rise, London NW10 5TB, England.

### **Acknowledgements**

The kind permission of the following sources to reproduce certain excerpts in this work is acknowledged:

*Graham Allison*. Various pages summarised and quotations used from Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?, © Graham T. Allison 2017. Reproduced with permission from Scribe Publications.

*Daniel K. Gardner*. Licensed material from Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction, © Oxford University Press 2014. Reproduced with the permission of Oxford Publishing Limited (the 'Licensor') through PLSclear.

*International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*. Selected data from The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 used to build the charts created in Appendix D of this Briefing. © International Institute for Strategic Studies, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, <http://www.tandfonline.com> on behalf of IISS.

*International Monetary Fund (IMF)*. Tables E6 and E7 based on selected data from the World Economic Outlook database of the International Monetary Fund at <http://data.imf.org/> used under the IMF's 'Special Terms and Conditions Pertaining to the Use of Data'.

*Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*. Tables E3 and E4 based on selected data reproduced with permission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, © OECD 2003, Tables 8b and 8c; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center Inc.

*Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)*. Permission granted to use selected data in Table E1 for the timeline between 2018 and 2021 from: <https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart>

*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*. Tables D1 and D2 based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, <https://www.sipri.org>

*Ming Wan*. Licensed material from The Political Economy of East Asia: Wealth and Power, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, © Ming Wan 2020. Reproduced with the permission of Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (the 'Licensor') through PLSclear.

*Odd Arne Westad*. Content from Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 used with the approval of the author. © Odd Arne Westad 2012. Published by Vintage of Penguin Random House UK in 2013.

*The World Bank*. Selected data for Tables E2 and E5 from World Development Indicators dataset at [WDI - Home \(worldbank.org\)](http://WDI-Home.worldbank.org) and World Bank Indicators dataset at [Indicators | Data \(worldbank.org\)](http://Indicators | Data (worldbank.org)) respectively.

Every effort has been made to contact all the copyright-holders but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity.

© International Peace Project<sup>2000</sup>, September 2022

### The Author Offers Thanks...

The British Library played an exceptional role in providing access to works used in the preparation of this Briefing which would otherwise have required expenditure beyond this author's resources. He would like to thank Dr Torsten Reimer and librarians in the Science 2 Reading Room for their help in locating Legal Deposit titles that had proved difficult to access.

The draft Briefing was reviewed and judged using pre-agreed criteria, adapted from those developed for the Peace Games 2020, by three Trustees of the International Peace Project. As a result, it was agreed that the final Briefing should be published but there was a long delay while the necessary copyright permissions were secured. The comments and reservations of the judges are reflected in the Trustees' Preface below. An explanation of the Peace Games 2020 and how they evolved into the Advanced Peace Game Trials, 2021-2023 will be found in Appendix G1 below and more fully on the IPP Peace Games website at [www.ipp2000.uk](http://www.ipp2000.uk)

The response times of publishers to requests for copyright permission varied greatly: the Peterson Institute for International Economics replied on the same day for which the author is even more appreciative now than he was at the time. The larger publishers tended to be the slowest to respond such that, with the agreement of the IPP Trustees, two received letters of complaint to senior board members. The assistance of Suzanne Carter at Oxford University Press was prompt and effective for which this author extends his sincere thanks....

### ...and No Thanks

... to Penguin Random House [PRH] UK. The material facts of the case speak for themselves:

29 April '22 – Email from IPP requesting copyright permission relating to a title of theirs:

- (i) 280 words in direct quotations, 'well within the allowed limits of fair dealing';
- (ii) 'A factual summary and paraphrasing of substantial parts of [Restless Empire] with full acknowledgement'

Automated response saying that it may take between 8 and 10 weeks to process the request.

13 July – A reminder sent by IPP which drew no response.

2 August – A letter of complaint to the PRH UK Group Legal Director.

26 August to

2 September – Substantive responses from PRH UK offered licence for (i) above on payment of a permissions fee of £250 plus VAT but this would not cover (ii) nor US rights for (i) held by Hatchette. The author of Restless Empire would not be consulted about (ii) because PRH UK has no contractual relationship with him and, in any event, would only seek author approval regarding edited quotes. PRH further stated that it would expect requestors to seek separate advice on the fair dealing rule and if a licence is requested would treat it as requiring one.

8 September – IPP advised PRH UK it would not now seek a licence. The author had swiftly given his approval on (ii), and (i) was well within the limits of fair dealing, while Hatchette's website stated usage within the U.S. Copyright Office definition of 'fair use' does not require copyright permission from that publisher.

### **The Author's Sole Responsibility**

The author is grateful to the scholars, governmental authorities and others whose work has been cited in this Briefing for providing the factual basis for his analysis. Additionally, he remains most appreciative of the continuing interest and, understandably, sceptical support of the IPP Trustees without whom this educational charity would not exist.

As is customary, though, it must be stressed that the responsibility for the contents of this Briefing, other than the Trustees' Preface, rests with this author alone. No other author cited is to be taken to have given any support, implicit or express, to his findings particularly on the direction of international conflicts involving China towards a state of peace or war.

Peter M. Southwood  
11 September 2022

## CONTENTS

List of Charts	xi
List of Tables	xii
List of Abbreviations	xiii
Conventions	xiv
Trustees' Preface	xv
Statement of Purpose	xvii
Summary	xviii
1. Introduction	1
2. Historical Background	2
2.1 Method of Selecting Relevant Facts	2
2.2 Historical Analysis	2
2.2.1 Conclusion	4
2.3 Confucianism	5
2.3.1 Neo-Confucianism	6
2.3.2 Conclusion	6
2.4 Education	7
2.4.1 Education and Politics in China: A Preliminary Conclusion	7
2.4.2 The Constitution of the CPC: A Preliminary Conclusion	7
2.4.3 Higher Education in China: A Preliminary Conclusion	8
2.4.4 Overall Conclusion	9
3. Method of Analysing the Conflict	10
3.1 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2005 to date	10
3.1.1 Conclusions: The Prospects for Peace	10
3.1.2 Criteria for Evaluating the Analysis Against the Subsequent Course of Events in the Conflict Area	11
3.1.3 Outcomes in the Conflict Area	12
3.2 Implications of IPP Briefing No. 1 for the China Briefing	13
3.3 China Briefing Method of Analysis	14
3.4 Overall Conclusion	15
4. Analysis	16
4.1 Application of the Conceptual Framework	16
(i) Avoidance of Societal Collapse in China	16
(ii) Avoidance of Great Power Wars	17
(iii) Achieving Balances of Power and Peace	18
4.2 China and the Balance of Military Power in Asia, 1990 – 2020	19
4.2.1 Historical Analysis and Future Relationships	19

4.2.2	North v South Korea	20
4.2.3	India v Pakistan and China	22
4.2.4	China's Other Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Taiwan	22
4.3	China and the Balance of Economic Power in East Asia, 1990 – 2020	23
4.3.1	Historical Analysis and Future Relationships	23
4.3.2	The United States and China	23
4.3.3	Other East Asian States and China	24
A.	North Korea	24
B.	Taiwan and ASEAN	24
C.	Claims to Islands in the South China Sea	26
4.3.4	Global Trading Partners and China	26
4.3.5	The Environment	27
4.3.6	Conclusion	27
	Part I Limitations of This Economic Analysis	28
	Part II Economic Dependencies and Future Peace or War	28
	Part III Answer to Question 3	29
4.4	Military and Economic Alliances in East Asia, 1990 – 2020	30
4.4.1	Background	30
4.4.2	Military Alliances in East Asia	30
4.4.3	Economic Alliances in the East Asia and Pacific Region	31
4.4.4	Conclusion	32
5.	Conclusions: The Prospects for Peace	33
5.1	Peace Grows Out of Weakness	33
5.2	China's Multifaceted Internal and External Conflicts	33
5.2.1	Conclusion on Internal and External Conflicts	34
5.2.2	North v South Korea	35
5.2.3	India v Pakistan and China	36
5.2.4	China's Other Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Taiwan	37
5.3	The Role of Education	38
5.4	China and the United States: Destined for Peace or War?	39
5.4.1	The Propensity for Peace or War Between China and the United States	43
	Scenario (i) – Avoidance of Societal Collapse in China	43
	Scenario (ii) – Avoidance of Great Power Wars	44
	Scenario (iii) – Achieving Balances of Power and Peace	44
5.5	Briefing Answers	46
6.	Criteria for Evaluating the Analysis Against the Subsequent Course of Events in China	47
6.1	Starting Point	47
6.2	Achieving a Balance	47
6.3	Adoption of an Irenical Perspective?	48
7.	Recommendations	50

References	51
<b>APPENDICES</b>	<b>54</b>
A Historical Background	55
A1 Introduction	55
A2 Method of Analysis	55
A3 The Pre-Modern Era	56
A4 The Modern Era – Qing Dynasty, 1644 to 1912	57
A4.1 The Opium War of 1839-1842	58
A4.2 Christian Missionaries and the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864	58
A4.3 The Second Opium War, 1856-1860	59
A4.4 The Tongzhi Restoration	59
A4.5 Competing Imperialisms	60
A4.6 Religion, Education and Science	60
A4.7 Closing Years of the Qing Dynasty	61
A4.8 Qing Relations with Japan Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95	61
A4.9 Korea and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95	62
A4.10 Japanese Colonisation of Taiwan in 1895	62
A4.11 Qing Relations with Japan After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95	63
A5 The Modern Era – Chinese Republic, 1912-1949	64
A5.1 Steps to Revolution, 1898-1912	64
A5.1.1 The Boxer Rebellion, 1898-1901	64
A5.2 Chinese Relations with the United States and Germany	65
A5.3 The Collapse of the Qing Dynasty, 1908-1912	66
A5.4 Early Years of the Chinese Republic, 1912-1928	67
A5.4.1 Mongolia	67
A5.4.2 Tibet	68
A5.4.3 Xinjiang	68
A5.4.4 China Post-World War I	68
A5.5 The GMD Government, 1928 – 1937	70
A5.6 The Sino-Japanese War, 1937 – 1945	71
A5.6.1 Background	71
A5.6.2 Costs	72
A5.6.3 Manchuria	72
A5.6.4 A United Front Against Japan	73
A5.6.5 Initial Stages of the War: 1937-1939	73
A5.6.6 The War: 1939-1945	74
A6 Landlord and Peasant in the Making of Communist China	76
A6.1 The Upper Classes in the Imperial Chinese System	76
A6.2 The Gentry and the World of Commerce	78
A6.3 The Failure to Adopt Commercial Agriculture	79
A6.4 Collapse of the Imperial System and the Rise of the Warlords	80

	A6.5	The Guomindang Interlude and Its Meaning	80
	A6.6	Rebellion, Revolution, and the Peasants	81
A7		Modern Era – People’s Republic of China, 1949 to present	84
	A7.1	The Triumph of the CCP, 1945-1949	84
	A7.2	Relations with the Soviet Union	85
	A7.3	The Korean War, 1950 – 1953	86
	A7.4	The PRC’s International Relations, 1949 – 1960	86
		A7.4.1 The Great Leap Campaign and Its Consequences	89
	A7.5	Sino-Indian Relations, 1955 to 1962	89
	A7.6	Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cultural Revolution in China	90
		A7.6.1 Chinese Relations with North Vietnam and North Korea	90
		A7.6.2 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution & The Threat of War with the Soviet Union	91
	A7.7	Sino-American Relations, 1970-2010	92
		A7.7.1 Impact of the Ending of the Cold War	94
		A7.7.2 Economic Developments in the 1990s and 2000s	94
		A7.7.3 Taiwan	95
		A7.7.4 Impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the United States	96
	A7.8	China’s Relations with the Rest of Asia, 1970 – 2010	96
A8		Conclusion	97
		References	101
B		Confucianism	112
	B1	Introduction	112
	B2	The Legacy of Confucius	112
	B3	Assumptions Behind His Vision	113
	B4	Confucian Teachings on the Individual and Government	114
		B4.1 The Individual and Self-Cultivation	114
		B4.2 Government	115
		B4.3 Re-Interpretation and Reorientation	116
	B5	Practice	119
		B5.1 The Civil Service	119
		B5.2 The Common People	119
		B5.3 The Ruler	120
		B5.4 The Family	120
		B5.5 Women	121
	B6	Conclusion	121
		References	122
C		Education in the People’s Republic of China	123
	C1	Introduction	123
	C2	Historical Background	123
		C2.1 A Preliminary Conclusion	126



C3	The Constitution of the Communist Party of China	126
	C3.1 A Preliminary Conclusion	128
C4	Higher Education in China	128
	C4.1 A Preliminary Conclusion	130
C5	Overall Conclusion	131
	References	131
D	China and the Balance of Military Power in Asia, 1990 – 2020	133
	D1 Introduction	133
	D2 Global Military Expenditure	133
	D3 Nuclear Weapon States	135
	D4 Asian Regional Analysis	138
	D4.1 Quantitative Factors	138
	D4.1.1 North v South Korea	139
	<i>Overall Assessment</i>	144
	D4.1.2 India v Pakistan and India v China	145
	<i>Overall Assessment</i>	151
	D4.1.3 China’s Other Territorial Disputes	153
	<i>Overall Assessment</i>	161
	D4.2 Qualitative Factors	163
	D5 Conclusion	165
	References	166
E	China and the Balance of Economic Power in East Asia, 1990 – 2020	167
	E1 Introduction	167
	E2 Origins of China’s Current Economic Strategy	167
	E3 The US-China Trade Dispute	169
	E3.1 Legal Background	169
	E3.1.1 Non-Market Economies Under the GATT	170
	E3.1.2 The Special Case of China	170
	E3.1.3 NME Methodology and Section 15 of China’s Accession Protocol	170
	E3.1.4 Is China Now a Market Economy?	171
	E3.2 The US-China Trade War and Phase One Deal, 2018-2021	172
	E3.2.1 US-China Competition for Future Technologies	174
	E3.2.2 US Section 301 Investigations	175
	E4 East Asian Economies	177
	E4.1 China: Socio-Economic Trends	181
	E4.2 North Korea	181
	E4.3 Taiwan and ASEAN	182
	E4.3.1 The Legal and International Relations Background	182
	E4.3.2 Taiwan-ASEAN Trade Relations	184
	E5 Global Trading Partners and China	185
	E5.1 China’s Relations with Multilateral Financial Institutions	190
	E5.2 China’s Belt and Road Initiative	191

E6	The Environment	191
E7	Economic Dependencies and Peaceful Relations	192
	E7.1 Case Comparison of US-Japan and US-China Trade Disputes	193
E8	Conclusion	194
	E8.1 Limitations of this Economic Analysis	195
	E8.2 Balances of Economic Coercion	195
	E8.3 Balances of Economic Cooperation	196
	E8.4 Economic Dependencies and Future Peace or War	197
	References	199
F	Military and Economic Alliances in East Asia, 1990 – 2020	202
	F1 Introduction	202
	F2 Military Alliances in East Asia	202
	F3 Economic Alliances in East Asia and the Pacific Region	203
	F4 Conclusion	205
	References	206
G	China: Destined for Peace or War?	207
	G1 Introduction	207
	G2 A Difference of Method	216
	G3 Conclusion	217
	References	218
	Select Bibliography	220

**LIST OF CHARTS**

D1	North v South Korea: Armed Forces Personnel (exc. Reserves), 1990-2020	139
D2	North v South Korea: Main Battle Tanks, 1990-2020	140
D3	North v South Korea: Armoured Combat Vehicles, 1990-2020	140
D4	North v South Korea: Artillery, 1990-2020	141
D5	North v South Korea: Combat Aircraft, 1990-2020	142
D6	North v South Korea: Principal Surface Warships, 1990-2020	143
D7	India v Pakistan and India v China: Armed Forces Personnel (exc. Reserves), 1990-2020	146
D8	India v Pakistan and India v China: Main Battle Tanks, 1990-2020	147
D9	India v Pakistan and India v China: Armoured Combat Vehicles, 1990-2020	147
D10	India v Pakistan and India v China: Artillery, 1990-2020	148
D11	India v Pakistan and India v China: Combat Aircraft, 1990-2020	149
D12	India v Pakistan and India v China: Maritime Combat Aircraft, 1990-2020	149
D13	India v Pakistan and India v China: Principal Surface Warships, 1990-2020	150
D14	India v Pakistan and India v China: Submarines, 1990-2020	151
D15a	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Armed Forces Personnel (exc. Reserves), 1990-2020	154
D15b	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Armed Forces Personnel (exc. Reserves), 1990-2020	154
D16a	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Combat Aircraft, 1990-2020	156
D16b	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Combat Aircraft, 1990-2020	156
D17a	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Maritime Combat Aircraft, 1990-2020	157
D17b	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Maritime Combat Aircraft, 1990-2020	157
D18a	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Principal Surface Warships, 1990-2020	159
D18b	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Principal Surface Warships, 1990-2020	159
D19a	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Submarines, 1990-2020	160
D19b	China's Other Territorial Disputes: Submarines, 1990-2020	160

**LIST OF TABLES**

A1	An Historical Analysis of Armed Violence in China Since 1750	104
D1	Asian Countries Amongst the Global Top Fifteen Military Spenders, Compared to the United States, in 2020	134
D2	World Nuclear Forces, January 2021	136
D3	Relevant Datasets for Modelling the Qualitative Aspects of a Military Balance Between States	164
E1	US-China Trade War Tariffs: A Summary of Main Actions Taken, 2018-2021	173
E2	Economic Change in East Asia by the Late 2010s	179
E3	Share of World GDP, Regional Totals and Selected Countries, 1820 – 2001	186
E4	World Per Capita GDP, Regional Totals and Selected Countries, 1820 – 2001	187
E5	China, as a Percentage of the United States, 1980 – 2015	188
E6	IMF World Economic Outlook Comparison of the Economies of the United States and China, 2020	189
E7	IMF Overview of the <i>World Economic Outlook</i> Projections for the Economies of the United States and China, 2021-2022	190
F1	Membership of Trading Partnerships in the East Asia-Pacific Region, January 2022	204
G1	A Comparison of Two Methods for Analysing China’s Prospects for War or Peace	208

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ALBMs	- air-launched ballistic missiles
ASEAN	- Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUKUS	- Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (pact)
BIA	- bilateral investment agreement
BRI	- Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	- Chinese Communist Party
CPC	- Communist Party of China (official name)
CPTPP	- Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CRS	- Congressional Research Service
DoD	- Department of Defense (US)
DPP	- Democratic Progressive Party
DPRK	- Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EIC	- (British) East India Company
EU	- European Union
FDI	- foreign direct investment
FTA	- Free Trade Agreement
GATT	- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	- gross domestic product
GHG	- greenhouse gas emissions
GMD	- Guomindang
GNI	- gross national income
HPAEs	- high-performing Asian economies
ICBMs	- intercontinental ballistic missiles
IISS	- International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	- International Monetary Fund
IPP	- International Peace Project
IPR	- Institute of Pacific Relations
IT	- information technology
MFN	- most favoured nation
MIRVs	- multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
MRH	- multi-role helicopter
NAFTA	- North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NME	- non-market economy
NSP	- New Southbound Policy
OECD	- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PG	- Peace Games
PIIE	- Peterson Institute for International Economics
PLA	- People's Liberation Army
PLAAF	- PLA Air Force
PLAN	- PLA Navy

PLARF	- PLA Rocket Forces
PNA	- Palestinian National Authority
Prodem	- Project on Demilitarisation
PRC	- People's Republic of China
RCEP	- Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIIA	- Royal Institute of International Affairs
ROK	- Republic of Korea
SEZs	- special economic zones
SIPRI	- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBMs	- submarine-launched ballistic missiles
SSBNs	- ballistic missile submarine nuclear-fuelled
TiVA	- trade in value-added
UK	- United Kingdom
UN	- United Nations
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
USA	- United States of America
USMCA	- United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (trade pact)
USSR	- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTR	- United States Trade Representative
VASS	- Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences
WTO	- World Trade Organisation

## **Conventions**

### Historical dates

The author uses the traditional BC/AD system for recording years, rather than BCE/CE, in recognition of where both systems came from. The former is also especially apt for his theme (page 33) – relevant to all, irrespective of any religious or secular belief.

### Transliteration

The author follows the system of translating from Chinese known as *hanyu pinyin* (Chinese phonetics), as explained by the historian, Odd Arne Westad, in his book summarised in Appendix A. The exceptions he allows are for personal names, too well known in English in other transliterations to alter now, e.g. Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen.

### Referencing

This has been kept as simple as possible: full citation on the first occasion and in abbreviated form thereafter. 'Ibid' means the reference is to the same book or article in the previous note.

### *'The island of Taiwan'*

The author uses this term in the period from October 1949 to refer to a region of China and any reference to 'Taiwan' or 'Taipei' is intended to be taken in the same way. He believes this has no political connotations as the government of Taiwan has not declared independence.

## TRUSTEES' PREFACE

The period from the ending of the Cold War in November 1990 to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is a remarkable one by any standards. The unexpectedly peaceful termination of the US-Soviet rivalry, that had begun soon after the end of the Second World War, was as surprising as the Russian-Ukrainian war in these last few months has been shocking. Differing explanations for this transition, which reversed previous progress towards a more peaceful future, are called for.

A similar story and search for understanding pertains to the rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China in the period from the early 1970s to their trade war in 2018-2020 and increasingly confrontational relations over Taiwan and a raft of other issues.

This Briefing addresses the latter transformation today, just as the Briefings of IPP's predecessor body focused on the former in the early 1990s, each with a forward-looking orientation: are the region and the world heading towards peace or war?

### *I. Can such a question be reliably answered?*

That there should be doubts about this is entirely natural. The Trustees themselves, varying only in degree, are not yet convinced that the role of education and, especially mathematical approaches to forecasting, will yield even the results achieved in economics or meteorology.

Yet, offsetting this scepticism, is an equal recognition that political institutions and processes have on their own, or assisted by military force, singularly failed to achieve lasting peace settlements in a whole variety of international conflicts around the world. This consideration alone compels an urgent and rigorous search for new methods and deeper understanding.

### *II. Is such information worth having?*

It is undoubtedly the case that IPP Briefing No. 1 on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, published in January 2006, contains a chapter written on an irenic perspective which did foresee periodic war between the two sides, as subsequently transpired. It can be claimed that any informed observer at the time might have arrived at the same conclusion.

However, such political judgements are fallible and may be overly subjective, offering no universally applicable method of conflict analysis tested against subsequent events. That Briefing did offer such a method: comparing each side's peaceful means of conflict resolution.

### *III. What could be done with such information?*

It is equally true that the lack of response from governments and political and social scientists may be because such forecasts are not thought useful or not communicated in the right way.

This is a weighty argument but only if it is believed that public or expert opinion is decisive. Conversely, if long term forecasts are consistently borne out, irrespective of any existing consensus, then the consequences of ignoring them may be incalculable in the nuclear age.

The jury is still out. The current Briefing on China is a continuation of the process begun a generation ago by its author, (Dr) Peter Southwood, using essentially the same method of analysing international conflicts deployed then. *However, the contents of this Briefing are not to be taken as reflecting the views of IPP or its Trustees.* Rather, the Trustees wish to encourage written responses from academics or laypersons either in the form of a critique of its method and conclusions or, ideally, an alternative analysis which might also be based on the factual Appendices of the Briefing, in so far as they are deemed relevant and complete.

As the Trustees are open to sceptical viewpoints, and contrary methods to that in the China Briefing, we would be pleased to consider for publication on the Peace Games website any critique or alternative analysis, subject only to the IPP quality standards, Full details are available at [www.ipp2000.uk](http://www.ipp2000.uk) and initial inquiries can be made to [hon.secretary@ipp2000.org](mailto:hon.secretary@ipp2000.org)

Such critiques and alternative analyses, preferably in comparable format to the Briefing, might then engender a real debate focused on IPP's sole objective: the education of the public in the differing means of securing a state of peace and avoiding a state of war.

The Trustees of the International Peace Project (IPP)

September 2022



## STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Questions to be addressed in predicting peace or war:

Which country or region in the world possessing, or thought to possess, nuclear weapons is at greatest risk of collapse into civil conflict or war? By what means can a state of peace be secured there?

## **SUMMARY**

### Introduction

The choice of the People's Republic of China (PRC) arises from: the way the Cold War ended in 1990; China's historical experience of descent into civil conflict and war; the multiple potential flashpoints for armed conflict with risk of escalation which may require, as a subsequent project, computer modelling to aid understanding and forecasting; and Professor Graham Allison's book Destined for War (2018) as a basis for comparison with this analysis.

### Historical Background

Chinese history since the mid-nineteenth century is analysed in depth from 'an irenic perspective'. The key finding being that the PRC became relatively prosperous and secure within its own borders not because of a favourable balance of power (compared to the USA and USSR). Rather the transformative moment in modern Chinese history came in the 1970s from a favourable balance of peaceful methods of conflict resolution ('balance of peace') resulting in its rapprochement with the United States. The PRC's coercive power today came from the moment of greatest weakness for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – and a period of vulnerability for the United States, too – not from its strength and global integration.

The tentative conclusion from modern Chinese history is that the rules-based understanding of the international order is not how the world, in fact, works. Rather, irrespective of size of country or region concerned, it is the immensely complex way in which the balances of power and peace interact that determines, independently of political will, whether that direction is more peaceful or violent.

The impact of the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BC) on the history of China, despite his apparent lack of success in persuading any ruler in his own lifetime to adopt his vision and ideas, illustrates an emphasis on moral example rather than coercion and, beyond that, the role of self-cultivation through learning. As the notion of reciprocity affects all Chinese normative relationships, it may be said that a form of 'Golden Rule' applies in China as in the West despite all the shortcomings between Confucian teachings and actual practice in China down through the centuries until the Communist revolution in 1949.

Evidence on education in the PRC suggests the IPP Advanced (Peace Game) Trials 2021 to 2023 could be run in China with the acceptance, or even approval, of the Communist Party.

### Method of Analysing Conflict

The unique contribution of this Briefing author to analysing international conflicts over the last 30 years has been his systematic use of 'balance of peace', in addition to conventional 'balance of power', calculations between rival state and non-state entities.

This method was applied in IPP Briefing No.1 on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict published in January 2006, which forecast armed conflict there at periodic intervals 'without end'. Since then, there have been no less than five upsurges in violence between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza. Each subsequent political initiative led by the United States to bring about a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinian movement has been unsuccessful.

So, essentially the same method of analysis used in IPP Briefing No. 1 is now being applied in this China Briefing across the three main dimensions of security – military, economic, and institutional. It seeks to take account of all relevant factors on a like-for-like basis. The main difference is that this China Briefing contains a multitude of different disputes involving varying entities. It is thus far more complex and differing hypotheses are needed for each area of conflict covered in the Briefing. Thereby an assessment is made of whether a climate for peace or war is being created affecting China and what testable conclusions can be arrived at.

Provided the assumption is accepted that peace is generally preferable to war, then the analysis does not depend on making any political judgements, especially as analyses are open to competitive and scientific challenge to determine whether a climate for peace or war is being created. This propensity then predetermines the likely outcome.

### Analysis

Applying a conceptual framework to China is to be done within two extreme possibilities which should be avoided unless the force of circumstances makes them inevitable. These two extremes are avoidance of (i) societal collapse in China and (ii) Great Power wars. The third possibility is (iii) achieving balances of power and peace between conflicting entities.

*Limitations* of available military data concern qualitative information on armed forces and their military equipment particularly in the period 1990-2020. Likewise, over the same period, the internal socio-economic and political matters on which little or no impartial and readily accessible data is available include labour and social unrest; and regional and ethnic issues. This socio-economic data limitation restricts the ability of this (or any) analyst from being able to forecast when internal conditions may increase the risks of societal collapse. It does not substantially affect the benefit of this China Briefing because the internal socio-economic factors are not the primary risks but could become so if the external threats are mishandled.

The analysis covers the following topics in the period from 1990:

- China and the balance of military power in Asia (summarised from Appendix D):
  - Focused on these conflict areas: North v South Korea; India v Pakistan and India v China; other territorial disputes: the island of Taiwan; disputed islands in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
- China and the balance of economic power in East Asia (summarised from Appendix E):
  - Focused on the balances of economic cooperation and coercion affecting: the United States and China; other East Asian entities and China especially North Korea, the island of Taiwan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and all principal global trading partners and China.
- Institutional alliances in the East Asia and Pacific region (summarised from Appendix F):
  - China's only known military alliance is with North Korea. It is affected by the pact between Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) announced in September 2021 to supply, inter alia, nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.
  - A complex set of economic alliances has emerged in the Asia-Pacific region including RCEP and CPTPP, in addition to ASEAN, changing the balances of cooperative and coercive relationships affecting China.

### Conclusions: The Prospects for Peace

This analysis draws on the preceding method and analysis to identify China's vulnerabilities to reach conclusions on how a cycle of peaceful means of conflict resolution might build trust between entities in dispute. Conversely, though, should opposing entities not adopt reciprocal measures then the forecast would have to move from a state of peace to war.

The main risk of societal collapse arises from external efforts to move the PRC from communism to liberal democracy. Communist China today is a more open society than in the period from 1949 to 1976 when most foreigners were excluded from the country due to what was perceived within the PRC as a century of malign Western influence. Yet there is a zero tolerance for anything that threatens public order, and communist control, and that is a fact.

**Answer to the Briefing questions:** there is a growing propensity for war between China and the United States... due to unfavourable balances of peaceful methods of conflict resolution.

The dramatic, if unwanted, successes of this author's Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem) Briefings (1993-1995) and IPP Briefing No. 1 (2006) in predicting conditions for war, based on his application of an irenic perspective, have been demonstrated by the 'Court of history': the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022); and five wars between Israel and Hamas-led Gaza.

Yet it is equally true that the educational method pioneered by Prodem and developed by IPP has been almost universally ignored in the West up to now and unknown in the East or South (except Zimbabwe). At present, there is little to prevent China and the United States from taking the path to war except the balance of power and political wisdom. As the war in Europe illustrates, the former keeps breaking down. While each side's misrepresentation of the other offers a poor prognosis for reliance on the latter.

The unique feature of this Briefing is the multiplicity of conflicts faced by China – whose subsidiary conclusions may be found in section 5 below – any one of which could be the scenario where a spark ignites a wider war with the United States. Yet there is a light shining from distant history which may bring hope to publics longing for peace:

- China accepted and incorporated Western science and technology (to add to its own distinguished history of inventiveness) from the mid-nineteenth century.
- Can the PRC and United States now adopt an irenic perspective in the twenty first century which neither have consciously done before but did implicitly in the 1970s, when *their rapprochement came out of their weakness*, and without seeing (before the Deng era) the consequences for their respective futures?

This then takes us to the role of *politically impartial education* without which the propensity for a favourable 'balance of peace' between China and the United States is negative.

### Criteria for Evaluating Outcomes

The counterintuitive view that 'Peaceful relations grow out of a recognition of weakness' is the starting point in proposing criteria for judging outcomes in a conflict area. Conversely, the

starting point for political systems and ideologies is the exploitation of weakness in other entities, varying only according to circumstances and in degree.

The general criteria for assessing outcomes from Premises 1 (on internal relations) and 2 (on external relations) as described on pages 47-48 are:

Premise 1: The enhanced role of politically impartial education in China and the main countries with which it has cultural relations, particularly the United States.

Premise 2: The extent to which China and the relevant foreign entities in the conflict area below do or do not reciprocate and adopt these principles in relation to China:

*China v United States:*

Scenario (i): Were the future existence of the Chinese state to be at risk, and the control of the CPC, there is a high probability of its use of nuclear weapons against perceived enemies, internally or externally, rather than except defeat.

A further risk of such societal collapse and its consequences would arise from defeat in a Great Power war, such as might occur were the PRC to attempt a military invasion to recover the island of Taiwan and the United States to intervene in its defence.

Scenario (ii): No reason currently exists for a Great Power war to be deliberately chosen by China or the United States, such as over Taiwan, unless:

- Taiwan decides to make a formal declaration of independence from the PRC.
- The PRC decides to abandon its policy hitherto of not seeking territorial aggrandisement by conquests outside of China's existing borders.
- The PRC decides to start trying to impose its own Communist system of government on other countries in Asia or beyond.

Scenario (iii): Progress, or otherwise, in finding ways by which two incompatible systems of government can coexist in harmony with each other, such as between the island of Taiwan and the PRC under the one-China policy.

The adoption or not of an educational model such as the IPP Peace Games would be indicative of whether politically impartial education could play a constructive role prior to political negotiations between Beijing and Taipei seeking a peaceful reunification of China.

### Recommendations

That anyone, especially in China and the United States, preferring peace to war seeks:

- *To understand or refute* the claim that 'Peaceful relations grow out of a recognition of weakness' by participation in the IPP Advanced Trials to follow this Briefing.
- *To decide* whether education – but only of the politically impartial and scientific kind – constitutes the 'third leg' of the tripod, after politics and the military, needed to secure a state of peace and avoid war.
- *To apply*, in the nuclear age, 'an irenic perspective' as a fundamental principle to secure that peace... yet mainly by the voluntary means of faith and reason.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The choice of the PRC, as one of the nine nuclear weapon states in the world today, was made for the following reasons:

- The significance of the ending of the Cold War, in the way it did in 1990, and the collapse of the Soviet Union a year later, has profoundly affected the outlook of the Chinese leadership (and their Russian ally) to peaceful means of conflict resolution.
- The previous experience of foreign intervention, rebellion and war and the resulting periods of chaos between the 1840s and end of the 1940s has left an enduring historical memory in China of the consequences of descent into civil conflict and war.
- The multiple internal and external potential flashpoints for armed conflict with risks of escalation including its relationship to North Korea, another nuclear weapon state, make it a hugely complex entity and region to analyse on which, at a later stage, mathematical and computer modelling may make a significant contribution to our understanding and capacity to forecast the propensity for a state of peace or war.
- The benefit of competing analyses of the same conflict area is greatly aided by the prior publication of Professor Graham Allison's [Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?](#) which provides a basis for comparison with the analysis here.<sup>1</sup>

At a personal level, this Briefing is written by an author with no prior specialist knowledge of China but only a tried and tested means of predicting a climate for peace or war in various regions of the world including between the West and Russia, and between Israel and the Palestinian movement which, it will be shown, has proved accurate in the post-Cold War era.

The Briefing author emphasises, though, that the most serious international conflict will not necessarily break out in or with China – indeed, it is a purpose of this Briefing to contribute through the Peace Games to securing a state of peace rather than war in that region. It is entirely possible for a more serious armed conflict to break out elsewhere which may, or may not, involve China. That 'spark' is not usually predictable; the propensity for such a fire is.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Even before the method of analysis used in this Briefing is presented, it is necessary to say a word on how the history of a country or region is understood and interpreted. Then the salient facts from modern Chinese history can be presented that are essential background to the ensuing analysis of the present position and prospects for peace or war. A second aspect of that analysis, unique to China, is the philosophy and ethics of Confucius which has had a lasting impact over nearly two and a half millennia and, despite emphatic rejection in the early decades of the PRC, continues to exert an influence to the present day. Elements of his thinking and ideas, as adapted by Neo-Confucian scholars, have proved amenable and even helpful to the current Communist leaders of China. A third aspect, directly linked to the second, is the role of education in China in the post-Cold War era and the consistency, or otherwise, of the Peace Games concept, as it may be developed by mathematical modelling, with China's own emphasis on science and technology including ideas taken from abroad.

### 2.1 Method of Selecting Relevant Facts

This analysis is based on the adoption of 'an irenical perspective',<sup>3</sup> i.e. seeking to identify from the historical sources what factors emphasised, and what undermined, peaceful means of conflict resolution. In practical terms, this involves comparing the 'balance of (coercive) power' between the parties in dispute and their balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution or 'balance of peace' over the short and long term to determine the direction of a conflict to peace or war.

Naturally, in many instances sufficient information may not be available, or would take too long to obtain, in order to fully apply this method. However, it may still be possible, on an initial reading of selected sources, to gain some insight into the relative reliance of force ('power of coercion') and reason ('power of cooperation') between the parties in dispute that provided the impetus to armed violence at pivotal moments in Chinese history.

The main source on China since the Qing Dynasty, as summarised here, is Odd Arne Westad's Restless Empire. This book is suitable because of its factual, strategic coverage of the period with specific attention paid to China's foreign relations. A longer-term perspective on class relations is provided by relevant facts in Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. This latter work seems especially apt in view of the Communist takeover in China in 1949. Other sources offer additional facts, but a multiplicity of titles is not required unless there is dispute over their reliability, which is not so in most historical examples relevant here.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.2 Historical Analysis

War has had a profound effect on human history and the experience of China over the last two and a half centuries has well illustrated this. However, what is usually missed is how short term the benefits of coercion can be for the victors unless any imbalance in the peaceful

means of conflict resolution is addressed for the long term. The analysis in Table A1 of Appendix A (on pp. 104-11) is unique, as far as this author is aware, in highlighting that point across the three main periods of modern Chinese history, as summarised in that Appendix based on Westad's work covering: the Qing dynasty since the late eighteenth century; the Chinese Republic, 1912-1949; and the People's Republic of China, 1949 to the present day.

(i) Qing Dynasty, 1644-1912

The fall of the last imperial dynasty of China, though it came after a succession of military defeats dating from the British naval intervention in the 1840s, occurred when the last Qing general agreed to negotiate with Chinese republican revolutionaries because further fighting to sustain a dynasty, which even he did not believe in anymore, was futile. The balance of peace – in this case, over constitutional principles and against foreign control – had proven decisive despite several wars and suppression of internal rebellions to negate or obviate them. While these matters were far from resolved in 1912, the last Qing Emperor's abdication conclusively accepted that China's long era of monarchical dynasties was finally over.

(ii) Republic of China, 1912-1949

The history of the Chinese Republic, when the country was at its weakest and under threat from both Western and Eastern powers, demonstrates how even under conditions of almost continuous war, varying only in degree, a superior Western and Japanese balance of military power did not resolve the underlying issues in their Western/Japanese favour, nor an inferior balance of Chinese military power prevent their eventual resolution:

- The victory of the Western liberal democracies, with Japan and China, in the Great War did not resolve the questions of extra-territoriality and national self-determination for the Chinese people at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
- The success of the Guomindang (GMD)-led Northern Expedition in 1926-28 and the establishment of a stronger central government in China did not resolve these matters either.
- The initial defeats of China and Britain by Japan and then the defeat of Japan by the USA, with Chinese and British support, in the Second World War finally created the conditions for foreign extra-territoriality to be ended in China by 1943 despite the GMD/Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces' imbalance of military power compared to Japan until 1945, with the Soviet Union also entering the war against Japan that year.

Furthermore, the political and military triumph of the GMD government in 1945 did not prevent their defeat four years later in the Chinese civil war and the triumph of the CCP in October 1949. *Whatever else explains the direction of conflicts towards a state of peace or war, the balance of power would appear in this case to be a most inadequate guide on its own.*

Equally obvious is that *the prospects for achieving a balance of peace were successively undermined throughout the period of the Chinese Republic*, virtually ensuring that the underlying issues of foreign extra-territoriality, national sovereignty and land reform would



only be resolved as a by-product of war and, thereby, generate conditions for East-West hostility and Sino-Japanese distrust for decades or generations to come.

(iii) People's Republic of China, 1949 to date

Unlike in the two previous periods of modern Chinese history, *the PRC has become relatively prosperous and secure in its own borders not because of a favourable balance of power (compared to the USA and USSR) but due to a sufficient balance (demonstrated in the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet border dispute and threat of a great power war in 1969). Rather, the transformative moment not only in the history of the CCP leadership of the PRC but of modern China came in the 1970s from a favourable balance of peace. The PRC's (coercive) power now – military, economic and institutional – came from the CCP's moment of greatest weakness and international isolation not from its strength and integration with the world economy.*

### 2.2.1 Conclusion

It is this truth which all state and non-state entities including the CCP itself need to keep firmly in mind in addressing Q3 of Appendix A:

What factors in the future of the PRC, domestically and internationally, are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

The factors affecting the future, at the most fundamental level, may be assumed to be like those which shaped the past and are constraining the present. If it were not so, the past would be incomprehensible to the present, and the future a blank sheet of paper to be written on as only dreamers could imagine. The predictability of the future, on that assumption, can only rest on the depth of understanding of the past and present.

On that basis, three main factors can be identified now to decisively affect the propensity for China's state of peace or war (adaptable to any country or region):

- Size. China, like the United States, is a large and populous country. Inevitably, therefore, as it grew economically its political and military power would also increase commensurately as, unlike Japan, it was not burdened by a militarist past in living memory and the constraints imposed by its failure in international conquest and defeat in war. The sole question is how that size and the resulting growth of coercive power might be used.
- Use of coercive power. China knows from its own history, since European intervention in the mid-nineteenth century, that mightier powers were unable to sustain extra-territorial rights on Chinese territory or permanently deny national self-determination to its people. Moreover, in Mao Zedong, the CCP produced one of the foremost exponents of the Chinese way of guerrilla or people's war so highlighting the limitations of conventional military superiority as a means of imposing a system of government that does not have popular consent. The CCP leadership may, therefore, be acutely aware that the rationale for increasing their political and military power is primarily limited to preventing other state or non-state entities from imposing their will on China by coercive means.

- Use of willing cooperation. The other type of power is founded on belief and reason and relies on peaceful and non-coercive means of persuasion. Often looked down upon by those who are powerful (at that moment) and exemplifying powerlessness, it also seems self-evidently true to those who judge events short-term, and on appearances, that what matters is the power of coercion. Once again, China's modern history demonstrates that a people who can and do endure will triumph in the long term because coercive power can be legitimated only when founded on widely accepted belief and reason.

In answer to Q3, based on Appendix A, it may not be China's size and growing strength that will be decisive to its future prospects for peace or war but the balances of power, cooperative as well as coercive, in its relationships with other entities at home and abroad. How this can be assessed is outlined in section 3 below.

For the tentative conclusion from modern Chinese history is that the rules-based understanding of the international order, favoured by the United States and its allies and partially enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, is not how the world in fact works. Rather, irrespective of size of country or region concerned, it is the immensely complex way in which the balances of power and peace interact that determines, independently of political will, whether that country or region moves in a more peaceful or violent direction.

This emphasis, though, on assessing the use of cooperation, rather than coercion, in human relationships takes us on to the vision and work of Confucius (described more fully in Appendix B) and, beyond that, to the role of education in modern China, especially the PRC.

### 2.3 Confucianism

The impact of the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BC) on the history of China has been profound, despite his apparent lack of success in persuading any ruler in his own lifetime to adopt them. In relation to this Briefing there are three matters of special relevance, viz. the thoughts of Confucius and his successors on:

- (i) The relationship between sages and rulers in China;
- (ii) The relationship between heaven and earth;
- (iii) How the relationship between their teachings and the Chinese state worked out in practice.

These questions, and the philosophical framework of (Neo-)Confucianism within which they are addressed, provide the historical background to culture and education in China before the Communist revolution in 1949. The answers relate to the question 'By what means can a state of peace be secured there?' Education in China today is then considered in Appendix C.

It will be convenient to use Daniel K. Gardner's Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction<sup>5</sup> to extract out the main facts that help answer questions posed by (i) to (iii) above.

Other philosophies and religions, like Daoism and Buddhism, have also had an impact on China but not as great and, for reasons of space, must be left mostly to one side here.

### 2.3.1 Neo-Confucianism

Neo-Confucianism involved, during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries AD, a reorientation of the Confucian tradition. While upholding its classical values and ethics, Neo-Confucianism offers a new outlook in two important ways:

- 1.) It grounds classical Confucianism in a detailed metaphysical system, i.e. an explanation of the nature of being and knowing; and thereby
- 2.) It creates a structured programme of self-cultivation for 'becoming a sage'.<sup>6</sup>

Overall, Neo-Confucianism illustrated the adaptability of the Confucian tradition and its longevity by keeping the tradition meaningful and relevant for centuries to come. Yet it remained true to classical Confucianism's most fundamental beliefs concerning: man's moral perfectibility; learning as the key to moral improvement; sages of antiquity offering a Way to be moral and behave well in society; the transforming effect on others of the morally superior man; and that social harmony results from people fulfilling their moral responsibilities.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.3.2 Conclusion

In answering the three questions posed above, it may be concluded:

- (i) *The relationship between sages and rulers* in pre-Communist China was one where the sages were dependent on the rulers' acquiescence in applying Confucian ideas. Sage rulers were a rarity, it would appear, but most rulers from the Emperor Wu (141-87 BC) were clearly influenced by Confucian and later, Neo-Confucian, thinking and, however imperfectly, sought to apply and advance its teachings in China. In particular, Confucian teachings focus on self-cultivation through learning and seek to minimise the use of law, force and punishment and emphasise, instead, moral example.
- (ii) Although Confucianism involves no belief in a Creator God, *it does recognise 'heaven' which is concerned with the well-being of the human realm* and offers moral guidance to sages. Moreover, rulers derive their authority to rule from the 'Mandate of Heaven' which depends on their virtuosity and can be withdrawn if rulers cease to be virtuous. In this respect, heaven acts not on its own volition but as presenting the will of the people in transferring the Mandate to a new and benevolent ruler, so legitimating the replacement of one dynasty by another.
- (iii) *Ren, or true goodness, involves empathy for others in practice and, therefore, treating them as we would wish to be treated ourselves.* The notion of reciprocity affects all Chinese normative relationships, including the family and the world of ancestral spirits, as the foundation not only for a moral individual but for establishing a peaceful and stable social and political order. It may, therefore, be said that a form of 'Golden Rule' applies in China as in the West despite *all the shortcomings between Confucian teachings and actual practice in China* down through the centuries until 1949.

## 2.4 Education

The purpose here is to answer a specific question, rather than to give an overview of education in the PRC more generally, viz.

Can the IPP Advanced (Peace Game) Trials 2021 to 2023 be run in China with the tacit acceptance, or even the explicit approval, of the Communist Party of China (CPC)?

Nevertheless, to address this subject does require a basic knowledge of the historical background to education in China prior to the communist revolution of 1949, the current Constitution of the CPC and the context of university or higher education in China. For it is only within this framework that the above question can be answered.

Needless to add, it is a matter of high importance whether and, if so, on what conditions the Peace Games concept is tolerated or, better still, endorsed by a country with a system of governance different to the liberal democracy of the country (England) in which IPP is based. If it can, then IPP could make a substantial contribution to securing a state of peace between conflicting entities, East and West. This claim is considered more fully in Appendix C.

### 2.4.1 Education and Politics in China: A Preliminary Conclusion

What then is the decisive difference between the work on China of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in the 1920s and 1930s and that of the Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem) in the 1990s and the International Peace Project (IPP) in the 2000s? It lies in the focus of RIIA/IPR on *policy* and of Prodem/IPP on *evaluation of a process*. The former plainly carries a high risk of straying into the political sphere which would be particularly unwelcome in China. The latter is the proper province of education of a politically impartial kind and might – just might – gain the same credence that science and mathematics has, if the IPP Advanced Trials can harness these tools to demonstrate the public benefit for all countries, including China, of being able to forecast the propensity for a state of peace or war in any specific region of the world.

Does the constitution of the CPC permit this, at least in theory?

### 2.4.2 The Constitution of the CPC: A Preliminary Conclusion

On 24 October 2017 the CPC's Constitution was revised and adopted at its 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress to incorporate 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'. Relevant sections from this revised Constitution are cited in Appendix C, section C3 leading to this Briefing author's preliminary conclusion.

Although the historical legacy in China from the mid-nineteenth century may inhibit adoption of the IPP Advanced (Peace Games) Trials, due to its having arisen in the West, the long-term benefits of Western science and technology have also been evident from that time. Tilting the balance towards the latter may depend on the extent to which the mathematical sciences can be successfully deployed to produce testable and verifiable results on conflict analysis.

In the 1970s, when this writer first became involved in peace studies, a relatively new field of study at university level in England, the analogy with medicine was sometimes cited to denote its healing purposes. However, that proved illusory at the time and the field had a controversial reputation even in the West. Today, though, it could become a more realistic prospect if the focus of peace and conflict studies switches from policy, which is in the political sphere, to the evaluation of a process by competition, aided by sophisticated mathematical models based on network theory.<sup>8</sup>

The main IPP analogy, since the publication of its Briefing No. 1 on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2006, has been weather forecasting.<sup>9</sup> It lends itself well to the notion of predicting the *propensity* for a state of peace or war, just as models for weather forecasting assess the probability of rain or sunshine in a specific region. That is what Prodem/IPP have been doing for decades and there is no reason at present to reject the hypothesis that such forecasts are reliable and *may owe little or nothing to the political convictions of the entities involved*.

#### 2.4.3 Higher Education in China: A Preliminary Conclusion

What the evidence from higher education in China suggests is that there may be scope for the IPP Advanced Trials to take place in the People's Republic itself. The drive to create world class universities and courses, as an essential part of efforts to strengthen China's competitiveness and thereby establish its long-term development, ensures a more favourable climate for whatever initiatives can demonstrate their scientific and technological relevance.

The pathbreaking doctoral research by Lukas Filler, then a postgraduate student at the Department for War Studies, King's College London<sup>10</sup> underlines this point:

- The application of statistical techniques to even sensitive national security issues, in an open and serious manner, can involve the top echelons of Chinese higher education.
- Findings that are forward-looking and testable against the actual course of events in an area of conflict including the PRC may be permissible, at least at the theoretical level.
- The link to 'non-coercive Confucian values' ensures that research that respects, and seeks to incorporate, Chinese characteristics is particularly welcome as a means of finding common ground between East and West e.g., a 'Golden Rule' in international relations.

The most important caveat from the Filler study is that:

- The sensitivity of national security issues (as in any country of the world) places a question mark over consideration of actual rather than hypothetical conflicts affecting China, which are essential to the credibility and relevance of the IPP Advanced Trials. Nevertheless:
  - The importance that the CPC leadership itself attaches to the end of the Cold War and the lessons to be drawn from it is recognised by the history of Prodem/IPP and, while they are not the same lessons, at least their educational value can now be translated into the language of the mathematical sciences for the public benefit of future generations in China and abroad.
  - The subject of 'the greatest risk of collapse into civil conflict or war' in any nuclear weapons state is one directly arising from the end of the Cold War and, apart from

the political conclusions which the CPC leadership draws, there is the separate educational assessment by competitive methods of its future consequences.

- The conflict between mainland China and Taiwan and the CPC goal of eventual reunification, in the absence of any Taiwanese declaration of independence to date, means the 'one-China' principle recognised by most states in the world is also consistent with the maintenance of strict political impartiality by IPP.

#### 2.4.4 Overall Conclusion

These three preliminary conclusions yield a cautious affirmative to the question whether the IPP Advanced (Peace Game) Trials 2021 to 2023 can be run in China with the tacit acceptance, or even the explicit approval, of the Communist Party of China.

It is suggested by this Briefing author that the requirements for IPP to be able to operate within China (including Taiwan) and involve Chinese universities appear to be:

- (i) Strict *political impartiality* by IPP, if not by individual contestants in the IPP Advanced Trials who must abide by a Code of Conduct e.g., precluding personal attacks on political or other leaders in China or elsewhere; and seeking truth from facts in evaluating the processes of a specific conflict, rather than policy prescriptions.
- (ii) A focus on *quantitative analysis* to validate findings from earlier qualitative studies i.e., using techniques like network analysis to evaluate international conflicts and forecast the propensity for a state of peace or war in those regions.
- (iii) A *commitment to publishing the results* of impartial and objective IPP research into the direction of conflicts made possible by judging the forecasts against the actual course of events in the conflict area, according to irenic criteria.

Naturally, (iii) would be the severest test of IPP's standing but is no less vital than (i) and (ii).

It must be emphasised, though, that this Conclusion is the author's alone and has not been considered, let alone endorsed, by the IPP Trustees themselves. Thereafter, as it may be amended and agreed, the only way to ascertain whether it is sound is to try it out in practice.

### 3. METHOD OF ANALYSING THE CONFLICT

*The unique contribution of this Briefing author to analysing international conflicts over the last 30 years, and the reason he believes he has been able to offer more accurate forecasts than any other person writing in the English language, has been his systematic use of 'balance of peace', in addition to conventional 'balance of power', calculations between rival State and non-State entities.* The reader is reminded that the 'balance of peace' is shorthand for the balance of peaceful methods of resolving international disputes. It is founded on the principle, recognised in both English and US charity law,<sup>11</sup> that peace is preferable to war and therefore peaceful, rather than military, techniques are emphasised in dispute resolution.

By analogy with IPP's Briefing No. 1 on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the efficacy of this analytical method can now be demonstrated because it was published in January 2006, using essentially the same method as in this China Briefing. It was first applied in this writer's four out of six Prodem Briefings published in the period 1993-1995 on the ending of the Cold War.<sup>12</sup> Undoubtedly the analysis has become increasingly sophisticated and only now reached the point where mathematical and computer modelling can be seriously contemplated.

To keep this section within manageable bounds the comparison of analytical methods will be kept to the IPP Briefing No. 1 focusing on the results achieved, and to be expected, against pre-determined irenic criteria published in January 2006.<sup>13</sup> Then the adaptation of this first IPP Briefing's method to the current China Briefing will be explained. All the conclusions cited below are the author's alone although the full Briefing No. 1 also summarises the analyses of two academics, one expressing an Israeli perspective and the other a Palestinian perspective, set down in a directly comparable format.<sup>14</sup>

#### 3.1 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2005 to date

The defining moment in this conflict, while IPP Briefing No. 1 was being drafted, came with the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in mid-2005 when settler communities were closed down, forcibly where necessary, and Israeli military infrastructure dismantled. This act was peaceful in itself, with regard to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), but this writer's task was to analyse and foresee whether it would be peaceful in its consequences.

##### 3.1.1 Conclusions: The Prospects for Peace

This writer's conclusions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with respect to each side were:

The prospects for peace between Israel and the PNA are based on the preceding analysis of the three assumptions... covering the military, economic and institutional dimensions of security. Instead of just examining the balance of power, which favours Israel in each aspect, comparisons also include both parties' co-operation with the other – the 'balance of peace' – in terms of the likely consequences for peace or war:

*For the Palestinians*

....

For the Palestinians, therefore, neither military ‘victories’ nor economic separation nor a two-state solution can in themselves secure the peace for future generations. *The prediction is for war without end until the greater jihad assumes priority in practice over the lesser jihad in the Palestinian national movement’s relations with Israel.*

*For the Israelis*

....

For the Israelis, therefore, neither military victories nor economic separation nor a two-state solution can in themselves secure the peace for future generations. *The prediction is for war without end until peaceful initiatives – like the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza – can assume priority in practice over political and military strength in Israel’s relations with the Palestinian national movement.*<sup>15</sup>

[Emphasis in the original]

The link between these conclusions and those of this China Briefing will be clarified in sections 3.2 and 3.3 below.

### 3.1.2 Criteria for Evaluating the Analysis Against the Subsequent Course of Events in the Conflict Area

It is relevant to reproduce the entire section from Briefing No. 1 (January 2006) below:

Reviewing the prospects for war between Palestinians and Israelis hereafter would be based on two simple assumptions:

1. The greater the imbalance in military power between parties in dispute the greater the likelihood of war (because either the more powerful side will be tempted to use that military might to enforce its will or the weaker side will resort to indirect military methods such as guerrilla war and terrorism);
2. The greater the imbalance between one party’s peaceful methods of conflict resolution as compared to others (the ‘balance of peace’) the greater the likelihood of war (because lack of reciprocity tends eventually to undermine peaceful methods of conflict resolution in favour of military methods).

Or vice versa, in predicting the prospects for peace. An imbalance of military power need not matter if it is off-set by a favourable ‘balance of peace’ between the parties.

The specific criteria for evaluating the analysis at regular intervals would be as follows:

- ‘War without end’ means the outbreak of armed conflict in Israeli/PNA territories at periodic intervals indefinitely. The tests applied would be whether:
  - a. An armed conflict is contained rather than resulting in, or threatening, a wider Middle Eastern or global war;
  - b. The Islamic practice of jihad in the Arab Middle East moves away from the lesser to the greater jihad, i.e. from a culture of war to a culture of peace;



- c. Israeli relations with the Palestinians give greater emphasis to peaceful means of conflict resolution than to their relative political and military strength.

If peace is secured within a generation so that guerrilla war and terrorism ends or, in the event of an occasional outbreak of armed conflict, 'a' applies despite the lack of progress on 'b' or 'c' then the conclusions of this chapter will have been refuted and the usefulness of the method of analysing the conflict (at section...) will be in doubt.

The international community's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly the Quartet, is regarded as important in facilitating conflict resolution but not as a primary determinant of outcomes unless a broader Middle Eastern or global war is threatened.<sup>16</sup>

It only remains to note how this prediction worked out in practice and what the implications are for governments especially the United States, Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

### 3.1.3 Outcomes in the Conflict Area

The verdict of what the Briefing author refers to as the 'Court of history', or outcomes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has been plain enough:<sup>17</sup>

1 March 2005	London meeting on supporting the Palestinian Authority concluded that this was 'a moment of <u>promise and opportunity</u> for Palestinians and Israelis'. [Emphasis in the original]
25 January 2006	Hamas wins elections to the Palestinian legislature.
30 January	Launch of first IPP Briefing on 'The Prospects for Peace': <u>The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict</u> . Chapter 3 predicts ' <u>war without end</u> until....'
25 June	Israeli soldier kidnapped by Palestinian militants in Gaza.
28 June	Israeli troops move into Gaza accompanied by air strikes against Palestinian targets.
12 July	Hezbollah ('Party of God'), radical Shi'a group in Lebanon inspired by the Iranian revolution, captures Israeli soldiers. In response Israel launches an assault on south Lebanon by land, sea and air.
14 August	UN-brokered ceasefire to take effect in Lebanon
26 November	Ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militant groups to take effect in Gaza.
30 September 2007	IPP seminar in Jerusalem at the American Colony hotel and Al-Quds University. (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem was closed for Succot.) Agreement in principle to establish a tripartite independent commission of Israeli, Palestinian and International educators to monitor and evaluate a peace process and issue predictive analyses.

27 November	President George W. Bush organised a Middle East peace conference in Annapolis, USA to try to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and implement the 'Roadmap for Peace'. A peace treaty was aimed for by end-2008.
Dec 2008/Jan 2009	Israeli military invasion into Gaza to try to stop Palestinian rocket fire.
November 2012	Significant Israeli troop incursion into Gaza following killing of a senior Hamas military commander by Israel and Palestinian rocket attacks.
Jul-Aug 2014	The most destructive Gaza war so far between Israel and Hamas, following Israeli air strikes and Palestinian rocket fire.
May 2021	Rising tensions in Jerusalem led to Hamas rocket fire on Israeli cities and Israeli air attacks on Gaza in reply (and a threatened land invasion).

Since the publication of IPP Briefing No.1 there have been no less than five upsurges in violence between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza of which the first in 2006 helped to provoke a wider Middle Eastern war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The independent commission approved in principle at the IPP Jerusalem seminar in 2007 could not take effect because of the very 'war without end' which the IPP Briefing had foreseen.

Thus, President Bush's Annapolis peace process ended in an Israeli-Hamas war, rather than a peace treaty. Later attempts to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by President Obama were similarly unsuccessful and are not recorded in the chronology above.

### 3.2 Implications of IPP Briefing No. 1 for the China Briefing

If the forecast in Chapter 3 of IPP Briefing No. 1 had been falsified by subsequent events it is highly unlikely that this China Briefing would ever have been written. Instead, as the preceding section has demonstrated:

- (i) The forecast published in January 2006 was accurate and has remained so to this day.
- (ii) Each subsequent political initiative led by the United States to bring about a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinian movement was likely, if not bound to be, unsuccessful because of:
  - a. The imbalance of power between the two sides coupled with...
  - b. A lack of emphasis on peaceful, rather than military, means of dispute resolution, i.e. an imbalance of peace arising from each side's willingness to immediately seek to exploit any sign of weakness in the other.
  - c. Both sides' respective positions being directly contrary to what their own Abrahamic religions teach, and of a secularised, 'Golden Rule', i.e. being unable or unwilling to treat their opponents as they themselves would wish to be treated.

- (iii) A climate for war thereby being created which sustains the mutually reinforcing aspects of (ii) a-c and undermines any political initiatives to create a climate for peace.

### 3.3 China Briefing Method of Analysis

The reference in the previous section to a Golden Rule provides an obvious link to China and the influence of Confucius down through the ages, albeit strongly rebutted in the early decades of the PRC but now at least partly re-established by the CCP leadership. Central to understanding the propensity for future war or peace is the extent to which the current Chinese leadership's own understanding of its internal and external opponents is mirrored by, or alienated from, the comprehension shown by those opponents of the CCP leadership. The role of education in these subjects in general, and of IPP itself, is to cut through to the irrefutable and verifiable factual core analysed against both the balance of power and balance of peace between entities in dispute – or by any superior method of analysis, if one exists.

So, essentially the same method of analysis used in IPP Briefing No. 1, and by this author in his earlier Prodem Briefings on Western handling of the ending of the Cold War, will now be applied in this China Briefing. It means:

- (i) Taking each of the three main dimensions of security – military, economic (and environmental), and institutional – using a holistic approach, i.e. seeking to take account of all relevant factors from an irenic perspective on a like-for-like basis.
- (ii) Assessing each such dimension according to the balances of (coercive) power and (cooperative) peace. The main difference between this China Briefing and the IPP Briefing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that, whereas the latter involved two main antagonists (splintered into competing factions) within a wider Arab-Israeli conflict, the former contains a multitude of different disputes involving varying entities. The China Briefing is, in that sense, far more complex and a simple set of hypotheses concerning what each rival entity holds in common cannot so easily be applied.<sup>18</sup>
- (iii) Taking the IPP Briefing No. 1 as a benchmark, what climate for peace or war is being created and what conclusions can be arrived at which are testable over time in the conflict areas? As part of this exercise, the method and results of the foregoing analysis will be compared with that of Graham Allison's Destined for War, concerning the risks of a war between China and the United States particularly over Taiwan.<sup>19</sup>

### 3.4 Overall Conclusion

Provided the assumption is accepted that

- A state of peace is generally preferable to a state of war and, therefore,
- Peaceful, rather than military, means of resolving international disputes are to be emphasised, then
- This method of analysing conflicts does not depend on any political judgements.

The growing confidence with which the China Briefing author can make his forecasts rests on a method of analysis that is replicable by others. Even though no author can walk back into history to recreate the conditions that once existed, as in 1990 when the Cold War ended or in 2005 when Israel withdrew from the Gaza, the method can be applied competitively and scientifically at any key moment to current conflicts to determine whether a climate (or propensity) for peace or war is being created or sustained. That then predetermines which outcome is more likely.

## 4. ANALYSIS

### 4.1 Application of the Conceptual Framework

Applying an irenic perspective to China is to be done within two extreme possibilities which, it is anticipated, all reasonable and fair-minded persons of whatever nationality would agree should be avoided unless the force of circumstances makes them inevitable. These two extremes are outlined in (i) and (ii) below. The third possibility (iii) is achieving a balance between military and peaceful means of resolving international disputes that demonstrates the benefits of tilting the balance towards cooperative, rather than coercive, relations amongst conflicting entities to secure a state of peace and avoid war.

#### (i) Avoidance of societal collapse in China

The reasons for avoiding this scenario are:

- The increased risk of the use of nuclear weapons in a civil war situation, generally the most bitter and violent type of armed conflict, where even families may be divided against each other. This risk would be especially great where there was any hint, truthful or otherwise, of external involvement in fomenting civil strife.
  - Compare the many such instances (in non-nuclear states) of developing countries or those in transition collapsing into civil war since the end of the Cold War in 1990, e.g. the former Yugoslavia and especially Bosnia (1992-1995); Afghanistan (2001-2021, although civil war dates back to the Soviet invasion in 1979); Iraq (2003-2017, with lower level insurgency thereafter); Syria (2011 to date); Libya (2011 to date); Yemen (2014 to date); parts of Eastern Ukraine with Russian involvement (2014 until Russia invaded in 2022).
- Chinese historical experience from the 1840s to 1949 and within the PRC from 1966 to the late-1970s – analysed in Appendix A – which makes the CPC particularly sensitive to any public protests or violence that the government believes threatens public order and social stability.
  - Compare how the Chinese government has responded to such protests:
    - Violent suppression of student dissent by PRC troops in Tian’anmen Square, Beijing on 4 June 1989.
    - Enforced re-education camps for many Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang province following certain terrorist acts and protests in 2010s.
    - A new security law imposed on Hong Kong following street protests in 2019, some of which had turned violent.

It is undoubtedly true that many reasonable and fair-minded people within or outside China do object strongly to any, or all, of these methods. However, the point here is that they illustrate that in this collectivist society there is in effect a zero tolerance for anything that threatens public order, and the control of the CPC, and that is a fact which must be included.

(ii) Avoidance of Great Power Wars

One factor which has greatly reinforced this predilection against internal disturbances has been the way in which the Cold War ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This gives rise to the first, and most significant, reason that Great Power wars are now much harder to avoid:

- President Xi and his predecessors have been determined not to repeat the mistakes, as they see it, of Mikhail Gorbachev, last President of the Soviet Union, who allowed East European countries to escape communist control after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union to dissolve in 1991. They are determined that this should not be allowed to happen again in the PRC, as highlighted in Appendices A and C. This negative impact of Western handling of the ending of the Cold War was foreseen in this author's four Prodem Briefings in 1993-1995 using essentially the same method as deployed in this China Briefing.<sup>20</sup>

However, mitigating this negative factor are two more positive ones:

- Since the CCP triumph in 1949 China has not sought to extend its own boundaries by military conquest, rather
  - The higher risk of a Great Power war arises mainly from conflict scenarios within what it regards, along with most foreign states, as its 'One China' policy or over its disputed maritime zones. In the former category, the island of Taiwan and, in the latter category, the South China Sea are well known. Additionally
  - There are various border disputes notably with India but recently with Nepal, and historically with Russia, that could escalate at any time. However, these disputes are potentially containable, and even resolvable, and no one expects that they threaten the existence of China or any foreign state unless they escalate to the nuclear level.
- Moreover, since the nineteenth century China has had to resist conquerors but has not itself been a conqueror unless its reassertion of control over Tibet in the 1950s is deemed such, though that province was part of the Qing empire. It would be necessary to go back to the emperors Kangxi (ruled 1661-1722) and Qianlong (ruled 1736-1796) to find conquerors and solidifiers of Qing rule.<sup>21</sup> The Manchus were themselves conquerors of China as the Mongol warlord Genghis Khan had been in the early thirteenth century, but those days are long gone – in the nuclear age, inaugurated at the end of the Second World War, attempts at large scale military conquests are doomed to fail or succeed only at the price of annihilation.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, in combination the three main factors point towards a setback in the 1990s to peaceful resolution of international conflicts but set against China's limits on military expansionism and the strong global current of history militating against the use of nuclear weapons. This highlights the crucial significance of finding a right balance to avoid the two violent extremes.

(iii) Achieving Balances of Power and Peace

In seeking a balance between peaceful and military means of resolving international disputes and tilting that balance towards cooperative, rather than coercive, relations between State and non-State entities in conflict with China, this Briefing:

- Highlights the great US/China historical lesson derived from their respective *moments of weakness* in the 1970s when they achieved a rapprochement in combination against the Soviet Union and compares this with the current alliance of China and Russia against the United States in its post-Afghanistan moment.<sup>23</sup>
- Analyses China in the post-Cold War period, based on Appendices D to F: its relevant balances of power and peace across each of three dimensions of security:
  - Military
  - Economic and environmental
  - Institutional

This is done to assess whether a climate or propensity for peace or war is being created between those entities in dispute with, or in, the PRC.

- Underlines the crucial role of education (and philosophy or religion) to illustrate where and how the benefits of peaceful/cooperative means of conflict resolution can be advanced, especially competitive evaluation of conflict areas:
  - By analogy, education is the third leg of a tripod where states have traditionally relied solely or mainly on politics and military science with the effect that the stool kept falling over thereby inflicting the evil effects of war on humanity.
  - Hence the frontier-advancing work of the Project on Demilitarisation in the 1990s and the International Peace Project in the 2000s which demonstrated foresight, as far as is known, beyond other methods used. Now, in open competition, the IPP Advanced Trials will seek to incorporate the latest IT and data science methods to prove that the third leg of education is essential.

Finally, a comparison between the method and conclusions of Allison's Destined for War and Southwood's China Briefing, based on Appendix G, will offer readers the opportunity to decide between them. The final judgment, though, will as always come from the Court of history and what Confucians would describe as the 'Mandate of Heaven'. Chinese communists also claim a scientific basis for their understanding of history derived from Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong, recently enhanced by 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'.

There ought, therefore, to be a basis for finding common ground in an educational method that works to help secure peace and avoid war especially amongst the nuclear weapon states.

## 4.2 China and the Balance of Military Power in Asia, 1990 – 2020

### 4.2.1 Historical Analysis and Future Relationships

The multi-faceted military threats and opportunities which the PRC faces are analysed in Appendix D, as far as the available facts would allow in the post-Cold War period up to 11 September 2021. That leads on to a third question to be addressed here:

- Q.3 What military factors in the future relationships of China, domestic and foreign, are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

The most important and striking conclusion from this analysis of the military dimension of the conflicts China faces, internally or externally, in 2021 arises from a comparison with the end of the Cold War in 1990. Then the US-Soviet focus was on disarmament and conversion of resources from military to peaceful purposes, albeit in a generally one-sided way. Conversely Appendix D, covering the period from 1990 to 2020, shows that there has been no significant disarmament initiatives in Asia and few military steps to lessen tensions where they exist. Although numbers of armed forces personnel and certain weapons platforms have declined in China and neighbouring countries this has had little to do with emphasising peaceful means of conflict resolution, rather it is part of force modernisation processes. Several conflicts have remained, as it were, ossified for decades or generations as in the case of North and South Korea, India versus Pakistan, and China versus Taiwan. Only in the case of the Sino-Japanese conflict over certain islands in the East China Seas is there little reason to believe that these would escalate any time soon to a major military confrontation because the weight of history, and Japan's defensive military posture with its United States ally, goes against it.

In view of the huge imbalances in military power between China and all its neighbours, except its ally Russia, that should be a matter of concern.

As the foregoing conclusion hints, the analysis here is also focused on the following groups of potential or actual conflict scenarios:

1. *North versus South Korea*, in the wake of a social and political collapse especially in the North, drawing in outside powers including China and the United States.
2. (i) *India versus Pakistan* over Kashmir or their other longstanding disputes and/or (ii) *India versus China* involving their border disputes. Such instability might result from internal conflict and terrorism linked to Kashmir or other causes.
3. *Other territorial disputes* between (i) China and Taiwan over national sovereignty and the independence issue; and/or (ii) China and Japan over islands in the East China Sea and/or (iii) China and various countries over islands in the South China Sea.

This leaves out certain other conflicts within China over Hong Kong, Tibet and/or Xinjiang where – despite the potential or actual existence of terrorism – a military balance does not exist or cannot be calculated. Likewise, conflicts arising from social unrest or the environment.



#### 4.2.2 North v South Korea

Overall, neither side has such a military superiority as to make the launch of an attack on the other, to achieve Korean reunification by force, a realistic prospect in cost-benefit terms.

However, there are lessons that can be drawn from the political negotiations which occurred in 2018-2019, after a period of heightened tensions arising from North Korean ballistic missile tests the preceding year. These talks between US President Donald Trump and the North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, which also involved the South Korean President Moon Jae-in, did not lead to denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula nor a peace treaty to end the Korean War of 1950-1953 that had resulted only in an armistice.

It appears that the negotiations between the United States and North Korea eventually broke down without agreement – although talks continued thereafter – because of:

- (1) US insistence that North Korea fully denuclearise.
- (2) North Korean insistence that all United Nations sanctions be lifted, though after the summit they disputed that they had demanded their immediate removal.

Applying the conceptual framework (in 4.1) based on the preceding method of analysis (especially 3.3), the shortcomings in the 2018-2019 political process were:

- Negotiations between a superpower (the United States) and a regional power (North Korea) are always likely to be harder to bring to a successful conclusion, or one that can survive implementation, because the more powerful entity will implicitly assume that the less powerful should concede more than an equal adversary would do. Added to this, Asian states have a long history of resisting perceived encroachments by outside powers.
- A trade-off between demilitarisation and economic sanctions is not a like-for like comparison, an apples and pears argument, so it is harder for negotiators to ensure mutually agreed and equitable treatment.

The obvious solution to these structural flaws in the US-North Korean negotiations is to involve the PRC in future, if it is willing, for these reasons:

- China is North Korea's closest ally and has a strong interest in regional stability, which may be enhanced by denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The PRC's involvement may also give the North Korean Supreme Leader confidence that any United Nations monitoring of a process of nuclear dismantlement would be fair.
- In the absence of such negotiations, North Korean missile testing and development of nuclear weapons might resume – the former has already started to happen – which may lead to another nuclear confrontation between the United States and North Korea. In 2017 this involved open threats and counter-threats of a nuclear exchange, and it would appear unthinkable that China would be unaffected by such an escalation, or likely to remain a neutral bystander, were it to come about. The PRC again has a strong interest in avoiding any such scenario arising.

- The economic position in North Korea, to be touched on in section 4.3, is dire especially as North Korea-China trade, since the Covid-19 pandemic began in 2020, has dwindled to very little under strict North Korean border closures.<sup>24</sup> Even before that, exports to China under the strongest UN sanctions imposed from 2017 have officially fallen close to zero. The risks of social and economic collapse in North Korea are likely to have risen higher than for many years with the potential for internal political conflict amongst the ruling class. None of this could be viewed with equanimity by China's leaders whose border areas might be gravely affected. On the other hand, the economic benefits of lifting UN economic sanctions would accrue not only to North Korea but also to China through increased trade.

Naturally, if North Korea did not want Chinese involvement or the United States objected, then there would appear to be few, if any prospects, for securing a state of peace. As one research body pointed out:

...as with other nuclear-armed states, it seems unlikely that North Korea would use its nuclear weapons outside extreme circumstances when the continued existence of the state and its leadership was in question.<sup>25</sup>

More hopefully, were negotiations involving the PRC, the USA and North Korea to proceed at some point in the future, their prospects for success should be enhanced by:

- Ensuring that the removal of North Korean nuclear capability is linked to:
  - Denuclearisation of the entire Korean peninsula.
  - Guarantees by the remaining nuclear weapons powers in the region – the PRC, Russia<sup>26</sup> and the United States – concerning that denuclearisation affecting the two Koreas along with legally binding pledges by the North Korean and South Korean governments to conduct no research and development into, or produce any, nuclear missiles and warheads.
  - Discussion of possible steps to reduce the scale of conventional forces ranged against each other along the Demilitarised Zone and the reduction or removal of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula.
- Ensuring the lifting of UN sanctions on North Korea is linked to:
  - Negotiations with South Korea and multilateral financial institutions on gradual opening-up of consumer markets, trade and civilian investment to ensure sanctions relief benefits the North Korean economy.
- A realistic timetable that ensures that the military and economic dimensions of security and peace can proceed in tandem.

This structure would respect the principle that it is sometimes at moments of greatest economic weakness and international isolation that peace and prosperity can happen – as the People's Republic of China knows from its own experience.

Whether such a process is followed or not should be a key indicator as to the propensity for peace or war in the region.

#### 4.2.3 India v Pakistan and China

As section D4.1.2 amplifies, there are two conflicts involving India versus Pakistan and India versus China which are taken together because Pakistan is a long-term ally of China. No formal military alliance exists, as far as is known, between China and Pakistan and the wars each has fought with India did not involve the two allies simultaneously but any existential threat to either may be expected to bring them together.

The focus here is on India's border dispute with China but the key to more peaceful relations between these two states may partly hinge on more peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. This, in turn, depends on the unresolved conflicts arising from the historic partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 when each country achieved its independence from Britain. These deep political and religious differences would require a separate IPP Briefing, which may be possible in 2022-2023, so are left to one side here, although the military facts and figures in Appendix D are essential background to the balance of power in central Asia.

Turning then to the Sino-Indian dispute, while neither India nor China face any realistic prospect of invasion and complete occupation by the other, both face the potential of large-scale population losses bordering on annihilation, if their border disputes, disagreements over Tibet (with its religious leader, the Dalai Lama, in exile in India), and competing relations with Pakistan, particularly over Kashmir, were to spin out of control due to a failure to find a peaceful means of conflict resolution. Little evidence exists, though, of any real advance in the balance of peace since the end of the Cold War, or even since the 1950s when China and India had a brief coming together. The conflict appears to remain largely unresolved.<sup>27</sup>

#### 4.2.4 China's Other Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Taiwan

Section D4.1.3 covers Taiwan's status, and disputes over various islands in the East and South China Seas with certain countries, which may be more conveniently considered as part of a regional picture. This is so because new conflicts may arise, which were not previously thought to be significant, and this regional overview would apply to them as well, allowing for future developments in the military balances between state and non-state entities.

Overall, Taiwan has the geographical advantage of being an island and, therefore, posing a considerable military and logistical challenge to China if it chooses to try to occupy Taiwan by force. Additionally, as long as Taiwan can rely on United States intervention, at least in providing naval support, China would be taking a very serious risk in attempting an invasion.

Little evidence exists of any real advance in the balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution as far as the military dimension of security is concerned. This, though, does not deny the significance of economic relationships between mainland China and Taiwan that may continue to weigh against a military confrontation.

Consequently, this major conflict scenario will be addressed once the economic and institutional dimensions have been covered below and, as previously indicated, in direct comparison to Allison's Destined For War analysis, leading to the conclusions in section 5.4.1.

### 4.3 China and the Balance of Economic Power in East Asia, 1990 – 2020

#### 4.3.1 Historical Analysis and Future Relationships

The main economic relationships involving China in the post-Cold War period are examined in Appendix E in terms of the balances of economic coercion and cooperation. Those trade and financial linkages are between:

- (i) The United States and China.
- (ii) Other East Asian states and China. The analysis focuses especially on North Korea, Taiwan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- (iii) All principal global trading partners and China.

The connection to *the environment* is becoming ever more significant and China's record is relevant to each dimension of security but may be more conveniently summarised here. Finally, a case comparison with the earlier US-Japan trade dispute will be presented to illustrate the relationship between economic dependency and a propensity for peace or war.

There is no one main source of information for the economic dimension of security, unlike the historical background and military dimension, so a multiplicity of sources has been drawn upon as indicated in Appendix E. The available data is generally up to the late 2010s. This leads on to an answer to a third question:

- Q.3 What economic factors in the future relationships of China, domestic and foreign, are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

The answer below summarises the economic and environmental dimension of conflict analyses relating to the propensity for a state of peace or war in China.

#### 4.3.2 The United States and China

The US-China trade imbalance from the 1990s, and the ineffectiveness of various attempts to reduce it, finally culminated in a trade war in 2018, under US President Trump, with tariffs and counter-tariffs being imposed by each side through to January 2020 when a Phase One deal was signed between the United States and China. This legal agreement committed China, inter alia, to buying an additional \$200 billion of US goods and services during 2020 and 2021.

The most important economic factors affecting future relationships between the US and China concerning their contribution to a state of peace or war are:

- The outcome of their Phase One deal for 2020-2021, particularly in reducing their trade imbalance.
- The other aspects of the US-China trade war which are long term and have little or no prospect of being resolved soon, even if the trade imbalance reduces, due to:
  - Differences with the previous US-Japan trade dispute (considered in E7/E8.4).

- Continuing concerns over access to US technologies by Chinese companies especially those with dual civil-military applications.
- US and Chinese national security interests and their respective international standing.
- An emphasis on unilateral or bilateral policy measures rather than the use of multilateral mechanisms for resolving trade disputes, e.g.
  - The continuing weaknesses of World Trade Organisation (WTO) regulations in the lack of definition of a non-market economy (such as China is deemed to be) and whether any part of the associated methodology can still be applied. China is clear that it should have ended with the 11 December 2016 deadline in keeping with the Chinese Accession Protocol to the WTO. The US disagrees.

While it appears from Table E1 in Appendix E that the United States can enforce reductions in the US-China trade imbalance because China has limited means of retaliation, the underlying breakdown of their partnership ensures more coercive relations are perpetuated.

China can, though, seek a greater emphasis on domestic markets, trade with ASEAN members and other regional economic partnerships, including with Russia, but continuing coercive relationships with the United States and other Western countries, varying only in degree, will adversely affect global economic relations for the short, and probably, the long term. The underlying structural problems and loss of trust are too deeply engrained to permit ready or quick solutions.

#### 4.3.3 Other East Asian States and China

##### A. North Korea

In view of the paucity of data, all that can be said is that North Korea remained a low-income country in the 2010s, according to the World Bank, unlike all the East Asian countries listed in Table E2. The dire economic position was underlined in section 4.2.2, aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic and prior economic sanctions arising from North Korea's ballistic missile tests in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions. The risks of a humanitarian crisis spilling over from North Korea to the PRC are obvious but held back by the Communist government's tight social and political control... so far.

##### B. Taiwan and ASEAN

Mainland China remains the island of Taiwan's main trading partner despite the Democratic Progressive Party's victory in the presidential elections in 2016 and the DPP President's introduction of a New Southbound Policy. This sought to reduce what was regarded as over-reliance on a single Chinese market with a more diversified external market. ASEAN had become Taiwan's second-largest trading partner during the 2010s. Although China (including Hong Kong) still accounts for almost 40 per cent of Taiwan's external trade, the ten ASEAN states' share had risen to 15 per cent by 2018.<sup>28</sup>

The PRC's position on Taiwan's participation in international organisations like the WTO, where it is a 'separate customs territory', reflects its practice of either maintaining silence or opposing Taiwan's external agreements. The main boundaries for the PRC are, first, that Taipei's many diplomatic titles should not include statehood or recognition as Taiwan or the Republic of China; and, secondly, that cross-Strait relations – referring to the sea which separates mainland China from Taiwan – underpins the PRC's strategy. Where Taipei's external trade agreements assist talks towards peaceful reunification, Beijing will not seek to hinder those agreements but otherwise it will oppose them based on their being intended to achieve the goal of Taiwan's independence.<sup>29</sup>

Consequently, it is the intention, rather than the nature, of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that counts most for the PRC. Due to the acceptance of the one-China policy by all ASEAN members, Taiwan is unlikely to be able to negotiate a FTA agreement with ASEAN itself. Nevertheless, ASEAN's non-recognition policy still allows individual member recognition of Taiwan's treaty-making capacity and the legitimacy of its laws and regulations. These effects tend to corroborate the international relations stance that recognition is not confined to recognition of statehood; rather a gradual view of recognition should be comprehended via the perspectives and norms of identity and status.<sup>30</sup>

Analysis of the balances of economic cooperation between Taiwan and ASEAN from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s, reliant on mostly pre- 2016 statistics, led to these conclusions:

- Although Taiwan and ASEAN have become crucial trading partners in recent decades, ASEAN has frequently experienced large trade deficits with Taiwan thereby reducing the economic benefits to ASEAN, and trade activities have sometimes fluctuated showing their vulnerability to unfavourable international developments.
- The trade structures are characterised by two-way trade with a high proportion of manufacturing and intermediate goods, especially in Taiwan's exports. ASEAN has been in control of significant stages in the supply chain of Taiwanese firms. There has been a high proportion of Taiwan-ASEAN trade in manufactures with high technology input, particularly electronic and electric parts and components. The improvement in ASEAN production capability is likely to include direct investment from Taiwanese enterprises.
- Nevertheless, this Taiwan-ASEAN trade structure remains very specialised and far less diversified than ASEAN trade patterns with Japan, South Korea and China. This, too, reflects the vulnerability of Taiwan-ASEAN trade relations when there are fluctuations in the supply of, or demand for, inputs. When it comes to trade in value-added (TiVA) Taiwan and ASEAN are crucial partners, yet Taiwan appears to be lagging behind other Northeast Asian economies in reinforcing linkages with ASEAN's regional production network and TiVA. This may result from the inability of Taiwan and ASEAN to establish a bilateral preferential trade pact.<sup>31</sup>

Consequently, when the balances of economic coercion and cooperation are combined it may be concluded that the main economic factors affecting the relationships between China and Taiwan for the future are:

- Increased economic coercion since Taiwan's presidential elections in 2016 but a counterweight of economic cooperation between many individual ASEAN members and Taiwan.
- Unless Taiwan makes a formal declaration of independence from the PRC, there is little or no economic necessity for war, rather their economic interdependence might be expected to mitigate the risks of war.

### C. Claims to Islands in the South China Sea

Conversely, though, the extensive Maritime Exclusion Zone in the South China Sea, which China claims, includes resource-rich islands that are subject to counter-claims from other Southeastern countries. While for reasons of space no detailed treatment is possible here, a different conclusion to that involving the PRC's economic relationship with Taiwan may be offered:

- Economic competition over islands in the South China Sea could lead to war due to the risks that China's size might lead it to reject the case for economic cooperation with its trading partners in ASEAN and any adverse decisions of international tribunals.

In this respect, the dominance of the US Navy in the Pacific may act as a counterweight to any temptation by PRC leaders to decide economic issues by non-economic means.

#### 4.3.4 Global Trading Partners and China

By way of historical background, China is estimated to have had 32.9 per cent of global GDP in 1820 (Table E3), which was about 32 per cent more than the combined GDP of Western Europe and Western offshoots, principally the USA, being 24.9 per cent of world GDP.<sup>32</sup> The study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on which this statistic is based, is worth keeping in mind because, as revealed at the start of section E5 of Appendix E, it is a measure of how far China fell behind economically during the subsequent century and a half and how considerable has been its recovery since the 1970s.

Moving to present times, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook of 2020 (Table E6) confirms that China now accounts for 18.3 per cent of global GDP on a purchasing-power-parity basis whereas the United States accounts for 15.8 per cent. Moreover, as the United States is the largest advanced economy (with the Euro area next), so China is the biggest of the emerging market and developing economies. It is also the single largest exporter in the world (12.3 per cent) though the Euro area accounts for 26.7 per cent.<sup>33</sup>

Looking at the IMF's economic growth projections from the base year of 2020, China's projected growth is 8.0 and 5.6 per cent in 2021 and 2022 respectively, compared to 6.0 and 5.2 per cent for the United States over the same period (Table E7).<sup>34</sup> However, such are the uncertainties amidst the current pandemic, global supply chain issues and inflation trends that these estimates should be treated with more than usual caution.

Naturally, at this global level, it is not yet possible to say much on which economic factors in the future relationships of China with each of its main trading partners are likely to have the greatest effect in contributing to a propensity for peace or a (trade) war, except that:

- China's partnership with Russia in 2010s has led to major energy deals between the two countries.
- As The Economist pointed out recently, both these countries have alternatives to SWIFT, the messaging system used by 11,000 banks in 200 countries to make cross-border payments. While their alternative networks, in the Chinese case, handle a smaller daily average volume of transactions than SWIFT (about one eighth in the past year but growing fast) and, in the Russian case, is not nearly as ubiquitous and sophisticated as SWIFT, both are usable in the event of sanctions for any reason. Moreover, in the Chinese case, their CIPS rival to SWIFT could threaten US global financial dominance if it reached scale.<sup>35</sup>
- China's Belt and Road Initiative of major infrastructure projects from 2013, not only in central and southeast Asia but in central and eastern Europe and across various parts of Africa,<sup>36</sup> has led the main Western democracies at their G7 summit in 2021 to propose 'Build Back Better' as an alternative project initiative.<sup>37</sup> However, the long-term future of both initiatives remains uncertain in the face of the global coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing economic fallout.

This is merely suggestive of a global realignment at the economic level which does, though, demonstrate how significant a transformation has occurred since the Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s when the United States and China were ranged against the USSR.

#### 4.3.5 The Environment

When it comes to the environment, there is one work that might have sufficed as the main resource for the purposes of this Briefing: Robert B. Marks' China: An Environmental History.<sup>38</sup> The reason that this work's factual evidence and findings are not summarised here is that the consequences for the environment, and irreversible man-made climate change, of a major nuclear missile exchange would dwarf the impact of greenhouse gas emissions and shorten the timescale from decades to months or days. This Briefing addresses the one to give time for the other.

#### 4.3.6 Conclusion

Before turning to the answer to Q.3 in section 4.3.1, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of this analysis due to the lack of impartial information on certain relevant topics affecting internal socio-economic and political matters in the PRC during 1990-2020.



### Part 1 Limitations of This Economic Analysis

The internal socio-economic and political matters in the PRC from 1990 to the present time on which little or no impartial and readily accessible data is available include, in particular:

- Labour and social unrest, e.g. in mainland China including Hong Kong.  
Generally, mainland trade unions are under the control of the CPC but Hong Kong has independent unions though under tighter state control since the protests, sometimes violent, in 2019.<sup>39</sup>
- Regional and ethnic issues, e.g. in:
  - Tibet;
  - Xinjiang including terrorism and human rights;
- The impact of environmental damage on local communities.

This data limitation restricts the ability of this analyst (and, he would argue, independent analysts generally) in being able to forecast when internal conditions may increase the risks of societal collapse. This, it should be emphasised, would be very difficult to do anyway and the timing of such an event is almost impossible to predict. Moreover, it does not substantially affect the benefit of this China Briefing because the internal socio-economic factors are not the primary risks but could become so if the external threats are mishandled.

### Part II Economic Dependencies and Future Peace or War

The extent to which economic interdependence may contribute to a state of peace or war has been a matter of controversy amongst academics for generations. More recently, an article by Yaechan Lee, a postgraduate student then at the School of International Studies, Peking University has examined the issue in relation to a case comparison between the US-China, and earlier US-Japan, trade disputes. His article in the East Asia journal was published in 2018 as the trade war between the United States and China got underway.<sup>40</sup>

This article at section E7, where it is more fully analysed, provides a useful backdrop against which to clarify certain definitional and conceptual issues before answering Q3 above:

- (i) *Distinguish between economic 'interdependence' and 'imbalance'.* It is very large imbalances in trade and services, as in the US-Japan and US-China case studies, which tends to produce conflict between the entities concerned, rather than close economic interdependence per se, such as the member states of the European Union have.
- (ii) *There is no necessary correlation between economic interdependence and a state of peace.* The classic example, often invoked, is that of Norman Angell's book, The Great Illusion, published a few years before the outbreak of World War I, arguing that the integration of the European economies made war futile and militarism obsolete.<sup>41</sup>
- (iii) *There may be an inverse relationship between economic imbalance and conflict but not necessarily between economic imbalance and a state of peace.* Economic conflict can be resolved through peaceful bilateral or multilateral negotiation that does not

lead, or threaten to lead, to war. Thereby, as Yaechan Lee affirms, it is indeed possible to advance conflict and peace simultaneously. In the language of peace research, this is 'positive peace' as opposed to 'negative peace' or the absence of war.

This conceptual clarification naturally progresses to a consideration of the relationship between the economic and military dimensions of a conflict, which are referred to in the case studies by Yaechan Lee as the non-traditional and traditional realms respectively:

- (iv) *In analysing the propensity for a state of peace or war in any given international conflict, it is necessary to treat each relevant dimension of security separately. As previously underlined, what this means is that like can only be compared with like, i.e. military relationships are considered separately from economic ones. Leaving aside the US-Japan trade dispute, post-1945, because this was never likely to develop into a military confrontation given Japan's pacifist constitution and close military alliance with United States, the relevant focus is on the implications for:*

The US-China trade dispute, late 1990s on

The trade imbalances arising from the late 1990s reached a major turning point in the US-China trade war of 2018-19 and the resulting Phase One deal. Neither this economic conflict nor any of the many others in East Asia are, in principle, incapable of resolution through bilateral and multilateral negotiations. However,

- I. Economic conflicts can involve increasingly coercive relationships between States but remain peaceful in the sense of avoiding violence ('negative peace'); but
- II. If the US-China economic conflict moves in a more coercive direction and there is a military imbalance between them then the risks of war increase and are not limited to economic issues though they may be exacerbated by them.
- III. If the US-China economic conflict moves in a more cooperative direction (as it did in the late 1970s and early 1980s), where rules are agreed and mostly kept to by both parties and foster peaceful relations ('positive peace'), as with the US-Japan resolution of its trade dispute in the early 2000s, then there is a favourable balance of peace to help offset any military imbalance.

Part III Answer to Question 3

Based on the foregoing analysis and the responses to Q.1 and Q.2 in Appendix E, the general answer to Q.3 (section 4.3.1) is that both external and internal economic relationships – allowing for more limited information on the latter – point towards less cooperation and more coercion in the future with fewer countervailing factors than before. In the event of economic factors generating internal chaos within the PRC at any future point, the likely consequence would be severe CPC countermeasures to ensure stability, reinforced by historical memory and experience.

So, it is concluded that, while the economic dimension of security may prove an aggravating factor, it is unlikely on its own to lead to a state of war except in these cases:

- The socio-economic and political collapse of North Korea; or
- The possibility that China proves unwilling to negotiate to resolve disputes with its neighbours and the United States over resource-rich islands in the South China Sea.

This forecast is likely to be valid for at least five to ten years unless

- Entities in dispute put greater emphasis on economic cooperation and, just as important, reciprocating such initiatives undertaken by rival entities; and/or
- The military and institutional dimensions of security, on which the economic is often dependent, also move in a less coercive direction than at present.

#### 4.4 Military and Economic Alliances in East Asia, 1990 – 2020

##### 4.4.1 Background

The institutional relationships that China has with other countries in the East Asia (and Pacific) region and whether they are tending towards a more coercive or a more cooperative climate are examined in Appendix F.

This then leads on, as with the other dimensions of security, to a third question:

Q.3 What institutional factors in the future foreign relationships of China are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

The answer summarises the institutional dimension of conflict analyses relating to the propensity for a state of peace or war in China.

##### 4.4.2 Military Alliances in East Asia

As far as can be ascertained from published sources, China's only known military alliance is with North Korea.<sup>42</sup> By that term is meant a group of states bound by treaty to come to each other's defence if any one of them is militarily attacked from outside the alliance.

Nor, until recently, was it apparent that any political and military alliance was necessarily directed against China (though one has its ally in mind). The security alliance between the United States and Japan binds the former to come to the assistance of the latter, if attacked. However, the obligation is not reciprocal because Japan has a pacifist constitution dating back to 1946 although in practice Japanese self-defence forces do exist (as noted in Appendix D).

Likewise, in 1953, at the conclusion of the Korean War a Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), that has been maintained ever since. It has involved stationing US troops on the southern part of the peninsular, operating in coalition with ROK military forces.<sup>43</sup>

One new military security development in East Asia and the Pacific was the signing of an agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) on 15

September 2021. It envisages a broad range of collaboration on diplomatic and technological matters including cyber security and artificial intelligence. However, the biggest item of the AUKUS pact was the arms deal in which at least eight nuclear-powered (but not nuclear missile-carrying) submarines are to be acquired by Australia.<sup>44</sup> This is to be done, according to the UK government, in line with its non-proliferation obligations.<sup>45</sup> Many details remain to be worked out including where the boats would be built and what combination of US and UK technology would be involved.

Naturally, there are numerous political alliances in the East Asia and Pacific region which also involve varying degrees of military cooperation. For China, two of the most significant at the present time are those with Russia and Pakistan.

#### 4.4.3 Economic Alliances in the East Asia and Pacific Region

A complex set of economic alliances has emerged in recent years for this region of which the main contours need to be briefly sketched. The oldest grouping is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) whose role was discussed in Appendix E. Its members are also listed in Table F1 in relation to two other major trading partnerships:

- In 2012 negotiations began to establish a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) centred on the ASEAN members but including a wider range of countries. Once the minimum number of ratifications or acceptances for the RCEP Agreement had been received by the secretariat it took effect on 1 January 2022.<sup>46</sup>
- On 5 October 2015 the Ministers of the 12 Trans-Pacific Partnership countries announced the conclusion of their negotiations which, it was envisioned, would eventually lead to their goal of open trade and regional integration. However, the United States withdrew from this agreement in 2017 so the 11 remaining parties, led by Japan, amended selected provisions and concluded the revised pact in 2018, now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This pact took effect on 30 December 2018.<sup>47</sup>

On examining the lists in Table F1 it is apparent that China belongs to RCEP, which is the larger of the two East Asia-Pacific trading partnerships. RCEP is also the world's largest Free Trade Agreement (FTA) accounting for some 30 per cent of global gross domestic product, twice that of CPTPP. It is, though, reported that China has recently applied to join the CPTPP.<sup>48</sup> While a detailed comparison of the two FTAs is not required here, it is evident that CPTPP has more demanding standards on trade and economic rules. Two ASEAN members – Singapore and Vietnam – have already become members of both FTAs.

That China is not, or not yet, a party to CPTPP and its provisions open to 'any State or separate customs territory' means that Taiwan may be able to join this FTA in a way that it has not been capable of agreeing a FTA with ASEAN, nor likely to achieve by seeking RCEP membership. However, differences with Japan arising from a Taiwanese ban on food imports from prefectures affected by the Fukushima nuclear accident has so far undermined Japan's

support for Taiwan becoming a CPTPP member. While the RCEP does allow ‘any ASEAN partner’ or ‘other external economic partners’ to accede to the agreement, the conditions and processes for accession depend on the unanimous consent of all parties, which is unlikely to be forthcoming in view of the key role played by China in RCEP.<sup>49</sup>

#### 4.4.4 Conclusion

Thus, the answer to Q3 is that the overall direction of travel for political, military and economic institutions in East Asia is towards more coercive relationships, rather than cooperative ones evidenced by:

- (i) The establishment of AUKUS in 2021 which is significant because it introduces into the region a political and military alliance that is directed, by necessary implication, against other States in the region having nuclear-powered submarines including China. While it has no immediate impact on the military balance of power in the region because the boats do not exist and may only begin to enter service in the 2030s, the AUKUS pact establishes a new coercive institution in the region of a kind which, as far as is publicly known, did not exist before. That is not to pronounce any adverse judgement on this development but simply to report an undoubted fact.
- (ii) Two recently created economic alliances, RCEP and CPTPP, reflect competing visions of the future of the Asia-Pacific region. While the fact that membership overlaps to a degree shows that there is no necessary incompatibility, it is likely that the more conflictual environment in the region will be reinforced by this institutional rivalry, particularly on contentious issues like any FTA with Taiwan. If there were no fundamental disagreements between RCEP and CPTPP, both pacts might not exist.

While there is no reason to think that the emergence of these new military or economic alliances would in themselves lead to armed conflict, they form part of a more coercive climate that reinforces the tendency of each dimension of security involving China towards a state of war rather than one of peace.

However, set against this, ASEAN itself remains a cooperative economic alliance and has demonstrated that its members can individually have economic relationships with the PRC and, separately, Taiwan without any breach of the one-China policy.

It is time to draw together the strands of section 4 to reach specific and testable conclusions.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS: THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Applying the conceptual framework in section 4.1 yields the following results:

### 5.1 Peace Grows Out of Weakness

Mao famously observed:

‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’<sup>50</sup>

However, this was said on 6 November 1938 during the war of resistance against Japan. It was undoubtedly true then and has been generally true in modern history.

Yet this same Mao initiated in the early 1970s the steps that led to the relative peace and prosperity after his death which China experienced, out of internal instability and external threat from the Soviet Union, by drawing closer to the PRC’s enemy in the Korean War. Guns were imported from the United States but proved peripheral compared to what became the vast economic renaissance of China, comparable to US growth in the nineteenth century.

Thus, no contradiction would appear to be involved in claiming in the post-1945 era:

‘Peaceful relations grow out of a recognition of weakness.’

Obviously, ‘weakness’ here refers to a position of structural inferiority resulting from involuntary circumstances beyond an entity’s control that may be due to oppression and injustice. It is not about cowardice or pathetic behaviour that eulogises self-indulgence.

This Briefing author, to the best of his knowledge and belief, is the only educator writing in the English language who systematically seeks to apply such an irenic perspective to international conflicts in the age of nuclear weapons. As to its effectiveness:

Let the ‘Court of history’ be the judge.

The suggested criteria for judging historical outcomes will be found in section 6 below.

### 5.2 China’s Multifaceted Internal and External Conflicts

Normally, analyses of modern China begin with identifying the country’s strengths which may then, whether intentionally or not, enhance the fear of other powers and lead to reactions aimed at countering China’s perceived dominance. Thus a cycle of coercive measures and countermeasures set in that feed on each other and may create a climate for armed violence.

Instead, this analysis proposes to draw on the preceding work in sections 2 and 4, and the accompanying Appendices, to identify China’s vulnerabilities in order to reach conclusions on how a cycle of peaceful means of conflict resolution might build trust between entities in dispute. Conversely, though, should opposing entities not adopt reciprocal measures then the forecast would inevitably move from a state of peace to a state of war.

What, then, are the potential causes of collapse into civil conflict or war in the PRC? Three relate to China's internal relations in 2021 and two to external relations although all have the potential for external scrutiny and pressure:

#### Internal

- (i) Protest movements, some peaceful but some violent, demanding multiparty democracy, e.g. as in the late 1980s and, specifically, in Hong Kong up to 2019.
- (ii) Rising standards of living halted, or even reversed, creating labour and social unrest and anger against the government.
- (iii) National or religious dissent in certain parts of China, being peaceful or involving terrorism e.g. in Tibet and Xinjiang provinces.

#### External

- (iv) Risk of defeat in war, e.g. any future attempt by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to invade or retake the island of Taiwan which precipitates US intervention; a clash with the US Navy in the South China Sea over access to resource-rich islands; border fighting with Indian troops.
- (v) Overflow of socio-economic and political collapse elsewhere, e.g. in North Korea.

No doubt others could be added but these arise from the foregoing analysis.

At present, it must be emphasised, despite the acknowledged data limitations on the internal position in China, there is little or no evidence of a serious risk of internal socio-economic or political collapse – quite the reverse as the PRC has not only increased living standards for the population in general, and improved income equality measured by the Gini coefficient, but has credibly eliminated extreme poverty from within its borders. However, were this progress to be interrupted by the global economic and political environment then changes in mass psychology can take place, and have occurred in China's history, with remarkable rapidity.

#### 5.2.1 Conclusion on Internal and External Conflicts

Drawing together the strands of modern Chinese history and especially the military, economic and institutional dimensions of Chinese security in the period 1990 to 2020, it may be concluded that the main risk of societal collapse arises from external efforts to move the PRC from communism to liberal democracy. As will be apparent from sections C4 and 2.4, communist China today is a more open society than in the period from 1949 to 1976 when most foreigners were excluded from the country due to what was perceived within the PRC as a century of malign Western influence. Yet as the conceptual framework of this Briefing underlined (s. 4.1(i)), there is 'a zero tolerance for anything that threatens public order, and

the control of the CPC, and that is a fact which must be included.’ On the other hand, especially after the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991, many Western governments and some of their peoples are unlikely to forego the hope or expectation, implicitly or explicitly, that at some point in time China will go the same way or that a mostly peaceful transition would occur as happened in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990.

These conclusions lead to the central prediction on the prospects for a state of peace or war in China:

#### Premise 1

The Chinese leadership are amenable to foreign ideas, technical innovations and proposals relating to China provided they are peaceful in themselves and advanced by cooperation. This may include their acceptance of criticism, where it is based on fact and reasoned argument.

#### Premise 2

Unlike the Soviet Union and the PRC in the period 1949 to 1976, China does not have any plans for imposing its ideology or system of government on any other state but may use military force within what it regards as its own territory and maritime exclusion zone or in its defence against external threats or attacks.

#### Conclusion

Therefore, insofar as China develops internal relations on the lines of Premise 1 it will serve to enhance the prospects for a state of peace. However, this would be offset by the extent to which foreign entities do not reciprocate and adopt these principles in relation to China.

The objective standard by which this is to be measured is the role of politically impartial education in China and the main countries with which it has cultural relations.

Insofar as China develops external relations on the lines of Premise 2 it will serve to either enhance or reduce the prospects for a state of peace according to the analyses of the conflict areas set out below. These analyses take into account the extent to which the relevant foreign entities do or do not reciprocate and adopt these principles in relation to China.

The objective standard by which each of these conflicts are to be measured is outlined in section 6 below.

Finally, when Premises 1 and 2 are combined in a manner consistent with an irenical perspective, as defined in this Briefing, then the prospects for peace in, and with, China would be optimal. And vice versa with respect to the prospects for war.

#### 5.2.2 North v South Korea

In view of the dire economic position in North Korea, and lessons which may be derived from the failure of the US-North Korean talks in 2018-2019 to achieve denuclearisation of the North and the full lifting of UN sanctions, it may be concluded that:



- *The prospects for a state of peace* would be enhanced by the full participation of the PRC in any future negotiations between the United States and North Korea.
- Were such negotiations to proceed at some point in the future, their prospects for success should be enhanced by:
  - Ensuring that the removal of North Korean nuclear capability is linked to:
    - Full denuclearisation of the entire Korean peninsula guaranteed by the remaining nuclear powers in the region along with legally binding pledges by the North Korean and South Korean governments.
    - Discussion of possible steps to reduce the scale of conventional forces ranged against each other along the Demilitarised Zone and the reduction or removal of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula.
  - Ensuring the lifting of UN sanctions on North Korea is linked to:
    - Negotiations with South Korea and multilateral financial institutions on gradual opening-up of consumer markets, trade and civilian investment so that sanctions relief benefits the North Korean economy.
  - A realistic timetable that ensures that the military and economic dimensions of security and peace can proceed in tandem.
- Whether such a process is followed or not should be a key indicator as to the propensity for peace or war in the region, i.e. that each dimension of security is balanced and reciprocal to the greatest practical extent.

Conversely, *the likelihood of a state of war* arising increases the longer the current political, military and socio-economic position continues unaddressed and unresolved because the highest risk of North Korea using its nuclear weapons would arise in extreme circumstances where the future existence of the state and its leadership were in doubt.

### 5.2.3 India v Pakistan and China

The focus here is on India's border dispute with China but the key to more peaceful relations between these two states may partly hinge on more peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. This, in turn, depends on the unresolved conflicts arising from the historic partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 when each country achieved independence from Britain. It was noted earlier (s. 4.2.3) that these deep political and religious differences would require a separate IPP Briefing, which may be possible in 2022-2023, so are left to one side here.

However, it is significant, with respect to the Sino-Indian dispute, that while neither India nor China face any realistic prospect of invasion and complete occupation by the other, both face the potential of large-scale population losses bordering on annihilation, if their border disputes, disagreements over Tibet (with its religious leader, the Dalai Lama, in exile in India), and competing relations with Pakistan, particularly over Kashmir, were to spin out of control due to a failure to find a peaceful means of conflict resolution.

This conflict, like the preceding one, has remained largely frozen in time since the last war.

#### 5.2.4 China's Other Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Taiwan

The prospects for peace or war regarding this major and long-running conflict between mainland China and the island of Taiwan will be fully addressed below by a direct comparison between this Briefing's conclusions and Allison's analysis in Destined for War, concerning a potential Great Power war between China and the United States.

Before that, though, it is relevant to draw together the conclusions on the economic and institutional dimensions of security in the period since 1990 for China and its partners and rivals in East Asia, which would affect the resolution of all their territorial disputes.

The overall conclusion on the prospects for peace in the region is that both external and internal economic relationships – allowing for more limited information on the latter in China – point towards less cooperation and more coercion in the future with fewer countervailing factors than before. This is unlikely on its own to lead to a state of war, with the possible exceptions cited below, but may prove an aggravating factor. In the event of economic factors generating internal chaos within the PRC at any future point, the likely consequence would be severe CPC countermeasures to ensure stability, reinforced by historical memory and experience which could, in turn, invite foreign economic sanctions.

The cases where economic factors could be dominant in contributing to a state of war are:

- The socio-economic and political collapse of North Korea (as previously indicated); or
- The possibility that China proves unwilling to negotiate to resolve disputes with its neighbours and the United States over resource-rich islands in the South China Sea.

This forecast is likely to be valid for at least five to ten years unless

- Entities in dispute put greater emphasis on economic cooperation and, just as important, reciprocating such initiatives undertaken by rival entities; and/or
- The military and institutional dimensions of security, on which the economic is often dependent, also move in a less coercive direction than at present.

This message is reinforced by the institutional dimension of security where there is no reason to think that the emergence of new military or economic alliances, identified in section 4.4, would in themselves lead to armed conflict. Nevertheless, they form part of a more coercive climate that reinforces the tendency of each dimension of security involving China towards a state of war rather than one of peace. Set against this, ASEAN remains a cooperative economic alliance and has demonstrated that its members can individually have economic relationships with the PRC and, separately, Taiwan consistent with the one-China policy.

### 5.3 The Role of Education

Before presenting the conclusions to the United States versus China war or peace scenarios, it is necessary to underline that a climate for war rather than peace is being created, varying only in degree, in all the internal and external relationships which China has (covered in sections 5.2.2 to 5.2.4). This conclusion begs the questions:

- Q.1 Why education plays so important a role in analysing conflict situations and foreseeing their direction towards peace or war?
- Q.2 Why policy makers and the general public should pay any regard to the findings of IPP education, like this China Briefing, as they manifestly did not to the earlier Briefing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or this author's Prodem Briefings in the early 1990s?

#### *Example*

Tragically, as it happens, while this part of the Briefing was being drafted a long simmering dispute between Russia and NATO members developed into a major crisis over Ukraine, leading to a Russian military invasion on 24 February 2022. It well illustrates the potential role of IPP in the PRC-Taiwan conflict, or any other dispute affecting China. The Chinese President is on record as supporting Russia's opposition to further expansion of NATO.<sup>51</sup>

Coverage by the BBC News website and News at Ten, for example, between December 2021 and February 2022 – despite the BBC's commitment to factually accurate and impartial reporting – showed how it is possible to mislead the public by omission of material facts, e.g.

- The historical background as to why NATO expansion eastwards from 1994 has been controversial in Russia (long before Putin came to power) as contained in this author's Prodem Briefings (or any other author's) forecasting conditions for future war due to the West's handling of the ending of the Cold War.
- Coverage of the unfolding crisis which normally omitted basic facts on the size and disposition of Ukrainian armed forces, the Russian leader's previous approach to crises in Chechnya (from 1999); intervention in Georgia (2008); overthrow of a Russia-friendly government in Ukraine (2014) leading to Russia's occupation of Crimea and support for rebels in the east of Ukraine; and intervention in the Syrian civil war (2015 on).
- Lack of information on what Ukraine and Georgia eventually joining NATO might mean with respect to triggering Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty in the face of Russian occupation of Crimea and the breakaway regions in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Western war predictions which had been widely advanced by US President Biden in January/February 2022, including Russian air and missile attacks on Kiev and likely Russian invasion of Ukraine from three directions proved justified when Russia: first, recognised the two breakaway republics in the Donbas on 21 February 2022 and also formally (instead of previously, informally) decided to place Russian troops in those republics; and secondly, launched a military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February.

Thus, it hardly needs saying that it is entirely possible to rectify all the above omissions without some people changing their minds on the political principle asserted, viz. that:

Ukraine, or any other sovereign state, has the right to decide its own future security arrangements.

However, it is the task of IPP and of this Briefing author, in competition with other authors, to offer an alternative educational principle, viz. that

The application of an irenical perspective will enable members of the public and their representatives to choose, where political principles clash in international relations, which direction of the conflict is more likely to secure a state of peace and avoid war.

Where the political principle threatens one or other of the two extremes in the conceptual framework in section 4.1, either societal collapse in a given country or a Great Power war, it is the educational principle which may offer to the contending entities and their respective publics a means to achieve a balance of power and peace to the common benefit of humanity. It is hoped and intended that IT and the data sciences will be harnessed to that end soon.

Why may the educational principle prevail? Essentially, because every time it has been ignored or rejected the conflicts to which it was applied only became less peaceful and more prone to violence – NATO-Russian, Israeli-Palestinian and now, it is foreseen, Sino-American relations. In these hostile environments, all political institutions are prone to misrepresenting their opponents which then exacerbates the conflict. The role of education, especially of IPP, is to ensure that facts are not omitted or inaccurate so that, like weather forecasts, publics come to trust them as more reliable than guesswork or convictions. Moreover, there is an objective test in the Court of history and, as the evidence mounts and the dangers of another Great Power war increase, so the opportunity for a hearing and then vindication may come. That was the experience of Confucius's successors and many other lesser-known figures for whom truth, or their share of it, prevailed in the long term over human passions and war.

#### 5.4 China and the United States: Destined for Peace or War?

Professor Graham Allison has offered a creative way to assess the prospects for peace or war between the rising power, China, and its challenge to the accustomed predominance of the United States. His organising principle is Thucydides's Trap, named after the Greek historian of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BC who wrote:

It was the *rise* of Athens and the *fear* that this instilled in Sparta that made war *inevitable*.<sup>52</sup> [Allison's emphasis]

A full analysis of Allison's thesis in comparison with this author's alternative – the application of 'an irenical perspective' – is given in Appendix G and especially Table G1. The focus there is on two competing methods of analysis. Here a summary of the main points of agreement and difference is provided followed by this Briefing author's own conclusions on the prospects for peace or war between China and the United States.

(i) Organising Principle

Thucydides's Trap need not apply. Indeed, Allison and Southwood are agreed that, in the age of nuclear weapons, it must not apply. However, the role of 'fear' in potentially bringing about the unthinkable is still a key factor.

Hence, Southwood emphasises the importance, in common law jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and United States, of applying a judicially defined irenic perspective, via competing analyses of conflict situations, to determine their direction to peace or war. Thereby

- To counter misrepresentations;
- To deepen understanding of underlying causes and possible resolution; and
- To guide/provide advice to policy makers and publics.

(ii) Historical Background

Both authors are agreed on the central importance of how the Cold War ended but draw diametrically opposed conclusions on whether it was successful from an irenic perspective.

The Harvard Thucydides's Trap Project, on which Allison's book is based, reviewed the last five hundred years and identified (in 2015) 16 cases in which an ascending power challenged an established power. Twelve of these rivalries resulted in war.<sup>53</sup> (This Briefing author notes, though, that both the post-1945 cases involved 'no-war', i.e. conflicts occurring after the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.) Allison observed (in 2017) that:

*'Though often tense, the Cold War stands as one of history's greatest successes in escaping Thucydides's Trap... the two powers [USA and USSR] peacefully managed the highest-stakes great power competition in history.'<sup>54</sup>* [Southwood's underlining]

Writing in the period 1993-1995, with foresight rather than hindsight, Southwood observed:

The dismantling of the Soviet empire broke the historic tradition of Great Power rivalry leading to war. Yet the post-Cold War peace settlement, after initial enthusiasm, has fuelled resentment and hostility in Russia against the West. Are we returning to the era of Great Power politics... can anything be done to avoid future military disaster?<sup>55</sup>

Both authors agree, nevertheless, that war between the USA and China is not inevitable. If it was, there would be no point in writing books to try to avoid it.

(iii) The Chinese Communist Party and the Clash of Civilisations

Whereas Allison's analysis focuses on China's leader, President Xi, Southwood's concentrates on the balances of power and peace (as explained in sections 3.2 to 3.4 above).

Yet Allison acknowledges President Xi's 'nightmare': Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This was the subject, in 1993-1995, of Southwood's 245-page editorial in four Prodem Briefings which highlighted the one-sidedness of the peace process. The lack of reciprocity, or sufficient reciprocity, by the West to the Gorbachev 'peace offensive' across each of the three dimensions of security undermined, Southwood foresaw, peaceful means of resolving conflicts. It put us '... on the road to war.'<sup>56</sup> [Original emphasis.]

Both Allison and Southwood are agreed that the clash of cultures or civilisations, as Samuel Huntington put it, while hard to define is a crucial aspect of understanding conflicts.<sup>57</sup> John Keegan, a British military historian, had written of 'War as Culture' and argued for the need to reintroduce rational restraint into future wars. Southwood had picked this theme up but pointed out the difficulties of applying the concept, given the Western way of war and that only the Chinese way of guerrilla war, developed by Mao, had been effective against it.<sup>58</sup> The difficulty being, in essence, the way the ending of the Cold War had been handled.

Yet both agree on the importance of understanding the implications of the ending of the Cold War, in the context of culture. Allison identifies various ways in which he considers American and Chinese cultures clash before concluding that the US-China gap most relevant for Thucydides Trap comes from competing perspectives on world order. While Americans aspire to an international rule of law... 'they recognize the realities of power in the global Hobbesian jungle, *where it is better to be the lion than the lamb.*'<sup>59</sup> Chinese point out they were absent when those rules were made.

Conversely, though, Southwood underlines the importance of recognising that strength can come from weakness. Later in his book, Allison also implicitly recognises this – see (vi) below.

(iv) Current Conflict Scenarios

It is clear from the History project website, if not Allison's book, that he is not claiming to predict the future, rather to prevent it. Whereas Southwood does seek to apply an irenical perspective to predict the propensity for a state of peace or war in a specific region.

Allison identifies various 'sparks' that may start a war. One war scenario is a move by Taiwan towards independence. Southwood accepts that a spark or catalyst for war is not usually predictable. However, in 1995 he outlined Yergin and Gustafson's scenario planning technique as a structured and disciplined method for thinking about the future, which they applied to Russia. It doesn't predict either but does create plausible 'stories of the future'.<sup>60</sup>

In relation to the prospects for a war between the United States and China, Allison uses his scenarios to illustrate how accidental, seemingly inconsequential events might trigger large-scale conflict. Leaders on both sides, in making choices in the face of the relentless advance of new military technologies whose effects cannot be fully understood before their actual use, may fall into a trap they both know exists but believe they can avoid:

On current trajectories, a disastrous war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than most of us are willing to allow.<sup>61</sup>

Southwood sees in the tragic events unfolding in Ukraine and Russia today a regrettable vindication of his analysis of Western relations with Russia in the early 1990s. In terms of Yergin and Gustafson's technique, it is obvious the 'Two-Headed Eagle' has prevailed so far:

The central government reasserts its power... [It] is heir to Russia's Great Power traditions...<sup>62</sup>

(v) Twelve Clues for Peace

Both Allison and Southwood seek to learn lessons from the past.

Four out of nine of Allison's clues relate to the Cold War case alone and three more are drawn from the four 'No war' cases. All these clues are listed in Table G1 and seem reasonable but reveal his deep antipathy towards Russia, despite Allison's criticism of Western triumphalism at the end of the Cold War. He gives no information or data on Gorbachev's 'peace offensive'.

Southwood's concept of competing analyses of conflict areas, including China, was first outlined in an appendix to the last Prodem Briefing in 1995. Out of this came the IPP trial 'Peace Games' focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2004-2007, reported on in section 3.1 above, and the abortive Peace Games 2020 (in section G1) offering contestants a range of nine scenarios from the eight declared, and one undeclared, nuclear weapon states. So, the current Advanced Peace Game Trials are now highlighting China, a nuclear weapon state, as contained in this Briefing and the linked IT and data science project to follow.

Which approach will work best for the public benefit of advancing international peace?

(vi) Where Do We Go from Here?

Allison's appeal is for a '... serious pause for reflection' in 2017 and, to that end, he offers a series of principles and strategic options to avoid World War III. Of special interest is his recognition of the significance of the structural reality of the opening to China by the United States in the 1970s. However, unlike Southwood, he does not explicitly see in this the importance of recognising *how strength grew out of weakness*; a point strongly underlined in the Conclusions to Appendix A containing the 'Historical Background' of this Briefing.

Thus Allison is left with no alternative but to rely on political wisdom if the United States and China are to avoid a Great Power war. Instead, Southwood relies on the critical value of a 'balance of peace', i.e. of peaceful methods of conflict resolution, in order to predict the direction of a conflict to be vindicated (or otherwise) by the Court of history. If Southwood's understanding is broadly correct that humanity keeps recreating the conditions for conflict and war because political institutions, even liberal democratic ones, have an in-built tendency to exploit weakness in opponents, then he can ask:

Does the lion dominate the lamb, as Allison (and many others) assume?

Southwood relies not on his personal relationship with politicians but on his deeper understanding of historical forces – just as Marx, Lenin and Mao did – but unlike them he does not seek a political revolution but an educational one in the study and advancement of peace.

Whatever their difference of approach, Allison and Southwood agree on the 'mega- threats' faced by China and the USA:

- Nuclear Armageddon;
- Nuclear anarchy;
- Global terrorism especially [the lesser] jihadism;
- Climate change.<sup>63</sup>

(vii) Conclusion

Southwood's conclusion in the last Prodem Briefing in 1995 was headed:

The Impossibility of Peace?

His thought was that if political institutions could not create a lasting peace out of the most favourable circumstances arising at the end of the Cold War then there were no conditions under which politics and military force, on their own, could secure a long-term state of peace.

Allison uses the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 to illustrate the most enduring lesson he derives for current Sino-US problems (quoting John F Kennedy, the US President at that time):

“Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert confrontations that force an adversary to choose between a humiliating retreat and nuclear war.”<sup>64</sup>

#### 5.4.1 The Propensity for Peace or War Between China and the United States

Finally, the Briefing author's conclusions are presented here in line with the conceptual framework outlined in section 4.1. Whereas Appendix G contained a comparison of Allison and Southwood's methods, this section contains the Briefing author's own conclusions with respect to the likelihood of (i) an outbreak of war between the PRC and United States, or (ii) a more peaceful relationship between these two countries. It is hoped and intended that a mathematical treatment of these matters will follow.

The reader is reminded that the military balances of power and peace examined in Appendix D revealed how several conflict scenarios had remained largely frozen in time for decades.

##### Scenario (i) – Avoidance of Societal Collapse in China

It is axiomatic, in view of the modern history of China (Table A1), that the CPC will never willingly permit this scenario. If it is threatened or starts to come about, the CPC will ruthlessly resist and seek to crush by all available means those entities which are thought to be behind the disorders. If certain Western countries continue to seek to promote liberal democracy for or in China, as criticised in the recent joint statement of the PRC and Russian Federation,<sup>65</sup> then the West would be blamed by the CPC leadership even if not directly involved in any disturbances. Under such conditions, were the future existence of the Chinese state to be at risk, and the control of the CPC, there is a high probability of its use of nuclear weapons against perceived enemies, internally or externally, rather than except defeat.

A further risk of such societal collapse and its consequences would arise from any defeat in a Great Power war, as the CPC leadership would be acutely aware. So, if at any stage it were to choose a military option, such as to retake the island of Taiwan, it would do so only if it were confident it would win and willing to escalate the armed conflict to achieve that end. The consequences of defeat for CPC rule would be potentially terminal.



In this respect, were an occupation of Taiwan by sea and air to be deemed too risky but the CPC leadership considered that circumstances had arisen in which a military option must be exercised, then an alternative might be a conventional ballistic missile attack. (The island is about 100 miles from the east coast of China so even short-range missiles might suffice.) While Taiwan has anti-missile defences it is likely that they would not be 100 per cent effective so some missiles would get through. Life on the island could be made unbearable and, in extremity, impossible. While Taiwan's own surface-to-surface missile launchers are few at present,<sup>66</sup> they could cost mainland China the destruction of several of its cities yet, in such extremities, the CPC might deem it worthwhile.

These unpalatable conclusions are necessary in order to appreciate the available options if the extreme Scenario (i) were ever to be threatened by social disorder or defeat in war.

#### Scenario (ii) - Avoidance of Great Power Wars

Once again, the ultimate failure of the Gorbachev peace offensive and the collapse of the Soviet Union casts a long shadow. A repeat of his efforts at securing peace between the two main Cold War enemies appears unthinkable in the current Chinese context.

On the other hand, Western support for a formally independent Taiwan, reversing the current recognition of a one-China policy under CPC leadership, would contrast with Western opposition to Ukraine's loss of sovereignty over Crimea and parts of the Donbas region in 2014 and Russia's current war to further encroach on its internationally recognised borders.

Hence it is concluded that no reason currently exists for a Great Power war to be deliberately chosen by China or the United States, such as over Taiwan, unless:

- (a) Taiwan decides to make a formal declaration of independence from the PRC.
- (b) The PRC decides to abandon its policy hitherto of not seeking territorial aggrandisement by conquests outside of China's existing borders.
- (c) The PRC decides to start trying to impose its own Communist system of government on other countries in Asia or beyond.

#### Scenario (iii) – Achieving Balances of Power and Peace

In this conflict situation, concerning the status of the island of Taiwan, finding the right balances of power and peace assumes foundational significance – literally a pivot to future peace or war. This Briefing takes Taiwan as an exemplar; finding the right approach here would potentially open up avenues in other parts of China to strengthening the unity and territorial integrity of the country by enabling cultural differences to coexist harmoniously rather than foment centrifugal forces of disintegration. Thereby the likelihood of external interference would be reduced, and a Sino-American military confrontation avoided.

Take the three dimensions of security in turn affecting cross-Strait relations including the presence of the US Navy in the East China and South China Seas.

### Military dimension

The huge imbalance of military power favouring the PLA over the armed forces of Taiwan, as illustrated in Appendix D, means that the US Navy performs an essential though, from a Chinese perspective, no doubt irksome and unwanted function in ensuring a overarching military balance. Otherwise, at some point, the CPC leadership might be tempted to resolve the issue, as they see it, of a breakaway region, by their superior military force. The role of the US Navy remains consistent with its government policy since 1979 of recognising only PRC and not the Taipei government (to which it does, though, supply defensive weapons).

On its own, this dimension of security creates only an armed truce, analogous to that on the Korean peninsula or in Europe during the Cold War up to 1990.

### Economic dimension

As noted in section 5.2.4, analysis of economic relationships in East Asia points towards less cooperation and more coercion in the future with fewer countervailing factors than before. This is unlikely on its own to lead China into a state of war, with the exceptions previously cited, but may prove an aggravating factor. The impact of the US-China trade war and the outcome of the Phase One deal, highlighted on page 23, will also influence the overall climate of the region in a more coercive direction, unless the underlying difficulties can be resolved. As they touch on sensitive military technologies and national security, this seems unlikely in the short term.

Mainland China and Taiwan have deep economic interdependence, though obviously the PRC's economy is far larger. Trade between Taiwan and ASEAN has demonstrated the former's strength but vulnerability to choppy cross-Strait relations. Further development of economic cooperation is thus constrained at present.

### Institutional dimension

As the institutions behind the economic and military dimensions of security reflect the increasingly coercive environment affecting China, the central problem facing the task of peaceful reunification between the PRC and the island of Taiwan is:

How are two incompatible systems of governance to co-exist in harmony with each other?

In view of various failed or, at most, partially successful attempts by powerful countries to impose their form of constitutional system on an emerging or developing country,<sup>67</sup> an attempt to reach a consensus by drawing on East Asian historical experience and philosophical ideas (e.g. Confucius) might be appropriate. The IPP Peace Games would provide an educational model for undertaking this thought-provoking exercise:

- In a non-threatening manner.
- Based on Chinese history and characteristics but willing to draw on foreign ideas.
- By relying on gradual long-term development aimed at reunification by consensus that respects two systems but one country, as existed in Qing times between China and Vietnam or Burma but stripped of their threatening, oppressive or humiliating aspects.

Naturally, if the Chinese Peace Games achieve useful results, it would be for the CPC in negotiation with the Taiwanese provincial government and political parties to try to reach a political agreement on eventual reunification.

The benefits of this innovative approach would be:

- Helping to foster China's higher educational goals.
- Building trust for these future political negotiations.
- Counteracting any impulse towards short-term military solutions.

Indeed, the latter point is the strongest of all, because the PRC has already waited over 70 years and is still waiting to see any real progress towards eventual reunifications. National sentiments on the mainland and in Taiwan will not wait for ever and are a factor neither Beijing nor Taipei can ignore.

#### 5.5 Briefing Answers: A Growing Propensity for War Between China and the United States ...Due to Unfavourable Balances of Peaceful Methods of Conflict Resolution

The dramatic, if unwanted, successes of the Prodem Briefings (1993-1995) and IPP Briefing No. 1 (2006) in predicting conditions for war, based on this Briefing author's application of an irenical perspective, have been demonstrated by the 'Court of history': the Russian invasion of Ukraine (at the time of writing); and five wars between Israel and Hamas-led Gaza.

Yet it is equally true that the educational method pioneered by Prodem and developed by IPP has been almost universally ignored in the West up to now and unknown in the East or South (except Zimbabwe).<sup>68</sup> At present, there is little to prevent China and the United States from taking the path to war except the balance of power and political wisdom. As the war in Europe illustrates, the former keeps breaking down. While each side's misrepresentation of the other offers a poor prognosis for reliance on the latter.

The unique feature of this Briefing is the multiplicity of conflicts faced by China, any one of which could be the scenario where a spark ignites a wider war with the United States. Yet there is a light shining from distant history which may bring hope to publics longing for peace:

- China accepted and incorporated Western science and technology (to add to its own distinguished history of inventiveness) from the mid-nineteenth century.
- Can the PRC and United States now adopt an irenical perspective in the twenty first century which neither have consciously done before but did implicitly in the 1970s, when *their rapprochement came out of their weakness*, and without seeing (before the Deng era) the consequences for their respective futures?

This then takes us to the role of politically impartial education – as science and technology are and religion and philosophy should be, but usually are not – without which the propensity for a favourable 'balance of peace' between China and the United States is negative.

Those answers to the Briefing questions (on page xvii) bring us to the criteria for judging future events affecting China and the soundness, or otherwise, of this Briefing's conclusions.

## 6. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE ANALYSIS AGAINST THE SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF EVENTS IN CHINA

### 6.1 Starting Point

The counterintuitive view that ‘Peaceful relations grow out of a recognition of weakness’ is the starting point in proposing criteria for judging outcomes in a conflict area. Conversely, the starting point for political systems and ideologies is the exploitation of weakness in other entities, varying only according to circumstances and in degree. Thus, the role of genuine education in assessing China’s vulnerabilities is to ensure that, simultaneously, the weaknesses of rival entities are also assessed and, crucially, whether the behavioural responses of each to the others are reciprocal in terms of the balances of power and peace.

### 6.2 Achieving a Balance

In practical terms this means avoiding the two scenarios described in section 4.1 (i) and (ii), viz. societal collapse and Great Power wars respectively, by a focus on (iii) achieving balances of power and peace in each conflict area.

The main risk to the PRC, which has been previously identified, is that of internal and external attempts to coerce China from a communist system – or, strictly speaking, a state socialist system aiming over the long term at becoming a communist and, therefore, stateless society<sup>69</sup> – to a liberal democracy. While those supporting or seeking this objective would see this as highly desirable, opponents in the CPC and elsewhere regard it as a potentially existential threat to peace and security in China that was revealed in its violent response on 4 June 1989. Hence the importance in the nuclear age of finding ways by which incompatible political systems can coexist and evolve in relationships which secure peace with economic prosperity.

It is within the political sphere that, inevitably, the struggle between rival constitutional systems of government will continue but it is for the educational sphere to help temper the heat of institutional rivalries by offering authoritative guidance on the balances that may best avoid the extremes of societal collapse in, or a Great Power War with, China.

Thus, drawing on the conclusions in section 5.2.1, the general criteria for assessing outcomes from Premises 1 (on internal relations) and 2 (on external relations) as described on pages 35 are:

- A. Premise 1: The enhanced role of politically impartial education in China and the main countries with which it has cultural relations, particularly the United States.
- B. Premise 2: The extent to which China and the relevant foreign entities in each conflict area listed below do or do not reciprocate and adopt these principles in relation to China:

*North v South Korea*: the criteria for evaluating the prospects for peace or war are set out in section 5.2.2 in relation to the role of the PRC.

*China v United States:*

Scenario (i): Were the future existence of the Chinese state to be at risk, and the control of the CPC, there is a high probability of its use of nuclear weapons against perceived enemies, internally or externally, rather than except defeat.

A further risk of such societal collapse and its consequences would arise from defeat in a Great Power war, such as might occur were the PRC to attempt a military invasion to recover the island of Taiwan and the United States to intervene in its defence.

Scenario (ii): No reason currently exists for a Great Power war to arise between China and the United States, such as over Taiwan, unless:

- Taiwan decides to make a formal declaration of independence from the PRC.
- The PRC decides to abandon its policy hitherto of not seeking territorial aggrandisement by conquests outside of China's existing borders.
- The PRC decides to start trying to impose its own Communist system of government on other countries in Asia or beyond.

Scenario (iii): Progress, or otherwise, in finding ways by which two incompatible systems of government can coexist in harmony with each other, such as between the island of Taiwan and the PRC under the one-China policy.

The adoption or not of an educational model such as the IPP Peace Games would be indicative of whether politically impartial education could play a constructive role prior to political negotiations between Beijing and Taipei seeking a peaceful reunification of China.

### 6.3 Adoption of an Irenical Perspective?

The overriding criterion for evaluating the conflict between China and the United States, and all related internal and external conflicts affecting China, is:

- C. Premises 1 and 2 combined in a manner consistent with an irenical perspective, as defined in this Briefing, then the prospects for peace in, and with, China would be optimal. And vice versa with respect to the prospects for war.

On the *military dimension* of each conflict between China and other internal or external entities (insofar as the relevant data is available), the prospects for war are based on the same two simple assumptions as contained in IPP Briefing No. 1:

- (i) The greater the imbalance in military power between parties in dispute the greater the likelihood of war (because either the more powerful side will be tempted to use that military might to enforce its will or the weaker side will resort to indirect military methods such as guerrilla war and terrorism);
- (ii) The greater the imbalance between one party's peaceful methods of conflict resolution as compared to others (the 'balance of peace') the greater the

likelihood of war (because lack of reciprocity tends eventually to undermine peaceful methods of conflict resolution in favour of military methods).

Or vice versa, in predicting the prospects for peace. An imbalance of military power need not matter if it is off-set by a favourable 'balance of peace' between the parties.

On the *economic (and environmental) dimension* of each conflict between China and other internal or external entities (insofar as the relevant data is available), the prospects for a trade war are adapted from the two assumptions of the military dimension:

- (iii) The greater the imbalance in economic power between parties in dispute the greater the likelihood of coercive relationships developing (because either the economically disadvantaged side will seek to act unilaterally or bilaterally to reduce its dependence, or the economically advantaged side will try to counteract those actions);
- (iv) The greater the imbalance between one party's cooperative methods of conflict resolution as compared to others (the 'balance of peace') the greater the likelihood of economic war (because lack of reciprocity tends eventually to undermine cooperative methods of conflict resolution in favour of coercive ones).

Or vice versa, in predicting the prospects for peace. An imbalance of economic power need not lead to a trade war if it is off-set by a favourable 'balance of peace' between the parties.

On the *institutional dimension* of each conflict between China and other internal or external entities (insofar as the relevant data is available), the prospects for war are adapted from the two assumptions of the military dimension:

- (v) The greater the incompatibility of institutional forms of governance between parties in dispute the greater the likelihood of coercive relationships developing into armed conflict (if either side seeks to impose its institutional system on the other);
- (vi) The greater the imbalance between one party's willingness to maintain cooperative relationships as compared to others despite institutional incompatibility (the 'balance of peace') the greater the likelihood of war (because lack of reciprocity tends eventually to undermine cooperative methods of conflict resolution in favour of coercive ones).

Or vice versa, in predicting the prospects for peace. An incompatibility of institutional systems need not matter if it is off-set by a favourable 'balance of peace' between the parties.

The next step would be to give mathematical expression to these relationships through the linked IT and data science project of IPP's Advanced Peace Game Trials.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS

The life and work of the Chinese philosopher, Confucius, is a reminder of the central themes of this Briefing. The rulers of his day appeared to find his ideas impractical, so he turned from politics to teaching. Eventually that vision had a greater impact on the history of China, and for a longer period, than perhaps any other until the early twentieth century. His apparent powerlessness in his day is mirrored by modern Chinese history where weakness since the mid-nineteenth century became the basis for the Republican revolution of 1911, then the Communist revolution of 1949 and, most dramatically of all, the Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s leading to the modern, wealthier and powerful China of today.

The recent history of Prodem (1992-2000) and its successor body, IPP (2000-to date), is unique in highlighting and documenting systematically the balance of peaceful methods of resolving international conflicts. That role, as far as this author is aware, has enabled forecasts on the direction of those conflicts that no one else has been able to match in accuracy so far, despite IPP providing an opportunity in the Peace Games 2020 for rival contestants to do so.

These recommendations are, therefore, addressed to anyone in every country of the world, especially China and the United States, who acknowledges the public benefit of education in the differing means of securing a state of peace and avoiding a state of war.<sup>70</sup>

- I. *To understand or refute the claim that ‘Peaceful relations grow out of a recognition of weakness’ by participation in the IPP Advanced Trials to follow this Briefing. This principle of the ‘balance of peace’ complements and does not reject the traditional ‘balance of power’ as this author has illustrated. Reflect on whether the most powerful military alliance in world history, without a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons, secured peace in Afghanistan by August 2021 or in Europe by February 2022?<sup>71</sup>*
- II. *To decide whether education – but only of the politically impartial and scientific kind – constitutes the ‘third leg’ of the tripod, after politics and the military, needed to secure a state of peace and avoid war. As such, in this author’s experience, it can barely be said to exist outside of IPP in England and Wales and not at all in the United States, as far as the application of research findings go. Obviously, it does exist in terms of high quality political and social science research and this China Briefing is beholden to it.*

One of the most famous US Presidents, Abraham Lincoln, who led the country through the trauma of the American civil war (1861-1865) said in a speech on 19 November 1863:

That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.<sup>72</sup>

He spoke before the nuclear age began on 6 August 1945 after which it may be asked whether any form of government on earth can survive another Great Power war? If there is any doubt:

- III. *To apply, in the nuclear age, ‘an irenic perspective’ as a fundamental principle to secure that peace... yet mainly by the voluntary means of faith and reason.*

## REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> . See Appendix G.

<sup>2</sup> . At the time these words were written (January 2022) a NATO-Russia conflict over a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine was daily news. By the time this chapter was complete Russia had invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. In this case the ‘spark’ was the breakdown in diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to differences between Russia and Ukraine, and Russia and NATO, which the United States did predict politically, using military intelligence between December 2021 and February 2022. The ‘propensity’ or climate for war arising out of the ending of the Cold War was predicted in Peter Southwood’s four out of six Briefings of the Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem) in 1993-1995, as summarised in this China Briefing especially Appendix G. Short-term political predictions differ from long term educational ones in that the former are, or may be, under the control of state institutions whereas long term educational forecasts on the climate for peace or war are not.

<sup>3</sup> . See Carnwath J. in Southwood & Parsons v H M Attorney General, High Court Case No: CH 1995 S No. 5856 concerning the Project on Demilitarisation (9 October 1998), especially para. 26 which was influenced by the US case of Parkhurst v Burrill [1917] 117 NE 39 in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. On appeal see Chadwick LJ in Southwood & Parsons v H M Attorney General, Court of Appeal No: CHANF 98/1405/CMS3 concerning the Project on Demilitarisation (28 June 2000), especially paras 25-31. For copies of the Prodem judgments, see: <http://www.ipp2000.org/ipplaw.html>

<sup>4</sup> . Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (Vintage Books, 2013) and Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Penguin Books, 1979). Another work of special interest is Robert Bickers, Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination (Penguin Books, 2018). This work covers much of the period covered by Westad but in a more ‘micro’ way, i.e. providing a useful picture of events on the ground at certain critical moments in the history of Republican, and then Communist, Chinese history. It is less adaptable for the purposes of this Briefing but see Appendix C, section C2 for Bickers’ observations on two Western educational bodies in Republican China.

<sup>5</sup> . Daniel K. Gardner’s Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>6</sup> . *Ibid*, pp. 70-71.

<sup>7</sup> . *Ibid*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>8</sup> . Following publication of this China Briefing, IPP has funding to initiate an IT/data science project to develop a computer model to test mathematically the predictions arising therefrom. If successful, this model might be applied more widely to other conflict areas around the globe to give advance warning of a propensity for a state of war or peace, as scientifically determined.

<sup>9</sup> . See Peter Southwood (ed.), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Briefings on the Prospects for Peace, Briefing No. 1 (International Peace Project, January 2006), p. 28 at <http://www.ipp2000.org/index.html> (bottom of home page).

<sup>10</sup> . Lukas Filler, ‘Chinese Views of the Role of Morality in International Relations and the Use of Force’ (electronic doctoral thesis, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, United Kingdom, September 2016). Accessed through the British Library.

<sup>11</sup> . See note 3 above.

<sup>12</sup> . Peter Southwood, General Editor and Editor Series A, Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem): The Triumph of Unilateralism: The Failure of Western Militarism, Briefing No. 1 (Prodem, March 1993), 69pp ISBN 1-898079-00-5; NATO’s Military Supremacy: What is It For? Briefing A/1 (Prodem, September 1993), 44pp ISBN 1-898079-10-2; Western Generals: The Dangers from British and American Military Success, Briefing A/2 (Prodem, School of Business and Economic Studies, University of Leeds, April 1994), 53pp ISBN 1-898079-20-X; Military Adventurism: Learning From the Past – Looking to the Future, Briefing A/3 (SBES, University of Leeds, October 1995), 79pp ISBN 1-898079-25-0. All available through Legal Deposit libraries in the UK and Ireland. (Details of the Series B and C Prodem Briefings, edited by Steve Schofield, are omitted here but available on the back cover of the Series A Briefings.)

<sup>13</sup> . However, refer to Appendix G where the method and results of this author’s Prodem Briefings are reported in detail by way of comparison to Graham Allison’s history project.

<sup>14</sup> . The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, chapters 1 and 2. The valuable contributions of Professor Raphael Israeli and Cheryl A. Rubenberg respectively, as summarised by Peter Southwood from their books, provide an Israeli and a Palestinian perspective based on different methods of analysis that are specific to that conflict.

<sup>15</sup> . The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 37-38. The three assumptions referred to in the quotation are not relevant here but can be found on p. 30.



- <sup>16</sup> . Ibid, pp. 38-39. The section referred to in the quotation is 3.3.
- <sup>17</sup> . The main source is the *Financial Times* (various dates); and *The Economist* (22 May 2021).
- <sup>18</sup> . *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, section 3.3, p.30.
- <sup>19</sup> . See Appendix G.
- <sup>20</sup> . See Appendix A, p. 94 and Appendix C, pp. 124-25.
- <sup>21</sup> . Westad, p. 8.
- <sup>22</sup> . The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 should prove a case in point.
- <sup>23</sup> . The United States and its NATO allies withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021 in chaotic circumstances following the fall of the Afghan government and collapse of its armed forces, analogous to the US withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1975.
- <sup>24</sup> . See 'North Korea: A Decade of Despair', *The Economist* (18 December 2021), pp. 44-45.
- <sup>25</sup> . Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, 'World Nuclear Forces' in *SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021), pp. 395 and 397.
- <sup>26</sup> . Naturally, during the current war in Ukraine (2022), any negotiations involving the USA and Russia might not be possible.
- <sup>27</sup> . The most serious border clashes in decades occurred between Indian and Chinese soldiers in June 2020. Although both sides insisted no bullets were fired there were fatalities: [India-China clash: 20 Indian troops killed in Ladakh fighting - BBC News](#) (16 June 2020).
- <sup>28</sup> . Pasha L. Hsieh, 'Rethinking Non-Recognition: Taiwan's New Pivot to ASEAN and the One-China Policy', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2020), pp. 210-11 citing Bureau of Foreign Trade, 'Taiwan's Trade Situation Across Various Continents for the Months of January-August 2018' (Economic and Trade Issues, International Trade Situation Analysis, China Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade) – accessed by Hsieh on 25 December 2018.
- <sup>29</sup> . Hsieh, p. 217.
- <sup>30</sup> . Ibid, p. 210.
- <sup>31</sup> . Truong Quang Hoan, Dong Van Chung and Nguyen Huy Hoang, 'Taiwan-ASEAN Trade Relations: Trade Structure and Trade in Value Added', *China Report*, vol. 55, no. 2 (2019), p. 120.
- <sup>32</sup> . Ming Wan, *The Political Economy of East Asia: Wealth and Power*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Edward Elgar, 2020), pp. 73-76.
- <sup>33</sup> . *World Economic Outlook: Recovery During a Pandemic* (IMF, October 2021), Statistical Appendix, p. 88.
- <sup>34</sup> . Ibid, downloaded database on 30 December 2021.
- <sup>35</sup> . 'Economic Sanctions: SWIFT Thinking', *The Economist* (18 December 2021), pp. 58-59.
- <sup>36</sup> . For the background to BRI, see the official China website at: [beltAndRoad \(www.gov.cn\)](http://beltandroad.gov.cn)
- <sup>37</sup> . See [What is China's Belt and Road Initiative \(BRI\)? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank](#)
- <sup>38</sup> . Robert B. Marks, *China: An Environmental History*, second edition (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
- <sup>39</sup> . See 'Trade Unions: Teaching Them a Lesson', *The Economist*, 21 August 2021, pp. 41-42.
- <sup>40</sup> . Yaechan Lee, 'Economic Interdependence and Peace: A Case Comparison Between the US-China and US-Japan Trade Disputes', *East Asia*, no. 35 (2018), pp. 215-32.
- <sup>41</sup> . See [Norman Angell - Wikipedia](#) for a brief summary.
- <sup>42</sup> . This is the 'Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea' signed on 11 July 1961 published in *Peking Review*, vol. 4, no. 28, at p.5. Before discovering the alliance with North Korea, Peter Southwood wrote to the Defence Attaché in the Chinese Embassy in the UK on 11 January 2022 to try to clarify this point but did not receive a response.
- <sup>43</sup> . 'U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea' Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State, 22 September 2020), at [U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea - United States Department of State](#)
- <sup>44</sup> . 'The New Geopolitics of Asia: Enter AUKUS', Briefing, *The Economist* (25 September 2021), pp. 21-26.
- <sup>45</sup> . See [PM Statement on AUKUS Partnership: 15 September 2021 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#) This statement did not refer to the number of nuclear-powered boats Australia might acquire.
- <sup>46</sup> . See [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership \(RCEP\) agreement to enter into force on 1 January 2022 – RCEP \(rcepsec.org\)](#) – accessed on 12 January 2022.
- <sup>47</sup> . Hsieh, pp. 205 and 220-21; and [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\) | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade \(dfat.gov.au\)](#) – accessed on 12 January 2022.

- <sup>48</sup> . Hsieh, p. 221; and Zoey Zhang, 'Joining CPTPP: What China Needs to Do and Comparison with the RCEP', China Briefing (Dezan Shira & Associates, 13 October 2021) at: [China's Bid to Join the CPTPP: What it Must Overcome and Other Issues \(china-briefing.com\)](#) - accessed on 12 January 2022.
- <sup>49</sup> . Hsieh, p. 221.
- <sup>50</sup> . 'Problems of War and Strategy' in Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. II (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967), p. 224.
- <sup>51</sup> . See [China joins Russia in opposing Nato expansion - BBC News](#) (4 February 2022) including a weblink to the joint statement of Russia and the PRC.
- <sup>52</sup> . Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Scribe, 2018 reprinted 2020), p. vii.
- <sup>53</sup> . Allison, p. 41.
- <sup>54</sup> . *Ibid*, p. 281.
- <sup>55</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), 'Statement of Purpose', p. iii.
- <sup>56</sup> . See note 12 for details of the Prodem Briefings. The quotation is from The Triumph of Unilateralism, Prodem Briefing No. 1 (March 1993), 'Statement of Purpose', p. iii.
- <sup>57</sup> . Allison, p. 136 citing Huntington's essay in Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 22.
- <sup>58</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p. 7. To be clear, this conclusion is Southwood's not Keegan's.
- <sup>59</sup> . Allison, pp. 146-47. Emphasis added by Southwood. See also section 2.2.1, penultimate paragraph on whether the rules-based order reflects how the world really 'works'; and Table G1, end of section 3, for further comparisons between Allison and Southwood.
- <sup>60</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), pp. 38-39 and Appendix E, especially pp. 74-76.
- <sup>61</sup> . Allison, p. 184.
- <sup>62</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p. 76.
- <sup>63</sup> . Allison, pp. 214-28.
- <sup>64</sup> . Allison, pp. 234-35.
- <sup>65</sup> . See the joint Russia-PRC statement referred to in note 51 above.
- <sup>66</sup> . International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021 (Routledge, 2021), refers in the data section for Taiwan to the possibility of US sales of, inter alia, long-range precision-strike missiles 'which, if these sales proceeded, would significantly boost Taiwan's military capabilities' [page number unclear in digital version].
- <sup>67</sup> . Examples include the attempt by the Soviet Union to sustain a communist party in Afghanistan following its invasion of that country in 1979; and the United States' attempt to inculcate a form of liberal democracy there post-2001. The multi-party democracy in Iraq, developed after the US-led occupation of Iraq in 2003, has survived so far despite endemic problems of popular legitimacy and a continuing low-level insurgency.
- <sup>68</sup> . Since 2010 IPP has pioneered an educational programme in the Republic of Zimbabwe, in cooperation with a local non-governmental organisation called the Southern Institute of Peace-building and Development (SIPD). It is called 'Peace and the Constitution of Zimbabwe', based on the new constitution approved in a referendum in March 2013, and aimed at educating young people in constitutionality and peaceful means of conflict resolution. A pilot project was carried out in a non-partisan way in 2014 with the permission of the relevant local authorities. Once the pandemic is over, the course is ready to roll-out across the country.
- <sup>69</sup> . See 'Constitution of the Communist Party of China', Revised and Adopted at the 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 24 October 2017, 'General Program'; and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Vintage, 2010), originally published in 1848. The latter states, under 'II Proletarians and Communists', 'When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another... In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.' What is unclear is how that happy state of society, in which a Golden Rule would be respected universally, would come about by political action alone.
- <sup>70</sup> . This terminology repeats the objects clause of the IPP Declaration of Trust of 2 November 2002.
- <sup>71</sup> . With respect to peace in Europe, the key document against which to make an assessment is: 'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance'. NATO Review, no. 4 (August 1990), pp. 32-33.
- <sup>72</sup> . J M and M J Cohen, The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations (Penguin Books, 1974), p. 235.

## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX A – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

### A1 Introduction

Modern Chinese history can be dated from the Qing dynasty beginning in 1644. While a brief look at the pre-Modern era will also be undertaken, the main focus has to be on the impact of Western intervention in China from the mid-1800s, which has had such consequences for East-West relations ever since. Once China became a nuclear weapon state in 1964, the risks for the world arising from any collapse into civil conflict or war have grown ever more serious.

There are three research questions to be addressed in assessing China's modern history:

- Q.1 What factors have produced the explosions (or implosions) of armed violence in Chinese history since AD 1750?
- Q.2 What factors in recent Chinese history, since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, have led to explosions (or implosions) of armed violence, internally or externally, or may do so in the future?
- Q.3 What factors in the future of the PRC, domestically and internationally, are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

### A2 Method of Analysis

This analysis is based on the adoption of an irenic perspective, i.e. seeking to identify from the historical sources what factors emphasised, and what undermined, peaceful means of conflict resolution. In practical terms, this involves comparing the 'balance of (coercive) power' between the parties in dispute and their balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution or 'balance of peace' over the short and long term to determine the direction of a conflict to peace or war.

Naturally, in many instances sufficient information may not be available, or would take too long to obtain, in order to fully apply this method. However, it may still be possible, on an initial reading of selected sources, to gain some insight into the relative reliance on force ('power of coercion') and reason ('power of cooperation') between the parties in dispute that provided the impetus to armed violence at pivotal moments in Chinese history. The influence of Confucianism, or lack of it, at differing times is an interesting case in point although the principal features of this philosophical and ethical system are considered in Appendix B.

The main source on China since the Qing Dynasty, as summarised here, is Odd Arne Westad's Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750. This book is suitable because of its factual, strategic coverage of the period with specific attention paid to China's foreign relations. A longer-term perspective on class relations is provided by relevant facts in Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. This latter work seems especially apt in view of the Communist takeover in China in 1949. Other sources offer additional facts,<sup>1</sup> but a multiplicity of titles is not required unless there is dispute over their reliability, which is not so in most historical examples relevant here.

### A3 The Pre-Modern Era

The historian J M Roberts noted the long history of Chinese civilisation, and the unique contribution of China's great schools of ethics (especially Confucianism), as features which strikingly differentiated it from Western tradition.<sup>2</sup>

Another factor in ensuring its continuity was that an administrative elite provided a culture which survived the collapse of dynasties and empires, thereby providing continuity and a written record from very early times. A long process from the Shang dynasty, around 1700 BC, involving conquest, consolidation, collapse and new conquest led eventually to the unification of China in 221 BC by the Ch'in dynasty, known as Qin in the latest *pinyin* transliteration, but the former gave the country its name.<sup>3</sup>

Under the Han dynasty (206 BC to AD 220) entry into the civil service was by competitive examination focused on training in the Confucian classics – its ideological rival, legalism, lost its grip. Thereby, literacy and political culture were welded together as nowhere else. In China the bureaucracy maintained Confucian values rather like the moral supremacy of the clergy in the West but there was no Church to rival the State.<sup>4</sup>

Under this structure China's civilisation became self-contained, self-sufficient and stable despite the passing of dynasties. Such changes as did take place were contained and regulated to sustain traditional structures. Confucian principles taught that government should be obeyed – it possessed 'the mandate of heaven' – but a government which provoked a rebellion it could not control ought to be replaced because it had become illegitimate. Confucian teaching supported the distinction of spheres of action and so ensured dynasties could be changed without compromising the fundamental structure and values of society.<sup>5</sup>

Two other features of Chinese civilisation are worth highlighting, in view of their significance when the clash with Western values came about: Chinese inventiveness include paper in the second century AD and printing in tenth. Many books were published in China long before anywhere else. However, this did not produce a dynamic, progressive society because, in spite of inventions, there was generally a low rate of innovation e.g., a magnetic compass invented centuries before the Ming dynasty (1368 to 1644) was used for public relations purposes rather than voyages of exploration and discovery. Casting in iron was known to the Chinese fifteen centuries before Europeans yet the engineering potential was left unexplored. It proved difficult for China to learn from those outside due to its Confucian tradition and the confidence generated by its great wealth and remoteness.<sup>6</sup>

In the military sphere, this is illustrated by the invention of gunpowder, which the Chinese had before anyone else but could not make guns as effective as the Europeans nor deploy effectively those made for them by European craftsmen.<sup>7</sup> This had important consequences when Western countries began to make their presence felt in China during the nineteenth century.

#### A4 The Modern Era – Qing Dynasty, 1644 to 1912

Chinese ways of viewing the world are directly influenced by its history so it is necessary to understand their past, and the impact it continues to have, in order to navigate the future. In the Chinese view, the foreign world has treated China unfairly in the past two hundred years – this grievance remains a constant in China’s international relations. Many Chinese in nineteenth thought they were being forced into an international society characterised more by *chaos* than rules. A sense of its own centrality is a crucial component of the Chinese mindset which makes it difficult for some of them to understand other world views.<sup>8</sup>

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Qing empire dominated East Asia. Their armies relied on highly mobile cavalry, firearms and artillery, and effective logistics. The Qing sought to create a great multicultural dynastic state with universalistic values. This universalism drove the empire in the later eighteenth century to engage in costly military expeditions at its frontiers, such as with Burma in 1760s and Vietnam in the 1780s. These emptied the imperial treasury and led to a state of exhaustion by early nineteenth century.<sup>9</sup>

In view of its current salience, it is worth noting that the Qing conquered Taiwan by 1683. Tributary relationships existed between the Qing empire and many surrounding countries but not, in practice, with Japan.<sup>10</sup>

By the early nineteenth century China was suffering the consequences of imperial overreach arising from Emperor Qianlong’s belief in military solutions to China’s many border problems.<sup>11</sup>

Western attacks on China, starting with the Opium War in 1839 meant the empire had less time to adapt and change than might have been expected. The Qing faced a revolution in thought and behaviour created in continuous interaction with the outside world.<sup>12</sup>

Two major trends in the development of the domestic economy of nineteenth century China were:

- (i) The relative impoverishment of the periphery as the State disintegrated; and
- (ii) A shift in the patterns of trade in rich Chinese coastal areas from the interior of China to abroad, mainly South-East Asia.<sup>13</sup>

The combined result of uneven economic growth was to create, in mid- to late-nineteenth century China, a much more unequal and less well integrated China than a century before.

Still more crucial were Western incursions into the country resulting in the establishment in the 1840s and 1850s of foreign-controlled enclaves inside China, which became key to its economic development. Linked to this was the beginning of a profound transformation in attitudes towards their economy.<sup>14</sup>

While ‘Han’ Chinese are the ethnically dominant group in China the empire embraced many ethnicities and religions. Imperial China had no idea of the nation such as that slowly emerging in Europe.<sup>15</sup> Chinese people accepted the legitimacy of the imperial State but their primary identities were local or clan-oriented. The Qing inherited from earlier dynasties a value system that regarded Chinese values as superior to those of other peoples.

The Qing opened up two zones of trade with European powers:

- Russia based on, and regulated by, the Kiakhta treaty of 1727;
- Seaborne trade of European merchants by the Canton system based (from the mid-eighteenth century) on setting up the port of Guangzhou (Canton) as the only harbour open to Western trading ships. Foreigners, mostly from the British East India Company (EIC) could only come during the October to March trading season; obtain a Chinese permit when passing through Portuguese-held Macao; then anchor at Huangpu, south of Guangzhou. Trade could only be with licensed Chinese merchants – taxes and duties accruing to the Qing.<sup>16</sup>

#### A4.1 The Opium War of 1839-1842

Opium was a prime concern to the emperor and his advisers. As the drug was used increasingly in the early nineteenth century, the authorities were anxious about its effects. From 1796 there had been a total ban on opium import. However, for Britain the China trade in opium had suddenly become profitable and sizeable. It had a monopoly on opium production in India and private investors profited from selling the drug in China especially after the EIC's monopoly was abolished in 1833. Efforts by the emperor's commissioner to eliminate opium smuggling, including a letter to Queen Victoria, resulted in the British changing the subject to one about Britain's honour, trade access and, finally, which empire's trade rules were supreme.

The Sino-British or Opium War broke out in March 1839 because the Qing authorities tried to protect vessels from abroad seeking to break the British embargo. The British foreign secretary made military enforcement of the embargo the centrepiece of his policy relying on the superiority of the British navy. In 1842 the emperor sued for peace and, subsequently, Britain and China signed the Treaty of Nanjing in August that year. Its terms involved China accepting the opening of Guangzhou, and four other ports north to Shanghai, for direct trade with foreigners. The island of Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in perpetuity and China paid British merchants reparations for being driven out of Guangzhou. A treaty signed the following year gave Britain full extraterritoriality – i.e. full exemption from local laws – for all its subjects in China. The resulting loss of prestige for the Qing was considerable.<sup>17</sup>

#### A4.2 Christian Missionaries and the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864

The impact of Christian missionaries on China's relations with, and knowledge of, the West had been significant since their arrival centuries before, although the number of Chinese converts was few. Despite an attempted crackdown in the early 1800s by the Qing, the Protestant awakenings in Britain and the United States in the 1820s and 1830s, together with growing trade, resulted in many more missionaries operating on the margins of the empire. The number of converts remained small but it irritated Chinese officials.<sup>18</sup>

However, the major threat came from new and militant forms of religion within China itself. In 1843, in the wake of the Chinese defeat in the Opium War, Hong Xiuquan announced that he was the son of God and younger brother to Jesus Christ. He set out on a long march to Guangxi to win adherents. He and his 'gospel' attracted the poor and dispossessed and

eventually made of them a formidable army. By 1850 he turned the tables on his movement's persecutors by mobilising an army of 20,000 and began laying siege to cities in south central China. The next year he announced the formation of a 'Christian' state in China called Taiping Tianguo, the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace. Its aims were to drive the Manchus (who established the Qing dynasty in 1644) from power and establish Hong Xiuquan and his elder brother Jesus as the source of all authority. This resulted in a 13-year war which killed at least 20 million people and devastated large parts of south, central and eastern China. The Taiping rebels believed great peace would be established when the Heavenly Kingdom joined with its foreign brethren to form a universal Christian state. While the promise to set wrongs right won many adherents it also alienated most local elites who by the late 1850s started joining the Qing to defeat the Taiping Rebellion. The movement was finally destroyed in 1864. Other rebel groups were also defeated in the 1860s and early 1870s: the Nian in east central China; Muslim rebels in Yunnan and Xinjiang; and local insurgents in south China. They were gradually overcome or forced into remote areas where some survived to fight another day and under different banners.<sup>19</sup>

The processes of change coming out of Chinese society in the eighteenth century, and the consequences of Western incursions in the nineteenth century, would have seemed less painful without the cataclysmic wars of the mid-1800s because they split Chinese society and made it more vulnerable to economic exploitation and social devastation. That the Qing overcame the Taiping and other rebellions did, though, show its resilience.<sup>20</sup>

#### A4.3 The Second Opium War, 1856-1860

During the Qing's period of greatest stress in 1856, Western powers chose to continue their (opium) wars against China to force further trade concessions. When the Qing resisted, British and French troops landed at ports in the north and moved towards Beijing. Although beaten back at first, these attacks were renewed in 1860. After Beijing was occupied the Yuanmingyuan, the Gardens of Eternal Brightness – completed in 1750 at the height of the Qing empire – were plundered and burnt by British and French troops.<sup>21</sup>

#### A4.4 The Tongzhi Restoration

In the mid-nineteenth century the great rebellions had reduced the Qing to their weakest point and foreign empires recognised this. Many Westerners thought it would collapse; it was compared to the Ottoman empire, with a gradual breaking away of the smaller parts to leave a 'core only'.<sup>22</sup>

However, in 1870s and 1880s the Qing staged a comeback. Their Self-strengthening Movement – also known as the Tongzhi restoration (which might be compared to the contemporaneous Meiji restoration in Japan) – was founded on Western form, especially in defence and science, combined with Chinese essence which meant Confucianism. China could use Western weapons and technology to defend itself while keeping Chinese culture as the unwavering pivot of its empire. Policies developed by Li Hongzhang and other reformers preserved the Qing dynasty for a time by giving it a new lease of life.<sup>23</sup>



#### A4.5 Competing Imperialisms

In the late nineteenth century, Westerners were becoming central to Asian commerce and trade. And only a generation after the West forced Japan to open its borders to trade, Japan became an imperialist power itself. Britain, though, remained the major foreign power in China. It controlled key bases and depots for developing trade in Singapore, Hong Kong and – to a great extent – Shanghai. However, these depots for East Asian trade were Chinese cities run as much by Chinese networks as by the British authorities. At the same time the Chinese became travellers and emigrants to the rest of the world. They covered the globe with no area excepted.<sup>24</sup>

Before the First World War, there were 48 ‘treaty ports’ where foreigners had the right to settle, conduct business and be protected under extra-territoriality by their own consuls. In the main treaty ports were concessions, or settlements, which were almost entirely under foreign jurisdiction. They were maintained by Western powers using gunboats in Chinese waters whenever they deemed it necessary to enforce conditions on Chinese cities. Although unequal and oppressive to the Chinese, some of these concessions did expand ideas of Western law and attempt adoption of international law to regulate the multinational presence in China. The treaty-port system was unwieldy, composite and varied not conforming to a single model. The most important were the large concessions in Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Wuhan with German- and Russian-leased areas of Qingdao and Harbin as special cases. These zones helped create modern China. Shanghai through its ‘international’, French and Chinese sections was the concession city par excellence and became, from the late nineteenth century, China’s prime industrial centre.<sup>25</sup>

#### A4.6 Religion, Education and Science

In the mid-1800s Christian missions sprung up in the treaty ports and missionaries spread to most parts of China. Despite official and popular resentment, Christian missions had a bigger impact on education and science than on religion. Christian faith did have a deep impact on some parts of Chinese society. While social and economic dislocation provided a fertile soil for Christianity, the link with foreign aggression reduced the effectiveness of the missionaries’ message. The sense that Christians were one of many Western groups out to destroy the existing order in China harmed their cause and undermined the goodwill on which its expansion depended. Confucian officialdom remained very hostile to Christians. However, two more receptive communities were women and ethnic minorities. Missionaries frequently learnt Chinese and so became translators and interpreters of China to the West and vice versa.<sup>26</sup>

Qing China put a strong emphasis on education. In the late nineteenth century, though, the content and organisation of education changed. China now had schools run by missionary societies as well as secular schools which focused on science, not just the classics. After 1900 schools for women spread. While far into the twentieth century most Chinese continued to go to schools which gave little attention to Western science or languages, some students who did receive education outside of the Confucian curriculum became crucial bridgebuilders between two contrasting visions of human existence. The most prominent was Sun Yat-sen

who became first president of the Chinese republic in 1911. By 1905, when the Qing abolished imperial examinations, Chinese education was becoming a hybrid of Confucian didactic values and empirical study.<sup>27</sup>

#### A4.7 Closing Years of the Qing Dynasty

By 1900 the Sino-Western amalgams emerging in the cities had further divided China into two parts:

- (i) A huge countryside with little or no foreign presence; and
- (ii) A group of urban islands where a new international society was developing.

Tensions between the new and the old, rural and urban – both exacerbated by foreigners – threatened to split China apart.<sup>28</sup>

#### A4.8 Qing Relations with Japan Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95

Although its islands never belonged to China, Chinese culture, script and religion have influenced Japan for over a thousand years. While, in the mid-nineteenth century, China saw Japan as an inspiration and a potential ally in its struggle with the West, from the mid-1880s the Qing began to regard Japan as a rival. In 1894-95 these two countries fought a destructive war resulting in a military defeat for the Qing; Korea and Taiwan became Japanese protectorates and later colonies. China's humiliation and the subsequent collapse of the Qing (in 1911) provided the Japanese elite with what they regarded as a civilising mission in China like that pursued by European great powers in Africa and South Asia.<sup>29</sup>

During the Tokugawa period in Japan, between 1603 and 1868, contact with the outside world was limited but trade with China never fully ended. Many leading intellectuals revered China as the centre of East Asian Confucianism. However, from the late eighteenth century, Japanese thinking moved towards an unfavourable contrast between their own perceived superior qualities – e.g. thrift and industry – and the supposed failings of the Chinese – e.g. perversions and indolence. Following the Qing's losses to the West, and the great internal rebellions it faced in the mid-nineteenth century, that negative view became a flood of criticism. As the two peoples looked alike, the troubles of their larger neighbour negatively affected Japan too. Rescuing the Chinese from their debasement became a racial task for the Japanese, in the mind of part of their elite, in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>30</sup>

Chinese views of Japan also went through wide variations in the period to the 1920s. From a view of the Japanese as eastern barbarians who had cut themselves off from the imperial centre, the belief of what Japan represented started to change in the mid-nineteenth century. Chinese visitors commented favourably on Japanese willingness to adopt Western knowledge and technology in the Meiji era. While some Chinese were critical of perceived Japanese desertion of a Confucian worldview, those eager to see Westernising reform in China itself saw Japan as the example of an Asian society transforming itself into a stronger and better entity. Mixed with this was a fear of Japan's growing power through conflict and war.<sup>31</sup>

The Meiji Restoration in Japan went much further than the Tongzhi Restoration in China. From the 1860s profound changes were carried through by a Meiji elite determined to save Japan

from foreign control and instability at home by creating a new Japan that was outward-looking, industrialised and militarised. In the early 1880s, Japan moved towards a new constitution and a parliamentary political system. The Meiji leaders sought to abolish the unequal treaties that the Western countries had imposed in the decade before the Restoration. They sought to engage more fully on the Asian mainland and soon attempted to impose on China the same kind of unequal treaties which they wanted abolished in Japan.<sup>32</sup>

#### A4.9 Korea and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95

Korea had been the key state in the Sino-centric international system in the region. It was closer to China than any other independent country. Its Confucian scholars wrote in Chinese and regarded Korea as close to China but still distinct. Korean elites acted as a bridge between China and Japan. Chinese script arrived in Japan via Korea in the fourth century AD and Buddhism the same way two centuries later. But by mid-nineteenth century the flow of ideas began to be reversed, yet Koreans still put China first.<sup>33</sup>

After a naval incident between Japan and Korea in September 1875, the Japanese government insisted on the signing of a Western-style treaty with Korea. While the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876 did not give Japan extraterritoriality it did open-up Korea to trade as an independent state without recognising its tributary relationship to China.<sup>34</sup>

By the early 1890s Korean society was fragmenting as a new religion called Tonghak (Eastern Learning) called on the Korean people to rebel against foreign influence. Based mostly on peasants from some of the most impoverished regions of the country, the Tonghaks defined Koreans as a separate nation and linked up with reformist officials in Seoul who wanted to emphasise Korean identity vis-à-vis the two other countries in the region. When the Tonghaks marched on Seoul the Korean king asked for Chinese help in putting down the rebellion. After Japan had been notified by China of its troop deployment, in accord with the Tianjin Protocol of 1885, the Japanese sent their own troops, ostensibly for the protection of their civilians. The scene was set for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. After attempts to avoid conflict failed, the Chinese land forces were decisively beaten on 15 November 1894 by superior Japanese organisation, logistics and firepower. The following day China's navy was also heavily defeated. Japanese forces then entered Manchuria by sea and land as well as landing on the Shandong peninsular and Taiwan. The Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 required China to recognise the independence of Korea (under Japan's protection); pay substantial reparations; cede Taiwan and the Penghu islands; open more treaty ports on the Yangzi river; and allow Japanese to manage factories in China. This heavy defeat led to a deep crisis amongst the Chinese rulers.<sup>35</sup>

In 1910 Japan fully annexed Korea at a time of heightened Korean nationalism.<sup>36</sup>

#### A4.10 Japanese Colonisation of Taiwan in 1895

The Japanese occupation of Taiwan in 1895 led to protests by Chinese nationalists. It became Japan's first colony. The colonisers viewed the population as comprising three groups: Chinese who would go back to the mainland; Chinese who would become loyal to Tokyo; and aboriginals who could be kept in a permanently weakened position. When China and Japan

again went to war in 1937 many Taiwanese were caught in the dilemma of the two sources of their identity. Before then, Chinese leadership on the island in the 1920s and 1930s were divided between those who sought more autonomy for Taiwan under Japan and those who hoped for reunification with the mainland.<sup>37</sup>

#### A4.11 Qing Relations with Japan After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95

For the Empress Dowager Cixi and much of the Court, China had given up too much of its Confucian 'core' requiring an appeal to justice and reason to correct the wrongdoings of people inside and outside the empire. However, for many Chinese such an appeal was meaningless in the face of the country's humiliation. Demands for reform emerged and younger members of the elite thought China could not survive unless society and the state were fundamentally changed. An intellectual mass rebellion by younger members of the elite flourished briefly, and attracted support from the young Guangxu emperor himself for the fundamental reforms proposed by Kang Youwei, but it was suppressed by the Empress Dowager in September 1898 and a number of reformers were executed. She felt that she alone stood between the empire and chaos. In her view, and that of traditionalists, reforms would be useless if adopting them meant China lost its Confucian soul.<sup>38</sup>

Many exiles from China including Kang fled to Japan where they received education, set up organisations to advocate fundamental changes in their homeland and discuss the key concepts of nationalism and republicanism in the first decade of the twentieth century. Most Chinese still preferred to see China as an empire governed by ancient principles and having a common culture rather than being a nation. Japanese and Western examples jarred with this view so Chinese republicanism developed in exile, primarily in Japan. However, such ideas about nation and governance would have little part to play in the demise of the Qing empire.<sup>39</sup>

Although Japan's victory over China in 1895 meant that China was no longer the centre of East Asian international relations, it did not mean that Japan replaced it. As the Meiji leaders had feared, the European powers and the United States were aiming to prevent the region being dominated by one power, especially an Asian one.<sup>40</sup>

Russia's defeat by Japan in its war of 1904-05 meant that Russia's advance into China had been stopped but Japan's accelerated. The Portsmouth Treaty resulting from the conference, held under the aegis of the US President, transferred Russia's possessions in (southern) Manchuria to Japan and the southern part of Sakhalin Island. Although sovereignty remained with the Qing empire, Japan had now become the main power in northern and north-eastern China. The apparent powerlessness of the Qing, who had not even been invited to attend the Portsmouth conference, led to a public outcry and compelled them to agree to a constitution and a national assembly.<sup>41</sup>

## A5 The Modern Era – Chinese Republic, 1912-1949

### A5.1 Steps to Revolution, 1898-1912

A series of political convulsions in the early twentieth century led to the foundation of the Republic of China and deeply affected future foreign relationships. In 1900 many ordinary Chinese organised violent demonstrations against the foreign presence which became known in the West as the Boxer Rebellion. In 1911 regional elites across the country revolted against the Qing and the army mutinied compelling the mother of the four-year old emperor to issue his abdication. China became, by imperial decree, a republic although few knew what that meant.<sup>42</sup>

Between 1900 and the late 1920s China experienced many different regimes, interventions by foreign powers and powerful provincial rulers. The Qing empire was replaced by a series of weak central governments whose authority gradually became restricted on most matters to only a part of northern China around the capital, Beijing. This was a period of huge flux in people's daily lives and how the Chinese viewed themselves and their country. Despite this China remained an integrated state with enough cohesion for central government to conduct foreign relations. That China's borders today are much as they were in late Qing times testifies to this idea of a unified state. Additionally, no foreign state wanted the breakup of China preferring to work through a weak central government.<sup>43</sup>

The other main factor in early twentieth century China was the increasing Chinese capability in all sectors of the economy. This meant adapting Chinese methods to foreign technologies and creating new forms of authority and self-conceptions. By 1937 China had developed a small but significant Western-style industrial and commercial sector which was increasingly internationalised. Yet even for most Chinese in the still-dominant agricultural sector change was evident in the networks of power in their villages and the armies that sought their support, willingly and unwillingly.<sup>44</sup>

#### A5.1.1 The Boxer Rebellion, 1898-1901

In October 1898 a small group of peasants calling themselves *Yihequan* or Fists of United Righteousness began a violent new phase in China's confrontation with the West. They were inspired by martial arts and secret societies which had a long history in their region of eastern Shandong. They were called Boxers by foreigners. This group had a longstanding conflict over rights to a local temple claimed by Christians and non-Christians in the community. For the Boxers all the troubles of their region and country seemed to have one cause: the willingness of Chinese to be overcome by what was foreign, especially in religion, without resistance. They set out to free China of the injustice of foreign ways and reverse its humiliation by blood and fire. The Qing, even before this development, had difficulty coping with sects and societies which got out of hand. Yet the Boxers were different as, despite their extreme and ruthless behaviour, they seemed to address China's problems and provide young, lower class Chinese with the opportunity to demonstrate their patriotism and courage. Consequently, the Qing hesitated to suppress the Boxers while they claimed loyalty to the state. Western accounts of the violent confrontations focused on the killing of foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians but during the three years of the Boxer Rebellion only a quarter of the

120,000 were Christians and just 250 were foreigners. The remainder were non-Christian Chinese killed by foreign forces or Chinese troops who supported them.<sup>45</sup>

At first some Qing officials and military commanders hunted down Boxer bands or at least attempted to maintain order between Christian and anti-Christian groups, while assisting foreigners to evacuate. In other regions officials and commanders joined the Boxers either in sympathy with the anti-Christian message or for fear of the consequences if they resisted a popular movement. The ambivalence of the Court changed to open support, with the issue of an edict on 21 June 1900, after foreign navy ships attacked Chinese forts in attempting to land troops in Tianjin. The Court ordered all its forces to join with armed groups including the Boxers to defend the empire. This further divided military commanders and regional leaders, some of whom obeyed especially in the north around Beijing but others did not. Allied troops entered Beijing on 14 August 1900 and various atrocities and massacres were committed. Nevertheless, the Boxer War was blamed by the Western-led international system on China and the Qing Court. The Boxer Protocols, signed in September 1901, were imposed on China by the allied powers that had intervened militarily against her. A strict weapons embargo was established, and the main pro-Boxer members of the government were executed or exiled; Chinese forts defending Beijing were razed to the ground and foreign troops guarded roads from the capital to the seaports. An indemnity equal to almost four times China's entire annual income in 1900 was imposed, amortised over a forty-year period. The Qing empire lost international credibility and became subordinated to the political and economic interests of the West and Japan.<sup>46</sup>

#### A5.2 Chinese Relations with the United States and Germany

There were two main newcomers, apart from Japan, who imposed themselves on China. The United States of America sought to obtain access to Chinese markets for US products and capital without establishing its own areas of domination. Germany, on the other hand, chose the traditional route of having territorial concessions from China for the purpose of modernisation, achieved by German methods, as well as for trade. By the early twentieth century Germany had control over much of the Shandong province.<sup>47</sup>

The USA adopted the Open Door Policy, demanding the right for free trade to operate within spheres of influence within China, including concessions given to foreign powers, but this had little effect on other powers' policies in China. What did endure from this Policy was the determination of the US not to be excluded from China by the other powers. As Japan's power in the country grew, this meant increased conflict between the two states. Many Chinese were attracted to American ideals and sought their aid but were repelled by its racism and immigration restrictions. They came to realise that the Open Door opened China to US capital but not the USA to Chinese people. This disenchantment with the USA has echoed down through the generations.<sup>48</sup>

Germany stressed improvement and modernisation in China (as Americans did) but the colony they set up was meant to be a model and superior in every way to what Britain and France were already doing. The German government coveted Qingdao as a naval base and German Christian missions in Shandong, which gave rise to the Boxer movement, were

planned with this imperial expansion in prospect. While Germany's possessions in China ended in the First World War, Chinese republicans saw Germany as a possible ally until shortly before the Second World War. German advisers were of the first rank to Chiang Kai-shek in the 1930s in supporting his leadership of China. German-Chinese trade greatly increased and Germany became China's largest supplier of credit. This only ended after Germany allied itself with Japan following the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.<sup>49</sup>

### A5.3 The Collapse of the Qing Dynasty, 1908-1912

In August 1908 the Qing announced that it would introduce constitutional rule over the next nine years but emphasised the powers of the executive branch, i.e. the Qing dynasty itself. Reform would have to be gradual, the Court considered, or the empire would lose its Chinese essence. The long serving Empress Dowager, Cixi, who had dominated the Court for decades and sought gradual reform after the suppression of the Boxer rebellion in 1901, died on 15 November 1908. The main threat to the Qing dynasty came from provincial and regional leaders, in collaboration with foreigners, whom *the Qing feared might breakup China*.<sup>50</sup> [Added emphasis]

The various reforms by the Qing did not obviate a showdown which came in October 1911. An accidental explosion caused by revolutionaries, who had infiltrated the army in Wuhan, precipitated an insurrection when detailed plans were discovered by the police. Young officers seized control of strategic assets and declared their loyalty to a republic of China. Within a few days they controlled all Wuhan and called on other provinces to help defeat the Qing and create a republic. By late November most provincial strongmen south of the Yangzi river had joined the revolutionaries. Most foreign powers with an interest in China were too preoccupied with their own issues abroad to become involved. Japanese leaders could not decide whom to support. So, it turned out that the British approach became the dominant one, as in times past, which involved ensuring a government in China that would provide stability for its business interests to be protected.<sup>51</sup>

By the end of 1911, Britain's choice for maintaining China's unity was the former Qing general, Yuan Shikai, who had been purged by the Court in 1909 but was now made prime minister and head of the Qing army. By December 1911, his forces had retaken Wuhan and forced the revolutionaries to negotiate. However, Yuan also had an incentive to bargain as he did not want responsibility for shedding more Chinese blood in trying to reconquer southern China in defence of a dynasty in which he no longer believed.<sup>52</sup>

Republican principles were then substituted for monarchical ones but ideas varied widely from a presidential republic, advocated by Sun Yat-sen and his Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui), to a federal republic, promoted by revolutionaries in central and southern China, to a parliamentary republic, argued for by merchants in the cities. For many activists unlimited potential seemed to be opened up by the revolution. On the other hand, Qing officials prepared for life without the empire while many non-Han officials became the objects of popular anger – some 10,000 were killed in Wuhan. More generally, the commercial interests of entrepreneurial officials sought to limit Qing power and, as production and trade increased, the ties of China's elites to the dynasty wore thin.<sup>53</sup>

The Chinese diaspora was key to the success of the revolution. Sun Yat-sen lobbied abroad and finally returned home on Christmas Day 1911. He was immediately elected provisional president of the Republic of China, albeit one with few resources apart from what overseas Chinese offered. Yuan Shikai abandoned the Qing Court by telling the empress dowager that the lives of the imperial family could only be saved by the issue of a proclamation supporting the republican system of government. This happened on 12 February 1912 and the Qing dynasty came to an end. The next day Sun Yat-sen resigned his presidency and Yuan took control of the government and became the new president of the Republic of China.<sup>54</sup>

#### A5.4 Early Years of the Chinese Republic, 1912-1928

Yuan, who died in 1916, like his successors in the Warlord Era (1916-1928) was caught between competing visions of China's future which he was unable to define or resolve. Up to 1928, political power in Beijing was held by a bewildering array of northern politicians and warlords who fought each other to control central government. This was ephemeral because, although that government was recognised by foreign states, real control passed to the provinces, or coalitions of such provinces, that were largely independent including Hunan, Guangdong and Sichuan. In the early republican period, there was more freedom of movement, both of young Chinese to the cities and of students and workers travelling abroad. In the latter case, this happened despite strict travel conditions imposed by foreign governments. This was a turbulent period but one which lack of effective central government also made ripe for political experimentation.<sup>55</sup>

In the wake of the collapse of the Qing Empire the position of conquered areas like Mongolia, Tibet and large parts of Central Asia became especially acute. Yet even regions in the south and northeast, which the Qing had incorporated more fully into China, faced calls from nationalists for immediate independence, autonomy or special rights. With the Qing no longer there to oppose these nationalist tendencies, those who saw their future outside a united China had their opportunity. Sometimes, foreign powers supported these provincial attempts at independence for their own strategic reasons.

##### A5.4.1 Mongolia

Russia tried to insist on full independence for northern or Outer Mongolia which succeeded in all but name mainly because of the commitment of the Mongolian separatist leaders who issued their independence proclamation in December 1911. The new leader of northern Mongolia, called the Bogd Khan, was a religious person who used a shared reverence for Buddhism as the basis for his appeal for Mongolian unity. He insisted that a Chinese republic could not inherit the Chinese empire. While Yuan objected to the principle he agreed, under Russian pressure, to autonomy for northern Mongolia under Chinese sovereignty. So, the southern half of Mongolia remained under direct Chinese control while the north achieved independence in all but name. Moscow's influence grew and checked Japanese expansion there.<sup>56</sup>



#### A5.4.2 Tibet

In Tibet Buddhism was also the unifying force. Following an uprising in Lhasa as the Qing collapsed, the exiled Tibetan religious and political leader, the Dalai Lama, returned and issued a declaration of independence. While the British organised a convention to discuss and seek agreement on the status of Tibet, the Chinese government would not agree to any autonomy for Tibet that infringed on Chinese territorial integrity. Partly this was due to disagreements about the borders of Tibet, but also with the Dalai Lama's insistence on incorporating Inner Tibet into the new autonomous nation. The latter demand meant no agreement with China was reached. Instead, the British government established a legal fiction with representatives of the Dalai Lama by recognising his regime as autonomous and incorporating into British India the region known today as Arunachal Pradesh.<sup>57</sup>

#### A5.4.3 Xinjiang

The Qing had conquered this huge territory in the 18<sup>th</sup> C. and reconquered it, at great cost, just a few years before the 1911 revolution. The new Chinese republic thought Muslim groups would rebel but a Qing official, Yang Zengxin, took power in the provincial capital of Urumqi with support from Qing troops. Yang's personal dictatorship, based on terror, involved keeping the Russians at bay while offering at least token loyalty to the Chinese central government. This did not solve the Xinjiang problem where, after the Russian Revolution in 1917, independence movements flourished on both the Russian and Chinese sides of the border. The borders remained intact until the Communist revolution in 1949 despite the Soviets, having crushed Muslim rebels in their territory, giving restrained support to rebels in Xinjiang.<sup>58</sup>

Thus, in China the transition from empire to republic came about without most non-Han Chinese breaking away. The construction of political entities for these nationalities was not prioritised.<sup>59</sup>

#### A5.4.4 China Post-World War I

Efforts at defining China took centre stage during a political and cultural revival after the Great War. It is often referred to in Chinese history as the May Fourth era, named after the student protests against foreign humiliations of China which started on that day in 1919. The Chinese government believed it would be rewarded for supporting the Allied cause in the world war. It expected that some positions foreign powers had taken for themselves in China would be ended. Like millions of other Chinese, they had confidence in US president Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points underlining that the war had been fought for self-determination and equality among nations. However, at the Versailles conference the former German concessions were not returned to China and there was no general acceptance of the principle of removing foreigners' extraterritorial rights within China. When the former Chinese concessions in Shandong were given to Japan, Chinese cities exploded in protest with University students in Beijing and Shanghai taking the lead. The May Fourth Movement was inspired by the writings of Chinese intellectuals who were at that time trying to redefine China and its place in the world. In politics, new and radical trends emerged which underlined the need to make China wealthy and powerful within its existing borders. Further inspiration

came from the Russian Revolution and democratic changes in Germany (the Weimar Republic) as well as from anticolonial movements in Asia. Socialism seemed to some to be the future: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed in 1921.<sup>60</sup>

In 1920 Sun Yat-sen and a reconstituted Guomindang, a political party with a much more centralised and militarised organisation than before, were back in Guangzhou. Sun was recognised by his followers as the leader-for-life and provisional president of China (as, briefly, in 1912). The party's ideology was encapsulated in the Three Principles of the People: nationalism; democracy; and 'peoples' livelihood'. Sun planned a reunification drive to the north. The new China would then seek huge foreign loans for infrastructure, industrialisation and settlements in outlying regions. He sought to make capitalism create socialism in China (similar, in some ways, to reform programmes in China in recent decades). While his appeals for assistance from the great powers largely fell on deaf ears, the aims of his Guomindang (GMD) movement, benefitting from the May Fourth Movement, resulted in popular support even in regions that he hardly knew and where the party had no presence. A new activist patriotism rooted in mass movements helped ensure that by the mid-1920s the GMD was a force to be taken into account by domestic and foreign powers. The GMD was backed by the Soviet Union in the early 1920s and the CCP received funds and organisational support from agents of the Comintern, the Communist International. The CCP aimed to assist Sun Yat-sen with his revolution. The Soviets sought to build up military and organisational support for Sun Yat-sen's movement, with the CCP as a small but active group within it. They believed that a nationalist bourgeois revolution was required before a socialist one could take place. Sun was glad to obtain Soviet support, especially in establishing a military academy in Guangzhou, but kept his political distance from them. A young Chiang Kai-shek was commander there. By 1925 the GMD was a different and much stronger party, resulting from Soviet backing. When non-Communists within the GMD began attacking the CCP for what they regarded as factional behaviour the Soviet leader, Stalin, was emphatic that the only future for Chinese communists was within the Guomindang. This greatly helped the Chinese nationalist movement but made the small band of CCP members vulnerable to the jealousy and distrust of their allies.<sup>61</sup>

Although Sun Yat-sen's early efforts at a military drive to unify China were unsuccessful, and he died in March 1925, during the spring of that year most of eastern China was engulfed in waves of anti-imperialist demonstrations that threatened the stability of the system which foreign powers had arranged to manage China after 1911. On 30 May 1925 nine student demonstrators were killed in the international concession in Shanghai. This led to the May Thirtieth Movement with demonstrations, strikes and blockades in other cities, too. Sun Yat-sen became a martyr for the nationalist cause and a symbol for a new, powerful and united China. Chiang Kai-shek in Guangzhou urged an early beginning to a military expedition north. Chiang's vision for China was of a united, stable and militarily powerful country which he derived from his Confucian upbringing and his military training in Japan. He had been close to Sun Yat-sen and saw himself as his natural successor.<sup>62</sup>

The Northern Expedition commenced in July 1926 and became a huge political and military success. Moving rapidly north the GMD forces overwhelmed their enemies one at a time, aided by Guomindang and Communist organisers and other local nationalists who set up

underground committees in cities to prepare for their arrival by staging strikes and demonstrations. At first many local leaders submitted but fighting intensified as the revolutionary armies reached cities in central China. However, as Chiang's troops approached Shanghai, he became more wary of the aims of his Communist allies. There had been distrust before but the success of the drive to the north split the alliance. While the CCP and Soviet advisers saw Chiang as a potential dictator, Chiang was gravely concerned that the CCP and left wing of the Guomindang would put China under Soviet control. The Communists were planning to seize control of Shanghai before Chiang's troops entered. The left-wing government in Wuhan had ordered Chiang's arrest. Chiang's soldiers put Shanghai under martial law as soon as they arrived and Chiang, acting on what was probably a preconceived plan, acted to destroy the CCP and GMD left. Almost the entire CCP leadership was captured or killed, together with thousands of rank-and-file members and sympathisers. Only a few CCP leaders including Mao Zedong managed to flee but the organisation was destroyed for several years. The left-wing government in Wuhan eventually surrendered and by the spring of 1928 Chiang Kai-shek was unchallenged as leader of the Guomindang. During that year the GMD attained at least nominal control of all China except Manchuria.<sup>63</sup>

The success of the Northern Expedition profoundly shocked foreign countries. Britain, which had much to lose, dispatched 15,000 troops to defend its concessions in Shanghai.<sup>64</sup>

#### A5.5 The GMD Government, 1928 - 1937

During ten years of governing China from its capital, Nanjing, the GMD ran the most effective government the country had had since the mid-nineteenth century despite financial corruption and administrative failures. It followed the pattern of authoritarian governments in the Soviet Union and Italy and, from 1933, Germany. It also borrowed from Western and Japanese development experiences though without adopting their ideologies. Even though the international economic climate was difficult in the late 1920s and 1930s the GMD government presided over strong economic growth in the urban sectors. While there is some issue over its policy effectiveness, at the very least it provided relative stability after years of internal turmoil.<sup>65</sup>

Chiang was determined to recover China's full sovereignty. This involved seeking the reintegration of all provinces back into China and the abolition of all foreign rights of extraterritoriality. However, the West's unwillingness to negotiate and the increasing threat of war with Japan rendered void his threat to unilaterally end all unequal extraterritorial rights for foreigners by 1 January 1930. While the Soviet Union was a threat to China and the two fought a brief border war in northern Manchuria in 1929, which meant the Soviets kept control of the Chinese Eastern Railway until 1931 when it was lost to Japan. Chiang's efforts to reach an understanding with Japan also foundered over the Japanese positions in Shandong. The GMD forces sent to complete Chinese reunification there were confronted by Japanese troops in the provincial capital Jinan in April 1928. In Manchuria, local warlord Zhang Xueliang declared his allegiance to the GMD government, which increased Japanese fears of Chinese nationalism. The strength of the Soviet Union there was also a concern. While Chiang regarded Manchuria as an inalienable part of China, he could not confront Japan while he faced, in the early 1930s, rebellions from dissatisfied GMD leaders and local warlords and the

CCP, though much reduced, still operated from remote places in southern China. A huge programme of rearmament and training was initiated, supported by Chiang's German advisers, and began to produce results. With heightened tensions in Manchuria, Japanese army officers in Shenyang planted a bomb near the South Manchurian railway in September 1931, which they blamed on Zhang Xueliang forces, and then attacked the Chinese garrison in the city. Acting against orders from their government in Tokyo, the Japanese army in Manchuria moved swiftly to occupy most cities in Manchuria. As the Soviet Union wanted to stay out of the conflict and the Tokyo government accepted their military's occupation of Manchuria, there was little Chiang could do about it. He bided his time.<sup>66</sup>

Although the republic established in 1912 had survived, it took a radically different form to that which its founders had envisaged. There were two main reasons the Republic of China survived: first, Chinese nationalism, which broke through in 1910s and 1920s and put the need for a strong state at its heart; and the international conditions, which turned the main Western countries' attention to Europe during World War 1 and weakened them for a time thereafter. These troubles also allowed China to cooperate with other autocratic regimes, first the Soviet Union and later Germany. Within this international context Japan was, by the early 1930s, plainly the main threat to China. 'Chinese nationalism and Japanese expansionism could not coexist' despite all the two countries had in common. The Chinese nationalist reaction helped unify the country, although there were profound differences on strategy. This, in turn, would create opportunities for China to take its place (after the Sino-Japanese War which meshed with World War II) in the new international order that would be needed.<sup>67</sup>

## A5.6 The Sino-Japanese War, 1937 – 1945

### A5.6.1 Background

The relationship of China to Japan was a crucial influence around 1912, when the republic came into being, because Meiji Japan was viewed as a model across the political spectrum. However, this changed in January 1915 when Japan issued its Twenty-One Demands by which, inter alia, Tokyo sought full control of Shandong, reinforcement of its power in Manchuria and extension of its leading role in Fujian, the coastal province across the sea from Japanese-occupied Taiwan. These demands were meant to secure Japanese interests in Shandong, after German forces had surrendered to the Japanese navy in November 1914, following Japan's entry into World War 1 on Britain's side. Instead, these demands provoked protests from Britain and other wartime allies and changed many Chinese people's attitudes to Japan. Student protests and boycotts of Japanese goods conflicted with the Chinese government's prior offer to cooperate with Japan as well as splits in the opposition on the issue. This changing view of Japan helped enable Beijing to join the Allies in 1917 when the United States abandoned its neutrality. However, the outcome of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, as previously related, benefitted Japan and provoked the May Fourth Movement. Developments in Manchuria became a special rallying point for Chinese nationalists.<sup>68</sup>

Thus between 1912 and 1937 Japan had gone from being a primary inspiration for China in building its new state and society to becoming its principal threat. While some on both sides

in the 1920s and 1930s called for more cooperation and less confrontation but these voices had grown fewer, and more denigrated, as imperial Japan sought to secure its position as a great power at China's expense. The view of Japan as China's enemy persists amongst some Chinese nationalists to this day despite Japan's defeat at the end of the Second World War.<sup>69</sup>

For Japan, fear of foreign domination was the dominant factor in its relationship to China. As Japan's coercive power grew in the twentieth century a part of the Japanese elite believed that their country needed an empire of its own, like that of European states, to ensure it was not isolated and did survive. This thinking led to the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and made China an object of conquest and economic exploitation. There were also Japanese who genuinely believed in cooperation with China and other East Asian nations to provide a bulwark against the West. Both groups, though, accepted that *by conquest or attractive example* Japan had to avoid China becoming a Western oriented state directed against Japan.<sup>70</sup> [Added emphasis]

For China, its enduring weakness was, in the mind of its elite, reflected in its relations with Japan: China's weakness was due to Japan's strength and the Tokyo government not only exploited China's condition but sought to entrench it and widen its scope. Some Chinese thought that China's destruction was the precondition for Japan's dominance in East Asia and that this was against the natural order of things. It was China's worst problem.<sup>71</sup>

#### A5.6.2 Costs

The eight-year war with Japan was a cataclysmic event in China's modern history. Casualties amongst soldiers and civilians were huge and much of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. There were at least two million Chinese men killed in fighting and 12 million Chinese civilians died as a direct consequence of the war. Yet more died from starvation, dams and dikes that had been demolished, disease and mistreatment in the Chinese army. Japan lost 400,000 fighting men in China, together with 1.5 million more in other wars springing from the one in China. In addition, Japan lost 1.2 million civilians in the Second World War including 300,000 in post-war prisoner of war camps mainly in Manchuria and the Soviet Union. A further 400,000 Chinese died fighting with the Japanese army in China and other parts of Asia. The consequences of this level of death and destruction were to be felt in both China and Japan for generations to come. Despite victory for China, the war was to undermine the GMD due not just to the damage caused by the war, and the inability of the state to cope with the civilian challenges arising, but because the war allowed the CCP to survive and then expand after the fighting against Japan ended. War became a catalyst for modernity though not necessarily that which most people had sought.<sup>72</sup>

#### A5.6.3 Manchuria

By 1936 right-wing terror in Japan, including the assassination of two prime ministers in succession in 1931-32, had paralysed democracy. The Great Depression caused a deep crisis for the Japanese economy, fuelled by conspiracy theories against the West, which reinforced the drift to authoritarianism. Japanese expansion began, as previously related, in Manchuria and when the League of Nations declared its actions to constitute aggression, Japan withdrew from the League in March 1933. Even before this, it had begun to set up a separate state

called Manzhouguo – Land of the Manchus – in China’s north eastern provinces with a new Japanese administration to replace Chinese officeholders, although the last Qing emperor became the Kangde emperor in this puppet state. Manzhouguo symbolised a new Japanese imperialism characterised by economic development and public services. Even before the economic crisis, Japanese foreign investment in China accounted for 85 per cent of the total and 80 per cent of this was in Manchuria. By 1945 it invested more there than its total investment in Korea, Taiwan and the rest of China combined. The Manzhouguo government also invested substantial sums in transport, education and public health leading to close collaboration with some traditional elites after decades of warfare and chaos. However, the great majority of Chinese in Manchuria continued to view it as part of China and engaged in at least passive resistance against the Japanese occupiers who responded with violence and repression including forced land confiscations.<sup>73</sup>

#### A5.6.4 A United Front Against Japan

The most intractable problem for Chiang was the remnant of the CCP which he was sure would not submit to his central government. He, therefore, made the CCP bases in the Jiangxi-Fujian border areas the main object of his military campaign in 1934. This forced the principal Communist forces out of the south on the ‘Long March’, as it came to be known, to the west and north to establish a new capital, Yan’an, by late 1935 in remote Shaanxi province. This is where the survivors regrouped under Mao Zedong, the CCP leader from 1936 until his death forty years later. He remained, though, under Comintern discipline and the direction of Stalin who wanted to see the CCP join Chiang in a new united front against Japan. An incident in Xian in December 1936 brought matters to a head and resulted by the spring of 1937 in the Chinese central government and most regional power brokers and the CCP working together in an Anti-Japanese United Front. An armed conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces in the Hebei province around Beijing in July 1937 finally convinced Chiang that the war, which he knew was coming but had try to defer for as long as possible, had finally arrived.<sup>74</sup>

#### A5.6.5 Initial Stages of the War: 1937-1939

Chiang decided to strike back in and around Shanghai, where his best troops were stationed, in mid-August 1937. The battle raged for two months with both Chinese and Japanese armies seeking to avoid the foreign concessions. However, by early November, Japanese forces had secured the city and were heading for Nanjing, the Chinese capital. The international isolation of the Japanese government swiftly became clear with Britain, Japan’s old ally, viewing it as the aggressor and the United States making scarcely veiled criticisms of Tokyo’s actions. Stalin not only provided substantial armaments to the Chinese government, but the Red Army heavily defeated the Japanese forces in a war for control of Mongolia in the summer of 1939. Despite the success of Japanese forces against the Chinese, the cost was high and it became clear to Tokyo in the winter of 1937-38 that this war would be unlike previous ones where the Chinese agreed to negotiate after initial defeats.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, the behaviour of Japanese troops after their hard-fought battle to take Nanjing, the GMD capital, in the autumn of 1937, reinforced Chinese resistance against the invaders. The city fell to Japanese forces on 13 December and during the next six weeks more than

200,000 inhabitants and prisoners of war were killed with the complicity of Japanese officers. The massacre became known as the Rape of Nanjing. Despite victory after victory by the Japanese armies in 1938 and 1939 the Chinese resistance and morale did not break. The imperial army took Wuhan, Guangzhou and almost all of coastal China and was advancing into the interior in the south and west. Tokyo was given no choice by Chiang but to abandon hopes of negotiation and attempt to destroy Chiang's government and breakup China into regimes like Manzhouguo. For his part Chiang, as the head of Chinese nationalism, was irrevocably committed to national resistance against Japanese occupation. While Japan did set up collaborationist regimes in various parts of the country it could not inflict a decisive defeat on Chiang's forces. Despite a paucity of Chinese victories, the porous frontline and effective use of guerrilla war by the GMD and CCP against overextended Japanese forces left its military outposts and supply lines exposed. Thereby significant losses were inflicted and Japanese morale suffered. In 1939 the GMD government was able to establish a new wartime capital at Chongqing in western Sichuan and was also able to keep the allegiance of most local leaders in the unoccupied west and south.<sup>76</sup>

#### A5.6.6 The War: 1939-1945

The unexpected non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in late August 1939, which paved the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland and the start of World War II, removed the Soviet threat to Japanese forces in northern China and ended Soviet support for the GMD government's war effort. For over two years China had to fight alone against Japan putting Chinese nationalism and the GMD under intense strain. In late 1939 the Japanese advanced into Hunan province in central China and then Guangxi province in the south. Some local warlords arranged ceasefires with the Japanese army. Britain temporarily closed transport routes through Burma in July 1940, which had been a crucial supply line for the GMD, while the French authorities in Vietnam, now loyal to the Vichy regime in France, cut-off supplies from the south. By late September 1940, after a period where Japan's relations with Germany had worsened in the wake of its non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, a military alliance was formed between Japan and Germany with the aim of cooperating in each other's sphere of influence. Thereafter, Japan launched a huge bombing offensive in China gaining full control of the air and subjecting Chinese cities and civilian populations to the consequences. Yet despite many defections in central China and growing conflict with local commanders, including battles with the CCP forces, Chiang did not agree to a ceasefire with the Japanese. Once again imperial Japanese forces became overextended and were forced back with severe casualties in certain areas like Shangao in southern China.<sup>77</sup>

Chiang's efforts to obtain aid from the United States bore fruit by November 1940 when his government received its first supply of US credit. Then in the spring of 1941, as the GMD was in the midst of intense fighting in central and southern China, US President Roosevelt extended the Lend-Lease Agreement, which had supported Britain in its darkest hour, to China. This support included new Chinese fighter planes, flown by American volunteers, which had been delivered by the USA. Chiang was convinced that, although the US would not send its own forces to fight in China, its application of strict sanctions on Japan meant that Roosevelt regarded that country as an increasing threat to the US in the Pacific. He foresaw

that Japan would get into a war with the USA and China had only to hold out until that happened – Tokyo would ‘court its own destruction’.<sup>78</sup>

Following Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, there was a renewed alliance between the GMD government and the CCP at the instigation of Stalin. While the Soviet Union, fighting for its own existence, was not in a position to provide China with military support, at least the fighting between the GMD and CCP forces was stopped for the time being. However, this did not mean that the Communists fulfilled the role Chiang wanted. On the Japanese side, there was growing military support for an attack on the United States and Britain. Some Japanese planners argued that by conquering Southeast Asia they could force a Chinese surrender and obtain access to the resources required for an extended front. This proposal was assisted by the Japanese army’s failure to make major advances in the autumn of 1941. The attack on Pearl Harbour on 8 December 1941 did not surprise Chiang who pledged the US President full Chinese support for the war in the Pacific against Japan. The rapid advance of the Japanese forces into Southeast Asia did not undermine the Generalissimo’s confidence although he was shocked by the rapid collapse of British resistance in Singapore on 15 February 1942. The fall of Burma, after the Japanese forced the British Army to retreat into India in May 1942, left newly arrived Chinese divisions exposed and cut the Burma Road into southern China. Nevertheless, the Sino-American alliance progressed quickly after Pearl Harbour. Allied planes brought in supplies, military equipment and advisers from northern India across the Himalayas to China. This was only a tiny proportion of all US assistance because the Allies had decided on a Europe First policy which meant focusing on Germany’s defeat before Japan’s. Nevertheless, the close cooperation between Chinese and US forces was of great benefit to China in winning the war and in its international standing. Even before the Allied Conference in Cairo in November 1943, where Chiang was treated as an equal with respect to the war in the East, both the USA and Britain had given up their extraterritorial rights in China.<sup>79</sup>

While the Japanese forces made little progress in 1942-43 their High Command launched a major offensive in 1944 with the aims of breaking Chinese resistance and establishing direct land supply lines between north China and Southeast Asia. Operation Ichigo (Number one), as it was named, came closer to destroying the GMD than to achieving supply lines. The GMD government faced an acute economic and social crisis in 1944 which limited its capacity to resist. New taxes often could not be collected; supplies were running out while famine began in some parts of GMD-held territory; and there were record levels of desertions and revolts against conscription. Moreover, the GMD’s response to its funding crisis of printing more money fuelled inflation and increased poverty. Overall support for the government reached its nadir in the war. Operation Ichigo started in April 1944 and GMD forces were quickly driven out of Henan province. Japan also captured Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, and then advanced into Guangxi and began moving towards the GMD capital in Sichuan from the south and east. Although the Japanese operation started losing momentum in the spring of 1945, as army units had to be redeployed to the near Pacific, GMD counteroffensives had little success. Worse still, while the credibility of GMD government crumbled that of the CCP rose as it built its own political institutions in areas evacuated by the GMD behind overextended Japanese lines. Even the Americans began to reach out to the Chinese



Communists as part of its strategy of mobilising against Japan. Most of all, though, the CCP stood to benefit from war-weary Chinese people, especially its educated classes, who doubted the GMD's economic strategy and sought peace and a solution to longstanding domestic problems.<sup>80</sup>

The Yalta conference of Allied leaders in February 1945, to which Chiang was not invited, agreed that after Germany had surrendered the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the Allied side, subject to certain conditions affecting the status of Outer Mongolia and specific ports and railroads, which would also require the Generalissimo's concurrence. Germany surrendered in May 1945 and the Soviets and GMD representatives negotiated to little effect until the US dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August, with another nuclear bomb on Nagasaki days later, precipitated the Soviet attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria. The GMD negotiators signed a treaty with the Soviet Union agreeing to give Stalin what he had been promised at Yalta in return for a promise that he would only work with the Chinese government rather than the CCP. Shortly afterwards, Japan capitulated. The Soviet Union occupied Manchuria and northern Korea while collaborationist regimes collapsed. All over China GMD forces, assisted by their American allies, were preparing to take over. The CCP seemed to have few of the fruits of victory. Chiang appeared triumphant and set to create the fully unified China so many had dreamed of for so long.<sup>81</sup>

## A6 Landlord and Peasant in the Making of Communist China

### A6.1 The Upper Classes in the Imperial Chinese System

To understand more fully the background to the triumph of the CCP over the GMD government, in little more than four years after Chiang-led China's victory at the end of the Second World War, it may be helpful to step back and address the long-run factors that provided the foundations for that outcome. For while the Communist triumph in China in 1949 may not have been inevitable there ought to be some understanding of why it succeeded, and the GMD failed. The work of Barrington Moore Jr<sup>82</sup> from the 1960s focuses on class relations and, while not orthodox, nevertheless engages with Marxist perspectives and, therefore, has some salience for understanding the CCP outlook found in Mao's works.<sup>83</sup>

Barrington Moore's thesis begins with the questions: 'how were the upper classes connected with the land in this [Imperial Chinese] society where the overwhelming majority were tillers of the soil? Did their power and authority rest ultimately on control of landed property or was it an outcome of their near monopoly of bureaucratic posts? If it was a combination of the two, what was the nature of this combination?'<sup>84</sup>

In modern times no system of vassalage existed in Imperial China and there were only very limited grants of land in exchange for military services. So, Barrington Moore argues, the use of the term 'feudalism' in a Chinese context is at least as inappropriate as describing this system as bureaucratic, which some Western scholars do. Even so, that the Marxist stress on landlordism is fully justified, which he seeks to establish empirically. In short, while some Western scholars try to deny the connection between landholding and Imperial office,

Marxists are equally determined to establish such a connection but de-emphasise its bureaucratic character. Taking the Manchu [or Qing] dynasty (1644-1911), Barrington Moore aims to identify the key structural characteristics whose impetus gave a direction to Chinese development culminating in the Communist triumph in the mid-twentieth century.<sup>85</sup>

Long before the Qing dynasty, the problem of a turbulent aristocracy bound to the land had ceased to exist. The examination system, functional by the end of the Tang dynasty in AD 907, was partly responsible as it enabled the emperor to recruit his bureaucracy. Whether this ancient aristocracy, of which little was left by the Song dynasty (960-1279), could be regarded as feudal is not relevant here. What is material is whether a landed aristocracy persisted under the guise of a centralised bureaucracy during the Qing dynasty? There is general agreement that a class of wealthy landowners did exist and overlapped with a class of officials and scholars and were not identical. However, the degree of overlap and gradations within each class are uncertain. The key point, though, is to ascertain how they worked together and the role of degree holding in that connection.<sup>86</sup>

Patrilineal lineage operated through the family and, in agriculturally more productive regions like southern China, through the clan. The family as a social mechanism worked by investing fortunes gained via Imperial service in land thereby assuring its lineage. Likewise, any family aspiring to aristocratic status had to have a degree holder, or the prospect of one, whom it financed in the expectation that he would obtain an official position and thereby advance the family's financial wellbeing. An Imperial post would ensure that the scholar recouped or enhanced his family fortune thus maintaining its lineage. The clan functioned in a similar manner but would include many ordinary peasants. Although official rank was open to the lowest peasant with intelligence and drive, as there was no general system of education such a student would require the support of a wealthy family for the many years of intense study required to pass the exams. This did sometimes happen if a wealthy family lacked children with the necessary aptitude. Consequently, the link between official position and wealth through lineage was a crucial characteristic of Chinese society. This upper class of scholar-officials and landlords may be called 'gentry'.<sup>87</sup>

Taking the landlord first, in the absence of feudal compulsions, he managed to get the peasants to work for him by tenancy arrangements similar to those which operate under modern capitalism. Despite paucity of data, the general picture, allowing for regional variations, is that by the start of the nineteenth century the tenancy took the form of sharecropping supplemented by hired labour. The landlord provided the land and the peasant the labour; the crop was divided between them. The Imperial bureaucracy ensured the landlord's control over the land. While a rich peasant would work the land the scholar, it is thought, did not. The landlord-scholars lived in the countryside yet appear to have had no role at all in cultivation; not even in supervision. Buying and selling of rice did occur on a large scale but it may be inferred that sharecropping predominated with the landlord receiving his share in grain rather than cash. Under this system the landlord had a vested interest in overpopulation because more peasants would drive up the landlord's share of the crops. This competitive element might be balanced by custom and practice and an interest in the quality of a landlord's peasants but having a numerous peasantry was a decisive factor. This was

dependent, though, on a strong government to maintain order so that landlords could assert their property rights and collect their rents. This task fell to the Imperial bureaucracy. Moreover, Imperial concern about the effects of overpopulation on the land were evident before the mid-eighteenth century so cannot be attributed, as some Marxists have done, to Western impact which came much later.<sup>88</sup>

The Imperial bureaucracy was also needed to provide effective irrigation so that tenants could grow quality crops and this, in turn, required official influence through landlord-scholars. This seems to have been the main economic contribution of the landlord or, for larger projects, of groups of provincial landlords. Even more powerful cliques were required for national Imperial projects. A further benefit of the bureaucracy, previously alluded to, was ensuring the future wealth of the family which, in the absence of primogeniture, might otherwise be reduced to penury within a few generations as wealth was distributed equally at inheritance. While making a fortune by sending someone with academic abilities into Imperial service was formally illegal, it was socially accepted corruption e.g. buying land and retiring to it after a career in public office. Finally, it should be said that Confucian values and the examination system provided legitimacy for landlords, in terms of higher social status and no manual labour, if a member of the family could obtain a degree.<sup>89</sup>

The lack of any effective means of preventing too intense a squeeze on peasants, so that they were induced into banditry or insurrection led by disaffected members of the upper class, may have been a fundamental weakness of the Imperial system. Even though the empire had an interest in fair and efficient collection of taxes it had few personnel to achieve this. An individual official, on the other hand, had a strong financial motive to enrich himself, restrained only by the danger that flagrant extortion might lead to a scandal and damage his reputation. In pre-industrial societies, how large bureaucracies extract sufficient resources from their population to pay salaries, and so make officials dependent on their superiors, has a major impact on the entire social structure. The Chinese solution was to permit almost open financial corruption. Estimates of the extra-legal income of an official vary from four to 16-19 times his normal salary. Whatever it was, this malpractice will have seriously reduced effective control from the centre, varying in different historical periods. The means by which Chinese society blocked modernisation until too late for gradual solutions, including containing disaffected elements within the Imperial system, was a massive problem. Certain aspects now require our attention.<sup>90</sup>

#### A6.2 The Gentry and the World of Commerce

Unlike the later stages of feudalism in Western Europe, Imperial China did not develop a comparable urban trading and manufacturing class. The Imperial system generally succeeded in uniting China thus differentiating it from the many-sided competition between various sources of power which existed in Europe and enabled a merchant class to break through. The Chinese examination system also discouraged career-minded individuals from pursuing a life in commerce. Moreover, making money constituted a grave threat to scholar-officials because it potentially represented an alternative route to achieving legitimacy and high social standing. If allowed to get out of control, commerce could render worthless and out-of-date Confucian-based classical culture, which required such arduous efforts to acquire. Instead,

the gentry taxed commerce or turned an activity, like the salt trade, into a state monopoly. The Imperial bureaucracy pumped resources out of the population into the hand of the Empire whose rulers carefully guarded their position by controlling any threats to their privileges.<sup>91</sup>

However, the decay of the Imperial system, beginning before the close of the eighteenth century, undermined its ability to control commercial interests in society. This capability was further damaged by the political and military intervention of Western countries, as previously described, restrained only by the rivalry between those countries. By the second half of the nineteenth century the traditional role of the scholar-official in coastal cities had fallen apart and a new hybrid society had emerged in which intermediaries served in various capacities between decaying Chinese officialdom and foreign merchants. Thus, when Chinese industry emerged in the 1860s it often did so under the aegis of provincial gentry who sought modern technology for their own separatist purposes. The early machinery was for arsenals and navy yards or other military services. Hence this early industrialisation was a disruptive rather than a unifying factor in China because it came mostly from the provincial powerbrokers with little input from the Imperial centre. Barrington Moore argues that Marxists made too much of the way Western imperial interests stifled Chinese industrial development, which could not have happened without the prior suffocation by solely domestic forces. It was not until 1910 or, perhaps, by the end of the nineteenth century that the Chinese business class can be said to show concrete signs of independence from official control though indigenous elements were very small and the decisive commercial and industrial areas were to remain in foreign hands for much longer. By the demise of the Imperial dynasty there were claimed to be some 20,000 factories in China but only 363 employed mechanical power – the remainder relied on human or animal power.<sup>92</sup>

So China entered the Republican era with only a small and politically dependent middle class without its own independent ideology. Nevertheless, it played a key role in undermining the Empire and creating new political groups to replace it. In particular, there was a major amalgamation over time between sections of the gentry (and, later, the landlords who succeeded them) and business leaders in the urban trading, industrial and financial sectors. This combination provided the main social basis for the Guomindang. It arose chiefly due to the gentry's failure to effect the transition from pre-industrial to commercial farming whose causes occupy the next section.<sup>93</sup>

### A6.3 The Failure to Adopt Commercial Agriculture

The Chinese upper class, which had shown serious interest in technology for military and industrial purposes, with a few isolated exceptions displayed no interest in commercial agriculture. This does not, therefore, appear to be due to any innate lack of adaptability, as suggested by some Western scholars, arising from the cultural and psychological impact of Confucianism. In the early and vigorous stage of the Qing dynasty, there was no fast-growing population centres with diffused and increasing wealth that could help stimulate commercialised agriculture for the market. Instead peasant truck gardening predominated near towns and cities. While big estates did come to dominate parts of the Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century it is unclear whether this involved much rationalisation.

Under conditions involving primitive technology and plentiful labour, there was no incentive for a Chinese landowner to rationalise production for an urban market. As previously described, all he had to do was sit back and rent his land to the peasants, allowing competition to drive up rental income. Nearby wealthy town dwellers could invest profitably in land leading to the growth of absentee landlords. However, this position could remain stable only while political methods succeeded in keeping peasants at work and rents could be collected. Eventually this problem would prove insoluble.<sup>94</sup>

In conclusion, it was the lack of incentive, rather than the absence of adaptability, and the presence of easier alternatives to commercialised agriculture, which prevented the Chinese gentry from successfully transitioning to the modern world. When, belatedly, the markets did appear only a minority of the gentry turned into politically connected *rentiers*, rather than agricultural entrepreneurs, becoming the cutting edge of a powerful historical trend.<sup>95</sup>

#### A6.4 Collapse of the Imperial System and the Rise of the Warlords

[This section of Barrington Moore's thesis has been left out here as having little relevance to the theme for which his work is being used, i.e. the rise to power of the CCP. Moreover, Westad has already provided the material facts pertaining to this period, as summarised in section A5.4. above.]

#### A6.5 The Guomindang Interlude and Its Meaning

By the 1920s Chinese political and social life were significantly affected by commercial and industrial interests, albeit dependent on foreigners and subordinated to agriculture. They had begun to amalgamate with landlords near the port cities, as the previously mentioned *rentiers*. Urban workers were also making their presence felt in turbulent and violent ways. During this time the Guomindang [referred to as 'Kuomintang' by Barrington Moore in keeping with the system of transliteration from the Chinese used in his time] rose to power, as noted before. The significant point from the GMD triumph in late 1927 is that the ensuing government of Chiang Kai-shek sought a military solution to the agrarian problem through suppressing communism and banditry.<sup>96</sup>

An acute lack of dependable statistics at the time made it difficult to specify the agrarian problem in detail. Yet the main aspects are reasonably clear: China was not a country of large landholdings owned by an aristocracy who exploited a multitude of poor peasants and hired labourers; as commerce and industry developed, a system of absentee land ownership was growing steadily, especially near the coastal cities, marked by increasing disparities in wealth; and, in the interior, tenancy issues were acute though more linked to former practices than resulting from newer developments. The statistical category of tenancy covered diverse situations e.g. landlords overburdened by debt might be worse off than many tenants; or those who rented land might be well-off people with spare cash or poor peasants with little or no land whose least adversity might reduce them to destitution. The consequent statistical difficulty of social classification should not be allowed to disguise the extent of explosive class divisions in the Chinese countryside. It can be said, though, that by the mid-1920s land in China consisted almost entirely of private property. The State held roughly seven per cent. Approximately three quarters of the remainder was owned by individual farmers and one

quarter was rented. Sharp regional variations, though, help reveal why tenancy was still a serious problem in some areas. While in the wheat-growing regions of the north the most dependable estimates suggest that seven-eighths of the land was owned, and what tenancy there was generally took the form of share-renting, yet landlordism was deep rooted in at least one area of north eastern China later under Communist control. However, in several provinces of southern China rented land accounted for at least forty per cent although in the whole rice growing region three-fifths were still owned. Taking into account the prevalence of absentee landlords near the major cities, the picture conveyed is of commercial influences reducing peasant ownership, and wealth being concentrated in the hands of the *rentiers*.<sup>97</sup>

As this coalition of parts of the old gentry and new industrial and commercial interests constituted the main social basis of the GMD, its agrarian policy was aimed at maintaining or restoring the status quo. The situation was further polarised by its rivalry with its former Communist ally. That did not mean that the GMD government failed to carry out any reforms to improve the lot of the peasantry. However, testimony from both friendly and hostile sources to GMD reforms clearly demonstrate that they stopped short of changing the elite's control of local agrarian communities. 'Over wide areas of China, the end of the Imperial regime did not produce fundamental changes in the political and economic role of the landed upper classes.'<sup>98</sup> This is not to say that the situation was as bad everywhere as some criticisms suggested. Various anthropological studies of Chinese communities in the early to mid-1930s indicated that traditional patriarchal values and institutions continued to exercise a restraining effect on the more egregious types of exploitation. Simultaneously, they demonstrate the continuity of ex-gentry rule locally.<sup>99</sup>

The GMD government's efforts to drive China into becoming a unified and modern state ended in complete failure in 1949 with the victory of the CCP. Peasant insurrection made a decisive contribution towards that communist path to modernisation, rather than the alternatives. It is this role that now requires careful examination.<sup>100</sup>

#### A6.6 Rebellion, Revolution, and the Peasants

China was prone to peasant rebellions from premodern times, but they were not revolutions in the sense of changing the basic structure of the society. This structural weakness was also evident in the late Qing dynasty and helped bring about a real revolution under new tensions created by developments in commerce and industry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The most significant flaws were the weaknesses in the connections which bound the peasantry to the upper classes and the central government, as previously related. Barrington Moore argues that the evidence points strongly towards the conclusion that neither stratum performed any function which the peasants regarded as crucial for their way of life. Under severe strain, therefore, the link between rulers and ruled was liable to break. Three methods were used by the Imperial dynasty to strengthen that link: first, the provision of granaries so that in times of shortage grain could be distributed to the populace but this was largely abandoned in the nineteenth century when it was most needed; secondly, the *pao-chia* system of surveillance, which modern scholars of China have judged to be quite ineffective; and, thirdly, the *hsiang-yueh* system of periodic public lectures on Confucian ethics, which ceased in 1865. A fourth link was the clan which appears to have been more

effective in connecting the peasantry to the prevailing order. While existing in the north they were far stronger in the agriculturally richer south and generally associated with greater wealth. Even where clans were not prevalent it appears safe to assume that there were many smaller lineages which included gentry and peasant families with the same purpose of binding rulers and ruled. In general, then, the clan and patrilineal descent linked the higher and lower strata of Chinese society together. However, this could cut both ways as the clan could also become a means of holding rebel groups together.<sup>101</sup>

In view of the paucity of data from the Qing dynasty about peasant communities only inferences can be drawn from later field studies of Chinese villages. The main conclusion is that Chinese peasant society seems to have been much less cohesive than in other peasant societies like India and Russia. So, in China, it is the structure of peasant society, combined with the weak links between the peasantry and upper classes, which provide the underlying rationale for the proneness to rebellion and also the barriers and constraints upon them. As poverty intensified into the twentieth century such bonds as existed would break and peasants would leave their homes to become bandits and, later, recruits for warlord armies. Rebellion, though, required more than the breaking of existing bonds; it necessitated the development of new forms of solidarity which could produce enduring loyalty. The difficulties in achieving this were exacerbated by the limited experience of cooperation amongst peasants outside of family and clan. Still greater are the demands made for a revolution and had not certain circumstances arisen, beyond China's borders, the Communists might never have been able to resolve the problem.<sup>102</sup>

At the time of writing, Barrington Moore found that there was no good treatise on the major Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s with a focus on social structure but there was one on the contemporaneous Nien Rebellion (1853-1868), which collaborated with the Taiping rebels for a time. Two factors, the secret societies and the local gentry's own military units, took this rebellion beyond the classification of gangsterism. However, this involvement of the gentry constrained any attempt at land reform, which the Communists were later to overcome, albeit with difficulty. In the later stages of the rebellion, without any real improvements in the inhabitants' position, and possibly as the rebels' exactions became more onerous, popular support waned. On the Imperial side, purely military solutions proved unavailing until the government took over rebel tactics and started working through local leaders and offering peasants support for cultivation and peace. So, one of the most important features of the Nien Rebellion was that both rebels and central government could work through local social structures with similar ease or difficulty. Consequently this traditional framework of Chinese society both encouraged revolt and yet also placed severe limits on what it could accomplish. Only later, as the modern world brought decay to that structure, as previously outlined, did a serious revolutionary initiative become possible.<sup>103</sup>

A decline in the peasant's economic position during the nineteenth century seems apparent from the discontinuous evidence available across China. Peasants who fell into debt had to borrow, frequently at the highest rates, and if they were unable to repay then title in their land had to be passed to a landlord while they remained as a tenant to work the soil. The processes of decline and debt were most felt in the coastal areas which, in 1927, experienced

the worst peasant rebellion since the Taiping according to its historian, Harold Issacs. In view of the link between landed property and social cohesion, the growth of a mass of marginal peasants at the base of the social hierarchy in the village is most significant. Local modern studies suggest that at least a half of the inhabitants were in this position although there was no way of knowing at the time of writing how much of an increase this may represent over the nineteenth century. In any event, they constituted a potential tinder box. This land-hungry peasantry was the mass basis of the revolution which commenced in 1927 and was fulfilled in the Communist victory in 1949.<sup>104</sup>

Yet widespread and extensive poverty and exploitation are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to produce a revolutionary situation. There must also be a sense of injustice about the social structure either in terms of a perceived unfairness in the new demands placed on the peasantry or that old demands are no longer defensible. Barrington Moore posits that the decay of the gentry was this sufficient condition for a potential conflagration. As the gentry turned into usurers of the land, with the imperial examination system ended and the Confucian underpinning discredited, so their legitimacy was terminated. In the absence of a strong central government, private violence was prevalent and necessary for landlords to collect their rent and debts. While this generalisation allowed for much variation in practice around the country, the loss of legitimacy was widespread enough to contribute to turning many areas of China into a potentially explosive mixture that gave the Communists their opportunity.<sup>105</sup>

Such a conflagration would not self-ignite. Many accounts of village life, studied by Barrington Moore, gave no indication that peasants were ready to organise themselves effectively or act of their own volition. Anthropological field studies under Guomindang auspices and in peaceful communities do not support the thesis that peasant villages were in open revolt before the Communists arrived. As in Qing times the peasants required external leadership before they would rise against the prevailing social structure. The alternative was for the situation to continue to worsen until most village inhabitants died in the next famine. This often occurred. While this does not imply any innate foolishness or lack of courage and will on the part of Chinese peasants, the historical legacy of Empire and Republic constrained individuals to act as isolated individuals or to even conceive of possibilities of revolt. As in all major revolutions in modern history, spontaneity was not enough. Even the emergence of the CCP on this scene of extensive decay and hardship did not suffice for fundamental change. In part this was because of Marxist orthodoxy that led the party to seek power through proletarian uprisings in the cities which resulted in much bloodshed and heavy defeats. Serious interest in adopting Mao's strategy of mobilising the peasantry instead, from the late 1920s, was an essential precondition for eventual success along with a more nuanced approach to the better-off peasants during the war with Japan. However, the decisive factor was the Japanese invasion and their occupation policies.<sup>106</sup>

The Japanese invaders inadvertently helped the CCP task by eliminating the old elites in the villages, as GMD officials and landlords moved out of the countryside to the towns leaving peasants to their own devices, and forging solidarity amongst the masses, as the Japanese army conducted a campaign to mop up and exterminate defeated Chinese forces. The



Communist guerrilla organisations did not take root where Japanese or their puppet regimes provided the peasants with some security or in regions with no occupying force present. The Sino-Japanese War intensified a pre-existing revolutionary situation and brought it to a crisis point. Barrington Moore cites two field studies, one in northern China and the other in the south, to illustrate how the Communists used the social cleavages to destroy what was left of the old order and build new organisations, to supplant the existing village one, amongst poor peasants and women or link their regime to national government. In the latter case, land reform was conducted on an equal-share basis amongst family members without regard to age or sex thereby destroying or greatly weakening the link between landed property and kinship. This, in turn, unleashed powerful conflicts across lines of class, age and gender. The Communist regime thereby forged a new link from village to national government making evident to every peasant that his daily life now depended on the central power. This may, in fact, have increased the economic burdens beyond what the *rentiers* or GMD had previously imposed but it was more equitably shared. While these changes were temporary and transitional<sup>107</sup> – they take the history back to where it was left with the GMD government's triumph at the end of World War II. Yet only four years later it lost power to the CCP in 1949.

## A7 Modern Era – People's Republic of China, 1949 to present

### A7.1 The Triumph of the CCP, 1945-1949

To return to Westad's history, the Chinese communists were inspired by Leninism, in terms of the organisational aspirations of the Soviet Revolution of 1917. The preoccupation of the founders of the CCP in 1921, and their successors up to the late 1980s, was modelling a state on the lines built by Stalin which was modern and powerful under the command of the party and its hierarchy and military with strict discipline of its members and all citizens. Ultimately, they believed the whole world would move towards socialism even if not strictly in accord with Marx's own detailed understanding of international capitalism and its future.<sup>108</sup>

As previously noted, the CCP was forged in war. Party membership was very small until the Sino-Japanese War: about 40,000 in 1928; by 1937, after the Long March to the north, around the same number but with a further 40,000 non-member soldiers and civilians; but, as the war got underway, reaching 200,000 members in 1938 and, by its end in 1945, 1.2 million. One aspect of its growth was Mao's decision to move the CCP more towards the political centre and to emphasise a common defence of the nation against the Japanese invader. The other dimension was a line of thinking known as Maoism, or Mao Zedong Thought, involving strong ideological training based on the Chairman's own political curriculum. Thereby the party leadership sought to eliminate independent thinking while putting Mao's credo of self-sufficiency and sacrifice, and his persona, centre stage.<sup>109</sup>

Despite the weak position that the CCP was in at the end of the war, the international position was to move in Mao's favour in the summer of 1946 as the US-Soviet Cold War began to take effect. In the interim, Chiang Kai-shek had put military pressure on the CCP to try to achieve full integration of all its forces into the government army and gain official access to areas under Communist control. He also resisted US attempts at mediation through General George

C. Marshall. Stalin, after initial attempts to prolong Soviet occupation of Manchuria to force economic concessions from the GMD, did order a full pull-out in the spring of 1946 while arming CCP forces in the process. Mao ordered his military forces to resist the government troops entering Manchuria at every step of the way. Longer term he hoped that the Soviets would assist in supplying and training CCP forces to resist the more numerous and better equipped government forces.<sup>110</sup>

The Chinese civil war lasted from mid-1946 until early 1950, although the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed by Mao on 1 October 1949 at Tian'anmen Square, Beijing. The course of the civil war can be briefly summarised. In 1946 and 1947 the GMD launched offensives against CCP forces, removing them from almost all its territory south of the Great Wall including Yan'an, the Communist capital in the Sino-Japanese war, in March 1947. However, in late 1947 the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), as it was now called, counterattacked in Manchuria and by the autumn of 1948 GMD forces had been pushed out. Then in early 1949 the PLA crossed the Yangzi river and took Beijing in January, Nanjing (the GMD capital) in April, and Shanghai in May. By October Guangzhou and south China were overrun and by December Sichuan was also taken by the PLA. Thereafter, with Soviet assistance, Xinjiang in the far west was conquered by April 1950. Later, in October 1951, the PLA entered Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, and by then the PRC included all the territory of the former Qing dynasty, except Outer Mongolia which had its own socialist government and Taiwan where the remnant of Chiang's GMD and its forces were isolated. This was despite the United States providing over \$1.9 billion in assistance to the GMD between 1945 and 1950 (equivalent to \$40 billion in the early 2010s).<sup>111</sup>

---

*Note from Briefing Author*

The reasons for this victory may be found not only in the superior strategy and tactics of Mao and his CCP forces, which are outside of the scope of this Briefing,<sup>112</sup> but in the CCP's understanding and willingness to address the land question, as presented in section A6 above.

---

## A7.2 Relations with the Soviet Union

On 14 February 1950, after two months of negotiations in Moscow, the Soviet Union and China signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in which the Soviets promised to defend the PRC from attacks by Japan and its allies (obliquely referring to the USA) and provide military and civilian assistance in return for China setting up jointly owned companies in a wide range of goods and services and accepting Outer Mongolia's independence. The Soviet Union also agreed to return to China, without charge, their concessions in Manchuria, which had been granted in 1945, while China would not allow any country but the Soviet Union to operate in Manchuria and Xinjiang.<sup>113</sup>

### A7.3 The Korean War, 1950 – 1953

Korea was divided into two at the end of the Second World War, having a US and a Soviet occupation zone. The Korean Communists held power under Soviet domination in the north and a rival regime, supported by the US, had come into being in the south of the country. In the spring of 1950 Stalin gave approval for the communist leader, Kim Il-sung, to seek to reunify his country by force. The Chinese government had been kept informed and Mao endorsed the campaign in May, albeit without envisaging direct Chinese involvement.<sup>114</sup>

The North Korean attack across the country's dividing line started on 25 June 1950 and the Korean Communist army advanced rapidly south. Due to a Soviet boycott of the United Nations Security Council, US President Truman was able to pass a resolution authorising the use of force to support South Korea. Nevertheless, by August, the Communists were in control of the whole country except for a small area around the south eastern, coastal city of Pusan where the remaining Korean anti-communist forces were hemmed in with their US advisers. Then, on 15 September, US amphibious landings at Inchon, Seoul's port city, split the Communist forces in two before defeating them in the south. Thereafter they moved north into the Soviet occupation zone. Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, fell to US and UN forces on 19 October and it was now North Korea that faced defeat.<sup>115</sup>

Chinese forces had been massed at the border with Korea after the war started but the CCP's ruling body, the Politburo was divided on the merits of intervention at this critical juncture. Mao's determination to show solidarity with the Korean Communists and enhance its international standing was decisive in the end. At first, PRC intervention went well, with some of their forces strategically placed on the south bank of the Yalu river and UN forces being unprepared for wave after wave of Chinese soldiers coming against them. Soon the UN forces were back at the former demarcation line between the two Koreas. However, the war was unpopular in China, after so many years of fighting, and the United States Navy intervened to protect the GMD government of Taiwan thereby deferring reunification indefinitely. The Korean War ended in a stalemate [an armistice in July 1953] but China had demonstrated its ability to withstand even the strongest military power on earth at the time and fight it to a draw. It also strengthened the alliance with the Soviet Union but, by resisting the UN forces, at the price of undermining its ability to be part of the wider world.<sup>116</sup>

### A7.4 The PRC's International Relations, 1949 – 1960

The concept of the liberation of China was, and remains, central to the CCP's understanding of history: communists had freed the country from foreign rule and its indigenous supporters. The new Chinese government determined to sever its links with the rest of the world in a systematic manner, except for those with the Soviet Union, because it believed that its own position would not be secure while any other foreign influence remained. It did this by:

- (i) Removing foreigners who remained in China after 1949. Many had already left, and the great majority of the rest departed voluntarily in 1950-1951 or were deported without resistance. Political campaigns drove out most of the more recalcitrant.

- (ii) Attacking businesses and other organisations that had foreign ownership or were under foreign influence. Those bodies with special value or expertise might be kept on as state institutions and run solely by Chinese after foreigners were expelled.
- (iii) Attempting to reduce access to foreign books, films and products though this proved much harder than driving out foreigners.
- (iv) Using terror and imprisonment against foreigners who refused to leave the country, such as some missionaries, and Chinese who resisted efforts at reforming their attitudes and behaviour. The effects of large-scale killing and arrests during the CCP's early campaigns have been estimated by the Chinese historian Yang Kuisong to be much higher than the 700,000 killed and 2.5 million arrested that Mao acknowledged in 1957. Westad suggests somewhere between four and five million deaths, over half being executed, in the period 1949-1955.<sup>117</sup>

These antiforeign campaigns succeeded due to an unprecedented regimentation of the lives of Chinese citizens combined with the enthusiastic support of most Chinese because they wanted the state rebuilt and social reforms carried out. The latter was particularly aimed at improving the lot of women, factory workers and peasants.<sup>118</sup>

On the other hand, the assistance of the Soviets caused some tensions within the CCP between those who wanted China to copy the Soviet Union's path to modernisation and those, like Chairman Mao, who believed that Soviet aid and examples had to be vetted to ensure they were fit for Chinese objectives. He wished to avoid Soviet control of the CCP's political processes. That said, by 1949 all plans for a socialist China were prepared based on Soviet models and relied on Soviet expert assistance. China's capital city, which the CCP decided would be Beijing, was to be reconstructed in a Soviet style. There was a total reorientation towards working with the Soviets in the late 1940s to achieve the biggest transfer of foreign knowledge into China ever known so that the new State could break with China's difficult past as quickly and efficiently as possible.<sup>119</sup>

After Stalin's death in 1953 his successor, Khrushchev, sought to deepen the Soviet alliance with the PRC as a bedrock of his policy. Whereas Stalin had been cautious and mistrustful in his approach, Khrushchev promised far more civilian and military assistance than ever before: one-third of all projects in China's first Five Year Plan were to be built and funded by Soviet or East European assistance; and by 1955 sixty per cent of China's total trade was with the Soviet Union. Total economic assistance, including loans, between 1946 and 1960 was approximately US \$3.4 billion (in 1960 value), or about \$25 billion in early 2010s value, accounting for just under one per cent of Soviet Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on a yearly average basis. Even this does not take account of technology transfers, the salaries of Soviet experts in China or grant support for Chinese students in the Soviet Union. While some eighteen per cent of the value came from Soviet allies and roughly fifteen per cent was eventually repaid by the PRC, it still represented a huge resource transfer with important effects for both countries. In the process the Sino-Soviet alliance created, as both states intended, the most politically powerful anti-Western front at that time.<sup>120</sup>

Despite the Chinese Communists seeing themselves as being in the frontline of a global struggle against capitalism and imperialism, under the leadership of the Soviet Union, Mao

and his senior party officials supported the comparative easing of East-West relations under Stalin's successors. Both the Soviets and Chinese supported the partition of Vietnam and worked together to prevent Kim Il-sung from initiating a new war between the two Koreas. The CCP had given support to Ho Chi Minh's Communist-led Vietminh, in its struggle against French reoccupation of Indochina after World War II, which increased during the Korean War and culminated in the Vietminh defeat of France at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. At the subsequent peace conference in Geneva, the Chinese helped persuade a reluctant Ho to accept a settlement which involved a temporary division of Vietnam into Communist and non-Communist zones. Similarly, China's attitude to other Third World countries was informed by the Soviet Union's new emphasis on peaceful coexistence in order to gain allies amongst postcolonial countries in the struggle with the West. This included China signing up to Indian Prime Minister Nehru's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which involved a commitment to the equality of nations and non-interference in international affairs. Support for nationalist Third World governments like Nehru's was combined with helping Communist parties in such countries prepare to win power.<sup>121</sup>

Internally, though, China differed from the Soviet Union by the late 1950s in that, as the Stalinist mode of terror was being reduced in the Soviet Union, CCP policies were moving further left with an attendant willingness to use terror to encourage or enforce obedience.<sup>122</sup>

China's First Five Year Plan, introduced in 1953, had produced satisfactory results, with large-scale Soviet assistance, accounting for about nine per cent growth per year in the prioritised sectors of iron & steel, coal, cement, electricity generation and machine building. Nevertheless the leadership, especially Mao, was concerned about the future because agriculture could not keep pace with industrial expansion or even population growth while overall growth was insufficient to enable China to catch up with advanced countries. By 1956 this led to some policy differences between Mao and some younger leaders, on the one hand, who emphasised innovation and rapid economic transformation, and the old guard traditionalists like Zhou Enlai, on the other hand, who stressed reliance on the Plan and learning from Soviet experience.<sup>123</sup>

Then in February 1956 Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, shocked communists around the world by revealing in depth the extent of Stalin's terror in a speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. While a further admission of 'Russian chauvinism' in Stalin's relations with other countries' parties met with CCP approval, concerns were raised when Khrushchev's revelations contributed to subsequent revolts by Polish and Hungarian workers against their Communist governments later in 1956. CCP leaders' anxieties were heightened by open opposition in China itself and public demonstrations in late 1956 for improved worker conditions, greater democracy, and freedom of speech. Mao's proposal, that the party launch the 'Hundred Flowers Campaign' for greater openness, was taken up so opponents of the Communist government could be identified. Then, in late 1957, they were arrested and sent to labour camps. These latter developments, combined with the need to intensify heavy industrial production and agricultural growth, provided the impetus in 1958 for a 'Great Leap Forward'.<sup>124</sup>

#### A7.4.1 The Great Leap Campaign and Its Consequences

All private property was abolished in the countryside and peasants organised into people's communes with the intention of raising productivity. In these communes all services were collective. Huge land reclamation campaigns were carried out. Peasants worked to exhaustion to make a success of a Great Leap Forward and overcome obstacles like a lack of fertilizer by demolishing outbuildings and eventually even their own homes to provide material to grind up and spread on fields. Their produce was then sent to the cities or abroad. The government established agricultural production quotas based on inflated figures for the provinces and local CCP leaders then reported false output against quotas. Some local villagers were encouraged to setup furnaces in their backyards to aid steel production. As a result of this Great Leap campaign, by late autumn of 1958, it was already evident that parts of the country were going hungry. In the ensuing winter peasants began to die of starvation. By 1961 when the campaign ended it is estimated that 45 million people, mainly peasants, had died from hunger, disease and exhaustion.<sup>125</sup>

Some of the Soviet experts reporting to Moscow from China predicted in the spring of 1958 the considerable human cost of the Great Leap. Moreover, in private, Soviet advisers began issuing warnings to CCP comrades of the likely consequences of this campaign, which reportedly infuriated Mao.<sup>126</sup>

This difference contributed to a marked deterioration in relations between the Soviet Union and China in 1958-1959. This split came into the open in June 1960 as the two parties clashed at the congress of the Romanian Communist party. Then on 18 July that year Khrushchev ordered most Soviet advisers to return home immediately. Although, for a time, Sino-Soviet tensions eased and limited forms of cooperation were maintained but by mid-1964 a final breach, for the time being, became evident. For these new forms of cooperation and the retreat from the Great Leap led to open criticism of that campaign by the president of the PRC in 1962. Chairman Mao struck back against these criticisms of the Great Leap by making these doubts a matter of class struggle against revisionism in the CCP. This was to take its most radical form in 1966 when Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.<sup>127</sup>

#### A7.5 Sino-Indian Relations, 1955 to 1962

Whereas at the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955 the Chinese and Indian prime ministers had pledged eternal friendship between their two countries, by the end of the decade relations had broken down. In particular, when Chinese policies in Tibet led to a rebellion in 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, Mao believed that the Indian government had been behind the disturbances and wanted to benefit from it. In the summer of 1962, as Mao turned on CCP comrades who had criticised his Great Leap, Chinese policy towards India became underpinned by a siege mentality. Yet at this moment India began forward patrolling in the disputed border areas between the two countries. While Mao did not want war, when India refused the Chinese appeal for negotiations he was ready to act. Chinese forces began their attack on 20 October 1962 on two fronts some six hundred miles apart. The Indian forces were overwhelmed on both fronts and when China declared a ceasefire one month later it was in control of all the disputed border area. The Soviet Union

supported the Chinese position but did not get involved as Khrushchev was focused on the Cuban missile crisis. The enmity between China and India, created by this border war, has endured to the present day.<sup>128</sup>

#### A7.6 Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cultural Revolution in China

China claimed from 1962 onwards that the Soviet Union was applying military pressure on their common border. When many people defected from the western province of Xinjiang to the Soviet Union, this added to the CCP impression that their former ally had become an inveterate enemy. The break with the Soviet Union came as the two superpowers, the USA and USSR, were starting to draw back from the brink, following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, by signing (with the UK) the nuclear test ban treaty in August 1963. Instead, China went ahead with its first successful nuclear test in October 1964. So now China could develop its own nuclear weapons and achieve the security Mao expected from holding that arsenal. During the following year preparations for a purge of the CCP were clearly being made. In October 1965 Mao left Beijing for undisclosed locations in the interior, only returning in the summer of 1966 when the Cultural Revolution was in full swing across China. Now internationally isolated, Mao tried to use his theories about people's war to reach out to Third World countries and revolutionary groups to align with China and establish a new international centre, based on recognition of Mao's strategic genius.<sup>129</sup>

Although, in the mid-1960s, Mao saw countries like Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana and Cuba as part of this Third World front against both US imperialism and Soviet revisionism, by the late 1960s all these erstwhile allies were lost as their leaders were overthrown, chose the Soviet Union instead or were put off by China's inflexible attitude of superiority towards them.<sup>130</sup>

##### A7.6.1 Chinese Relations with North Vietnam and North Korea

China's new strategic orientation and its Sino-Soviet split created problems for these two communist neighbours. North Vietnam had to face US ground troops from 1965 and devise a long-term strategy to defeat them and reunify the country under their Communist leadership. This required as much foreign support as possible, but Mao insisted on a choice being made. Likewise, North Korea had expected that US involvement in Vietnam would permit them to coerce the South but, instead, found China requiring complete commitment to its own mission.<sup>131</sup>

For the North Vietnamese leaders and the National Liberation Front in the South, the US intervention created an urgent need for more weapons and economic support from its allies. The Soviets started a large-scale programme of supplying Hanoi with aircraft, tanks and air defences once US bombing of North Vietnam began in the autumn of 1964. Mao, on the other hand, took a more nuanced stance: by increasing basic supplies only and not allowing military advisers and support troops in North Vietnam to become involved in the fighting but covertly warning the United States that a ground invasion of North Vietnam would result in PRC intervention; thereby conserving its military armaments for its own defence in the event of a Soviet attack on China or Moscow provoking a Sino-US war. Although this stance kept China out of the Vietnam War it destroyed the previously close relations with Ho Chi Minh and his successor, Le Duan. The hindrances placed by China on their receiving Soviet aid was

especially resented, together with their criticisms of Vietnamese strategy and tactics as the Cultural Revolution in China developed. By 1969 the Vietnamese Communists thought the PRC was aiming to dominate a reunified country, when achieved, and to that end wanted the war to continue for as long as possible.<sup>132</sup>

Similarly, the North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung, had also thought the Chinese version of socialism more attractive than that of the new Soviet leader Brezhnev. Yet by 1966 he was facing Chinese advisers and students in his own capital, Pyongyang, shouting slogans in favour of Mao Zedong Thought and against revisionists. When his attempts to reign them in through covert persuasion failed, Kim adopted open criticism of Chinese 'chauvinism' and Mao's Red Guards. Instead of Chinese support for a renewed offensive against South Korea, Kim faced Chinese loudspeakers along the entire border with North Korea broadcasting propaganda against his ideology. This brought North Korea closer to the Soviet Union.<sup>133</sup>

#### A7.6.2 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution & The Threat of War with the Soviet Union

This was the biggest and most ferocious campaign of the Chinese government whose main impact was felt not so much in numbers killed or economic adversity (compared to the Great Leap) as in ruined lives. Across China people were brought forcibly before *ad hoc* tribunals and publicly humiliated or tortured in front of their families and friends. These included well known and long serving CCP members like the former president of China, Li Shaoqi. The young people who carried out torture and killings were authorised by Chairman Mao, whom they revered. During the Cultural Revolution China's foreign relations were almost entirely put on hold. Foreign students in China were deported and some embassies were attacked. Even the Soviet embassy was put under siege and East German diplomats beaten up in public.<sup>134</sup>

By the late 1960s it was the Soviet Union which was regarded as China's main enemy. Concerns were heightened by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and further increased by Soviet deployment of troops to Mongolia, at the government's request there because of the chaos in China where Red Guards fought each other with heavy weapons in the streets. China's only surviving ally in Europe was Albania whose Communist leaders had broken with all its former allies. Preparations for war in Beijing, begun in 1965, involved whole factories being moved to what Mao called the Third Line to form a 'secure rear base area', which continued until the early 1980s, causing severe economic waste and dislocation. Yet to the Cultural Revolution leadership, China's international isolation helped forge a new China and save the revolution. Although Mao used the PLA to end the worst chaos on the streets in late 1968, Mao regarded the process as on-going.<sup>135</sup>

To test Soviet intentions on the prospect of war with China and demonstrate the PLA's loyalty, Mao authorised a limited military attack on Soviet forces. This took place in March 1969 on Zhenbao/Damanskii island on the Ussuri river, which formed part of the north Manchurian border area claimed by both countries. It resulted in the deaths of some thirty Soviet soldiers. The Soviet Union contemplated a pre-emptive strike on Chinese nuclear facilities. However, while tension remained along the frontier, Mao allowed negotiations to take place. Then in August new clashes took place along the Xinjiang border in the western sector with heavy casualties on both sides. On this occasion, China believed the Soviet Union was planning a



large-scale attack despite a visit to Beijing by the Soviet premier to try to negotiate. In October 1969, the PLA was put on emergency alert and senior CCP leaders were evacuated from Beijing. Mao's mobilisation orders also attempted to reign in the Cultural Revolution with force, if necessary. While a major war did not break out the situation remained tense until the early 1970s.<sup>136</sup>

In the aftermath of this crisis, Mao sought advice from former army generals who reported that the 'Soviet revisionists' were now a greater threat than the 'U.S. imperialists' but, as both China and the United States regard the Soviet Union as their main enemy, the Soviet revisionists do not dare to fight a two-front war. Out of this, and other advice, came the thought of a possible rapprochement with the United States.<sup>137</sup>

#### A7.7 Sino-American Relations, 1970-2010

In 1970 Mao decided to 'ease' (in his terms) the general conflict with the United States although this did not affect his commitment to his political aims. In Westad's view, while he retained a lifelong commitment to the total revolutionary transformation of China, Mao's about-face on the United States was due to China's increasing conflict with the Soviet Union that he feared might result in a Soviet attack. Most of this concern resulted from the ideological conflict with Moscow which began in the 1960s, a dispute that assumed an apocalyptic form in the minds of China's leaders because it might end in nuclear war. However, as Westad stresses, the opening to the United States had unforeseen consequences that Mao could not imagine and which would have appalled him if he had been able to.<sup>138</sup>

China's relationship with the United States became the dominant consideration in the minds of most Chinese in the final decades of the twentieth century, which persists into this century despite diplomatic relations becoming problematic at times. The CCP has largely accepted the international system, as it was created by Britain and then the United States, as far as the framework for trade is concerned as well as other matters like the role of the UN Security Council.<sup>139</sup>

At about the same time of Mao's decision, the new US President Richard Nixon with his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, had become convinced by the war in Vietnam and protests in the United States that a diplomatic opening to China was a feasible option, while working with other Third World countries hostile to the Soviet Union. Eventually, after a secret visit to Beijing by Kissinger in July 1971, Nixon made an official visit in February 1972. While developments thereafter were slowed by many factors, and it took to the end of the decade to decide on the content of the Sino-American rapprochement, trade with the Chinese began quickly and, later, included military technology. Crucially Beijing assisted the United States in withdrawing from the Vietnam War but also agreed limited cooperation in clandestine operations against Soviet interests in certain Third World countries. Progress was delayed by political turmoil in both Beijing and Washington arising, in the former case, from the Cultural Revolution up to Mao's death in 1976, and, in the latter case, from Nixon's forced resignation in 1974 due to the Watergate scandal. Moreover, the US relationship with Taiwan remained a significant difficulty to overcome.<sup>140</sup>

After Mao's death his successor, Hua Guofeng, allied himself with China's military and had the former Chairman's radical allies on the Politburo arrested. Military commanders, who feared a return to the chaos during the Cultural Revolution, demanded a return to power of previously purged leaders like Deng Xiaoping, who had been the CCP's general secretary. With him, many other members of the party's old guard were rehabilitated. Deng, more than any other, appreciated the cost in economic development of China's isolation and political campaigns. He wanted experimentation including the introduction of material incentives to increase agricultural productivity, as envisaged in the early 1960s. Other radical reforms under consideration involved imported technology and domestic investment incentives. By 1981, with military support for economic growth and Deng in the political ascendancy, he chose, in place of previous policies, modernisation focused on economic construction. He made the United States the model for China's technological development, a view reinforced by his visit to several cities there in 1979. Consequently, he prioritised working with the United States and easing tensions, including over Taiwan, in order to realise the vast opportunities for technology transfer, civilian and military.<sup>141</sup>

Full diplomatic relations between China and the USA were restored in 1979 while Washington cut its formal links with the government of Taiwan. More significantly, economic and military cooperation increased spurred on by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year. Beijing sought to bolster cooperation with its message that the Soviet Union was a threat to world peace and that only a powerful China could counter Soviet advances in Asia. Under Ronald Reagan's presidency in the 1980s, China was treated as a *de facto* ally, despite early reservations about keeping faith with its friends on Taiwan, and it was given sensitive intelligence and access to technology sometimes unavailable to others outside of the USA. Reagan sought to assist China in becoming a threat to the Soviet Union thereby limiting Moscow's ability to intervene in other parts of the world.<sup>142</sup>

On the military front, China aimed to produce its own weapons and did not become a major importer of US weapons. Instead, there was Chinese access to US technology in the 1980s including aerospace and missile technology. Deng planned to make China into a top military power within twenty years to deter or defeat any Soviet attack with US assistance. While Sino-American differences over Taiwan remained problematic during this period, a degree of stability was achieved by a joint statement in August 1982 by which the United States agreed to phase out its weapon sales to Taiwan. Later US presidents have, though, largely ignored this weapons compromise.<sup>143</sup>

In the 1980s over 20,000 international partnerships worth more than US\$26 billion were signed by China. They enabled the Chinese economy to restart, concentrated at first in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) like Shenzhen, near Hong Kong, which arose throughout the country especially in the south and along China's eastern coast. Private Chinese companies came into being, as property rights were gradually re-established, and collectivisation in agriculture was ended. By 1983 Chinese economic growth had reached double figures and GDP quadrupled during the decade as whole. Even though much of the capital came through Hong Kong, the United States provided most of the expertise, business organisation and technology. It was also the destination for the largest share of Chinese exports.<sup>144</sup>

However, for most Chinese, early changes in the economy did not affect their living standards very much, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, though there were more opportunities to eke out a living. The great majority of Chinese workers were still engaged by state-owned companies working within a planned economy. Although wages were tiny, all services were provided by the state enterprises, covering housing to health care from cradle to grave. Yet, by the end of the 1980s, there were no labour or capital markets for most people.<sup>145</sup>

#### A7.7.1 Impact of the Ending of the Cold War

In tandem with economic change in China in the 1980s a debate began amongst students and intellectuals, as well as some party officials, about reform of the political system, too. Amongst longstanding leaders of the CCP, including Deng himself, there was serious concern about the risks of a return to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Many of the ideas for political reform were also drawn from the United States and by the experience of Chinese students abroad. The political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s encouraged an emphasis on freedom and the rights of citizens. Demonstrations began to break out in Chinese cities. Deng Xiaoping feared they might result in chaos and had martial law imposed in Beijing and other cities where rallies were being organised. The violent suppression of dissent in Tian'anmen Square, Beijing on 4 June 1989, when hundreds of unarmed demonstrators, mostly students, were killed by government soldiers created a crisis in China's relations with the West. While almost all democratic governments condemned this use of force and many, including the United States, imposed sanctions on China, the Sino-American relationship was regarded as too important in Washington to be put at risk especially at a time when the United States wanted continued Chinese support for its containment of the Soviet Union.<sup>146</sup>

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Deng warned publicly of the consequences of foreign influence in China. Expressing concern about how peaceful evolution towards capitalism in China could be prevented once the present generation of CCP leaders are dead, Deng sought to strengthen the CCP dictatorship through a new generation whilst ensuring that China became wealthy and powerful. Despite the Tian'anmen Square massacre there was a vast opening-up of the Chinese economy in the 1990s sustained by a level of foreign direct investment (FDI) which had never been witnessed before in China's history. Although Deng died in 1997, his vision for China of prosperity under the party's political control was retained by his successors. So, while the 1990s did not become a decade for political change as even some top CCP leaders had hoped, it did realise unprecedented economic and social change. By 2000 China was more integrated into the global economy than it had been since the 1920s. As part of this process Hong Kong was returned to China by Britain in 1997.<sup>147</sup>

#### A7.7.2 Economic Developments in the 1990s and 2000s

During the 1990s China was only surpassed by the United States in attracting FDI due to the country's cheap and hardworking labour force and foreign investors' interest in its internal market development. A legal framework was created to serve these overseas interests which then also assisted China's own entrepreneurs. In the same fashion stock exchanges, insurance providers and quality control systems were established. China eventually managed, with US

support, to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 but this meant that, in order to enhance its export potential, it had to accept a regulatory regime aimed at ending state subsidies, maintaining industry standards and abiding by copyright protection laws while opening up its own domestic market to foreign competition.<sup>148</sup>

By 2000 the socialist economy in China had given way to a market economy, with active CCP leadership support. State enterprises were either privatised, downsized or permitted to go into liquidation. Those that did survive were publicly listed and faced the same regulations as other Chinese companies. For ordinary Chinese workers, this has meant that cradle-to-grave provision has gone and instead they search for private housing, enter the labour market, and save to provide for their children's education. Commuting to work has become the norm for many Chinese workers living in a market economy that looks more like that of the United States than Europe or Japan – without much of a social safety net, rather a focus on individual responsibility and taking advantage of the new opportunities. However, this led by 2010 to levels of income inequality in China – measured by its Gini coefficient – higher than that of any other country in the region and only slightly lower than the most unequal countries in the world, like Brazil. CCP leaders justify this, as Deng did, by his maxim that some people must become rich first.<sup>149</sup>

#### A7.7.3 Taiwan

Taiwan remained the main thorn in the side of the Sino-American relationship in the 1990s, as in the 1980s. On the island, under Chiang Ching-Kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, there had been some gradual liberalisation with martial law abolished in 1986 and de facto opposition parties permitted to operate. His successor, Li Denghui, as president in 1990 responded to big student demonstrations by setting out a timetable for full democracy. So, in 1996, Li became the first democratically elected president on Taiwan with a constitution granting individual freedoms including political participation in a freely elected parliament. These developments made some CCP leaders, like Jiang Zemin who became president in 1993, concerned that Taiwan was moving towards independence from China. The first military operation by the PLA near Taiwanese islands since 1958, though, only strengthened support for Li's presidential bid in 1996 and resulted in US fleet deployments into the Taiwan Straits. Overall, this flare-up had the effect of China maintaining its longstanding position that conflict with the United States was not in its interest.<sup>150</sup>

Then, in 2000, Taiwanese voters elected a non-GMD president, Chen Shuibian, who had openly supported independence from the mainland. However, in office, Chen did not promote separatism as a principal objective. Moreover, China's outstanding economic growth, which Taiwanese companies wished to benefit from, and President George W. Bush's desire for a stable relationship with China, after his war on terror began in 2001, also helped divert attention from any threat of conflict over Taiwan. The emergence of financial corruption in Chen's government was another factor leading to the rejection of his party in the Taiwanese elections in 2008. A poll on Taiwan in 2009 found sixty-four per cent in favour of the status quo, on Taiwan's relationship with the mainland, compared to nineteen per cent for independence and five per cent for unification.<sup>151</sup>

#### A7.7.4 Impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the United States

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 profoundly changed the Sino-American relationship. The new US President Bush had viewed China as a 'strategic competitor' and the primary challenge to his country's security. However, Bush's global war on terrorism provided the Chinese leadership with the opportunity to partner the United States, which they did thereby easing tensions in the relationship. China supported the US-led attack on terrorist bases in Afghanistan post 9/11 and accepted the overthrow of the Taliban government which had sheltered Osama bin Laden whose terrorist group were held responsible for the attacks on the United States. While the lengthy period leading up to the United States-led war against Iraq in 2003 put strains on the relationship yet China confined itself to oral opposition without any attempt to use the UN Security Council to block the use of military force. Instead, as the United States became embroiled in its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China pursued economic growth and the build-up of its military power. It became the world's second largest economy, after the United States, in 2010 and the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods. China's trade surplus was huge and its foreign investment started to expand.<sup>152</sup>

However, difficulties arose from Chinese currency manipulations and state interventions in the domestic economy while further cause for foreign complaints arose from the size of the Chinese trade surplus especially with the United States. Moreover, within China, concerns were voiced about income inequality, appalling labour conditions in some sectors and the scale of the requirement for new jobs to absorb entrants into the labour market. China also remained far behind the United States in terms of military investment.<sup>153</sup>

#### A7.8 China's Relations with the Rest of Asia, 1970 – 2010

Since the rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s and the opening-up of the Chinese economy in the early 1980s, China has reengaged with the rest of Asia. Its previous position of self-isolation except for its close relationship with North Korea, where it competed for influence with the Soviet Union, was combined with territorial and ideological disputes with all its neighbours including North Korea. Amongst the most serious were:

- Its 3,000 miles of closed borders with the Soviet Union;
- A war with Vietnam in 1979 in which China suffered heavy casualties; and
- A hostile relationship with India since its defeat by China in the 1962 border war.<sup>154</sup>

In the period before China's reengagement, other Asian economies had been making strong advances. Japan, the leading Asian economy at the time, had experienced economic growth averaging ten per cent a year in the period 1950 to 1973, as had Taiwan. Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong were not far behind with average annual economic growth of eight per cent. Whereas in the PRC, GDP per capita was about \$800 in 1973 the comparable figures for Japan were \$11,500, Hong Kong \$7,000, Singapore \$6,000 and Taiwan \$4,000.<sup>155</sup>

Yet since 1980 China has itself experienced economic growth averaging ten per cent up to the late 2000s, as it has reengaged with the East Asian system of trade, finance and investment.

China, with its 1.3 billion population [by the end of this period], had become the economic powerhouse that the rest of Asia had oriented itself towards.<sup>156</sup>

## A8 Conclusion

War has had a profound effect on human history and the experience of China over the last two and a half centuries has well illustrated this. However, what is usually missed is how short term the benefits of coercion can be for the victors unless any imbalance in the peaceful means of conflict resolution is addressed for the long term. The analysis in Table A1 below is unique, as far as this author is aware, in highlighting that point across the three main periods of modern Chinese history, as summarised in this Appendix based on Westad's work covering: the Qing dynasty since the late eighteenth century; the Chinese Republic, 1912-1949; and the People's Republic of China, 1949 to the present day.

By reference to Q1 in the Introduction above, the following answer can be offered:

### A. Qing Dynasty

- Generally speaking, *each war before the final collapse of this dynasty in 1911 was decided by the more militarily powerful side* but, as a sign of imperial overreach, Qing military expeditions against neighbouring countries (like Burma and Vietnam) in the latter part of the eighteenth century were costly failures.
- More importantly, Western military victories in the Opium Wars of nineteenth century and the imposition of extra-territoriality and takeover of Hong Kong by Britain stored up *a growing imbalance of peace that took a century and a half to finally resolve*. Furthermore, Japan in a similar position to China at first, in facing up to Western military and economic power, proved its greater success in addressing this challenge (Meiji v Tongzhi Restoration), in their decisive defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 over their respective positions in Korea. This, though, had the long-term consequence of encouraging Japanese militarism and undermining nationalists in China and Japan seeking common ground in self-determination for their countries.
- *As the Qing lost international credibility it faced growing internal threats* in the form of the Taiping Rebellion, based on an interpretation of Western Christianity – however perverse and sacrilegious – which later resurfaced in the Boxer Rebellion, with its militant anti-foreigner and anti-Christian sentiments, arising in the wake of Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. *The military defeat of these and other rebellions, despite the Boxers having Qing Court support, in no way removed the underlying grievances arising from the longstanding imbalance of peace between China and Western powers* and made yet more problematic the Qing's own efforts at reform on a Confucian basis that could not reconcile monarchical with republican principles.

The fall of the last imperial dynasty of China, though it came after a succession of military defeats dating from the British naval intervention in the 1840s, occurred when the last Qing general agreed to negotiate with Chinese republican revolutionaries because further fighting to sustain a dynasty, which even he did not believe in anymore, was futile. The balance of peace – in this case, over constitutional principles and against foreign control – had proven

decisive despite several wars and suppression of internal rebellions to negate or obviate them. While these matters were far from resolved in 1912, the last Qing Emperor's abdication conclusively accepted that China's long era of monarchical dynasties was finally over.

## B. Chinese Republic

- While the weakness of the balance of peaceful methods of conflict resolution had been clear even in the later phase of the Qing dynasty, *the evidence in the first unstable period of the Republic of the imbalance between Chinese and Western perceptions* was even more striking. The failure of the Paris Peace Conference and disillusionment, resulting from the rejection of the principle of self-determination in China's case and favouring of Japan's claim to Chinese land (Shandong), gave rise to the May Fourth movement in China in 1919. Inevitably it radicalised Chinese politics and helped to undermine any prospect for a peaceful means of resolving grievances.
- The rejuvenation of the GMD in the 1920s, and formation of the CCP in 1921, took more centralised and militarised forms that led to *the GMD's Northern Expedition with CCP support in 1926-28 and the end of the era of provincial warlords*, (even if not re-establishing full central control). However, *it did not enable the new GMD government of Chiang Kai-shek to resolve the issue of foreign extra-territorial rights in China* because of Western unwillingness to negotiate and the threat of war with Japan.
- The background to the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 was *the progressive undermining of the balance of peace in both Japan and China amongst those who sought cooperation rather than confrontation, conquest by example rather than the exploitation of Chinese weakness*. The actions of the Japanese army in Manchuria in 1931 as well as assassinations in Japan itself prepared the ground for all-out war.
- *The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 produced many military victories over GMD government forces but did not break Chinese morale or resistance*, partly due to atrocities committed by the invaders. Furthermore, over-extended Japanese lines offered opportunities for effective guerrilla warfare by GMD and CCP forces. Once the Sino-Japanese War meshed with the Second World War US support for the GMD, especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, and later to the CCP helped sustain the Chinese war effort despite British defeats by Japan in the Far East.
- *Yet out of this eight-year war came not only victory for the GMD government of China but the building-up of the CCP under Mao* and its political organisation and guerrilla forces. A key component of this formation was *its more successful mobilisation of the peasantry in addressing their longstanding grievances on land reform*. (Here the work of Barrington Moore is of seminal importance, as summarised in this Appendix.) It is doubtful, though, when if ever the CCP would have come to power in China had it not been for *the Japanese invasion of China which created, inadvertently, the conditions for the CCP's eventual triumph in the ensuing Chinese civil war of 1945-50*.
- A further crucial benefit for the CCP in its civil war with the initially much stronger GMD government forces was *the start of the Cold War between the USA and Soviet Union*. *This ensured that the CCP could benefit from Soviet support* which, together with Mao's superior mastery of 'people's war', would bring victory in October 1949.

### Chinese Republic – concluding summary

The history of the Chinese Republic, when the country was at its weakest and under threat from both Western and Eastern powers, demonstrates how even under conditions of almost continuous war, varying only in degree, a superior Western and Japanese balance of military power did not resolve the underlying issues in their Western/Japanese favour, nor an inferior balance of Chinese military power prevent their eventual resolution:

- The victory of the Western liberal democracies, with Japan and China, in the Great War did not resolve the questions of extra-territoriality and national self-determination for the Chinese people at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
- The success of the GMD-led Northern Expedition in 1926-28 and the establishment of a stronger central government in China did not resolve these matters either.
- The initial defeats of China and Britain by Japan and then the defeat of Japan by the USA, with Chinese and British support, in the Second World War finally created the conditions for foreign extra-territoriality to be ended in China by 1943 despite the GMD/CCP forces' imbalance of military power compared to Japan until 1945, with the Soviet Union also entering the war against Japan that year.

Furthermore, the political and military triumph of the GMD government in 1945 did not prevent their defeat four years later in the Chinese civil war and the triumph of the CCP in October 1949. *Whatever else explains the direction of conflicts towards a state of peace or war, the balance of power would appear in this case to be a most inadequate guide on its own.*

Equally obvious is that *the prospects for achieving a balance of peace were successively undermined throughout the period of the Chinese Republic*, virtually ensuring that the underlying issues of foreign extra-territoriality, national sovereignty and land reform would only be resolved as a by-product of war and, thereby, generate conditions for East-West hostility and Sino-Japanese distrust for decades or generations to come.

### C. The People's Republic of China

By reference to Q2 in the Introduction above, the following answer can be offered:

- In the early years of the PRC, external conflicts were not sought by the CCP leadership, as far as can be ascertained, but Mao was drawn into the Korean War by the imminent defeat of its North Korean ally. *China's People's Liberation Army then demonstrated its fighting qualities and experience by achieving a military draw against the USA, despite a significant US technological advantage.* Likewise in 1962, the PRC sought a peaceful solution of its border dispute with India and only when that was rejected did it seek, and achieve, a military solution, albeit without resolving the underlying issues.
- *The most revealing example of the balance of peace – unique in the history of modern China – came out of Sino-Soviet border violence and threat of war in 1969.* A sufficient balance of military power between the two Communist neighbours helped ensure that neither was willing to risk a Great Power war with possible escalation to the nuclear level. However, it also prompted Mao to consider an easing of tensions with the USA while, on the American side, President Nixon saw an opportunity to reach out to China



as he faced mounting protests at home over the Vietnam War and sought to buttress opposition to the Soviet Union. On the economic side, the failure of the Great Leap Forward campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s, followed by the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and the international isolation it engendered, produced in China by the mid-1970s a strong rationale for a change of direction under CCP leadership, headed-up by Deng soon after Mao's death in 1976. This was matched by a US interest in providing economic and technological support to China, even military aid. It proved to be the transformative moment for the PRC, economically and, later, militarily, but with the potential for renewed coercive power relationships between the PRC and the West, with Japan, masked by the Cold War.

- A sharp reminder of how military prowess can slip came in 1979, only a few years after the Vietnam War had ended, when the PLA invaded Vietnam, after Vietnam had invaded Cambodia to remove the Khmer Rouge. By all accounts, Chinese forces suffered a sharp reverse and *the traditional rivalry between Vietnam and its larger neighbour has continued to produce tensions and civil conflicts to the present day.*
- *The unexpected and dramatic ending of the Cold War between the USA and USSR, coming soon after the violent suppression of political dissent in Beijing in 1989, threatened a renewal of coercive relations between the USA and China.* However, on this occasion the favourable balance of peace, on the economic dimension of the relationship, proved strong enough to be sustained in the 1990s. This resulted in yet greater economic benefits to China – and the opportunity to modernise the PLA. The move in Taiwan towards a Western-style liberal democracy, though, sharpened the institutional conflicts with mainland China and between the PRC and the West.
- In a similar way, the global war on terrorism after 9/11 also produced an early move towards more cooperative relations between the USA and China including over US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, as the US reduced (or, in the case of the former, ended) its military involvements there and its concerns with the PRC over a variety of political and economic issues escalated *in the 2010s and 2020s, so coercive relationships have started to overwhelm cooperative ones across each dimension of security – military, economic and institutional.* The task now is to foresee the future direction of the conflict between the USA and the PRC and between West and East.

Unlike in the two previous periods of modern Chinese history, *the PRC has become relatively prosperous and secure in its own borders not because of a favourable balance of power (compared to the USA and USSR) but due to a sufficient balance (demonstrated in the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet border dispute and threat of a great power war in 1969). Rather, the transformative moment not only in the history of the CCP leadership of the PRC but of modern China came in the 1970s from a favourable balance of peace. The PRC's (coercive) power now – military, economic and institutional – came from the CCP's moment of greatest weakness and international isolation not from its strength and integration with the world economy.*

It is this truth which all State and non-State entities including the CCP itself need to keep firmly in mind in addressing Q3 in the Introduction of this Appendix. The answer from this author is offered in the main chapter of the Briefing at section 2.2.1.

## References

---

- 1 . One work of special interest is Robert Bickers, Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination (Penguin Books, 2018). This work covers much of the period covered by Westad but in a more 'micro' way, i.e. providing a useful picture of events on the ground at certain critical moments in the history of Republican, and then Communist, Chinese history. It is less adaptable for the purposes of this Briefing but see Appendix C, section C2 for Bickers' observations on two Western educational bodies in Republican China.
- 2 . J M Roberts, The Pelican History of the World (Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 143 and 156.
- 3 . Ibid, pp. 146, 424 and 426.
- 4 . Ibid, pp. 428, 430-32.
- 5 . Ibid, pp. 434-36.
- 6 . Ibid, p. 438.
- 7 . Ibid, p. 444.
- 8 . Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (Vintage Books, 2013), pp. 2 and 5.
- 9 . Ibid, pp. 6-7, 9 and 21.
- 10 . Ibid, pp. 9-10.
- 11 . Ibid, p. 22.
- 12 . Ibid, p. 20.
- 13 . Ibid, pp. 25-26.
- 14 . Ibid, p. 26.
- 15 . Ibid, pp. 29-31.
- 16 . Ibid, pp. 33 and 36-37.
- 17 . Ibid, pp. 39-44.
- 18 . Ibid, p. 46.
- 19 . Ibid, pp. 46-49.
- 20 . Ibid, pp. 49-50.
- 21 . Ibid, pp. 12 and 50-51.
- 22 . Ibid, pp. 53-54.
- 23 . Ibid, p. 54.
- 24 . Ibid, p. 55.
- 25 . Ibid, pp. 60-62.
- 26 . Ibid, pp. 68-70.
- 27 . Ibid, pp. 70-73.
- 28 . Ibid, pp. 84-85.
- 29 . Ibid, pp. 87-88.
- 30 . Ibid, p. 88.
- 31 . Ibid, pp. 88-89.
- 32 . Ibid, pp. 89-91.
- 33 . Ibid, pp. 96-96.
- 34 . Ibid, p. 97.
- 35 . Ibid, pp. 96-103.
- 36 . Ibid, p. 115.
- 37 . Ibid, pp. 112-14.
- 38 . Ibid, pp. 103-06.
- 39 . Ibid, pp. 106-09.
- 40 . Ibid, p. 109.
- 41 . Ibid, pp. 110-12.
- 42 . Ibid, p. 123.
- 43 . Ibid, pp. 123-24.
- 44 . Ibid, pp. 125-26.
- 45 . Ibid, pp. 126-27.
- 46 . Ibid, pp. 127-30.
- 47 . Ibid, pp. 130-31.
- 48 . Ibid, pp. 131-33.
- 49 . Ibid, pp. 133-35.
- 50 . Ibid, pp. 135-37.

- 
- <sup>51</sup> . Ibid, pp. 137-38.  
<sup>52</sup> . Ibid, pp. 138-39.  
<sup>53</sup> . Ibid, pp. 140-41.  
<sup>54</sup> . Ibid, pp. 141-42.  
<sup>55</sup> . Ibid, pp. 142-45.  
<sup>56</sup> . Ibid, pp. 146-48.  
<sup>57</sup> . Ibid, pp. 148-49.  
<sup>58</sup> . Ibid, pp. 149-50.  
<sup>59</sup> . Ibid, pp. 150-51.  
<sup>60</sup> . Ibid, pp. 151-54.  
<sup>61</sup> . Ibid, pp. 155-60.  
<sup>62</sup> . Ibid, pp. 160-62.  
<sup>63</sup> . Ibid, pp. 162-64.  
<sup>64</sup> . Ibid, pp. 164-65.  
<sup>65</sup> . Ibid, pp. 165-66.  
<sup>66</sup> . Ibid, pp. 166-68.  
<sup>67</sup> . Ibid, pp. 168-70.  
<sup>68</sup> . Ibid, pp. 114-18.  
<sup>69</sup> . Ibid, pp. 119-20.  
<sup>70</sup> . Ibid, pp. 120-21.  
<sup>71</sup> . Ibid, pp. 121-22.  
<sup>72</sup> . Ibid, pp. 247-49.  
<sup>73</sup> . Ibid, pp. 249-52.  
<sup>74</sup> . Ibid, pp. 253-57.  
<sup>75</sup> . Ibid, pp. 257-58.  
<sup>76</sup> . Ibid, pp. 259-62.  
<sup>77</sup> . Ibid, pp. 262-64.  
<sup>78</sup> . Ibid, pp. 264-65.  
<sup>79</sup> . Ibid, pp. 265-69.  
<sup>80</sup> . Ibid, pp. 278-80.  
<sup>81</sup> . Ibid, pp. 280-84.  
<sup>82</sup> . Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Penguin Books, 1979).  
<sup>83</sup> . See Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 4 vols (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967-69).  
<sup>84</sup> . Barrington Moore, p.162.  
<sup>85</sup> . Ibid, pp. 162-63.  
<sup>86</sup> . Ibid, pp. 163-65.  
<sup>87</sup> . Ibid, p. 165.  
<sup>88</sup> . Ibid, pp. 166-69.  
<sup>89</sup> . Ibid, pp. 169-71.  
<sup>90</sup> . Ibid, pp. 171-72 and 174.  
<sup>91</sup> . Ibid, pp. 174-75.  
<sup>92</sup> . Ibid, pp. 175-77.  
<sup>93</sup> . Ibid, pp. 177-78.  
<sup>94</sup> . Ibid, pp. 178-80.  
<sup>95</sup> . Ibid, p. 180.  
<sup>96</sup> . Ibid, pp. 187-89.  
<sup>97</sup> . Ibid, pp. 189-92.  
<sup>98</sup> . Ibid, p. 194.  
<sup>99</sup> . Ibid, pp. 192-94.  
<sup>100</sup> . Ibid, p. 201.  
<sup>101</sup> . Ibid, pp. 201-08.  
<sup>102</sup> . Ibid, pp. 208-14.  
<sup>103</sup> . Ibid, pp. 215-18.  
<sup>104</sup> . Ibid, pp. 218-20.  
<sup>105</sup> . Ibid, pp. 220-21.

- 
- <sup>106</sup> . Ibid, pp. 221-23.
- <sup>107</sup> . Ibid, pp. 223-27.
- <sup>108</sup> . Westad, pp. 285-86.
- <sup>109</sup> . Ibid, pp. 286-87.
- <sup>110</sup> . Ibid, pp. 288-90.
- <sup>111</sup> . Ibid, pp. 290-91.
- <sup>112</sup> . See, however, note 83 above, especially vol. 4 of Mao's Selected Works which covers the civil war from 1945-1949.
- <sup>113</sup> . Westad, pp. 292-93.
- <sup>114</sup> . Ibid, pp. 293-94.
- <sup>115</sup> . Ibid, p. 294.
- <sup>116</sup> . Ibid, pp. 295-97.
- <sup>117</sup> . Ibid, pp. 297-300 and 323-24. Westad's figures are, according to his note 33, based on estimates by PRC historians who were then working on that period.
- <sup>118</sup> . Westad, p. 300.
- <sup>119</sup> . Ibid, pp. 301-03.
- <sup>120</sup> . Ibid, pp. 304-06.
- <sup>121</sup> . Ibid, pp. 319-21.
- <sup>122</sup> . Ibid, p. 323.
- <sup>123</sup> . Ibid, pp. 309 and 327.
- <sup>124</sup> . Ibid, pp. 328-30.
- <sup>125</sup> . Ibid, pp. 335-36 citing, in note 1, Frank Dikötter, Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-62 (Walker, New York, 2010).
- <sup>126</sup> . Westad, p. 336.
- <sup>127</sup> . Ibid, pp. 333 and 336-41.
- <sup>128</sup> . Ibid, pp. 341-43.
- <sup>129</sup> . Ibid, pp. 344-46.
- <sup>130</sup> . Ibid, pp. 350-51.
- <sup>131</sup> . Ibid, pp. 346-47.
- <sup>132</sup> . Ibid, pp. 348-49.
- <sup>133</sup> . Ibid, pp. 349-50.
- <sup>134</sup> . Ibid, pp. 353-55.
- <sup>135</sup> . Ibid, pp. 357-59.
- <sup>136</sup> . Ibid, pp. 360-61.
- <sup>137</sup> . Ibid, p. 362.
- <sup>138</sup> . Ibid, p. 366.
- <sup>139</sup> . Ibid, pp. 366-67.
- <sup>140</sup> . Ibid, pp. 368-70.
- <sup>141</sup> . Ibid, pp. 371-73.
- <sup>142</sup> . Ibid, pp. 373-75.
- <sup>143</sup> . Ibid, pp. 376-77.
- <sup>144</sup> . Ibid, pp. 377-78.
- <sup>145</sup> . Ibid, pp. 379-80.
- <sup>146</sup> . Ibid, pp. 380-83.
- <sup>147</sup> . Ibid, pp. 383-84 and 442-43.
- <sup>148</sup> . Ibid, pp. 384-85.
- <sup>149</sup> . Ibid, pp. 385-86 and 389.
- <sup>150</sup> . Ibid, pp. 389-92.
- <sup>151</sup> . Ibid, pp. 392-93 citing, in note 17, figures from the TVBS Poll Center, March 2009.
- <sup>152</sup> . Ibid, pp. 400-02.
- <sup>153</sup> . Ibid, pp. 402-03.
- <sup>154</sup> . Ibid, p. 405.
- <sup>155</sup> . Ibid, pp. 405-06. The figures cited, in note 1, are from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2001), pp. 216-17.
- <sup>156</sup> . Westad, p. 406.

TABLE A1

## AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ARMED VIOLENCE IN CHINA SINCE 1750

Event	E/I	Years	Competing Entities	Balance of Power	Balance of Peace	Outcomes: Short-Term	Outcomes: Long-Term	Year(s) Fulfilled
<i>A. Qing</i>								
Qing military expeditions	E	Late C18th	Qing v various countries on its borders	Qing pre-eminent	High military expenditures emptied Treasury	Tributary relationships (not with Japan)	Weakened central state	1839-42 (Opium War)
Opium War	E	1839-42	Qing v Britain	British naval superiority	Qing efforts to eliminate opium smuggling failed	Britain gained extra-territoriality and Hong Kong	Extra-territoriality given up by UK/USA and then Hong Kong returned to China	By Nov 1943 (Cairo conf.) 1997
Taiping Rebellion (et al)	I	1850-64	Qing v Taiping rebels (et al)	Qing dominance with local elites	Gospel of Jesus Christ interpreted by rebel leader, Hong, to justify violence to achieve Kingdom of Great Peace	Rebellion(s) crushed – 20m+ dead	Triumph of atheistic communism in China after a century of social divisions/economic exploitation	Oct 1949 (People's Republic of China established)
Second Opium War	E/I	1856-60	Qing v Britain and France	Western powers dominant/Qing weakened by rebellions	Qing efforts to resist further trade concessions failed	Beijing occupied and plundered by foreign troops/ Western economic power increased	Tongzhi Restoration gave Qing a new lease of life but less successful than Meiji Restoration in Japan	1894-95 (Sino-Japanese War)

Event	E/I	Years	Competing Entities	Balance of Power	Balance of Peace	Outcomes: Short-term	Outcomes: Long-term	Year(s) Fulfilled
<i>A. Qing (cont'd)</i>								
Sino-Japanese War	E/I	1894-95	Qing v Japan resulting from Tonghak rebellion in Korea	Japanese forces dominant on land and at sea	Tianjin Protocol of 1885 did not prevent war	Treaty in 1895 required China to recognise Korean independence; cede Taiwan and pay reparations to Japan	Qing reform efforts based on Confucianism failed but Western powers constrained Japan after its defeat of Russia in 1904-05 war	1911 (China becomes a republic)
Boxer Rebellion	E/I	1898-1901	Qing split, then Court supported Boxers v Western allies	Court support for Boxers also split Qing armed forces. Allies had naval superiority, while land forces occupied Beijing	Boxer Protocols of 1901 imposed weapons embargo and huge indemnity on Qing	Further weakening of Qing empire's international credibility/subordination to West and Japan		
Overthrow of Qing Dynasty	I	1911-12	Army officers in Wuhan revolt to create a republic v Yuan recalled by Qing, with British support, to head the army	Yuan retakes Wuhan but agrees to negotiate with revolutionaries	Republican principles replace monarchical ones/Sun Yat-sen made provisional president of Republic in late 1911	Qing Court issues abdication on 12 Feb 1912 and Yuan then made president of Republic	Long period of instability in China until a stronger State could be established	1928 (Guomindang [GMD] government comes to power under Chiang Kai-shek)

Event	E/I	Years	Competing Entities	Balance of Power	Balance of Peace	Outcomes: Short-term	Outcomes: Long-term	Year(s) Fulfilled
<i>B. Republic</i>								
First World War/Paris Peace Conference	E/I	1914-18/ 1919	Allies, supported by China (from 1917) v Germany	Allied victory in WW1 enabled liberal democracies to dictate terms to Germany in Versailles Treaty, signed 28 June 1919	Widespread belief in China in US President Wilson's principle of self-determination/equality of nations. May Fourth protest movement erupted when foreigners' extraterritorial rights not removed, and Shandong given to Japan	New and radical politics emerged to seek wealth and power for China in its own borders, inspired by Russian Revolution of 1917 and anti-colonial movements	Sun Yat-sen's GMD becomes in 1920 a more centralised and militarised political party. Backed by USSR and Chinese Communist Party	1928 (GMD government)
Northern Expedition during Warlord Era	I	1926-28	GMD, with CCP support v regional strong men in China	GMD forces overwhelmed their enemies one-by-one	GMD benefits from anti-imperialist May Thirtieth movement across China resulting from killing of demonstrators in Shanghai by British troops that day in 1925. Sun Yat-sen, who died in March that year, became a symbol for a new, united and powerful China	GMD government established in Nanjing, after Chiang Kai-shek eliminated most CCP leaders except Mao Zedong	Failure to recover China's full sovereignty due to West's unwillingness to negotiate and threat of war with Japan	1937 (start of Sino-Japanese War)

Event	E/I	Years	Competing Entities	Balance of Power	Balance of Peace	Outcomes: Short-term	Outcomes: Long-term	Year(s) Fulfilled
<i>B. Republic (cont'd)</i>								
Sino-Japanese War/Second World War	E/I	1937-45	Japan, from bases in China v Chinese Anti-Japanese United Front under GMD with CCP	Despite victory after victory by Japanese forces Chinese resistance and morale did not break, reinforced by the 'Rape of Nanjing' and other atrocities by the invaders in 1937-39. Over-extended Japanese lines provided opportunities for effective guerrilla resistance by GMD and CCP forces	Between 1912 and 1937 Japan went from being a primary inspiration for new Chinese Republic to becoming its main threat. Growing Japanese militarism in 1930s overcame those Japanese seeking cooperation by example with China. Chinese weakness seen as due to Japan's strength with Tokyo exploiting its position	Japanese army-initiated takeover of Manchuria in 1931 reinforced Tokyo's position in China. When war came in 1937 it was to cost China 2m military and 12m civilian dead plus many more from hunger and disease; Japan lost 0.4m military dead and 1.2m civilians	US financial and military aid to the GMD government, esp. after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, and later to CCP, whose political and military institutions were built-up during the war. Despite GMD triumph in 1945, CCP had a deeper strategy to deal with land reform	1949 (victory of CCP over GMD)
Chinese civil war	I	1946-50	GMD government v CCP forces	GMD forces dominant initially but the superior strategy and tactics of Mao and his CCP forces turned the tide, with Soviet support	US mediation resisted by Chiang who sought to integrate CCP forces within official GMD armed services	US-Soviet Cold War assisted CCP in its battle with GMD...	... and, much later, in effecting a rapprochement between PRC and USA	1979 (US restores diplomatic relations with China/cuts formal links with Taiwan)



Event	E/I	Years	Competing Entities	Balance of Power	Balance of Peace	Outcomes: Short-term	Outcomes: Long-term	Year(s) Fulfilled
<i>C. People's Republic of China</i>								
Korean War	E	1950-53	North Korea, with Soviet and CCP support v South Korea, with US-led UN support	Initially, in favour of N. Korea, then US-led UN forces, then stalemate after Chinese intervention	N. Korean leader chose a military path to reunification. Armistice agreed in July 1953 – no peace agreement to date	Future of N. Korea linked to PRC. War closed off Chinese integration with world economy	Cold War between N. and S. Korea (with US troop deployments). Fate of reunification partly tied to China.	2006 (N. Korean test of a nuclear device)
Sino-Indian War	E/I	1962	China v India	Tibetan rebellion of 1959, and exile of Dalai Lama to India, with Indian forward patrols in disputed border areas, increased tensions between these two major regional powers	India refused Chinese appeal for negotiations	Indian military overwhelmed by Chinese forces under Mao	Enmity between China and India has continued ever since. Heightened by China's support for Pakistan (in its continuing dispute with India)	1964 (Chinese nuclear test) 1974 (Indian nuclear test) 1998 (Pakistan's nuclear test)

Event	E/I	Years	Competing Entities	Balance of Power	Balance of Peace	Outcomes: Short-term	Outcomes: Long-term	Year(s) Fulfilled
<i>C. PRC (cont'd)</i>								
Sino-Soviet border violence and threat of war	E/I	1969	China v USSR	As US-USSR tensions eased, after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, China broke with the USSR in the wake of the failure of the Great Leap Forward economic campaign (1958-61) while Mao attacked his internal critics through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966 into 1970s). He authorised border clashes with Soviet forces in 1969	Mao permitted negotiations with USSR, while believing a large-scale Soviet attack was being planned against China. The Soviet premier flew to Beijing to try to negotiate. A major war did not break out though situation remained tense into 1970s	In 1970 Mao decided to 'ease' tensions with USA. His military advisers thought that as both the USA and China considered the USSR as their main enemy, 'Soviet revisionists' would not dare fight a two-front war	Rapprochement between PRC and USA began under US President Nixon in 1972 and culminated, after Mao's death in 1976, in US recognition of PRC in 1979. Meanwhile in China, previously purged CCP leaders like Deng Xiaoping were rehabilitated in the late 1970s	1979-81 (Deng prioritised working with the US on economic modernisation of China and easing tensions including over Taiwan)
Vietnam War	E	1964-75	North Vietnam with Soviet and PRC support v South Vietnam with US and allied forces	After US bombing of N. Vietnam began in 1964 Mao limited support and hindered aid to the North	China kept out of any major role in the Vietnam War, and Mao did not support N. Korea wanting to coerce S. Korea	Sino-Soviet split drove N. Vietnam and N. Korea towards the USSR	Reunified Vietnam (in 1975) resisted Chinese domination	1979 (war between China and Vietnam over Cambodia)

Event	E/I	Years	Competing Entities	Balance of Power	Balance of Peace	Outcomes: Short-term	Outcomes: Long-term	Year(s) Fulfilled
<i>C. PRC (cont'd)</i>								
Ending of Cold War	I	1989-91	USSR/Warsaw Pact v USA/NATO	Violent suppression of dissent by PRC troops in Tian'anmen Square, Beijing on 4 June 1989	In tandem with economic reforms in 1980s, political reforms debated arising from contact with the USA. Demonstrations in Chinese cities led to Deng fearing a return to chaos in China	After collapse of USSR in 1991, Deng warned of foreign influence in China. Fearing peaceful evolution of economy could be prevented, CCP sought to ensure a new generation of party leaders maintained its dominance	Vast opening-up of Chinese economy in 1990s, after initial Western sanctions, and, following Deng's death in 1997, his vision of CCP political control was retained by his successors	1996 (first PLA military operations near Taiwan since 1958 as first democratically elected Taiwanese president was voted into office)
Global war on terrorism	E/I	2001 to present	USA and its allies v international terrorists and their organisations/ State sponsors	Terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 Sept 2001 changed Sino-US relationship. President Bush had viewed China as a 'strategic competitor' and primary threat to its national security	As US became embroiled in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China pursued economic growth – though this also allowed it to build-up its military power	Beijing supported US-led attack on terrorist bases in Afghanistan and accepted overthrow of Taliban. Oral opposition to US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003	US concerns over China's trade surplus and practices rose by 2010s, along with its methods to suppress terrorism in Xinjiang and Tibet, and CCP intent on Taiwan reunification, by force if necessary, and military build-up	? (to be decided)

Note: E= external conflicts between States; I = internal conflicts within or affecting China; E/I = significant external and internal factors in the conflict event

*Source:* Facts taken mainly from Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (Vintage Books, London, 2013) as summarised in this Appendix A.

## APPENDIX B – CONFUCIANISM

### B1 Introduction

The impact of the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BC) on the history of China has been profound, despite his apparent lack of success in persuading any ruler in his own lifetime to adopt them. In relation to this Briefing there are three matters of special relevance, viz. the thoughts of Confucius and his successors on:

- (i) The relationship between sages and rulers in China;
- (ii) The relationship between heaven and earth;
- (iii) How the relationship between their teachings and the Chinese state worked out in practice.

These questions, and the philosophical framework of (Neo-)Confucianism within which they are addressed, provide the historical background to culture and education in China before the Communist revolution in 1949. The answers relate to the Bid question 'By what means can a state of peace be secured there?' Education in China today is then described in Appendix C.

It will be convenient to use Daniel K. Gardner's Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction<sup>1</sup> to extract out the main facts that help answer questions (i) to (iii) above and to which the reader may refer for more information on the philosophical framework and for further reading.

Other philosophies and religions, like Daoism and Buddhism, have also had an impact on China but not as great and, for reasons of space, must be left mostly to one side here.

### B2 The Legacy of Confucius

Confucius lived in a time when China had disintegrated into small warring states ruled by lords '... whose authority was maintained not through moral behaviour and genuine concern for the welfare of the people but through laws, punishments, and force.'<sup>2</sup> He looked back to the early Zhou dynasty, from around 1045 BC, when China was unified under a series of virtuous and powerful kings. Confucius' lifelong belief was that what he thought had prevailed at that time could once again predominate if a receptive ruler in his own time were willing to appoint him to an official position where his vision could be fulfilled. It seems, though, that the rulers of his day found his ideas impractical and so he never obtained that high level employment.

Instead, Confucius turned from politics to teaching his disciples, men he expected to adopt his political ideals and succeed in official positions which he himself had not obtained. His followers recorded their Master's sayings and conversations which form the basis of the Lunyu or Analects (as it is known in English), our main source of Confucius's thought. It was only in the second century BC that the Analects reached its present form. Confucius also came to be closely linked to five texts compiled between 1000-200 BC called the Five Classics, which Confucians revere as being perfectly in accord with the Master's teachings.<sup>3</sup>

In the Warring States period (403-221 BC), the teaching of Confucius was not favoured over other thinkers despite influential representatives, notably Mencius in the fourth century and

Xunzi in the third century BC. It was only during the reign of Emperor Wu (141-87 BC) of the Han dynasty that Confucian scholars were given a privileged status at court that, with some swings of fortune, was held in China until the early years of the twentieth century. The Emperor Wu decreed that all non-Confucians, especially those of the rival Legalist perspective, be dismissed from office. A Confucian expert group was established by the Emperor to serve as his advisers, adopting the principles and guidance of the Five Classics in counselling him. Later in this Emperor's reign, these scholars became the teaching staff of a newly created Imperial Academy whose students would obtain official appointments once they had passed examinations to prove their expertise in the Five Classics.<sup>4</sup>

As Gardner observes:

The significance of these steps... can hardly be overstated. From this time on, Confucianism served as the essential ideological prop of the imperial Chinese state. Rulers would rely on Confucian teachings for guidance and legitimacy, and recruit their bureaucracy through Confucian-based examinations. And, as a consequence of the ideological dominance of Confucianism in government, education in imperial China would center on mastery of Confucian writings. The great prestige – and economic rewards – associated with government service ensured that those who could afford the schooling devoted their efforts to the mastery of those texts that would earn them examination success and thus official position... The result: virtually all literate Chinese, particularly during the millennium leading up to the end of imperial China in 1912, were Confucian-schooled and Confucian-socialized. Thus the lives and work of almost all educated Chinese..., and the small percentage of literate women were shaped, to one degree or another, by the beliefs and ideals embodied in Confucian texts.<sup>5</sup>

### B3 Assumptions Behind His Vision

There was, as might be expected, a set of assumptions underpinning Confucius's vision of a perfectly harmonious society and sage government. He believed that the universe was composed of two realms: first, the human realm; and secondly, the realm of heaven and earth or natural realm. While the latter has an inherent regularity and harmony that spontaneously sustain a perfect balance of its constituent parts, the former actively creates and nurtures order through human agency by the practice of ritual. One significant function of ritual in the Analects is to ensure that such human activity as well as the ordering of the realm of heaven and earth are reciprocal and sustaining.<sup>6</sup>

Consequently, there is no God in Confucius's origin and maintenance of the universe since the cosmos operates autonomously as it has done from the dawn of time. While Confucius allowed for various spirits to assist human beings – in controlling nature, human habitations, and families and their ancestries – there was no place for an ultimate deity who created all things. The contrast with Western monotheistic beliefs could not be more marked.<sup>7</sup>

The Analects does refer to *tian*, conventionally translated as ‘heaven’, which Confucius believed recognised his special qualities, even when the rulers of his time did not, and protected him from his enemies. So, heaven is an entity that has consciousness and concern for the human realm which is expressed in moral guidance to man. It was this human realm that required active regulation because politics and morality had degenerated in Confucius’s own time. In place of the *Dao* or Way of the early Zhou period there was chaos and disorder. However, for Confucius the Way could be restored but this ‘... project would require the effort of good and righteous men.’<sup>8</sup> What makes for a good person also makes for good government. These are the two unifying themes of the Master’s teachings to which we now turn.

#### B4 Confucian Teachings on the Individual and Government

Before looking at Confucianism in practice it is first necessary to understand what Confucius and his interpreters taught with respect to the role of the individual in creating the good socio-political order and of the exemplary ruler who serves as a model for everyone.

##### B4.1 The Individual and Self-Cultivation

Every person is encouraged to participate in a process of moral refinement, known as self-cultivation, due to their capacity to exercise a beneficial moral effect on others. This is the starting point for all followers of Confucius, irrespective of status, in their pursuit of the true Way. The goal of individual self-cultivation is to become a *junzi* which, as Confucius took over the term, means a person of moral, not socio-political, nobility. For him, it denotes a morally superior person who, by conforming with the ritual code of the tradition, treats others with respect and dignity and pursues virtue. By contrast, one who does not do this and chooses not to follow a moral path is a ‘small man’. Although initially in Analects a person was born into *junzi* status, later Confucius recharacterizes it as a position that anyone, in theory, could attain by successful self-cultivation.<sup>9</sup>

The foundation of this process is learning. This devotion to learning, supremely exemplified by the Master himself, is what separates a *junzi* from others and makes him a model to follow. Confucius insists that learning should be open to all – though, in practice, few in his own day could have afforded the expense in what was mostly a peasant society. Even in the Master’s case, he also insists that his willingness to teach anyone still depends on their willingness to be genuinely determined to learn and willing to persist in what can be a long and hard path.

Other key features of learning for Confucius are:

- A focus on the past which provides the empirical data for what does, or does not, make a good socio-political order.
- It should never become simply a list of details and facts – a comprehensive framework is required that provides coherence and meaning to all one has learnt, i.e. ‘one thread’.
- The good student learns inferentially, building from items of knowledge to a fuller understanding. Furthermore, this should lead to an ability to apply inferential knowledge. ‘... book learning that devolves into mere memorisation is sterile and useless and not the true learning that will enable self-transformation and the betterment of society.’<sup>10</sup>

Thus, for Confucius, 'learning' means the study and embodiment of the values to become a *junzi*. Whereas in his own day learning had been reduced to a means of achieving worldly success or praise, his aim was to make learning once more about moral self-improvement. Through unswerving commitment to learning a student might become a sage whose every action is intuitively in line with the Way.

This morally superior man – Confucius nowhere applies his programme to women<sup>11</sup> - is a man of *ren* which is the highest virtue in the Confucian vision subsuming all others. No English translation fully captures its significance though Gardner suggests 'true goodness'. This quality can only be cultivated in relation to other people and how they are treated. It is closely associated with the practice of ritual on which much of the teaching in Analects is based.

*Ren* or true goodness is never summarised or defined by Confucius; it has an ineffable quality. Asked by one of his disciples if there is one word that can be practised one's whole life long:

'The Master said, "That would be 'empathy' perhaps: what you do not wish yourself do not do unto others." [Analects, 15.24]<sup>12</sup>

Gardner underlines that *ren* lies in the direction of empathetic behaviour such that, in dealing with others, we are required to treat them in the way we would ourselves wish to be treated. No-one has attained *ren* or true goodness because it is very challenging to sustain indefinitely. Thus it is not an indwelling state achieved once and for all; rather 'it is a *behavior* involving mind and body that is ongoing and requires constant vigilance.'<sup>13</sup>

Apart from rituals, which guide and express the superior man's empathetic concerns, it is the family which, according to Confucian teachings, set us on the path to virtue. Being a microcosm of society, family is the locus for learning about human relationships and the values which govern them, e.g. obedience and respect for authority, deference to parents, and affection towards the young and the infirm. Thus, the family fulfils an essential role in moulding the moral individual and so advancing a peaceful and stable socio-political order.<sup>14</sup>

#### B4.2 Government

It is the power of example by a moral elite, rather than the dicta of government, which achieves social harmony. Ideally, the exemplary ruler sits at the apex of this moral elite who, in his complete correctness, provides a model for everyone. This Confucian ruler possesses an inner virtue which, ripple-like, exerts a spiritual-ethical influence over others. As Gardner summarises from the Analects:

The people's submission to the good Confucian ruler clearly is not submission to some coercive power but rather to a fixed, reliable moral authority that radiates throughout the realm. This moral authority is a force capable of guiding others in their movements, of setting them in the right direction.<sup>15</sup>

In Confucius's view, harsh government reliant on punishment and physical violence is ineffective. It is 'misgovernment'. Good government necessitates moral leadership so that morality breeds morality; just as the wind of virtue of the superior man bends the grass of



virtue of the small man, as the Master put it. Consequently, a ruler without virtue threatens the entire moral and social order.<sup>16</sup>

Overall, Confucius suggests that culture and tradition are more effective in moulding the behaviour and norms of the people than legal and penal codes. In leading by ritual, the ruler becomes the standard bearer of culture thereby enhancing his legitimacy. Simultaneously, he serves as instructor of his people showing them by example the beliefs and practices which they are also to adopt. Yet this ritual is only effective if the ruler practices it in a spirit of humility or deference thereby demonstrating authenticity and a capacity to guide his people.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, this does not mean that Confucius saw no place for law and punishment in government. He appears to appreciate that to maintain social order, sometimes recourse to them cannot be avoided. However, he clearly wishes their use to be minimised. A central tenet of Confucian teachings is that the best government is one that relies least on law.<sup>18</sup>

This good ruler naturally chooses only those men as officials who share his commitment to Confucian principles and societal well-being. Beginning in the second century BC, this was to underpin the significance of the Chinese civil service examinations that lasted for two millennia through a succession of different dynasties.<sup>19</sup>

Although Confucius did not use the term 'Mandate of Heaven' (*tianming*) in the Analects, it is certain that his teachings supported and advanced the ideals contained in this concept. The Mandate means that a heaven concerned with the well-being of the people confers on virtuous men, with the same commitment, authority to rule. In order to maintain the mandate of Heaven these rulers and their successors must not cease to be virtuous; if they do, then they forfeit the right to rule and heaven withdraws its mandate.<sup>20</sup>

It is vital to note that heaven is responding to the will of the people and not acting simply of its own accord. While exercising a powerful sanction, heaven is like an agent acting on behalf of the people. It bestows or withdraws its Mandate at the people's bidding. Consequently, there is nothing pre-determined about the Mandate which revolves around rulers winning it by virtuous and benevolent rule or losing it by abandoning the same. This distinguishes it from the European dogma of the 'divine right of kings' where [at least in theory] rulers derive their right to rule from God Himself and are accountable to God alone for their actions.<sup>21</sup>

So the Mandate of Heaven, while legitimating the conquest of one dynasty by another, could just as readily serve to justify the overthrow of the new regime in its turn. Hence the importance of the cultivation of virtue by the new rulers; the Mandate is precarious.

#### B4.3 Re-Interpretation and Reorientation

Neo-Confucianism involved, during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries AD, a reorientation of the Confucian tradition. While upholding its classical values and ethics, Neo-Confucianism offers a new outlook in two important ways:

- 1.) It grounds classical Confucianism in a detailed metaphysical system, i.e. an explanation of the nature of being and knowing; and thereby
- 2.) It creates a structured programme of self-cultivation for 'becoming a sage'.<sup>22</sup>

The emergence of Neo-Confucianism occurred in the China of the Song period (960-1279 AD), which was seen by Confucian scholar-officials to be in a state of crisis due to the incursions of non-Chinese tribes into northern China. For them this demonstrated that the Way was in steep decline because it could not have happened if the Chinese Emperor and his ministers had been behaving virtuously. Additionally, many blamed the intrusion of Buddhism from the first century AD which had subverted even many scholars from Confucianism. Buddhism's focus on the enlightenment of the individual was regarded by Confucians as distracting people throughout society from their Chinese obligation to improve themselves in order to serve society and advance the welfare of others.<sup>23</sup>

The great synthesiser of Song Neo-Confucianism was Zhu Xi (1130-1200 AD), who built on the work of his predecessors in the tenth and eleventh centuries, to help restore the Way. He supports the Mencian view of human nature being good but goes further to address the question Mencius himself (in the fourth century BC) had left mostly unresolved: 'If men are born good, where and how does evil arise?'<sup>24</sup> After answering this question precisely, Zhu Xi proceeds to outline a comprehensive programme for eliminating evil and nurturing man's innate goodness.

Zhu Xi claims that the whole universe is comprised of *qi*, which may be translated by the term 'vital energy' or such like. It is dynamic and circulates endlessly to form particular configurations that make up specific things in the universe. Its two primal elements are *yin* and *yang* that unite to produce the concrete forms of things. The powerful ethical consequence of *qi* is that everything is interrelated so people are to treat other persons as 'brothers and sisters'.<sup>25</sup> While *qi* explains the interconnectedness of all things, it also accounts for their differences because the quality and quantity of *qi* varies at birth in different things. This is why man, having the 'most refined and spiritually efficacious *qi*'<sup>26</sup> among all creatures, is especially discerning, knowing the difference between good and evil. Yet the *source* of man's innate goodness is not *qi* but *li*, or principle, which is also possessed by all things. So, the reason that man is inherently good is due to the principle inhering in every human being. Yet principle, Zhu insists, is one though its manifestations are many. To elaborate: while each thing has its own manifestation of principle, the rule or pattern to which everything in the cosmos conforms is ultimately one. Although *li* (or principle) has no form or generative power, it provides coherence and order for a universe of endlessly circulating *qi*.<sup>27</sup>

Zhu gives the Mencian view of the goodness of human nature a metaphysical grounding by arguing that each and every human being has the same human nature because human nature is identical with principle: 'Human nature is simply this principle'.<sup>28</sup> Zhu then goes beyond Mencius to explain the existence of evil by the differing portions of *qi* each person receives, qualitatively and quantitatively, even though all human beings, relative to other creatures, have the highest-grade *qi*. This varying allotment of *qi* accounts for individualism so that, depending on the extent of its clarity and density, a person's good nature shines forth or is obscured. What share of *qi* a person receives at birth is pre-determined. Crucially, though, that endowment is malleable because *qi* is changeable and can be directed by human endeavour so that people can improve themselves and even become sages. Conversely, the clearest and most refined *qi*, if left unattended, can become muddied and vulgar. Herein lies

the human moral dilemma: he has the potential for becoming fully moral; yet usually finds himself falling short of such perfection. What Zhu and other Neo-Confucians do is to elaborate the meaning of *li* and *qi* to provide a detailed metaphysical rationale for self-improvement.<sup>29</sup>

Zhu Xi takes the first chapter of the Great Learning, a canon in the Confucian tradition, as the foundation of a programme of self-cultivation for disciples of the Confucian Way. This rests on what became his orthodox interpretation of ‘the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things’. As Gardner summarises Zhu’s commentary, the process is an inductive one requiring man, whenever he encounters any thing or relationship, to probe into and reflect on the specific revelation of principle inherent in it so as to get at the underlying truth. While this probing principle begins with the particular, by investing time and effort, it yields to a comprehension of the universal principle that provides all things with coherence.

The aim of this investigation, of course, is not understanding of the world for understanding’s sake, nor is it scientific inquiry that is being proposed. Rather, if a person genuinely understands the true nature of things and affairs, if he truly recognizes why things, affairs, and relationships are as they are, he will be capable of dealing with those things, affairs, and relationships he encounters in the world in a perfectly appropriate way. Getting at the various manifestations of principle leads to an enlightened understanding of the cosmic order, which, in turn, results in moral awareness of how one ideally is to comport oneself with respect to all things and affairs in that cosmic order.<sup>30</sup>

While Zhu acknowledges that not everyone can achieve this total illumination because the mind, which is capable of realising principle may, instead, be led astray by undue human emotions or desires. The mind is the ‘root’ which must be tended to and developed if man is to act in accord with principle. Hence the importance of ‘will’ or where the mind is headed.<sup>31</sup>

Zhu then goes on to offer his students a more focused direction for the investigation of ‘things’ based on what later came to be called the Four Books – including Great Learning and Analects – and, only after mastering these, the Five Classics. This shift to the Four Books represented a major philosophical reorientation in the Confucian tradition from a focus on the historical past towards teachings that put much more emphasis on the inner realm of morality and the supremely important process of self-cultivation. Underpinning this shift of focus is Zhu’s comprehensive theory and method for engaging with the canonical texts.<sup>32</sup>

In conclusion, Neo-Confucianism illustrated the adaptability of the Confucian tradition and its longevity by keeping the tradition meaningful and relevant for centuries to come. Yet it remained true to classical Confucianism’s most fundamental beliefs concerning: man’s moral perfectibility; learning as the key to moral improvement; sages of antiquity offering a Way to be moral and behave well in society; the transforming effect on others of the morally superior man; and that social harmony results from people fulfilling their moral responsibilities.<sup>33</sup>

## B5 Practice

Pre-modern Chinese state and society, from the time of the Emperor Wu's accession to the throne in 141 BC, was largely informed and guided by Confucian principles. While, as with Western Christendom, there was a significant difference between theory and practice, nevertheless Confucianism became institutionalised in the administration of the Chinese state and had varying impacts on the common people, the ruler, the family, and women.

### B5.1 The Civil Service

Confucians viewed official service as the highest calling in society and this had, despite the lack of any formal legislative backing, a great influence on the course of Chinese history. The scholar-official stood above the farmer and artisan, with the merchant at the bottom of the social ranking (and the military not even mentioned). The methods employed by Chinese governments for recruiting officials came to rely principally on the civil service examinations. While the specific form of the examinations might change over time, especially with the influence of Zhu Xi's school, the knowledge tested by examination remained Confucian. The influence on Chinese society was huge even though studies indicate that less than one percent of candidates sitting the district examinations would eventually pass the metropolitan examinations. As a result, and in view of the great financial rewards at stake, some resorted to cheating. Corruption proved a constant problem despite attempts by the state to prevent these abuses. Thus, ironically, a system designed to develop those with the best understanding of Confucian moral teachings led, instead, to widespread cheating.<sup>34</sup>

Nevertheless, the examination system proved a powerful force for integration in Chinese society by propagating a widely shared culture of values, beliefs and customs that created a degree of unity among the people in this vast country and thus made them more governable. Even so Confucian scholars themselves offered many criticisms of the examination system:<sup>35</sup>

- It rewarded rote learning rather than originality or analytical thinking;
- It advanced book learning over practical knowledge in governing a country;
- It was ineffective in discerning the moral character of the candidates;
- It turned students aside from genuine learning, i.e. moral cultivation; instead the pursuit of fame and worldly success were prized;
- It encouraged competition which is not a Confucian value.

These criticisms were taken seriously at times, and reforms instituted, but the examination system was preserved for nearly fifteen hundred years as the foundation of Chinese empire.

### B5.2 The Common People

Chinese society was encouraged by informal and formal methods to adopt the Confucian social practices and beliefs approved by the state. Most common people would recognise, if not necessarily fulfil, the obligations of sons and daughters to parents and grandparents and those who could afford to do so probably celebrated by ritual offerings their ancestral line. Through village schools and local official pronouncements as well as emperors' moral teachings, reflecting Confucian views and feelings, many would be affected and socialised.

However, it is uncertain how far the common people would have recognised those values and practices as Confucian rather than as preferred standards of Chinese culture. Probably most were not identifiably Confucian, but their lives were still shaped by its teachings and practices.

Moreover, Confucius himself acknowledged how he transmitted values like filial piety which were in place long before he celebrated them. Confucianism both drew on ancient Chinese values that pre-dated Confucius and his disciples, yet he and his interpreters also gave them new relevance and inspiration, particularly when they were most at risk, and thereby ensured their continuing diffusion amongst Chinese people by integration within state orthodoxy.<sup>36</sup>

### B5.3 The Ruler

One-man rule in China long predates Confucianism, and its institutionalisation in the second century BC, but Confucian teachings heaped high praise on the worth of one-man rule and thus gave that governance tradition in China increased legitimacy. However, the ideal government, in the view of Confucius, was *for* the people not *of* or *by* the people.

Yet even this ideal was unlikely to be typical so the question arose as to how a Confucian political order would be effective in the absence of a good Confucian ruler in reality? Although Confucian-trained officials should be a check on the ruler's power, in practice their dependence on him meant that any criticisms or challenges to his authority came at great personal risk and were, therefore, unlikely to occur often. The fundamental problem for Confucian orthodoxy in imperial Chinese history was that there were no constitutional or legal limits on the conduct of the emperor to constrain him when he chose to abuse his powers. However, generally whatever the imperfect adoption of Confucian ideals by rulers and officials, most of the time they were sufficiently willing and able to manage the affairs of state and uphold their dynasty's interests.<sup>37</sup>

### B5.4 The Family

A basic difference exists between the Western Abrahamic religions, for whom forebears also engendered love and respect, and the Chinese Confucian tradition. In the West the one God was believed to be responsible for the creation of everything that exists including, therefore, humanity. Thus believers within the Abrahamic traditions reserved their highest reverence for God who had created their family line. Conversely, in Chinese culture where belief in a creator deity did not exist – and was not widespread even after foreign missionaries made an impact – it was the biological line that was the sole source of one's existence and deserved an individual's praise and appreciation.

As with all normative relationships in China, the one between ancestor and descendant was founded on *reciprocity*. [Emphasis added.] For as parents and grandparents protect the young so, too, ancestors were believed to offer continuing guidance and protection for the family. Failure to fulfil one's duty to remember an ancestor could result in misfortune whereas remembrance might bring relief by a reduction in the family's troubles. This brings to light another prominent difference with Western Abrahamic traditions where the omnipotent God is not bound by obligations of reciprocity to humankind. God's plans are not fully known and so, in praying to Him for guidance and hope, members of these traditions are told to have

faith. In the Chinese tradition, there is little that is unfamiliar about one's ancestors such that the 'other world' is not very remote or immaterial. Although Chinese do believe in gods or spirits presiding over nature and adherents of Daoism, Buddhism and other religious groups believe in gods and spirits who offered support, the belief in ancestral spirits and practice of ceremonial respect was dominant in Chinese society and widely shared by almost everyone whatever their social or economic position.<sup>38</sup>

#### B5.5 Women

Nowhere in the Analects or other canonical texts is there any indication that the Confucian concept of self-cultivation for achieving moral perfection was meant for women. It appears that Confucian teachings were intended only for men. Consequently, women had no place in public life – a bias that persisted until the twentieth century. They were not allowed to serve as scholar-officials nor even enter the examination compound. Their responsibilities were limited to the family household. Despite these constraints, women did occasionally wield political power as in the case of Empress Dowager Cixi in the second half of the nineteenth century but by reason of their closeness to a powerful male. Girls in elite households would usually learn to read the main Confucian texts to help them become model Confucian women. Thus, through closeness to Chinese male power or influence within the Confucian family, some women were able – despite their formal subordination to the regulations governing women's behaviour – to exert influence or, occasionally, dominate the realm of politics. Moreover, within the family, women were given legitimate authority as mothers, teachers and managers of the household.<sup>39</sup>

#### B6 Conclusion

In answering the three questions posed in the Introduction to this Appendix, it may be concluded:

- (i) *The relationship between sages and rulers* in pre-Communist China was one where the sages were dependent on the rulers' acquiescence in applying Confucian ideas. Sage rulers were a rarity, it would appear, but most rulers from the Emperor Wu onwards were clearly influenced by Confucian and later, Neo-Confucian, thinking and, however imperfectly, sought to apply and advance its teachings in China. In particular, Confucian teachings focus on self-cultivation through learning and seek to minimise the use of law, force and punishment and emphasise, instead, moral example.
- (ii) Although Confucianism involves no belief in a Creator God, *it does recognise 'heaven' which is concerned with the well-being of the human realm* and offers moral guidance to sages. Moreover, rulers derive their authority to rule from the 'Mandate of Heaven' which depends on their virtuosity and can be withdrawn if rulers cease to be virtuous. In this respect, heaven acts not on its own volition but as presenting the will of the people in transferring the Mandate to a new and benevolent ruler, so legitimating the replacement of one dynasty by another.

- (iii) *Ren*, or true goodness, involves empathy for others in practice and, therefore, treating them as we would wish to be treated ourselves. The notion of reciprocity affects all Chinese normative relationships, including the family and the world of ancestral spirits, as the foundation not only for a moral individual but for establishing a peaceful and stable social and political order. It may, therefore, be said that a form of ‘Golden Rule’ applies in China as in the West despite *all the shortcomings between Confucian teachings and actual practice in China* down through the centuries until 1949.

## References

- 
- <sup>1</sup> . Daniel K. Gardner, Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014). Licensed material reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
  - <sup>2</sup> . Ibid, p. 1.
  - <sup>3</sup> . Ibid, pp. 3-4.
  - <sup>4</sup> . Ibid, pp. 4-7.
  - <sup>5</sup> . Ibid, p.7.
  - <sup>6</sup> . Ibid. pp. 12-13.
  - <sup>7</sup> . Ibid, p. 13.
  - <sup>8</sup> . Ibid, pp. 13-14.
  - <sup>9</sup> . Ibid, pp. 16 and 18.
  - <sup>10</sup> . Ibid, pp. 20-21.
  - <sup>11</sup> . Ibid, pp. 104-5.
  - <sup>12</sup> . Ibid, pp. 23-24.
  - <sup>13</sup> . Ibid, p. 24. [Emphasis in the original.]
  - <sup>14</sup> . Ibid, pp. 29-30.
  - <sup>15</sup> . Ibid, p. 34.
  - <sup>16</sup> . Ibid, p.34.
  - <sup>17</sup> . Ibid, pp. 37-38.
  - <sup>18</sup> . Ibid, pp. 38-39.
  - <sup>19</sup> . Ibid, p. 39.
  - <sup>20</sup> . Ibid, pp. 45-46.
  - <sup>21</sup> . Ibid, pp. 46-47.
  - <sup>22</sup> . Ibid, pp. 70-71.
  - <sup>23</sup> . Ibid, pp. 71-72.
  - <sup>24</sup> . Ibid, pp. 72-73.
  - <sup>25</sup> . Ibid, pp. 73-74 citing Zhang Zai.
  - <sup>26</sup> . Ibid, pp. 74 citing Zhou Dunyi.
  - <sup>27</sup> . Ibid, p. 75.
  - <sup>28</sup> . Ibid, p. 76.
  - <sup>29</sup> . Ibid, pp. 76-77.
  - <sup>30</sup> . Ibid, pp. 77-79.
  - <sup>31</sup> . Ibid. pp. 79-80.
  - <sup>32</sup> . Ibid, pp. 80-83.
  - <sup>33</sup> . Ibid, pp. 84-85.
  - <sup>34</sup> . Ibid, pp. 88-95.
  - <sup>35</sup> . Ibid, pp. 95-96.
  - <sup>36</sup> . Ibid, pp. 96-98.
  - <sup>37</sup> . Ibid, pp. 98-100.
  - <sup>38</sup> . Ibid, pp. 100-4.
  - <sup>39</sup> . Ibid, pp. 104-6, 111.

## APPENDIX C – EDUCATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

### C1 Introduction

The purpose here is to answer a specific question, rather than to give an overview of education in the PRC more generally, viz.

Can the IPP Advanced (Peace Game) Trials 2021 to 2023 be run in China with the tacit acceptance, or even the explicit approval, of the Communist Party of China (CPC)?

Nevertheless, to address this subject does require a basic knowledge of the historical background to education in China prior to the communist revolution of 1949, the current Constitution of the CPC and the context of university or higher education in China. For it is only within this framework that the above question can be answered.

Needless to add, it is a matter of high importance whether and, if so, on what conditions the Peace Games concept is tolerated or, better still, endorsed by a country with a system of governance different to the liberal democracy of the country (England) in which IPP is based. If it can, then IPP could make a substantial contribution to securing a state of peace between conflicting entities, East and West; otherwise, a state of war may not be avoided. This is a big claim to make but the supporting evidence is identified herewith for anyone to assess.

### C2 Historical Background

As the history section of this Briefing (Appendix A) reveals, Western influence on China from the mid-nineteenth century has left a lasting legacy of hurt and humiliation and an enduring suspicion about the motivation behind any initiative, even an ostensibly educational one, that may impact on the Chinese people. The value of Western science and technology began to be accepted, even by the late Qing Dynasty, because it could be adapted to, and utilised by, almost any political system. It is a different matter, though, when education impinges on political issues and the legacy of such Western non-governmental organisations is instructive.

The historian, Robert Bickers, has drawn attention to two such bodies who were active in China during the Republican era after the First World War: The Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) established in 1920, also known as Chatham House; and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), founded in 1925. Both bodies were influenced by the ideas of US President Woodrow Wilson, who presided at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and by a strong and new belief that problems could be solved only if they were, first, well-researched and understood and then widely discussed by expert stakeholders including those outside of established foreign ministries. Another such organisation was the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.<sup>1</sup> Bickers’ summary of IPR and RIIA work on China is not needed here. What is relevant are his conclusions on their activities, following the Japanese invasion in July 1937, concerning the anomalous position of Shanghai and its International Settlement:

Researchers at the [IPR] and the [RIIA] got to work, believing, as ever, that objective analysis could help provide a template for a solution. Hope sprang ever eternal in the academic heart: their reports were extensively documented, rigorously argued, and



delivered compelling conclusions. But they were wholly redundant. Soldiers did not stop to read them; those aiming to revise definitively the imperial status quo in China were not going to linger long over the arguments of foreign think tanks and professors.<sup>2</sup>

By way of contrast the work of this author through the Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem) in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, had a similar first method – an international dispute well-researched and understood – but a different secondary one, viz. forecasting the direction of international conflict between the West and the Soviet Union/Russia to be pursued, after his *prima facie* case, by competition open to experts and lay persons. Any discussion would focus on the results from such analyses judged against the Court of history i.e. the actual course of events in the area of conflict towards more, or less, peaceful relations between the former enemies. The work is cited in the references section of this Appendix.<sup>3</sup>

This work, which was published between 1993 and 1995, came to the following conclusions about Western handling of the Gorbachev ‘peace offensive’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s:

- It was one-sided across each of the three main dimensions of security:
  - The material facts presented demonstrated that the Soviet/Russian *military disarmament measures* outstripped those of NATO; heightened by the mostly peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 followed by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and reunification of Germany in 1990 and breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.
  - Only limited Western *economic aid for radical Soviet/Russian market reforms* increased domestic resistance and political instability and had the effect of returning, or attempting to return, Russia to its pre-1917 subordination to the West.
  - *Western institutional rejection, in practice if not in theory, of the concept of common security*<sup>4</sup> in favour of collective security through NATO, and from 1994 expansion of NATO eastwards to incorporate former Warsaw Pact members, highlighted military security over other threats to security – economic, social, and environmental.
- *The test to be applied* across the military, economic and institutional dimensions of security *is that of reciprocity* in terms of the balance of coercive power and (peaceful) cooperation between former enemies, especially the Soviet Union/Russia and the West.
- *The resultant forecast* was that Western emphasis on the power of coercion would:
  - Recreate the conditions for conflict and war between former enemies (and elsewhere in the world):
    - ‘...unless the West alters course, and does so soon [March 1993], the seeds of war sown in the 1980s and early 1990s will bear a bitter harvest as NATO, and other Western political and military institutions, embark on a strategy of enforcing the ‘peace’ by the application of overwhelming military force.’<sup>5</sup>
  - Be unlikely to
    - ‘...be rectified until Western political leaders and their generals have committed another major foreign policy blunder involving serious loss of Western lives and resources.’<sup>6</sup>

- Find the West ill-prepared for the kind of conflict that is most likely in the future:
  - ‘...[i.e. ones] mainly concerned with the process of state creation. In those conflicts the West would have to take greater military risks, if it intervenes, because of the declining relevance of the Western way of war and the increasing effectiveness of the Chinese way of war in challenging conventional forces. Avoiding entanglement in such conflicts may not be possible for the West in areas of the world of geo-strategic importance... Such conflicts are likely to be politically complex and deeply ideological. The diversification of warfare would make them harder to contain and the nature of modern war would make them very destructive. *In combination one of the gravest threats to world peace would be social disintegration in or near a nuclear weapon state.*’<sup>7</sup> [Emphasis added to this quotation.]

Unlike the RIIA and IPR work, which was soon refuted by the Court of history, this author can cite its judgments as an endorsement of his preceding analysis, conclusions, and forecasts:

- Russia’s relationship with the West has become more adversarial and less peaceful, when judged across all three dimensions of security, than it was with the Soviet Union in 1990.
- A primary reason for this in Russia was the West’s perceived handling of the ending of the Cold War, especially in relation to then Soviet President Gorbachev’s efforts to end adversarial relations.
- The current Chinese leadership also regards the fate of the Soviet Union as a seminal moment in recent history; one with grave consequences for their own country. As the historian, Odd Arne Westad, summarised it:

The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 came as a complete shock to the Chinese leaders. They simply could not imagine that a Communist Party general secretary could accept, first, the banning of the party and, then, the dissolution of the Soviet state, almost without a shot being fired in anger. Whereas the Chinese had used massive force to crush unarmed protest in 1989, Gorbachev had accepted change from below, and allowed the Soviet republics to secede peacefully after first dismantling Moscow’s control over Eastern Europe... Even today the Soviet collapse is a hotly discussed topic among Chinese leaders They want to learn from the Soviet disaster so as not to follow its example.<sup>8</sup>

To underline the point, Westad had earlier cited the Chinese President Jiang Zemin saying publicly to US President Bill Clinton on his visit to China in 1998:

‘With regard to political disturbances in 1989, had the Chinese government not taken the resolute measures, then we could not have enjoyed the stability that we are enjoying today.’<sup>9</sup>

Using the same approach, IPP has been able to replicate this successful exercise in forecasting conditions for peace or war with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 2005.<sup>10</sup>

Now the IPP Advanced Trials are seeking to engage the tools of applied mathematics to see whether Prodem/IPP's pioneering work could be replicated across the world including China to demonstrate how far forecasts of peace or war can be accurately made in any conflict zone.

### C2.1 A Preliminary Conclusion

What then is the decisive difference between the work of RIIA and IPR in the 1920s and 1930s and that of Prodem in the 1990s and IPP in the 2000s? It lies in the focus of the former on *policy* and of the latter on *evaluation of a process*. The former plainly carries a high risk of straying into the political sphere which would be particularly unwelcome in China. The latter is the proper province of education of a politically impartial kind and might – just might – gain the same credence that science and mathematics has, if the IPP Advanced Trials can harness these tools to demonstrate the public benefit for all countries including China of being able to forecast the propensity for a state of peace or war in any specific region of the world.

Does the constitution of the CPC permit this, at least in theory?

### C3 The Constitution of the Communist Party of China

On 24 October 2017 the CPC's Constitution was revised and adopted at its 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress to incorporate 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'.<sup>11</sup> It continues and develops the process of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. As part of Xi Jinping Thought all Party members are required to strive to fulfil:

- The three historic tasks of:
  - advancing modernization,
  - achieving China's reunification, and
  - safeguarding world peace and promoting common development,
- achieve the two centenary goals, and
- realise the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.<sup>12</sup>

While using the exact words of the CPC Constitution, bullet points are added above to highlight the underlying structure. The 'three historic tasks' include implicit reference to the status of Taiwan and to the global context of securing a state of peace and prosperity. All of which appear consistent with the IPP Advanced Trials.

Later, the CPC General Program continues:

In leading the cause of socialism, the Communist Party of China must continue its commitment to economic development as the central task, and all other work must take an ancillary role and serve this center. The Party shall implement the strategy for invigorating China through science and education, the strategy on developing a quality work force, the innovation-driven development strategy, the rural vitalization strategy, the coordinated regional development strategy, the sustainable development strategy, and the military-civilian integration strategy. It shall give full

play to the role of science and technology as primary productive forces and the role of innovation as the primary force driving development, draw on advances in science and technology, improve the quality of the country's workforce, and ensure higher-quality and more efficient, equitable, and sustainable development of the economy.<sup>13</sup>

The IPP Advanced Trials would, therefore, need to establish themselves as firmly within the heading of 'science and technology' by demonstrating as intended that they can be placed under the mathematical sciences. This thought may be reinforced by Xi Jinping Thought that:

The Party must uphold the fundamental national policy of making China open to the world and embrace and learn from all achievements of human society. In carrying out reform and opening up, the Party should be boldly explorative and brave in breaking new ground; the Party should improve the scientific nature of reform-related decision making, pursue reform in a more systematic, holistic, and coordinated way, and pioneer new approaches through practice.<sup>14</sup>

Later the General Program goes on to speak of national security in terms consistent with that of common security and, thereafter, of an independent foreign policy:

The Party shall pursue a holistic approach to national security and resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and development interests....

The Communist Party of China shall uphold an independent foreign policy of peace, follow a path of peaceful development, continue with the win-win opening up strategy, consider both domestic and international relations, and actively foster relations with other countries, endeavoring to develop a favorable international environment for China's reform, opening up, and modernization. In international affairs, it shall uphold justice while pursuing shared interests, safeguard China's independence and sovereignty, oppose hegemonism and power politics, defend world peace, promote human progress, work to build a community with a shared future for mankind, and advance the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. It shall develop relations between China and other countries on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The Party shall constantly work to develop good neighborly relations between China and its surrounding countries and work to strengthen unity and cooperation between China and other developing countries. It shall follow the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration and pursue the Belt and Road Initiative.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the Party speaks of working with firm resolve to meet five fundamental requirements, the second of which is also relevant to the IPP Advanced Trials:

2. Commitment to emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, advancing with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic. The Party's line of thinking is to proceed from reality in all it does, to integrate theory with practice, to seek truth from facts, and to verify and develop truths through practice...<sup>16</sup>

### C3.1 A Preliminary Conclusion

Although the historical legacy in China from the mid-nineteenth century may inhibit adoption of the IPP Advanced (Peace Games) Trials, due to its having arisen in the West, the long-term benefits of Western science and technology have also been evident from that time. Tilting the balance towards the latter may depend on the extent to which the mathematical sciences can be successfully deployed to produce testable and verifiable results on conflict analysis.

In the 1970s, when this writer first became involved in peace studies, a relatively new field of study at university level in England, the analogy with medicine was sometimes cited to denote its healing purposes. However, that proved illusory at the time and the field had a controversial reputation even in the West. Today, though, it could become a more realistic prospect if the focus of peace and conflict studies switches from policy, which is in the political sphere, to the evaluation of a process by competition, aided by sophisticated mathematical models based on network theory.<sup>17</sup>

The main IPP analogy, since the publication of its Briefing No. 1 on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2006, has been weather forecasting.<sup>18</sup> It lends itself well to the notion of predicting the *propensity* for a state of peace or war, just as models for weather forecasting assess the probability of rain or sunshine in a specific region. That is what Prodem/IPP have been doing for decades and there is no reason at present to reject the hypothesis that such forecasts are reliable and *may owe little or nothing to the political convictions of the entities involved*.

### C4 Higher Education in China

It is also necessary to examine the evidence of what is happening at university level in China today to assess how far practice accords with constitutional theory. This writer has been surprised by the extent to which the Communist government in China now tolerates criticism and comment from Western scholars working in China which would have been unthinkable at any time from 1949 until the end of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s.<sup>19</sup> More importantly one major example is highlighted below of doctoral research raising fundamental questions analogous to those at the heart of the IPP Advanced Trials, affecting all nuclear weapon states. This may help provide an answer to whether those Trials can be run in China.

First, though, a few salient facts may put this matter in context. Michael A. Peters and Tina Besley cite official statistics from 2014 in claiming that 'China's education system, with 260 million students and over 15 million teachers and 514,000 schools... is the largest in the world.'<sup>20</sup> They reveal that, out of roughly 2,000 colleges and universities in China, some 42 universities have been designated as part of the 'world-class' project and another 95 entities are included to develop 'world-class' courses. This 'Double First Class' or 'shuang yi liu' plan, as it was officially described in 2017,<sup>21</sup> arose in 2015 when the Central Party Committee and the State Council in China announced plans for the coordination and advancement of world-class universities and first-class subject building. This was seen as a strategic decision, building on previous projects, to strengthen China's competitiveness while establishing the basis for long-term development. Targets have been set for 'Double First Class' in successive stages to

be met by 2020, 2030 and 2050 to have a significant number of world-class universities and disciplines to be amongst the best in the world.

According to J. Grove in the Times Higher Education (THE) there were seven Chinese Universities in the World University Rankings 2018 top 200, a further 26 in the top 1000 and nine not ranked by THE. By comparison, the United States had 62 universities in the top 200 – widely regarded as an indicator of a ‘world-class’ university – the UK had 31, Germany 20, the Netherlands 13 and Australia eight. The issues raised by Peters and Besley, in connection with the Double First Class plan need not detain us here although it is worth noting in passing that the impact on the governance of higher education in China has been discussed, inter alia, by Hu Xuyang and Song Shanming of Zhejiang University in terms of the desirability of ‘... shifting the governance structure from bureaucratic management to shared governance and from traditional rule of man to the rule of law.’ Founded on Xi Jinping Thought on Fairness and Justice these authors envisage the building of ‘... a new type of collaborative relationship among governments, institutions of higher learning, academics and students, and society as a whole.’<sup>22</sup>

It is against this background that the doctoral thesis of Lukas Filler on ‘Chinese Views of the Role of Morality in International Relations and the Use of Force’, which was submitted in 2016 to the Department of War Studies of King’s College London, deserves to be considered. It is remarkable for the following reasons:

- (i) It was *a quantitative study* which ‘...tested whether the strategic preferences of China’s future decision makers are consistent with non-coercive Confucian values.’
- (ii) It involved *surveying students at six elite Chinese universities* ‘... to identify beliefs about the character of the international system, when and how it is permissible to use force, and whether morality should constrain state behavior.’ The survey was also conducted with the knowledge and tacit acceptance of Chinese political leaders, too, although they declined to take part.
- (iii) The purpose of the study was ‘... *to validate the findings deduced in earlier, qualitative studies* by seeing if they reflect the beliefs and priorities of actual Chinese people.’<sup>23</sup> [Emphasis added.]

As the author states, with respect to the purpose of this thesis:

This study is the first of its kind to examine Chinese beliefs about international relations and war through polling and focus groups that directly asks an important demographic to explain and clarify their beliefs about national security issues. It is further remarkable because ~5,500 surveys about a very sensitive subject were successfully collected in China by a single, self-funded Western scholar.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, as this doctoral student went on to justify, reaching the students at top Chinese Universities from whom the next generation of political leaders was likely to emerge, and whose views will have been moulded by the dominant politico-military culture, was second best only to being able to survey the current leaders themselves.

The limitations of the study are clearly explained and, as might be expected, include the need to use general scenarios in the questionnaires rather than

... more sensitive real-world issues in order to minimise objections from government authorities. This also avoids the problem that respondents might not want to select an answer that contradicts the Chinese government's official stance.<sup>25</sup>

The reader is referred to the thesis itself for a full treatment of the subject matter, methodology and conclusions from this path-breaking study.

#### C4.1 A Preliminary Conclusion

What the evidence from higher education in China suggests is that there may be scope for the IPP Advanced Trials to take place in the People's Republic itself. The drive to create world class universities and courses, as an essential part of efforts to strengthen China's competitiveness and thereby establish its long-term development, ensures a more favourable climate for whatever initiatives can demonstrate their scientific and technological relevance.

The Filler study underlines this point:

- The application of statistical techniques to even sensitive national security issues, in an open and serious manner, can involve the top echelons of Chinese higher education.
- Findings that are forward-looking and testable against the actual course of events in an area of conflict including the PRC may be permissible, at least at the theoretical level.
- The link to 'non-coercive Confucian values' ensures that research that respects, and seeks to incorporate, Chinese characteristics is particularly welcome as a means of finding common ground between East and West e.g., a 'Golden Rule' in international relations.

The most important caveat from the Filler study is that:

- The sensitivity of national security issues (as in any country of the world) places a question mark over consideration of actual rather than hypothetical conflicts affecting China, which are essential to the credibility and relevance of the IPP Advanced Trials. Nevertheless:
  - The importance that the CPC leadership itself attaches to the end of the Cold War and the lessons to be drawn from it is recognised by the history of Prodem/IPP and, while they are not the same lessons, at least their educational value can now be translated into the language of the mathematical sciences for the public benefit of future generations in China and abroad.
  - The subject of 'the greatest risk of collapse into civil conflict or war' in any nuclear weapons state is one directly arising from the end of the Cold War and, apart from the political conclusions which the CPC leadership draws, there is the separate educational assessment by competitive methods of its future consequences.
  - The conflict between mainland China and Taiwan and the CPC goal of eventual reunification, in the absence of any Taiwanese declaration of independence to date, means the 'one-China' principle recognised by most states in the world is also consistent with the maintenance of strict political impartiality by IPP.

## C5 Overall Conclusion

The three preliminary conclusions of this Appendix yield a cautious affirmative to the question whether the IPP Advanced (Peace Game) Trials 2021 to 2023 can be run in China with the tacit acceptance, or even the explicit approval, of the Communist Party of China.

It is suggested by this Briefing author that the requirements for IPP to be able to operate within China (including Taiwan) and involving Chinese higher education institutions appear to be:

- (i) Strict *political impartiality* by IPP, if not by individual contestants in the IPP Advanced Trials who must abide by a Code of Conduct e.g., precluding personal attacks on political or other leaders in China or elsewhere; and seeking truth from facts in evaluating the processes of a specific conflict, rather than policy prescriptions.
- (ii) A focus on *quantitative analysis* to validate findings from earlier qualitative studies i.e., using techniques like network analysis to evaluate international conflicts and forecast the propensity for a state of peace or a state of war in those regions.
- (iii) *A commitment to publishing the results* of impartial and objective IPP research into the direction of conflicts made possible by judging the forecasts against the actual course of events in the conflict area, according to irenic criteria.

Naturally, (iii) would be the severest test of IPP's standing but is no less vital than (i) and (ii).

It must be emphasised, though, that this Conclusion is the author's alone and has not been considered, let alone endorsed, by the IPP Trustees themselves. Thereafter, as it may be amended and agreed, the only way to ascertain whether it is sound is to try it out in practice.

## References

<sup>1</sup> . Robert Bickers, Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination (Penguin Books, 2018), pp. 117-18.

<sup>2</sup> . Ibid, p. 178.

<sup>3</sup> . Peter Southwood, General Editor and Editor Series A, Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem): The Triumph of Unilateralism: The Failure of Western Militarism, Briefing No. 1 (Prodem, March 1993), 69pp ISBN 1-898079-00-5; NATO's Military Supremacy: What is It For? Briefing A/1 (Prodem, September 1993), 44pp ISBN 1-898079-10-2; Western Generals: The Dangers from British and American Military Success, Briefing A/2 (Prodem, School of Business and Economic Studies, University of Leeds, April 1994), 53pp ISBN 1-898079-20-X; Military Adventurism: Learning From the Past – Looking to the Future, Briefing A/3 (SBES, University of Leeds, October 1995), 79pp ISBN 1-898079-25-0. All available through Legal Deposit libraries in the UK and Ireland. (Details of the Series B and C Prodem Briefings, edited by Steve Schofield, are omitted here but are available on the back cover of the Series A Briefings.)

<sup>4</sup> . In all the Prodem Briefings which Southwood edited 'Common security means a recognition that in the nuclear age national security cannot be achieved unilaterally and by military means.' This definition drew on the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (chaired by Olaf Palme), Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (Pan Books, 1982). Common security differs from the military security concept in that it also involves economic, social and environmental aspects of security.



- 
- <sup>5</sup> . The Triumph of Unilateralism, Prodem Briefing No. 1 (March 1993), p. 17. Quotation marks are used to separate quotations from summaries of points made in this and other Prodem Briefings.
- <sup>6</sup> . NATO's Military Supremacy, Prodem Briefing A/1 (September 1993), p. 19. See also Western Generals, Prodem Briefing A/2 (April 1994), p. 13. Quotation marks are used to separate quotations from summaries of points made in this and other Prodem Briefings.
- <sup>7</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p. 29. Quotation marks are used to separate quotations from summaries of points made in this and other Prodem Briefings.
- <sup>8</sup> . Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (Vintage Books, 2013), pp. 427-28.
- <sup>9</sup> . *Ibid*, p. 396.
- <sup>10</sup> . See Peter Southwood (ed.), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Briefings on the Prospects for Peace, Briefing No. 1 (International Peace Project, January 2006), Chapter 3, pp. 28-40 at <http://www.ipp2000.org/index.html> (bottom of home page).
- <sup>11</sup> . See 'Constitution of the Communist Party of China', Revised and Adopted at the 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 24 October 2017 – downloaded from Xinhua state news agency website on 16 August 2021.
- <sup>12</sup> . *Ibid*, p. 3.
- <sup>13</sup> . *Ibid*, p. 4.
- <sup>14</sup> . *Ibid*, p. 5.
- <sup>15</sup> . *Ibid*. pp. 6 and 7-8. The Belt and Road Initiative is considered more fully in Appendix E of this Briefing.
- <sup>16</sup> . *Ibid*, pp. 8-9.
- <sup>17</sup> . Following publication of this China Briefing, on approval by the Trustees, IPP has funding to initiate an IT/data science project to develop a computer model to test mathematically the predictions arising therefrom. If successful, this model might be applied more widely to other conflict areas around the globe to give advance warning of a propensity for war or a state of peace, as scientifically determined.
- <sup>18</sup> . The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (IPP, January 2006), p. 28.
- <sup>19</sup> . Westad's book (note 8 above) and his teaching work in China are examples. See also Michael Peters (note 20 below). By comparison, it appears that even Western sympathisers in 1960s and 1970s received short shrift in the PRC during the Cultural Revolution.
- <sup>20</sup> . Michael A. Peters and Tina Besley, 'China's Double First-Class University Strategy' in Michael A. Peters, The Chinese Dream: Educating the Future, An Educational Philosophy and Theory Chinese Educational Philosophy Reader, Vol. VII (Routledge, 2020), Chapter 6 – accessed as an e-book in the British Library. The authors cite the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014.
- <sup>21</sup> . *Ibid*, citing the Australian Department of Education and Training news site: 'Implementation measures released for China's new world-class university policy' (24 January 2017).
- <sup>22</sup> . Hu Xuyang and Song Shanming, 'The Governance of Higher Education According to the Marxist View of Fairness' in Social Sciences in China, vol. 39, no. 3 (2018), pp. 171-186.
- <sup>23</sup> . Lukas Filler, 'Chinese Views of the Role of Morality in International Relations and the Use of Force' (electronic doctoral thesis, Department of War Studies, King's College London, United Kingdom, September 2016), p.2 (Abstract), p. 10 and p. 134. Accessed through the British Library.
- <sup>24</sup> . *Ibid*, p. 15.
- <sup>25</sup> . *Ibid*, p. 144.

## APPENDIX D – CHINA AND THE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER IN ASIA, 1990 - 2020

### D1 Introduction

The aim of this analysis is to draw together relevant facts to help answer two questions relating to the People's Republic of China ('China' or 'PRC'):

- Q.1 What balances of military power exist between entities within, or external to, China in current, or future potential, areas of conflict in the period to 2021?
- Q.2 What balances of peaceful means of conflict resolution exist between entities within, or external to, China in current, or future potential, areas of conflict in the period to 2021?

'Conflict' is defined as a material area of disagreement between State and/or non-State entities that has the potential for peaceful or violent resolution.

The main sources of reliable data used here are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The available data generally only exists up to 2020<sup>1</sup> but the analysis in section 4.2.1 is intended to be up to 11 September 2021 and will seek to answer a third question:

- Q.3 What military factors in the future relationships of China, domestic and foreign, are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

The answer summarises the military dimension of conflict analyses relating to the propensity for a state of peace or war in China.

### D2 Global Military Expenditure

SIPRI estimated Chinese military spending in 2020 at US\$252 billion (at current prices and exchange rates), which accounted for 13 per cent of world military expenditure, second only to the United States of America (at 39 per cent). Of the top 15 military spenders in 2020 only three had lower military expenditure in 2020 than in 2011, based on constant (2019) US dollars. These three included the USA (-10 per cent) and UK (-4.2 per cent). On the other hand, China's increased military spending during this period was 76 per cent and by far the largest.<sup>2</sup> Table D1 compares the data relating to the USA and Asian countries amongst these top 15.

Despite the reduction in US military spending over the last ten years, there have been real increases in the financial years covering 2018-2020 due to perceived threats from strategic competitors like China and Russia and the drive by former President Donald Trump to rebuild what he regarded as a depleted US military. China's military spending has increased for 26 consecutive years because of its long-term military modernisation and expansion process. India's military expenditure was 34 per cent higher in 2020 than 2011 largely due to its continuing conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir and renewed border disputes with China. Pakistan – not shown in Table D1 – was ranked 23 by SIPRI, having military spending of US\$ 10.4 billion in 2020 which represented a 55 per cent increase on expenditure in 2011.<sup>3</sup>

TABLE D1

ASIAN COUNTRIES AMONGST THE GLOBAL TOP FIFTEEN MILITARY SPENDERS, COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES, IN 2020

Rank	Country	Spending (US\$ billion)	Change (%) 2011-2020	Spending as % of GDP <sup>(a)</sup>		World Share (%) 2020
				2020	2011	
1	United States	778	-10	3.7	4.8	39
2	China	[252]	76	[1.7]	[1.7]	[13]
3	India	72.9	34	2.9	2.7	3.7
4	Russia	61.7	26	4.3	3.4	3.1
9	Japan	49.1	2.4	1.0	1.0	2.5
10	South Korea	45.7	41	2.8	2.5	2.3

Notes: [ ] = SIPRI estimate; GDP = gross domestic product.

Spending figures and GDP are in US dollars at current prices and exchange rates. Changes are in real terms, based on constant (2019) US dollars. Percentages below 10 are rounded to one decimal place; those over 10 are rounded to whole numbers.

(a) The figures for military expenditure as a share of GDP are based on estimates of 2020 GDP from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (October 2020) and International Financial Statistics (September 2020) databases.

Source: Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian and Alexandra Marksteiner, 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020', [SIPRI Fact Sheet](#) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2021), p.2 adapting Table 1.

Russia, being an Asian and European power, had recorded 18 straight years of increases before 2017 and military spending rose again in 2019 and 2020. However, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic appeared to contribute to Russia's actual spending in 2020 being 6.6 per cent less than its initial military budget. The pandemic led to an increase in the military burden – that is. military expenditure as a share of GDP – in most countries irrespective of whether their military spending rose or fell in 2020. The longer-term impact will only be known in future years.<sup>4</sup>

Global military expenditure is mostly accounted for by two of the world's five regions: the Americas (43 per cent); and Asia and Oceania (27 per cent). In the latter case, total military

spending in 2020 reached US\$528 billion, being 47 per cent higher than in 2011 and maintaining an uninterrupted trend of increases since at least 1989. China and India together accounted for 62 per cent of military expenditure in the region in 2020.<sup>5</sup>

It is worth highlighting that calculating China's military expenditure is difficult, due to the limited amount of official information, so SIPRI has had to make its own estimates.<sup>6</sup>

### D3 Nuclear Weapon States

According to SIPRI estimates summarised in Table D2 below, China accounted for 350 nuclear warheads out of a total of 13,080 amongst the nuclear weapon states (excluding North Korea) in January 2021. It is thought that none of China's nuclear weapons are deployed but, like the stored warheads of other nuclear weapon states, are held in central storage that would require some preparation, such as transportation and loading on to launchers, before they could become fully operational. China has an official policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Out of an estimated inventory of about 350 nuclear warheads, just over 270 warheads are assigned to China's operational land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and to nuclear-configured aircraft. The remainder are thought to be with non-operational forces, like the development of the new DF-41 land-based system, operational systems that might increase in number in the future, such as the JL-2 sea-based system, and reserves. These estimates rely on publicly available information as China has never declared the size of its nuclear arsenal.<sup>7</sup>

The Chinese government's aim is to maintain its nuclear capability at the minimum level needed to safeguard national security with the goal of 'deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China'.<sup>8</sup> Currently China is building up a fully operational triad of nuclear forces with solid-fuelled land-based missiles, six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and bombers with a full re-established nuclear mission so as to increase its nuclear deterrence and second-strike nuclear capacity against what it regards as a growing external threat. These developments do not yet seem to have prompted any changes to its long established basic nuclear policies including on no-first-use. While steps are being taken to improve overall nuclear missile readiness, warheads are thought to remain de-mated from their delivery vehicles so being unavailable for immediate use. The US evidence of a nascent launch-on-warning posture '... appears to be relatively circumstantial.'<sup>9</sup>

Briefly, on each part of the triad:

- Aircraft and air-delivered weapons

In its 2020 report, the US Department of Defense (DoD) had concluded that in 2019 China had 'signalled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF [People's Liberation Army Air Force] publicly revealed the H-6N ([US-designation] B-6N) as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber'. China's older bombers had no air-to-air refuelling probe which much reduced their long-range targeting capability.

TABLE D2

## WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, JANUARY 2021

State	Year of first nuclear test	Deployed warheads	Stored warheads	Retired warheads <sup>(a)</sup>	Total inventory
United States	1945	1,800	2,000	1,750	5,550
Russia	1949	1,625	2,870	1,760	6,255
United Kingdom	1952	120	105	-	225
France	1960	280	10	..	290
China	1964	-	350	-	350
India	1974	-	156	..	156
Pakistan	1998	-	165	..	165
Israel	..	-	90	..	90
North Korea	2006	-	..	[40-50]	[40-50]
<b>Total<sup>(b)</sup></b>		<b>3,825</b>	<b>5,745</b>	<b>3,510</b>	<b>13,080</b>

Notes: .. = not applicable or not available; - = nil or negligible value; [ ] = uncertain value.

(a) These retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement.

(b) These totals exclude North Korea and are rounded to the nearest 5 warheads.

All figures are approximate and are estimates based on assessments by the authors. The estimates presented here are based on publicly available information and contain some uncertainties. SIPRI's detailed notes are omitted as the purpose is to illustrate the estimated size of China's nuclear forces in relation to other nuclear weapon states.

Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, 'World Nuclear Forces' in SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021), Chapter 10, Table 10.1 on p. 334.

Additionally: one of China's two new air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) may have a nuclear payload, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency; and the PLAAF is developing its first long-range strategic bomber, the H-20 (B-20), with a range of up to 8,500 kilometres and stealthy design, which might be in production within a decade, suggested the US DoD 2020 report, and able to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons.<sup>10</sup>

- Land-based missiles

China's modernisation involves new mobile, solid-fuel missiles and increased numbers of road-mobile missile launchers. It is motivated by a concern that US advances in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, together with precision-guided conventional weapons, threaten a pre-emptive strike against China's current fixed-missile launch sites.

The US DoD estimated, in its 2020 report, that China currently has 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and that the number of warheads on ICBMs capable of reaching the USA is likely to grow to 200 in 2025 [from SIPRI-estimated 132 in 2020].

Additionally, the People's Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF) have been developing a longer-range ICBM called the DF-41 (CSS-20) since the late 1990s with an estimated range of over 12,000 kilometres. The DF-41s are currently being integrated into the first PLARF brigades, possibly for training, and a small number of launchers might become operational in 2021. Moreover, China has, after many years of research and development, modified a few ICBMs to deliver nuclear multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). SIPRI states that the DF-41 is thought to be capable of carrying at least three warheads. It believes that about 18 launchers and 54 warheads might become operational in 2021.<sup>11</sup>

- Sea-based missiles

The US DoD report in 2020 assessed that China's four operational Type 094 SSBNs comprise China's 'first credible, sea-based nuclear deterrent'.<sup>12</sup> It also states that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has constructed two more Type 094s but these latest ones are not yet operational. Each Type 094 submarine can carry up to 12 three-stage, solid-fuelled JL-2 (CSS-N-14) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The JL-2 has an estimated range in excess of 7,000 kilometres and is thought to carry one nuclear warhead.

Following on from previous observations about Chinese nuclear policies, the question arises as to whether the missiles on Chinese SSBNs are normally mated with nuclear warheads. So far, SIPRI observes, there are no credible reports that nuclear-armed patrols have started. Any change to China's long-held practice of keeping nuclear warheads in storage would pose significant challenges to its command-and-control procedures. In a war scenario geographic 'choke points' and advanced US anti-submarine warfare capabilities might compel China to deploy its SSBNs in a protective cordon within the South China Sea thereby limiting their ability to target the continental USA.

PLAN is also developing its Type 096, the next generation of SSBN, with construction expected to begin in the early 2020s, according to the US DoD in 2020. It also assessed that China could have up to eight SSBNs by 2030. It would be armed with a successor to the JL-2, the JL-3 SLBM. The US Air Force's intelligence centre anticipated that the JL-3 would be capable of carrying multiple warheads and have a range of more than 10,000 kilometres.<sup>13</sup>

#### D4 Asian Regional Analysis

This section offers a preliminary analysis of the balance of power and the balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution, based on evidence from the annual IISS publication The Military Balance over the period since 1990, when the Cold War ended. The first part summarises and assesses the relevant quantitative data, with respect to selected military powers in Asia, in relation to armed forces personnel and major weapon platforms. The second part considers what qualitative evidence would be needed to provide a more complete view on the potential for peaceful or violent resolution of conflicts between these selected powers.

It is important to recognise, as IISS does in their annual publication, that information from one year to the next can differ for reasons other than an actual change in military personnel or weapons platforms. Additional factors are IISS reassessment of the evidence supporting their previous judgements about a country's military forces, in the light of the public availability of any new information, rather than actual changes in numbers of personnel or weapons. Consequently, time series data presented here in five-yearly intervals from 1990 to 2020 need to be interpreted as giving only general, rather than precise, indications of trends. It is also the case that the level of public disclosure varies markedly from one country to another so accuracy may differ on that count, too.

Whereas IISS addresses qualitative factors through narrative assessments, this author believes that a fundamental restructuring of the presentation of IISS data would potentially make possible the use of a more data-driven, and mathematical, method of comparing quality of service personnel, weapons platforms and systems. Invaluable as the IISS military data base is, after adopting essentially the same format and approach since 1959, the time may have come for a basic overhaul that would ensure The Military Balance becomes even more useful.

##### D4.1 Quantitative Factors

The analysis in this Briefing is focused on groups of potential or actual conflict scenarios:

1. *North versus South Korea*, in the wake of a social and political collapse especially in the North, drawing in outside powers including China and the United States.
2. (i) *India versus Pakistan* over Kashmir or their other longstanding disputes and/or (ii) *India versus China* involving their border disputes. Such instability might result from internal conflict and terrorism linked to Kashmir or other causes.
3. *Other territorial disputes* between (i) China and Taiwan over national sovereignty and the independence issue; and/or (ii) China and Japan over islands in the East China Sea and/or (iii) China and various countries over islands in the South China Sea.

This leaves out certain other conflicts within China over Hong Kong, Tibet and/or Xinjiang where – despite the potential or actual existence of terrorism – a military balance does not exist or cannot be calculated. Likewise, conflicts arising from social unrest or the environment.


#### D4.1.1 North v South Korea

The Asian conflict most reminiscent of the Cold War in Europe is that between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ('DPRK' or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). The demilitarised zone marking the ceasefire line between North and South Korea at the end of the Korean War (1950-1953) is surrounded on each side by a high concentration of troops and equipment rather like that between Western and Eastern Europe from soon after the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War in 1990.

The longer-term perspective, with the caveats made previously on interpreting the data, is set out in the charts below, where it seems meaningful to this author to do so. The main quantitative conclusions he draws, as at the beginning of 2021,<sup>14</sup> are:

*Armed Forces Personnel:* North Korea has a paper advantage over the South in terms of active personnel (Chart D1) although this may be offset by military reservists where IISS counterposes an estimated 600,000 North Koreans to 3.1 million South Koreans. (The North also has a paramilitary reserve of some 5.7 million, whereas the South has 3 million in this category.)

CHART D1




*Note:* The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.




CHART D2



\* Main Battle Tanks exclude light tanks and MBTs known or estimated by IISS to be in storage.

CHART D3




\* Armoured combat vehicles include Armoured Personnel Carriers and Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles excluding those known or estimated by IISS to be in storage.

*Note:* The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

*Land forces:* the North has a numerical superiority over the South in both main battle tanks (Chart D2) and artillery (Chart D4) – Seoul, the South Korean capital, is within range of some of the North’s artillery – whereas South Korea appears to have a certain precedence in terms of armoured combat vehicles (Chart D3) – including only armoured personnel carriers and armed infantry fighting vehicles – suggesting a potential advantage in terms of flexibility and speed of manoeuvre in wartime over the North.

CHART D4



\* Artillery includes Towed artillery, Self-Propelled artillery, and Multiple Rocket Launchers excluding those known or estimated by IISS to be in storage.


*Note:* The legal deposit copy of [The Military Balance 2016](#) could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, [The Military Balance](#), editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

*Air forces:* in terms of numbers of combat capable aircraft, there seems little to choose between North and South Korea (Chart D5). However, it is more difficult to assess the numerical balance in armed helicopters; a problem generally shared in this category for any balance of military power in Asia. Partly it is definitional, because even where a specific ‘attack helicopter’ category exists, there may also be other types which are relevant to include. In this author’s assessment, armed helicopters here include attack and multi-role helicopter (MRH) variants. An additional complication is that armed helicopters may be under the control of the air force (as in North Korea) or part of the army (as in the South). The North has had about 20 attack helicopters since 2010 but none were recorded for 2020 although there were 80 MRHs. The South Korean army had 60 attack helicopters since 2005, rising to 96 in

2020. Additionally, it has had 175 MRH since 2010. South Korea, therefore, has numerical superiority in this category.

CHART D5



\* Combat capable aircraft exclude those known or estimated by IISS to be in store.

*Note:* The legal deposit copy of [The Military Balance 2016](#) could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, [The Military Balance](#), editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.


*Naval forces:* North Korea's surface fleet is dwarfed by that of South Korea: in 2020, there were two principal surface warships to 23 in the South Korean navy (Chart D6). Moreover, while the North has no maritime combat aircraft, the South had 16. Additionally, the South Korean navy had 31 antisubmarine warfare helicopters whereas the North had none.

As regards the submarine fleet, once coastal and midget submarines were excluded, the North was left with 21 submarines in 2020 to 18 in the South Korean navy. However, it is the potential for a sea-based nuclear deterrent in the North which is most significant.

*Nuclear weapons:* only the North has nuclear weapons but, according to SIPRI, it is '... an active but highly opaque...' programme.<sup>15</sup> Little advantage would derive from more than the briefest summary of what is known here. SIPRI concludes:

It is unclear how many nuclear weapons North Korea has produced with its fissile material, how many have been deployed on missiles, and what the military characteristics of the weapons are. North Korea has only demonstrated a thermonuclear capability (or a capability with demonstrated thermonuclear yield) once, in 2017. US intelligence sources have not yet confirmed North Korea's capability to deliver a functioning warhead on an [ICBM]...<sup>16</sup>

CHART D6



\* Principal surface warships generally exclude corvettes and patrol boats.

*Note:* The legal deposit copy of [The Military Balance 2016](#) could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, [The Military Balance](#), editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

North Korea is, according to SIPRI, widely believed to have prioritised developing and deploying an ICBM that could potentially deliver a nuclear warhead to targets in the continental USA. These include not only land-based ICBMs but the development of a solid-fuelled SLBM in order to improve the survivability of its nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems. During 2020 there was some evidence that North Korea had made progress towards achieving its objective of designing, building and ultimately deploying an operational ballistic missile submarine. At present the North has one Gorae-class (Sinpo) experimental submarine in service capable of launching one SLBM, probably the Pukguksong-1 until it is replaced by more advanced versions under development. In November 2020 the South Korean intelligence service announced that North Korea was constructing a new ballistic missile

submarine designated Sinpo-C by the US DoD. Its operational deployment was said, in 2019, to be 'near at hand' by North Korea's state-controlled news agency.<sup>17</sup>

*Foreign military forces:* In view of the balance of North and South Korean forces on the peninsular, the actual presence of US armed forces in the South and the proximity of the People's Liberation Army of China along the long border with the North, is highly significant. According to The Military Balance 2021, the US Pacific Command had 96,850 personnel of which 31,050 were based in the Republic of Korea. (This compares with 165,220 US armed forces personnel in the US Pacific Command in 1990, at the end of the Cold War, but a similar number in South Korea in the early 1990s to the number now.)

A fuller description of Chinese and US armed forces is provided later in this Appendix. It is evident, though, that these two nuclear weapon states must be regarded as part of the overall balance of power in the region. (Russia may also be a factor as it borders on North Korea.)

### **Overall Assessment**

In answer to Q1 on page 133 above, the existing military balance of power between DPRK and the Republic of Korea, at a quantitative level:

- *favours* North Korea in terms of active armed forces personnel, land-based weapons platforms (except armoured combat vehicles) and having its own nuclear weapons, if not yet any sophisticated means of delivering warheads on long-range missiles;
- *favours* South Korea in terms of principal surface warships, armed helicopters both for its army and naval aviation, and the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States alongside its US Pacific Command and troop deployment in South Korea itself.

Overall, neither side has such a military superiority as to make the launch of an attack on the other, to achieve Korean reunification by force, a realistic prospect in cost-benefit terms.

In answer to Q2, though, little exists beyond the occasional establishment of telephone 'hot lines' and other limited political agreements, from time-to-time,<sup>18</sup> to suggest any significant advance in the balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution in nearly 70 years since the armistice at the end of the Korean War. However, it is noteworthy that whereas the PRC did intervene in that war, after the initial success of the North Korean invasion of the South turned into a potential defeat, once US forces intervened in a United Nations-mandated operation, there is no reason to assume China would do so now if similar circumstances arose. Then China had little to lose; now it would have everything in a war started by someone else.

The crucial qualitative factors which would need to be addressed are:

- a like-for-like comparison of the quality of armed forces personnel and equipment including not only platforms but land, sea and air-based missiles, electronic and cyber warfare systems, and drones etc. integrated into a full balance of power analysis;

- the differing impacts on forces' morale and willingness to fight, dependent on the precise circumstances in which a war might arise;
- the extent to which a conventional conflict could be contained to prevent it becoming a nuclear one.

In the latter case, SIPRI's judgement is pertinent. Noting that North Korea, despite a pledge not to use its nuclear weapons 'pre-emptively', does not have a no-first-use policy:

However, as with other nuclear-armed states, it seems unlikely that North Korea would use its nuclear weapons outside extreme circumstances when the continued existence of the state and its leadership was in question.<sup>19</sup>

#### D4.1.2 India v Pakistan and India v China

The reason for assessing these two conflicts together, despite their involving differing issues and the wars between these state entities occurring at differing times, is that Pakistan is a long-term ally of China. It makes sense, therefore, to consider the comparative balance of military forces of China, India and Pakistan over the same time period. India and Pakistan attained their independence in 1947 and the PRC was established in 1949. In 1971 East Pakistan broke away to form Bangladesh but, as it shares no land border with China, its military forces are not taken into account in this part of the Asian military balance of power.


The longer-term perspective since 1990, with the caveats made previously on interpreting the data, is set out in the charts below, where it seems meaningful to this author to do so. The main quantitative conclusions he draws, as at the beginning of 2021,<sup>20</sup> are:

*Armed Forces Personnel:* The size of the armed forces (excluding reserves) of both India and Pakistan has increased since 1990 with India maintaining a numerical advantage of about 2.2: 1 over Pakistan (Chart D7). This is a similar ratio to that in 1990. The position on reserves is unclear as IISS has published no figure for Pakistani reserves for the five-yearly intervals since 2005. However, Pakistan's active paramilitary personnel are given as 291,000 in 2020, slightly down on the comparable numbers since 2005. India, on the other hand, had 1,155,000 reserves in 2020 although only 300,000 of these were first-line army reserves within five years of full-time service; another 500,000 army reserves have a commitment to age 50.

China, though, had nearly 40 per cent more armed forces personnel (excluding reserves) than India in 2020. The position in 1990 had been about 140 per cent more than India so, unlike India and Pakistan, active Chinese military personnel have reduced in number by almost one third since the end of the Cold War. According to IISS estimates Chinese reserves have also reduced from 1.2 million plus in 1990 to an estimated 510,000 in 2020.

*Land forces:* although India may have had a significant advantage over Pakistan in main battle tanks in 1990, by 2020 that was no longer the case (Chart D8). Similarly, an apparent

CHART D7



*Note:* The legal deposit copy of [The Military Balance 2016](#) could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.


*Sources:* IISS, [The Military Balance](#), editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

superiority in numbers of armoured combat vehicles at the end of the Cold War seemed to have disappeared by 2020 leaving both sides roughly balanced (Chart D9). Only in the case of major items of artillery does India retain a material advantage and even in that category India's superiority has fallen from 2.85:1 in 1990 to 1.47:1 in 2020 (Chart D10).

On the other hand, China's numerical advantage over India in all three categories of land-based weapons platforms is clear from the graphs, but only in armoured combat vehicles has it increased markedly between 1990 and 2020. China had 120 per cent more main battle tanks than India in 2020, and 55 per cent more major artillery platforms that year, but 210 per cent more armoured combat vehicles than India in 2020 (compared to 125 per cent more in 1990).<sup>21</sup>


*Air forces:* India enjoys a quantitative superiority in combat aircraft, which has increased slightly since 1990, to being about 85 per cent more than Pakistan in 2020 (Chart D11). Acknowledging the previously described difficulties of assessing numbers of armed helicopters, the Indian air force had 39 attack helicopters and 389 MRHs in 2020 making a total of 428. In addition, the Indian army had at least 320 MRHs that year. The comparative figures for the Pakistan air force were 19 MRHs and for its army 42 attack helicopters and an estimated 115 MRHs in 2020. Hence a rough equivalence in attack helicopters, on the part of the two rival states, is complemented by an overwhelming preponderance of MRHs, on the part of India. This latter transformation is evident from IISS figures over the last decade.

CHART D8



\* Main Battle Tanks exclude light tanks and MBTs known or estimated by IISS to be in storage.

CHART D9




\* Armoured combat vehicles include Armoured Personnel Carriers and Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles excluding those known or estimated by IISS to be in storage.

*Note:* The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.



CHART D10



\* Artillery includes Towed artillery, Self-Propelled artillery, and Multiple Rocket Launchers excluding those known or estimated by IISS to be in storage.


*Note:* The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

China, though, has an overwhelming numerical advantage over India in combat aircraft although this has fallen from a ratio of about 6:1 in 1990 to 3:1 in 2020. Whereas China had few armed helicopters in 1990, the PLA had 270 attack helicopters and 351 multi-role helicopters in 2020, with another 22 MRH in its air force, making a total of 643 helicopters.


*Naval forces:* India has numerical superiority over Pakistan in each category of sea-based platform, as it has had since 1990. On principal surface ships, it had 28 to Pakistan's eight in 2020, compared with 27 to Pakistan's 13 in 1990 (Chart D13). Thus, the ratio increased from about 2:1 to 3.5:1 in favour of India between the two dates. Similarly, India's maritime combat aircraft increased from 41 in 1990 to 73 in 2020, while Pakistan's from five to nine in the same period, maintaining an advantage of about 8:1 (Chart D12). Additionally, India had 30 antisubmarine warfare, 57 multi-role, and 11 airborne early warning helicopters as part of its naval aviation force in 2020, compared to 11 antisubmarine warfare and 6 MRHs in Pakistan's naval air force. The same story is reflected in the two states' submarine fleets where India had 16 boats to Pakistan's eight in 2020, although this did reflect a reduced ratio of 2:1 compared to about 3:1 in 1990 (Chart D14). Overall, India's numerical advantage in naval forces between 1990-2020 is clear.

CHART D11



\* Combat capable aircraft exclude those known or estimated by IISS to be in store.


CHART D12



*Note:* The legal deposit copy of [The Military Balance 2016](#) could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, [The Military Balance](#), editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

CHART D13



\* Principal surface warships generally exclude corvettes and patrol boats.


*Note:* The legal deposit copy of [The Military Balance 2016](#) could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, [The Military Balance](#), editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

Although this superiority is dwarfed by that of China over India in the same period, this has little relevance here because of the great distances and formidable geographical obstacles, especially Indonesia, which separate the two fleets and would make it difficult for China's to operate in hostile waters off the Indian coastline so far from home – at least, for the time being. It is also most unlikely that other great powers, especially the United States, would remain passive observers in such a scenario.

*Nuclear weapons:* as Table D2 above reveals, India and Pakistan are thought by SIPRI to have a similar number of nuclear warheads. India has a full nuclear triad of aircraft, land-based missiles and ballistic missile submarines. Whereas previously, in view of the limited range of India's early nuclear systems, their only role was to deter Pakistan but now, with the development of longer-range nuclear missiles capable of targeting all of China, India seems to be putting more emphasis on deterring China. It is not yet known how this may affect India's nuclear strategy and arsenal. Although India has long held a nuclear no-first-use policy it is qualified by a stated willingness to consider their use in retaliation against non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, SIPRI reports that other governmental statements and academic contributions have raised doubts about India's no-first-use commitment.<sup>22</sup>

CHART D14



*Note:* The legal deposit copy of [The Military Balance 2016](#) could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, [The Military Balance](#), editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

While Pakistan is advancing the development and deployment of a full nuclear triad as part of its deterrence of India, there does not yet appear to be an operational sea-based nuclear force. The purpose would be to secure a second-strike capability. A submarine-launched cruise missile has been tested and is intended to establish a nuclear capability for Pakistan's Hashmat-class diesel-electric submarines – possibly also on Hangor-class air-independent propulsion-powered submarines ordered from China for delivery from 2022.<sup>23</sup>

China's strategic nuclear triad is described in section D3 above. It is estimated by SIPRI to have had 350 warheads to India's 156 and Pakistan's 165 as at January 2021.

*Foreign military forces:* as India, Pakistan and China came into being as independent states in the 1940s none of them rely on any foreign forces on their territory for their defence.

### **Overall Assessment**

This is in two parts:

- (i) In answer to Q1 on page 133 above, the existing military balance of power between India and Pakistan, at a quantitative level:

- *favours* India in terms of numbers of armed forces personnel and, probably, reserves too; and, additionally, in quantity of major artillery systems, in combat aircraft and armed helicopters (except attack helicopters) and in all categories of naval platforms.
- *favours* Pakistan in eliminating or reducing India's comparative advantage in numbers of land-based weapons platforms between 1990 and 2020; and also in reducing India's favourable balance in numbers of principal submarine boats consistent with Pakistan's development and anticipated deployment of the third leg of its nuclear weapons triad.

Overall, while neither India nor Pakistan face any realistic prospect of invasion and complete occupation by the other, both face the potential of large-scale population losses bordering on annihilation, if their disputes over Kashmir, treatment of religious minorities, and terrorism were to spin out of control due to an inability to find any peaceful means of conflict resolution.

In answer to Q2, though, little evidence exists of any real advance in the balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War or even in over 70 years since India and Pakistan achieved their independence. The conflict appears to be largely frozen in time.

(ii) In answer to Q1 on page 133 above, the existing military balance of power between India and China, at a quantitative level:

- *favours* India in terms of reduced numbers of armed forces personnel and reserves potentially ranged against itself by China between 1990 and 2020; and, additionally, in most categories of land and air-based weapons platforms. Needless to add, this has arisen not because of any Chinese disarmament but due to its extensive, long-term force modernisation that allows some sacrifice of quantity in favour of quality. However, India's main external threats are limited to China and Pakistan whereas China has a much wider range of external threats, as enumerated in this Appendix.
- *favours* China in all land-based weapons platforms, especially in numbers of armoured combat vehicles which have increased markedly more than India's since 1990. Its earlier disadvantage in attack helicopters, compared to India, has been reversed and China remains quantitatively dominant in combat aircraft, too. At the nuclear level, China possesses more than twice the number of nuclear warheads that India has.

Overall, while neither India nor China face any realistic prospect of invasion and complete occupation by the other, both face the potential of large-scale population losses bordering on annihilation, if their border disputes, disagreements over Tibet (with its religious leader, the Dalai Lama, in exile in India), and competing relations with Pakistan, particularly over Kashmir, were to spin out of control due to a failure to find a peaceful means of conflict resolution.

In answer to Q2, though, little evidence exists of any real advance in the balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War or even since the 1950s when China and India had a brief coming together. The conflict appears to remain largely unresolved.

As with the Korean conflict, the crucial qualitative factors to be addressed in (i) and (ii) are:

- a like-for-like comparison of the quality of armed forces personnel and equipment including not only platforms but land, sea and air-based missiles, electronic and cyber warfare systems, and drones etc. integrated into a full balance of power analysis;
- the differing impacts on forces' morale and willingness to fight, dependent on the precise circumstances in which a war might arise;
- the extent to which a conventional conflict could be contained to prevent it becoming a nuclear one.

#### D4.1.3 China's Other Territorial Disputes

This covers Taiwan's status and disputes over various islands in the East and South China Seas with different countries which may be more conveniently considered as part of a regional picture. This is so because new conflicts may arise, which were not previously thought to be significant, and this regional overview would apply to them as well, allowing for future developments in the military balances between state and non-state entities.

The longer-term perspective since 1990, with the caveats made previously on interpreting the data, is set out in the charts below, where it seems meaningful to this author to do so. The main quantitative conclusions he draws, as at the beginning of 2021,<sup>24</sup> are:

*Armed Forces Personnel:* with respect to Taiwan (as a breakaway province), Chart D15a compares not only China with Taiwan but the two regional or global powers, Russia and the United States, whose rivalry and capacity for intervention make their resources relevant to the military balance. (Doubtless other non-Asian states like France and the United Kingdom could be included but are left out of this analysis to keep it to essentials.) In 2020, the PLA had 2,035,000 armed forces personnel (excluding reserves) compared to Taiwan's 163,000, an advantage of about 12.5:1. However, this is somewhat counterbalanced by Taiwan's reserves of 1,657,000 in 2020, compared to China's estimated 510,000. Additionally, the global forces of the United States (1,388,100) and Russia (900,000) that year must be considered in the event of China deciding whether to challenge any future Taiwanese declaration of independence or simply seek to terminate by force Taiwan's armed autonomy.

Further insight into the military balance in Asia is gained from Chart 15b which covers other states whose interests conflict with China over islands in the East or South China Seas – such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines – or are significant militarily to China. It is apparent that apart from Vietnam, whose armed forces were reduced by about half in the early 1990s in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, all the other countries have either maintained or increased the size of their armed forces between 1990 and 2020. Two other states whose interests conflict with China in the South China Sea are Malaysia (113,000) and Brunei (7,200) – the armed forces of the former have reduced by about 16,500 since 1990.

CHART D15a





CHART D15b



Note: The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

China's armed forces dwarfed that of any state in Central or South Asia in 2020 including:<sup>25</sup>

<i>Central Asia</i>	<i>South Asia</i>
Mongolia (9,700)	Bangladesh (163,050)
Kazakhstan (39,000)	Cambodia (124,300)
Kyrgyzstan (10,900)	Nepal (96,600)
Tajikistan (7,300)	Singapore (51,000)

Afghanistan's sizeable armed forces (178,800 in 2020) fell apart in July/August 2021 before the Taliban advance and takeover of the country, while this Appendix was being written.

Further afield in Oceania, Australia and New Zealand had 58,600 and 9,400 armed forces personnel (excluding reserves) in 2020 allied with the United States. (See Appendix F.)

China's military dominance in the region, apart from its ally Russia, is plain to see.

*Land forces:* there is no good reason to present the data on China's overwhelming numerical advantage here because Taiwan is an island and China's disputes over sovereignty, concerning islands in the East and South China Seas, are also maritime issues. The problem of invading Taiwan from mainland China is one of how to successfully cross the Taiwan Strait, in view of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the United States Navy, before the PLA could bring its undoubtedly vast superiority in land-based platforms to bear on Taiwanese forces.

*Air forces:* China had a numerical advantage of nearly 5:1 over Taiwan in terms of combat capable aircraft in 2020, although this was down from 10:1 in 1990. In fact, as Chart D16a reveals, China's air force had greater numbers of these military aircraft than either the United States or the Soviet Union/Russia in any of the five-yearly intervals shown except 2010. This leaves out the crucial qualitative dimension but underlines how China's air force may have halved between 1990 and 2020 but its modernisation process has still left the country with a very sizeable air force compared to that of its rival, the United States, and ally, Russia.


However, on attack helicopters, China's advantage over Taiwan is more modest at under 3:1. Having few in 1990, it had 270 in 2020 under the control of the PLA, while Taiwan went from none in 1990 to 96 attack helicopters in 2020. (This leaves out other categories of armed helicopters.) The United States army had 714 attack helicopters in 2020, compared to the Russian air force's 394 plus.

Since it would be hard to imagine an armed conflict between China and Taiwan, or over disputed islands in the East or South China Seas, that did not threaten to or actually involve outside powers, especially the United States, these global balances of forces are relevant.

As regards China's territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, Chart D16b shows that Japan had by far the largest number of combat aircraft amongst the seven Asian powers listed but still only 23 per cent of China's combat aircraft in 2020. In fact, all seven states combined added up to less than half China's total of 2,367 combat aircraft that year and, in




CHART 16a



\* Combat capable aircraft exclude those known or estimated by IISS to be in store.

CHART 16b



\* Combat capable aircraft exclude those known or estimated by IISS to be in store.

Note: The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

CHART D17a





CHART D17b



*Note:* The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

any event, their diversity of political constitution and interest ensures that they would be most unlikely to all combine militarily against China.

As regards attack helicopters, the Japanese army had 101 in 2020 and Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines a few each plus other categories of armed helicopter. Overall, though, well below the number of Chinese attack helicopters listed above.

*Naval forces:* staying with aircraft numbers, China had 426 maritime combat aeroplanes in 2020 whereas no figure was given by IISS for Taiwan in 2020. (It was reported to be 32 from 1990 to 2010 inclusive.) However, it is the United States that is the dominant global power in this category, with 989 maritime combat aircraft in 2020, compared to Russia's 219. (See Chart D17a.) Additionally, the US Marine Corps had 362 combat capable aircraft and 141 attack helicopters. Russia had 8 attack helicopters as part of its naval air force in 2020 while China and Taiwan had none. (Each country's naval aviation had other categories of helicopter.)

Amongst other Asian powers, only Japan had a significant number of maritime combat aircraft in 2020 (Chart D17b). That year it also has 80 antisubmarine warfare and 10 mine countermeasures helicopters as part of its naval air force. Other countries listed had only small numbers of armed helicopters, if any, in their naval aviation force.

As Chart D18a reveals, China has been building up its fleet of principal surface warships and has increased its advantage over Taiwan from 1.6:1 in 1990 to 3.1:1 in 2020. However, the United States had 124 such warships in 2020 compared to 80 for China, a ratio of 1.55:1 (to say nothing of type or size of warship), although in 1990 the ratio had been 4:1. Russia's surface fleet, which in numerical terms had been on a par with the United States in the days of the Soviet Union, had shrunk to one quarter of the size of the US fleet by 2020. The main reduction occurred in the turbulent years for Russia of the 1990s.


Amongst the six Asian powers shown in Chart D18b, Japan again dominates in terms of numbers of principal surface vessels, but China had 80 such ships in 2020, compared to 51 Japanese, a ratio of 1.57:1.

It is a different matter, though, where the submarine fleets of the three major powers are concerned (Chart D19a). While the vast numerical superiority of the Soviet Union has gone, Russia was not so far behind the United States and China in 2020. All the fleets are smaller but modernising. Taiwan has had few submarines, though.

Only Japan, amongst the six Asian powers listed in Chart D19b, has a comparatively large submarine fleet, but China had 59 boats in 2020, compared to 22 Japanese, a ratio of 2.68:1.


*Nuclear weapons:* this category was explored in section D3 above for China with comparative figures in Table D2 for the United States and Russia.

CHART D18a



\* Principal surface warships generally exclude corvettes and patrol boats.

CHART D18b



\* Principal surface warships generally exclude corvettes and patrol boats.

*Note:* The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

CHART D19a





CHART D19b



*Note:* The legal deposit copy of The Military Balance 2016 could not be traced in the British Library so the 2015 edition was used instead where data is as at November 2014 – deemed a close enough approximation to 2015.

*Sources:* IISS, The Military Balance, editions: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 2000-2001, 2005-2006, 2011, 2015, 2021 (Routledge of Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005 to the present). Print or digital versions.

*Foreign military forces:* the United States, which switched recognition of the Republic of China to the PRC in 1979, does not have any forces stationed in Taiwan as part of the US Pacific Command. However, substantial military assistance continues to be provided to Taiwan in the form of sales of US military equipment.

The US Pacific Command had 55,300 armed forces personnel based in Japan in 2020.

### **Overall Assessment**

This is in three parts:

- (i) In answer to Q1 on page 133 above, the existing military balance of power between China and Taiwan (as a breakaway province), at a quantitative level:
- *favours* China in terms of numbers of armed forces personnel (excluding reserves); and, additionally, its air force has an overwhelming advantage in combat aircraft and a more modest one in attack helicopters; and China's navy has a far larger number of principal surface warships and, even more so, submarines than Taiwan. However, all this is potentially offset by the vast numerical superiority of the United States globally in most categories of naval platforms especially surface warships and maritime combat aircraft. The gap, though, is closing between the size of the US and Chinese submarine fleets.
  - *favours* Taiwan in terms of armed forces reserves (assuming the accuracy of IISS estimates of Chinese reserves) but, otherwise, in the event of an armed conflict with mainland China it would be dependent on intervention by the United States to counterbalance its comparative numerical weakness in conventional air- and sea-based platforms. It would also be reliant on China's 'no-first-use policy' on nuclear weapons or on the United States nuclear deterrent should that country intervene on Taiwan's side.

Overall, Taiwan has the geographical advantage of being an island and, therefore, posing a considerable military and logistical challenge to China if it chooses to try to occupy Taiwan by force. Additionally, provided Taiwan can rely on United States intervention, at least in providing naval support, China would be taking a very serious risk in attempting an invasion.

In answer to Q2, little evidence exists of any real advance in the balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution as far as the military dimension of security is concerned. This, though, does not deny the significance of economic relationships between mainland China and Taiwan that may continue to weigh against a military confrontation.

- (ii) In answer to Q1, the existing military balance of power between China and Japan, at a quantitative level, in relation to their dispute over islands in the East China Seas:

- *favours* China in terms of numbers of armed forces personnel and all categories of air- and sea-based weapons platforms in view of Japan's defensive posture since the end of the Second World War and its occupation at that time by the United States.
- *favours* Japan in relation to its alliance with the United States.

Overall, military power is balanced between China and Japan by reason of its alliance with the United States.

In answer to Q2, the size of Japan's armed forces and its land-, sea- and air-based weapons platforms have not changed markedly since the end of the Cold War or in response to China's military modernisation. Despite the historical legacy of war between the two countries and the bitterness arising from Japan's previous occupation of China, Japan's largely or wholly defensive force policy and structure pose little or no threat to China. A military conflict over disputed islands in the East China Sea seems unlikely, or if it occurs, containable given the alliance between Japan and the United States.

(iii) In answer to Q1, the existing military balance of power between China and various countries, at a quantitative level, in relation to their dispute over islands in the South China Seas:

- *favours* China in terms of numbers of armed forces personnel and all categories of air- and sea-based weapons platforms over Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. (If Malaysia and Brunei were included, there is no reason to think the conclusion would be different.)
- *favours* those countries in dispute with China only in so far as they can expect United States intervention on their behalf, perhaps in concert with their allies in Europe and Oceania.

Overall, military power is very unbalanced in China's favour unless the United States chooses, as it has done, to assert its global naval dominance in the South China Sea to deter a military resolution of the conflict, if threatened.

In answer to Q2, there are no known steps underway or in prospect to encourage peaceful means of conflict resolution as far as the military dimension of the conflict is concerned. On the contrary, reports of military installations being established and extended on or near the disputed islands point in the opposite direction.

As with the Korean and other conflicts previously examined, but with the caveats outlined below, the crucial qualitative factors to be addressed in (i), (ii) and (iii) are:

- a like-for-like comparison of the quality of armed forces personnel and equipment including not only platforms but (land), sea and air-based missiles, electronic and cyber warfare systems, and drones etc. integrated into a full balance of power analysis;

- the differing impacts on forces' morale and willingness to fight, dependent on the precise circumstances in which a war might arise;
- the extent to which a conventional conflict could be contained to prevent it becoming a nuclear one.

However, in the case of (ii), this may be less necessary for the reasons stated above, and in the case of (iii), this may be redundant as the relevant military balances are covered under (i).

#### D4.2 Qualitative Factors

While the IISS military database is an invaluable source of information, as this Appendix has demonstrated, its potential value could be greatly enhanced by a more objective treatment of the qualitative differences between the armed forces of each sovereign state. The purpose of this would be to derive a more accurate view on the balances of military power between all states in the world but concentrating initially on those state (or non-state) entities deemed at most risk of starting an armed conflict, especially one that might escalate to nuclear war.

To do this in a way that would be amenable to mathematical treatment and utilise the vast information technology resources now available to process huge quantities of data:

First, the parameters (inputs) are to be identified. The relevant data sets are listed below in Table D3 (as they may be amended in the light of any errors or omissions and the practicalities involved).

Secondly, a grading system must be devised that reflects current realities (not ideals) in terms of the military personnel and equipment of each entity. Based on a score of, say, 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest quality available worldwide, 0 is non-existent or unavailable, and 1 is untrained or unequipped military personnel or inoperable equipment, the qualitative aspect of the military balance can be quantified, provided this is done objectively and impartially by a team of academic analysts reflecting persons from East and West, North and South.

Thirdly, and crucially, the mathematical model so constructed must be consistent with the IT requirements to ensure that computer programming will yield practical results.

The mathematical model itself, which IPP is seeking to develop, would apply the theory of networks where each state or non-state entity is represented by a 'node' and each relationship by an 'edge'.<sup>26</sup> Time series data, such as this Appendix has drawn on but now including a qualitative dimension, would enable the model to reveal how peaceful (i.e. cooperative) relationships and unpeaceful (i.e. coercive) relationships – the variables – interact with each other in given time periods to produce conditions or a 'climate' for peace or war. Naturally, these relationships would cover not only the military dimension focused on here but also all other relevant dimensions especially the economic and institutional.

The way would then be open for this mathematical model, utilising the IISS and SIPRI databases with other relevant ones like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to test its predictive value in foreseeing the propensity for a state of peace or war in a specific



TABLE D3

RELEVANT DATASETS FOR MODELLING THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF A MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN STATES

---

Armed forces personnel

- Army
  - Active/reserve
  - Professional/conscript
  - Officer training
  - NCO and service training
  - Morale (generally): leaders/officers/NCO and service personnel
  - Intelligence systems and processes with respect to potential/actual armed conflicts
- Navy
  - [As for Army]
- Air Force
  - [As for Army]
- Strategic Forces (esp. nuclear)
  - [As for Army]

Weapons platforms and systems

- Land
  - Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
  - Armoured combat vehicles (APC and AIFV)
  - Artillery (SP, Towed, MLR)
  - Surface-to-surface missile systems (anti-tank)
  - Surface-to-air missile systems
  - Helicopters (ATK, ASLT, Multi-role, Special Ops)
  - Unmanned aerial vehicles (armed, recon)
  - Amphibious capacity
  - Communications systems (plus ECM, EW)
  - Cyber warfare systems
  - Logistics and support
- Navy
  - Principal surface warships (exc. corvettes and patrol craft)
  - Surface-to-surface missiles
  - Maritime combat aircraft
  - Maritime helicopters
  - Air-to-surface missiles
  - Mine warfare vessels inc. minelayers and mine countermeasures
  - Principal amphibious vessels
  - Submarines (SSBN, SSN/SSGN, SSG)

- Submarine-launched missiles (non-nuclear)
- Communications systems (plus ASW, EW)
- Cyber warfare systems
- Logistics and support
- Air Force
  - Combat capable aircraft
  - Armed helicopters (ATK, ASLT, Multi-role, ASW)
  - Air-to-air missiles
  - Air-to-surface missiles
  - Helicopters (ATK, ASLT, Multi-role)
  - Unmanned aerial vehicles (armed/recon)
  - Communications systems (plus ECM, EW)
  - Cyber warfare systems
  - Logistics and support
- Strategic Missile Forces (esp. nuclear), if applicable
  - (Land-based) ICBMs
  - IRBMs
  - SRBMs
  - (Sea-based) SLBMs
  - (Air-based) nuclear bombs
  - ALBMs

---

*Source:* Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance (Routledge, various years) in which a list of abbreviations may be found.

region. This would be based on whether the balance of power or the balance of peaceful means of conflict resolution is a more important determinant of outcomes over the long term.

Historically, the model could also use statistical tests to try to identify any trends in past conflict areas which emerged from the interaction of peaceful or unpeaceful relationships. The importance of this is in helping to answer the question at the end of the Cold War in 1990, as to whether the balance of military force or of peaceful means of conflict resolution was decisive in the long term in the creating conditions that led to 9/11 and the outcomes of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular.

## D5 Conclusion

The most important and striking conclusion from this analysis of the military dimension of the conflicts China faces, internally or externally, in 2021 arises from a comparison with the end of the Cold War in 1990. Then the US-Soviet focus was on disarmament and conversion of resources from military to peaceful purposes, albeit in a generally one-sided way. In this Appendix, though, covering the period from 1990 to 2020 it has been evident that there has

been no significant disarmament initiatives and few military steps to lessen tensions where they exist. Although numbers of armed forces personnel and certain weapons platforms have declined in China and neighbouring countries this has had little to do with emphasising peaceful means of conflict resolution, rather it is part of force modernisation processes. Several conflicts have remained, as it were, ossified for decades or generations as in the case of North and South Korea, India versus Pakistan, and China versus Taiwan. Only in the case of the Sino-Japanese conflict over certain islands in the East China Sea is there little reason to believe that these would escalate any time soon to a major military confrontation because the weight of history, and Japan's defensive military posture with its United States ally goes against it.

In view of the huge imbalances in military power between China and all its neighbours, except its ally Russia, that should be a matter of concern.

## References

- 
- <sup>1</sup> . The latest version used in this Briefing is: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, February 2021), A year later IISS published The Military Balance 2022 but, for the purposes of this China Briefing and Appendix D, there was no need for an update.
  - <sup>2</sup> . Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian and Alexandra Marksteiner, 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020', SIPRI Fact Sheet (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2021), Table 1, p.2.
  - <sup>3</sup> . Ibid, pp.3-4.
  - <sup>4</sup> . Ibid, pp. 4-5.
  - <sup>5</sup> . Ibid, pp. 5 and 7.
  - <sup>6</sup> . See Nan Tian and Fei Su, A New Estimate of China's Military Expenditure (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, January 2021).
  - <sup>7</sup> . Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, 'World Nuclear Forces' in SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021), Chapter 10, pp. 369-71.
  - <sup>8</sup> . Ibid, p. 369 citing Chinese State Council, China's National Defense in the New Era (Information Office of the State Council, Beijing, July 2019), Chapter 2.
  - <sup>9</sup> . SIPRI Yearbook 2021, Chapter 10, pp. 369 and 371-72.
  - <sup>10</sup> . Ibid, pp. 372-73.
  - <sup>11</sup> . Ibid, pp. 371 and 373-75.
  - <sup>12</sup> . Ibid, p. 376 citing US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2020, Annual Report to Congress (DoD, 21 August 2020), (note 1), p. 45.
  - <sup>13</sup> . SIPRI Yearbook 2021, Chapter 10, pp. 376-77.
  - <sup>14</sup> . Data in The Military Balance 2021 is as at November 2020.
  - <sup>15</sup> . SIPRI Yearbook 2021, Chapter 10, p. 395.
  - <sup>16</sup> . Ibid, p. 398.
  - <sup>17</sup> . Ibid, pp. 401-04.
  - <sup>18</sup> . The negotiations between President Trump of the United States and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, in 2018-2019, which did not lead to a peace treaty, are referred to in the main Chapter at section 4.2.2.
  - <sup>19</sup> . SIPRI Yearbook 2021, pp. 395 and 397.
  - <sup>20</sup> . Data in The Military Balance 2021 is as at November 2020.
  - <sup>21</sup> . Percentages are rounded to the nearest 5 per cent.
  - <sup>22</sup> . SIPRI Yearbook 2021, Chapter 10, pp. 378-79.
  - <sup>23</sup> . Ibid, pp. 385, 389-90.
  - <sup>24</sup> . Data in The Military Balance 2021 is as at November 2020.
  - <sup>25</sup> . All manpower figures from IISS as detailed in the sources to Charts D15a and D15b.
  - <sup>26</sup> . There is a considerable literature linking applied mathematics to conflict analysis but this is not the time or place to review it.

## APPENDIX E – CHINA AND THE BALANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER IN EAST ASIA, 1990 - 2020

### E1 Introduction

The aim of this analysis is to draw together relevant facts to help answer two questions relating to the People's Republic of China ('China' or 'PRC'):

- Q.1 What balances of economic coercion exist between entities within, or external to, China in current, or future potential, areas of conflict in the period to 2021?
- Q.2 What balances of economic cooperation exist between entities within, or external to, China in current, or future potential, areas of conflict in the period to 2021?

'Conflict' is defined as a material area of disagreement between State and/or non-State entities that has the potential for peaceful or violent resolution.

The main economic relationships to be examined are between:

- (i) The United States and China.
- (ii) Other East Asian states and China. The analysis focuses especially on North Korea, Taiwan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- (iii) All principal global trading partners and China.

The connection to *the environment* is becoming ever more significant and China's record is relevant to each dimension of security but may be more conveniently summarised here. Finally, a case comparison with the earlier US-Japan trade dispute will be presented to illustrate the relationship between economic dependency and a propensity for peace or war.

There is no one main source of information for the economic dimension of security, unlike the historical and military dimensions, so a multiplicity of sources has been drawn upon as indicated in the references section below. The available data is generally up to the late 2010s. This Appendix will seek to answer a third question:

- Q.3 What economic factors in the future relationships of China, domestic and foreign, are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

The answer summarises the economic and environmental dimension of conflict analyses relating to the propensity for a state of peace or war in China.

### E2 Origins of China's Current Economic Strategy

A recent study by Lawrence C. Reardon provides an insight into the beginnings of the Chinese economic transformation in the 1980s. Most importantly it underlines that, for all the talk in the West of China's conversion to capitalism, that is not how the Chinese communist leadership understood it then (or now).

The evolution of the thinking of that leadership on economic matters was set within an unchanging ideological framework from the foundation of the PRC in 1949:

During the first three decades of communist rule in the People's Republic of China, Chinese elites steadfastly supported the long-term goals of the comprehensive Stalinist political, economic, and social paradigm. Those goals included building a strong national defense, developing a self-sufficient economy, and guaranteeing the Communist Party's hegemony over the state, the economy, and the people.<sup>1</sup>

Within this model, though, differences emerged between two Chinese variations of Stalinist economics from the 1950s to the 1970s:

- (i.) Mao advanced the 'first way' of development model I, which used the ideology and mobilisation mechanisms exemplified by the Stalinism of the Soviet Union between 1929 and 1934, to orchestrate the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
- (ii.) Zhou Enlai and others including Deng Xiaoping, later on, favoured the 'second way' of development model II, adapted from the bureaucratic Stalinism of the period 1934-1953, involving a strategy of remunerative, import substitution industrialisation (ISI). These ideas inspired the formulation of the various ISI Plans.<sup>2</sup>

However, the limitations of the latter approach were recognised by Chinese elites by the late 1970s and early 1980s. Inspired, to a degree, by the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy of 1921-1929, they pioneered experiments with a 'Third Way' for China's development model III. Deng, in particular, adopted a radicalised version of bureaucratic Stalinism involving outward-oriented development, special economic zones (SEZs) and a bigger role for the market. By the 1990s the Chinese leadership had moved to a new consultative economic model while keeping and adapting policies from older Stalinist political and social paradigms.<sup>3</sup>

Although a concept of a third or middle way also developed in Western political debate and practice for decades, embedded in the capitalist market and Western democratic traditions, the evolution of China's Third Way is uniquely fitted to its command economy experience. Initially, after Mao's death in 1976, Deng and others strengthened development model II. The decentralisation experiments of the 1980s reduced state monopoly control over industry and began to transform China from a command to a market economy. This was done gradually such that elites devolved greater decision-making powers to ministries, local areas and individuals who embraced their new economic freedoms. A more consultative relationship emerged with China's main economic agents which ignited huge economic growth in coastal districts. Since the 2000s civil society has evolved in China as a tool of the Communist Party through strengthening 'consultative authoritarianism' in ways 'command authoritarianism' could not do but which was not meant to generate democracy.<sup>4</sup>

The SEZs challenged the basic principles of the Stalinist model but in ways that allowed elites to carry out decentralisation initiatives in Guangdong and Fujian while isolating any disruptive influences on Chinese cities like Shanghai and the northeast. As these experiments succeeded in the 1980s it became possible for elites to shift from the inwardly oriented Stalinist model to a new Third Way advancing an outwardly oriented, consultative economic model. Coastal provincial and urban governments, industries and entrepreneurs were empowered to enter domestic and foreign markets. Foreign-owned firms were even allowed to operate in China. Subsequently the Chinese elites agreed to explore China's accession to what became the

World Trade Organisation. Thus the change in economic model to the Third Way initiated China's move to post-totalitarianism and enabled it to become one of the most significant great powers of the twenty-first century.<sup>5</sup>

Deng worked cooperatively with the first generation of Stalinist elites in forming 'the post-1978 Third Plenum consensus'. This involved agreeing to put their primary focus on China's economic growth, whilst also adapting and reinforcing the existing Stalinist political and social model:

Following the tumult of the Democracy Wall movement in the late 1970s, the first generation of Stalinist elites reached an implicit agreement to maintain the party's hegemonic role in the state and society. However, ideas that spilled over into society from experimentation in the 1980s often challenged the party's hegemonic role by empowering new non-party actors and thus planting the seeds for a new Chinese civil society.<sup>6</sup>

Reardon notes that spill-over is an unavoidable consequence of model experimentation and a transaction cost of policy reform. The ruling elites may decide that it has positive effects which can be harnessed for learning in other policy sectors. Alternatively, they may decide that it has negative consequences which must be contained or eliminated.

He describes what happened in China in the period leading up to, and following, the 'June Fourth Incident' in 1989<sup>7</sup> such that attempts to loosen the Chinese Communist Party's hegemony were reversed.<sup>8</sup> Reardon concludes:

Starting in the 1990s, Chinese elites shifted to a new consultative economic paradigm but kept and adapted the Stalinist political and social development paradigm. Deng and subsequent leaders continued to pursue the goals of building a strong national defense, developing limited integration with the international economy, and guaranteeing the party's continued control over the state, the economy, and the people...

This Third Way of development is enabling China to challenge the United States for world economic hegemony.<sup>9</sup>

### E3 The US-China Trade Dispute

#### E3.1 Legal Background

The issue of non-market economies (NMEs) in relation to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules is highlighted by editors James J. Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou, using China as a special case.<sup>10</sup> Among the many challenges faced by the WTO, that of NMEs has acquired growing prominence because of a provision agreed to by China and other WTO members in China's Protocol of Accession ('Accession Protocol'), regarding the treatment of Chinese companies and exporters in anti-dumping proceedings after 11 December 2016.

### E3.1.1 Non-Market Economies Under the GATT

The specific challenge which NMEs give to the global trading system is due to state intervention in commercial activities which creates market distortions and undermines the values and principles that normally apply to market-oriented economies. It is debatable whether the general rules of the WTO and its predecessor body, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), can manage NMEs. This goes back to the GATT negotiations in 1946-1948 which were conducted mainly amongst countries with market economies and there was little consideration of rules that apply to NMEs, except for state trading as a barrier to trade. A general obligation of non-discrimination on 'State Trading Enterprises' (GATT Article XVII) applies in both market and NMEs. When in the 1950s and 1960s certain NMEs, like Poland and Hungary, were admitted to the GATT a special anti-dumping rule was created to handle extreme conditions in which markets were dominated by state monopolies. In addressing allegations concerning dumped imports from these countries, investigating authorities could decide not to use the domestic prices of these economies to calculate dumping margins. Various difficulties in applying this special rule, and the marginal impact these NMEs had on global trade, meant that the shortcomings of the GATT rules only escalated into a systemic issue when negotiations for the accession of China to the GATT/WTO began.<sup>11</sup>

### E3.1.2 The Special Case of China

It took from 1986 to 2001 to negotiate China's membership of the global trading system. At the beginning China was a centrally planned economy, albeit the transition to a market-oriented economy had commenced in 1979. So the progress of this transformation was vitally important throughout the negotiations. At an early stage several members highlighted the difficulties in applying GATT rules to NMEs and, consequently, the need for special rules on China. The negotiations progressed to the point when Peter Sutherland, the founding Director General of the WTO speaking in Beijing in 1994, could accept that:

'China's economic reforms have given a far greater role to market forces and have led to rapid liberalization of its foreign trade regime.'<sup>12</sup>

However, Sutherland identified certain issues that needed to be resolved. In particular, the negotiating history revealed the problems in applying the special anti-dumping rule of the 1950s to China. So the WTO Working Party on the Accession of China was given the task of drafting the new rules to be included in the legal instruments on China's accession.

Finally, in 2001, China agreed to various obligations in addition to the general ones in the WTO agreements: the Chinese Accession Protocol; and the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. The most controversial of these obligations has been Section 15 of the Accession Protocol.<sup>13</sup>

### E3.1.3 NME Methodology and Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol

The editors refer to the special anti-dumping rules as 'NME Methodology':

Section 15 of the Accession Protocol essentially confers a right on WTO Members to treat China as an NME in anti-dumping investigations. This means that special anti-

dumping rules may be applied to Chinese producers and exporters based on the assumption that they do not operate according to market economy conditions. The application of the special anti-dumping rules typically results in the use of prices and costs in a third market economy country (i.e. a surrogate country) for the calculation of a 'normal value' of the Chinese goods under investigation. The extent to which the normal value exceeds the export prices of the goods during the period of investigation determines whether there is dumping, and if so, the magnitude of dumping. In practice, the use of the special anti-dumping rules almost invariably inflates the normal value depending on the arbitrary choices of surrogate values, and ultimately the quantum of anti-dumping duties to be levied. In practical terms, the discontinuation of the special anti-dumping rules will ensure that Chinese producers and exporters will be able to use, more often than not, their price and cost data for normal value determination.<sup>14</sup>

The reason for the controversy over the interpretation and application of Section 15 arises from its paragraph (d) which requires that Sub-section (a)(ii) of Section 15 shall expire upon completion of 15 years, i.e. on 11 December 2016. This Sub-section (a)(ii) permits WTO members to apply NME Methodology if Chinese producers under investigation 'cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry [concerned].' Thus the question arises: do the remaining elements of Section 15 continue to provide the basis for applying the NME Methodology?<sup>15</sup>

China's position is that the NME Methodology must be ended in accordance with the 11 December 2016 deadline and China initiated the EU-Price Comparison Methodologies dispute against the European Union (EU) the following day. Thereafter, China's officials argued, WTO Members are to apply general rules under the WTO covered agreements in anti-dumping proceedings against China. These are ordinary approaches to determining normal values envisaged in GATT Article VI:1 and Article 2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, whereby surrogate prices or costs can be applied only in the prescribed circumstances, once proven.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, the EU and the US, as a third party in the dispute, took the position that the expired Sub-section (a)(ii) of Section 15 concerned only 'burden of proof' – i.e. the assumption that China is an NME – such that the remaining parts of Section 15 still justify the use of NME Methodology. Scholars, too, are divided on the issue with some supporting China and others the EU/US position. At the time of writing the editors awaited a final decision from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the EU-Price Comparison Methodologies dispute.

#### E3.1.4 Is China Now a Market Economy?

In 2017 the US Department of Commerce issued a report, cited by the editors, which concluded that China remains a NME.<sup>17</sup> Some scholars agree but others note that China is not unique with respect to regulatory intervention, which is found in all markets. WTO rules do not provide a clear definition for either a 'market economy' or 'non-market economy'. This apparent lack of consensus amongst WTO membership on the general standards by which to distinguish the two kinds of economies is expected to put great strain on the WTO dispute mechanism whichever side wins a dispute. Yet any failure to resolve this issue may result in



an abundance of unilateral standards and practices, as already evidenced by WTO Members designating countries as NMEs.<sup>18</sup>

Until this fundamental issue is resolved the immediate concern relates to how the WTO rules may be applied to address China's unique economic system. This legal background provides a context for the US-China trade dispute that escalated under US President Donald Trump.

### E3.2 The US-China Trade War and Phase One Deal, 2018-2021

According to Tao Liu and Wing Thye Woo – the former an economist based in a Chinese university and the latter in universities in the USA, Malaysia and China – the US was driven to initiate the US-China trade war by three major concerns:

- (i) China's chronically large trade surplus which was depressing job creation in the USA. This was linked to a dispute over what the US regarded as an under-valued Chinese currency [and also access to Chinese domestic markets by foreign firms].
- (ii) China was using illegal and unfair means to purchase US technology at what was, in effect, a discounted price.
- (iii) China was trying to weaken US national security and its international standing.<sup>19</sup>

Min Wang, a political economist based in the USA whose second edition textbook on The Political Economy of East Asia provides many of the facts relied upon in this and subsequent sub-sections, has underlined the large measure of consensus in the USA on China's rise:

Despite heated debates over China policy, the US government largely maintained an engagement policy toward China, until the Trump administration. The thrust of the policy was to integrate China into the global system while influencing the nature of China's interaction with the rest of the world. The United States wanted to maintain primacy in East Asia and would work to deny China or any other countries a hegemonic position in East Asia, an economically and strategically important region in the world. The Obama administration adopted a hedging strategy of enhancing alliances with Japan and some key countries around China, to deter a rising China. Put simply, by maintaining a strong military presence in East Asia and by controlling the shipping lanes for oil and goods, the United States was essentially creating a situation in which it would be in China's own interest to focus on economic development rather than military adventures over Taiwan or territorial disputes with Japan, which would have a devastating effect on the East Asian economy. But even before Trump won the presidential election in 2016, there was already a strong sense in the US policy community that the engagement policy had failed and a tougher and coordinated approach was now necessary.<sup>20</sup>

The main contours of the US-China Trade War between 23 March 2018 and 15 January 2020, when the Economic and Trade Agreement between the two countries was signed, are outlined in Table E1. This Phase One trade deal has chapters covering: intellectual property; technology transfer; agriculture; financial services; currency; expanding trade; and dispute resolution.<sup>21</sup>

TABLE E1

## US-CHINA TRADE WAR TARIFFS: A SUMMARY OF MAIN ACTIONS TAKEN, 2018-2021

Date	Measure taken	Response (if any)
<i>Trade War</i>		
23 March 2018	US Section 232 tariffs on imports of steel (25%) and aluminium (10%)	[Relatively few exports of Chinese steel/aluminium to USA]
2 April		China's retaliation to S. 232 tariffs
1 July	China's MFN tariff cut on consumer goods, autos, and IT products	
6 July	<u>First round of China-specific tariffs (List 1):</u> US Section 301 tariffs of 25% on \$34 billion of Chinese imports	China's response in kind (25% on \$34 billion of US imports)
23 August	<u>Second round of tariffs on China (List 2):</u> US Section 301 tariffs of 25% on \$16 billion of Chinese imports	China's response in kind (25% on \$16 billion of US imports)
24 September	<u>Third round of tariffs on China (List 3):</u> US Section 301 tariffs of 10% on \$200 billion of Chinese imports	China's retaliation with tariffs of 5 to 25% on \$60 billion of US goods
1 November	China's MFN tariff cut on industrial goods	
1 January 2019	China suspends retaliation against US autos and parts (Section 301) and reduces MFN 2019 tariff rates	
15 June	US Section 301 tariffs on List 3 increased from 10 to 25%	China's retaliation (w.e.f. 1 June) on subset of \$60 billion US goods
1 July	China's MFN IT products tariff cut	
1 September	US Section 301 tariffs of 15% on subset of \$300 billion ( <i>List 4a</i> )	China's retaliation on subset of \$75 billion of US products
<i>Phase One Agreement</i>		
13 December 2019	Phase 1 Trade Agreement announced between US and China	
1 January 2020	China reduces MFN 2020 tariff rates	

Date	Measure taken	Response (if any)
8 February	US Section 232 tariffs extended to imports using aluminium and steel	
14 February	US Section 301 tariffs of 15% on List 4a products reduced to 7.5%	China's retaliatory tariffs on 1 September 2019 cut in half
1 July	China's MFN IT products tariff cut	
1 January 2021	China reduces MFN 2021 tariff rates	

MFN = most favoured nation

*Source:* 'US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart', by Chad P. Bown. Originally published on 20 September 2019 by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. <https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart> ; and additional detail from Ming Wan, The Political Economy of East Asia: Wealth and Power, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Edward Elgar, 2020), pp. 161-62.

The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) estimate that under this Phase One deal average US tariffs on Chinese exports remain elevated at 19.3 per cent, i.e. over six times higher than when the trade war began in 2018. Moreover, these tariffs cover 66.4 per cent of US imports from China.<sup>22</sup>

By comparison Chinese tariffs on US exports also remain elevated at an average of 21.2 per cent. The PRC's retaliatory tariffs still cover 58.3 per cent of imports from the USA. PIIE states that on 17 February the Chinese government announced that, under an exclusion process, Chinese companies intending to sign a contract to import US goods to China could apply for a temporary exemption from retaliatory tariffs.<sup>23</sup> Even so, PIIE considered there was doubt as to whether China could realise its commitment to buying an additional \$200 billion of US goods and services during 2020 and 2021, as described in Chapter 6 of the legal agreement.

### E3.2.1 US-China Competition for Future Technologies

As Ming Wan points out, US-China rivalry goes much further than the trade war and is particularly sensitive in the competition for future technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics and quantum computing. These dual-use technologies affect each country's prosperity and military capabilities. Despite US blacklisting of Huawei, a major Chinese 5G equipment and phone maker, and stopping many other Chinese technology firms from purchasing US parts and components, China's three state-owned wireless companies announced that they would be offering 5G subscription packages from 1 November 2019.

### E3.2.2 US Section 301 Investigations

It may be noted from Table E1 that the three main rounds of US tariffs on China all related to ‘Section 301’, which is a part of the US Trade Act of 1974. Moreover, there was no explicit reference to the WTO dispute mechanism in that table which begs the question what, if any, role this multilateral body played in the process. In addition, the critical role of technology transfer has been highlighted, bringing a further dimension of the conflict into play. Consequently, it is necessary to briefly investigate how the United States is pursuing its trade dispute with respect to unilateral and/or multilateral actions.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a ‘Legal Sidebar’ for Members and Committees of the US Congress in 2018 which explains the process under Section 301 in relation to the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) investigation:

...to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of China related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.<sup>24</sup>

In general Section 301 investigations are country-specific, in this case applying only to China, and require consultation and negotiations with the country concerned. Of particular interest, though, is that Section 301 investigations intersect between domestic trade laws and dispute settlement mechanisms at the international level, such as the WTO.

The domestic legal framework defines two types of executive action – mandatory or discretionary – that can emerge from Section 301 investigations. Whereas provision for mandatory action generally applies in the context of a trade agreement or a foreign country’s violation of international legal rights arising from such an agreement, the ‘discretionary action’ provision under Section 301(b) permits but does not require the USTR to take certain action set out in the statute if USTR determines that:

- ‘an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is *unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce, and... action by the United States is appropriate.*’<sup>25</sup> [Emphasis in the original]

This discretionary action can operate outside of the provisions of a trade agreement or of established international legal rights. ‘Discriminatory’ conduct under the statute means denying by act, policy or practice national or most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment to US goods, services or investment. (MFN is a commitment by trading partners to treat another country’s goods etc. no less favourably than those of domestic or other trade agreement countries.) Significantly, the statute provides examples of ‘unreasonable’ conduct such that a foreign country’s compliance with the WTO’s ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ may not be sufficient if that conduct denies ‘provision of adequate and effective protection of [IPR]’. Another example is denial of ‘nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection.’<sup>26</sup>

If the USTR initiates a Section 301 investigation the USTR must determine, as a threshold matter, whether it involves a trade agreement. This not only decides if the mandatory or

discretionary action provisions apply but, in the former case, the statute will require the USTR to follow the formal dispute settlement process contained in that trade agreement, should consultations with the country fail. However, neither the statute nor related case law seem to provide guidance on how the USTR is to determine whether an investigation does in fact involve a trade agreement.<sup>27</sup>

The importance of this determination becomes evident when the legal relationship between the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, established in 1995, and Section 301 is considered. For the USTR is allowed to implement trade-related actions authorised in the statute without following formal international dispute settlement if he decides that the conduct complained of does not 'involve a trade agreement'. This tension was considered in 1999 by a WTO dispute settlement panel who were reassured by a 1994 US Statement of Administrative Action approved by Congress which suggested that the United States would not apply Section 301 in a way that vitiated its WTO obligations. However, this Statement also stated that neither Section 301 nor the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding will require the USTR to invoke dispute settlement procedures if the USTR determines that a matter does not involve a WTO Agreement. Hence the importance of the USTR 'threshold determination.' The 1999 WTO panel had not considered the possibility of a disagreement with a USTR determination that a specific Section 301 investigation did *not* involve a trade agreement.<sup>28</sup>

The international legal implications arising from this unresolved issue were addressed in the CRS Sidebar Part II. As it happened, China's Minister of Commerce wrote on 28 August 2017 to the USTR that China opposed the commencement of the Section 301 investigation. After public consultations the USTR produced the final investigation report on 22 March 2018 under Section 301(b), the discretionary action provision. It also appeared that, as a threshold matter, the USTR had determined that this Section 301 investigation, or parts of it, did not involve a trade agreement. Consequently, the USTR's view appeared to be that resort to formal dispute settlement procedures was not needed and unilateral action to resolve some of China's practices was arguably permitted. Furthermore, if the USTR determines that China's conduct is not covered by a WTO agreement then the 1994 US Statement would seem to make it unnecessary to take this dispute before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.<sup>29</sup> (The CRS is careful to point out that these issues are not addressed in the USTR report.)

The President's Memorandum responding to the USTR's findings directed the actions the USTR was to take on three of its findings. Only one of these, on 'China's use of licensing processes to transfer technologies from U.S. to Chinese companies on terms that favour Chinese recipients', directed the USTR to pursue dispute settlement of these allegations of discrimination before the WTO and report to the President within sixty days on progress.<sup>30</sup>

As the Phase One of the US-China Trade Agreement demonstrates, bilateral rather than multilateral decisions have been the main mechanisms pursued so far.

#### E4 East Asian Economies

East Asia is here defined as a geographical region covering:<sup>31</sup>

##### *Northeast Asia*

China including (the island of) Taiwan

– albeit the latter operates in practice with a higher degree of autonomy than any other part of China.

Japan

North Korea and South Korea

##### *Southeast Asia*

Brunei

Cambodia

East Timor

Indonesia

Laos

Malaysia

Myanmar

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

Vietnam

All the latter countries are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) except East Timor which has observer status (as does Papua New Guinea).

Together, East Asia and the Pacific accounted for 30.2 per cent of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2018, constituting a major uplift from 16.2 per cent in 1980 according to figures from the World Bank. This compared with 27 per cent of global GDP in 2018 for the countries comprising the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – the United States, Canada and Mexico – and 22 per cent in that year for the European Union.<sup>32</sup>

A similar picture emerges on East Asia and the Pacific's share of world merchandise trade which rose from 16.0 per cent in 1980 to 31.80 per cent in 2017. This was almost as much merchandise trade as the European Union and twice as much as NAFTA.<sup>33</sup>

As Ming Wan puts it, East Asian economies have taken it in turns in leading the world in terms of speed of economic growth:

Japan in the 1960s;

Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1970s;

ASEAN in the 1980s;

China since the early 1990s.<sup>34</sup>

Although the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 interrupted the pace of East Asia's growth, which had outstripped any other region of the world, it remains a dynamic economic region spurred on by China's high growth.

Although, as Wan points out, East Asian economies are highly diverse they share a strong economic nationalism. If stages of development are factored in, there is a greater degree of convergence, what Wan refers to as ‘tiered convergence’. East Asian economies have followed comparable production-oriented, export-led and state-directed credit policies although not necessarily simultaneously or with the same intensity. In different decades various country models have provided sources of learning and emulation to others according to the degree of success they achieved in economic growth, as highlighted above.<sup>35</sup>

Wan considers the evidence concerning tiered convergence in political development. A work edited by James Morley in 1999 appeared to show an approximate correlation between levels of economic development and political system in the Asia-Pacific region with low economic levels correlating with autocratic systems and high levels with democracies.<sup>36</sup> Although Wan’s own table in the first edition of his book in 2008 tended to confirm this pattern, a new table created a decade later for the purposes of the second edition, did not confirm the earlier correlation. Table E2 below repeats the evidence on economic change from this second edition only and leaves out the columns on multiparty elections and political regime because the source used may not be regarded as politically impartial, however worthy the cause.

It is also necessary to note that North Korea has had to be left out of the table (as in Wan’s) because the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database does not have information on that country’s economic development. The World Bank includes North Korea as the only East Asian country in the low-income group of 31 countries.<sup>37</sup>

Table E2 shows that, attendant upon a convergence of national purposes and development strategies seeking rapid economic growth, there is now a convergence of economic performance. By the late 2010s all the countries had moved up to the next income category, compared to where they were a decade before, such that no country is left in the low-income group. China had moved from the lower-middle-income to the higher-middle-income group from the mid-2000s to the late 2010s, under the World Bank categorisation. An inverse relationship between the stage of economic development and the rate of per capita GDP annual growth, except for China, means further convergence may be expected. At the same time East Asia is also converging with the living standards of Europe and North America.<sup>38</sup>

However, Wan found that the rough tiered convergence between economic development and democratisation, which had been found a decade before, no longer existed. Singapore and Hong Kong outperformed the democracies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Apart from China, which is not far from being categorised as high-income, the countries with the highest per capita GDP growth rates were also categorised as authoritarian: Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Wan suggests that ‘There is now a stronger correlation between authoritarianism and economic performance than that between democracy and economic performance in the region.’<sup>39</sup>

As Wan’s own historical review, which covers much more than China, shows:

...East Asian countries have had a long tradition of doing things their own way. No great powers can force them to do for long what is against their pride and interests.<sup>40</sup>

TABLE E2  
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN EAST ASIA BY THE LATE 2010s

Income level/country	Per capita GNI (\$ in 2018)	Population in 2018 (million)	Per capita GDP annual growth rate (constant 2000 \$)
<i>High-income (\$12,376 or more)</i>			
Singapore	58,770	5.6	7.2 in 1990-2000 6.0 in 2000-2009 5.3 in 2009-2015
China – Hong Kong	50,310	7.5	3.6 in 1990-2000 4.8 in 2000-2009 3.3 in 2009-2015
Japan	41,340	126.5	1.3 in 1990-2000 0.8 in 2000-2009 1.4 in 2009-2015
South Korea	30,600	51.6	6.2 in 1990-2000 4.4 in 2000-2009 3.3 in 2009-2015
China – Taiwan*	25,371	23.6	6.7 in 1990 6.4 in 2000 -1.6 in 2009 2.9 in 2017
<i>Upper-middle-income (\$3,996 – 12,375)</i>			
Malaysia	10,460	31.5	7.0 in 1990-2000 5.2 in 2000-2009 5.5 in 2009-2015
China	9,470	1,392.7	10.6 in 1990-2000 10.9 in 2000-2009 8.2 in 2009-2015
Thailand	6,610	69.4	4.1 in 1990-2000 4.8 in 2000-2009 3.5 in 2009-2015



Income level/country	Per capita GNI (\$ in 2018)	Population in 2018 (million)	Per capita GDP annual growth rate (constant 2000 \$)
<i>Lower-middle-income (\$1,026 – 3995)</i>			
Indonesia	3,840	267.7	3.9 in 1990-2000 5.3 in 2000-2009 5.7 in 2009-2015
Philippines	3,830	106.7	3.3 in 1990-2000 4.9 in 2000-2009 6.2 in 2009-2015
Laos	2,460	7.1	6.4 in 1990-2000 7.0 in 2000-2009 8.0 in 2009-2015
Vietnam	2,400	95.5	7.9 in 1990-2000 6.8 in 2000-2009 5.9 in 2009-2015
Cambodia	1,380	16.2	7.0 in 1990-2000 9.2 in 2000-2009 7.1 in 2009-2015
Myanmar	1,310	53.7	7.0 in 1990-2000 12.6 in 2000-2009 7.6 in 2009-2015
<i>Low income (\$1,025 or less)</i>			

GNI = Gross National Income

*Notes:* The criteria for income categories are from the World Bank (1 July 2018).

\* Data for population and GNI per capita for Taiwan are from the Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2019, 75, 98. GNI per capita is in current \$. Data for GDP per capita annual growth rates are from National Development Council, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2018, 51.

*Sources:* Adapted from: Ming Wan, The Political Economy of East Asia: Wealth and Power, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Edward Elgar, 2020), Table 2.2, pp. 25-27 citing World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017 (World Bank, Washington DC, 2017), 68-72.

#### E4.1 China: Socio-Economic Trends

Another key consideration is the extent to which economic growth is consistent with, or at the price of, income equality because this is an important indicator of the quality of growth. It may also affect social stability. The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 represents complete equality (i.e. everyone has the same income) and 1 represents complete inequality (i.e. one person has all the income and the rest none).<sup>41</sup>

By way of comparison, a World Bank report in 1993 on the East Asian economic miracle described Japan, the ‘four tigers’ of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, and newly industrialising Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand ‘high-performing Asian economies’ (HPAEs). This report pointed out:

‘The HPAEs are the only economies that have high growth *and* declining inequality. Moreover, the fastest growing East Asian economies, Japan and the Four Tigers, are the most equal.’<sup>42</sup> [Emphasis in the original.]

While the 1993 World Bank report did not cover China the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) statistics reveal a clear increase in Gini coefficients for China while its economy grew rapidly, sharpening regional disparities. China’s Gini coefficient was 0.403 in 1998, with the poorest 20 per cent of the population accounting for only 5.9 per cent of the total income or consumption, while the richest 20 per cent accounted for 46.6 per cent.<sup>43</sup> The accuracy of Chinese statistics on income inequality has been much debated. China’s income inequality had, according to some analysts, changed from a comparatively low level in the 1980s to a very high level in 2010, with the Gini coefficient for family income above 0.5. This was seen as the consequence of regional disparities and a rural-urban gap.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, recent studies suggest that since 2010 Chinese inequality has been reduced because of urbanisation, poverty reduction measures and more restricted rural labour markets.<sup>45</sup>

In January 2021 The Economist newspaper published an article highlighting China’s announcement the previous month that extreme poverty had been eliminated within its territory.<sup>46</sup> By the World Bank’s estimate, about 800 million people in China have escaped penury in the past four decades. While the distinction between extreme poverty and simply being poor is a fine one, and pockets of deprivation may still exist, China set itself what The Economist described as a fairly high bar of \$2.30 per day for living costs at 2011 prices, compared to the World Bank definition of extreme poverty being those who make less than \$1.90 per day. A chart in the article, based on World Bank and national statistics, shows that the extreme poverty rate in China fell from about 50 per cent of the population in 2000 to less than 5 per cent by 2016. The central government de-collectivised agriculture thereby incentivising farmers to produce more. In recent years annual spending by central government on poverty alleviation has also increased markedly from an average of 500 yuan (\$77) per extremely poor person in 2015 to 26,000 yuan in 2020.

#### E4.2 North Korea

As noted previously in section E4, the lack of reliable statistics makes it difficult to make any assessment of North Korea’s economic development except that it is a low-income country.

### E4.3 Taiwan and ASEAN

The key economic relationships for Taiwan in the period since 1990 have been with mainland China and ASEAN, the latter being given special emphasis since 2016. The first part of this subsection examines the international law and international relations (IR) aspects of Taiwan's diplomatic and economic ties with ASEAN. The second part draws lessons from a quantitative study of Taiwan-ASEAN trade relations in the context of the one-China policy accepted by all members of ASEAN. Together, these contributions should help to clarify the boundaries for economic cooperation in the region.

#### E4.3.1 The Legal and International Relations Background

Pasha L. Hsieh, based at the Singapore Management University School of Law, contrasts the legal and IR perspectives on recognition in the evolution of Taiwan's engagement in Southeast Asia since the 1990s as a unique case study:

Using emerging IR literature on recognition, this article sheds light on the tensions and compatibility between ASEAN states' one-China policies and their substantial relations with Taiwan. The article argues that ASEAN states have established diverse forms of recognizing Taiwan in bilateral relations. Such recognition underlines the IR concept of recognition, which is premised on identity and status, and functions in line with ASEAN's non-recognition policy that minimizes potential conflicts with China. The fact that these modes of recognition encompass legal consequences but do not amount to recognition of statehood in international law evidences the gradual process of recognition in IR.<sup>47</sup>

The PRC became a dialogue partner in the 1990s leading to an acceleration of its engagement with ASEAN as a bloc. Article 41 of the ASEAN Charter gives legal authority to its members to 'develop common positions and pursue joint actions' within which the one-China policy arguably falls. Despite this neither ASEAN nor its members have made clear what non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan are permitted. Unlike the legal principle of collective non-recognition, which indicates the illegality of unrecognized regimes due to egregious violations of international law, ASEAN's non-recognition of any 'Republic of China', denying thereby Taiwan's representation of 'China', does not mean its government is considered as illegal.<sup>48</sup>

Based on his theoretical framework, rooted in Hegel's recognition theory as developed in IR literature and aware of the differences with the concept of recognition in international law, Hsieh arrives at this conclusion:

A policy of non-recognition is not tantamount to rendering unrecognized states a nullity in law... This is of significance to the evolution of ASEAN-Taiwan relations. IR scholars envision the absence of recognition as humiliating and provoking conflicts... However, as this articles demonstrates, certain forms of legal recognition do not imply recognition of statehood. These forms that accord Taiwan prestige and dignity in bilateral ties have avoided potential conflicts and made cooperation possible. One such form is recognition of privileges and immunities for Taiwan's diplomatic premises and personnel... The rationale for according privileges and immunities is not just to

respect sovereign equality, but also to allow foreign states and officials to effectively fulfil their diplomatic functions without interventions. Without providing diplomatic recognition and relations, certain ASEAN states exceptionally granted Taiwan legal rights 'as if' it was recognized.<sup>49</sup>

An additional form of recognition is the arranging of free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment agreements (BIAs). A key criterion of statehood, acknowledged by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933, article 1 is 'the capacity to enter into relations with other states.' The signing of such agreements likewise guarantees the rights of Taiwanese investors. ASEAN's non-recognition policy still allows [individual member] recognition of Taiwan's treaty-making capacity and the legitimacy of its laws and regulations. These effects tend to corroborate the IR stance that recognition is not confined to recognition of statehood; rather a gradual view of recognition should be comprehended via the perspectives and norms of identity and status.<sup>50</sup>

The Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) victory over the Guomindang (GMD)<sup>51</sup> candidate in the presidential election of 2016 led to Taiwan's new president, Tsai Ing-wen, introducing a New Southbound Policy (NSP). This was intended to replace what she regarded as over-reliance on a single market (mainland China) with a wider and more diverse external economy. Instead of focusing on recognition of its statehood, Taiwan sought reciprocal recognition, in relations with ASEAN states, based on prestige and dignity. The previous administrations' 'Go South' policy had made Taiwan a leading investor in ASEAN countries and provided opportunities for enhancing government-to-government inter-actions but had failed to alter the direction of Taiwan's outbound investment. The grave impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global banking crisis on Southeast Asia, combined with Chinese investment incentives, in fact increased the flow of investments to the mainland. However, since 2010 Taiwan's trade investment in China had unexpectedly decreased while Taiwan's exports to Southeast Asia increased by over 290 per cent from 2001 to 2013, resulting in ASEAN becoming Taiwan's second-largest trading partner. Although China (including Hong Kong) still account for almost 40 per cent of Taiwan's external trade, the ten ASEAN states' share has risen to 15 per cent.<sup>52</sup>

The PRC's position on Taiwan's participation in international organisations like the WTO, where it is a 'separate customs territory', reflects its practice of either maintaining silence or opposing Taiwan's external agreements. The main boundaries for the PRC are, first, that Taipei's many diplomatic titles should not include statehood or recognition as Taiwan or the Republic of China; and, secondly:

...cross-strait relations underpin the PRC's strategy. If Beijing deems that Taipei's external trade agreements facilitate cross-strait talks towards peaceful reunification, it will not explicitly obstruct those agreements, which can be seen as commercial pacts. Otherwise, Beijing will object to these agreements on the grounds that they purposely serve the end of Taiwan's independence.<sup>53</sup>

Consequently, it is the intention, rather than the nature, of FTAs that counts most for the PRC.

### E4.3.2 Taiwan-ASEAN Trade Relations

More detailed information on the trade relationship between Taiwan and ASEAN comes from a quantitative study by three academics linked to the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS). Apart from factors already mentioned, it highlights another trigger in the development of this relationship in the form of complaints by the USA about its large trade deficit with Taiwan. In 1992 Taiwan's domestic currency appreciated by 50 per cent against the US dollar which significantly impacted its export sector. Taken together with internal issues like big increases in land prices and labour costs, reinforced by strong labour unions, this resulted in Taiwanese firms moving investments abroad, especially to Southeast Asian countries.<sup>54</sup>

Among areas of cooperation between Taiwan and ASEAN, trade has seen a huge expansion, increasing from about US\$25 billion in 1995 to over \$70 billion in 2010 and \$80 billion in 2015. Taiwan has often had large trade surpluses over ASEAN and (at the time of writing) was ASEAN's sixth-largest trading partner after mainland China, Japan, the European Union (EU), the USA and South Korea. As previously noted, ASEAN has become Taiwan's second-largest trading partner after China but ahead of the USA and Japan.<sup>55</sup>

This study is one of relatively few that deeply analyses the trade structure between Taiwan and ASEAN. Additionally, utilising the trade in value-added (TiVA) database from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the authors' study investigates Taiwan-ASEAN trade in relation to domestic value-added and origin of value-added. Finally, the implications for future Taiwan-ASEAN trade relations are considered.<sup>56</sup>

Bearing in mind that the statistics from this analysis generally pre-date the NSP in 2016, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s, the overall conclusions are:

- Although Taiwan and ASEAN have become crucial trading partners in recent decades, ASEAN has frequently experienced large trade deficits with Taiwan thereby reducing the economic benefits to ASEAN, and trade activities have sometimes fluctuated showing their vulnerability to unfavourable international developments.
- The trade structures are characterised by two-way trade with a high proportion of manufacturing and intermediate goods, especially in Taiwan's exports. ASEAN has been in control of significant stages in the supply chain of Taiwanese firms. There has been a high proportion of Taiwan-ASEAN trade in manufactures with high technology input, particularly electronic and electric parts and components. The improvement in ASEAN production capability is likely to include direct investment from Taiwanese enterprises.
- Nevertheless, this Taiwan-ASEAN trade structure remains very specialised and far less diversified than ASEAN trade patterns with Japan, South Korea and China. This, too, reflects the vulnerability of Taiwan-ASEAN trade relations when there are fluctuations in the supply of, or demand for, inputs. When it comes to TiVA Taiwan and ASEAN are crucial partners, yet Taiwan appears to be lagging behind other Northeast Asian economies in reinforcing linkages with ASEAN's regional production network and TiVA. This may result from the inability of Taiwan and ASEAN to establish a bilateral preferential trade pact.<sup>57</sup>

Looking to the future, the VASS-affiliated authors observe:

There is high potential for the expansion of Taiwan-ASEAN trade in the years ahead since the trade structures between the two sides is principally complementary. Yet, to realise this potential, our study suggests that Taiwan and ASEAN should employ dynamic approaches. *Specifically, the development of Taiwan-ASEAN economic relations continues to depend on how stable cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China remain.* ASEAN probably does not wish to be in difficult situations if Taiwan-mainland China relations worsen. Stated differently, it seems that ASEAN does not expect its relations with Taiwan to improve faster than the cross-Strait relationship itself. Thus, it might be essential for Taiwan, ASEAN and other concerned countries to help maintain stable cross-Strait ties, so that there is greater space and opportunities for widening Taiwan-ASEAN trade relations.<sup>58</sup> [Emphasis added.]

#### E5 Global Trading Partners and China

Although the focus in this Appendix is on the period since the end of the Cold War, a longer historical perspective may help to bring out the significance of global trading patterns. An OECD study published in 2003<sup>59</sup> looks back 2000 years but, for the purposes of this Briefing, the period from 1820, before the main impact of Western intervention in China, and 2001, when the PRC joined the WTO, should suffice. More up to date information on the rapid growth of China compared to the United States is provided by Graham Allison, citing World Bank and IMF statistics, which links this analysis with that in Appendix G, based on Allison's book, Destined for War. Finally, China's cooperation as a developing country with multilateral financial institutions and, more recently, China's own support for developing countries via President Xi's Belt and Road Initiative will be briefly narrated.

Acknowledging the methodological difficulties in compiling historical statistics, the best available estimates summarised in Tables E3 and E4 shed light on the economic development of Asia in relation to Western Europe and the United States in particular. Each table has a gap separating out the years 1950 to 2001, being the year following the establishment of the PRC and the year in which China joined the WTO respectively. The earlier period from 1820 to 1913 covers the period before the main Western intervention in China until shortly after the fall of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China.

As Ming Wan highlights, in 1820 China is estimated to have had 32.9 per cent of global GDP (Table E3), which was about 32 per cent more than the combined GDP of Western Europe and Western offshoots, principally the USA, being 24.9 per cent of world GDP.<sup>60</sup> Beyond this, it may be observed that by 1913 the position had been reversed with China having only 8.8 per cent of global GDP to Western Europe/offshoots 54.3 per cent. In absolute terms, not shown here, this reflected a real increase in the size of GDP in Western Europe between 1820 and 1913 of roughly 460 per cent (or nearly five times) but in the United States of over 4,000 per cent (or 40 times), based on 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. Conversely, in China the comparable figure was barely 5 per cent (or almost nothing).<sup>61</sup>

TABLE E3

## SHARE OF WORLD GDP, REGIONAL TOTALS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1820 – 2001

(per cent of world total)

Region/Country	1820	1870	1913	1950	1973	2001
<b>Total Western Europe</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>25.6</b>	<b>20.3</b>
of which:						
France	5.1	6.5	5.3	4.1	4.3	3.4
Germany	3.9	6.5	8.7	5.0	5.9	4.1
Italy	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.1	3.6	3.0
United Kingdom	5.2	9.0	8.2	6.5	4.2	3.2
<b>Eastern Europe</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>2.0</b>
<b>Former USSR</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>3.6</b>
<b>Total Western offshoots</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>24.6</b>
of which:						
United States of America	1.8	8.8	18.9	27.3	22.1	21.4
<b>Total Latin America</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>8.3</b>
<b>Japan</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>7.1</b>
<b>Total Asia (exc. Japan)</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>22.3</b>	<b>15.4</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>30.9</b>
of which:						
China	32.9	17.1	8.8	4.5	4.6	12.3
India	16.0	12.1	7.5	4.2	3.1	5.4
<b>Africa</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.3</b>
<b>World</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

GDP = Gross Domestic Product

*Note:* The original OECD table provides figures for a wider range of countries than cited here.*Sources:* Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Development Centre, OECD, Paris, 2003), Table 8b, p. 261.

TABLE E4

## WORLD PER CAPITA GDP, REGIONAL TOTALS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1820 – 2001

(1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)

Region/Country	1820	1870	1913	1950	1973	2001
<b>Western Europe average</b>	<b>1,204</b>	<b>1,960</b>	<b>3,458</b>	<b>4,579</b>	<b>11,416</b>	<b>19,256</b>
including:						
France	1,135	1,876	3,485	5,271	13,114	21,092
Germany	1,077	1,839	3,648	3,881	11,966	18,677
Italy	1,117	1,499	2,564	3,502	10,634	19,040
United Kingdom	1,706	3,190	4,921	6,939	12,025	20,127
<b>Eastern Europe</b>	<b>683</b>	<b>937</b>	<b>1,695</b>	<b>2,111</b>	<b>4,988</b>	<b>6,027</b>
<b>Former USSR</b>	<b>688</b>	<b>943</b>	<b>1,488</b>	<b>2,841</b>	<b>6,059</b>	<b>4,626</b>
<b>Average Western offshoots</b>	<b>1,202</b>	<b>2,419</b>	<b>5,233</b>	<b>9,268</b>	<b>16,179</b>	<b>26,943</b>
including:						
United States of America	1,257	2,445	5,301	9,561	16,689	27,948
<b>Latin America average</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>681</b>	<b>1,481</b>	<b>2,506</b>	<b>4,504</b>	<b>5,811</b>
<b>Japan</b>	<b>669</b>	<b>737</b>	<b>1,387</b>	<b>1,921</b>	<b>11,434</b>	<b>20,683</b>
<b>Asia average (exc. Japan)</b>	<b>577</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>658</b>	<b>634</b>	<b>1,226</b>	<b>3,256</b>
including:						
China	600	530	552	439	839	3,583
India	533	533	673	619	853	1,957
<b>Africa</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>894</b>	<b>1,410</b>	<b>1,489</b>
<b>World</b>	<b>667</b>	<b>875</b>	<b>1,525</b>	<b>2,111</b>	<b>4,091</b>	<b>6,049</b>

GDP = Gross Domestic Product

*Notes:* The original OECD table provides figures for a wider range of countries than cited here. R.S. Geary and S.H. Khamis developed the method to allow international comparisons based on purchasing power parity and international average prices of commodities.

*Sources:* Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Development Centre, OECD, Paris, 2003), Table 8c, p. 262.



When this turnaround is then contrasted with that achieved under the PRC, China went from 4.5 per cent of global GDP in 1950 to 12.3 per cent in 2001, whereas Western Europe/offshoots had 56.9 per cent in 1950 but 44.9 per cent in 2001 (of which the USA was 21.4 per cent). In 1950 China's share of world GDP was about 92 per cent less than the combined Western Europe/offshoots share but in 2001 about 73 per cent less. In absolute terms, this reflected a real increase in the size of GDP in Western Europe between 1950 and 2001 of over 440 per cent (or four times) and about the same for the United States, based on 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. Conversely, in China the comparable increase was 1,800 per cent (or 18 times).<sup>62</sup> It should be added that the cooperation of the United States from the early 1980s was a very significant factor in this economic development.

Turning to Table E4, China's per capita GDP fell from \$600 to \$552 between 1820 and 1913 in real terms, being a reduction of eight per cent. During this period the Western European average per capita GDP rose from \$1,204 to \$3,458 in real terms, being an increase of 187 per cent, and in the United States from \$1,257 to \$5,301, being an increase of 322 per cent. However, the PRC's per capita GDP rose in real terms from \$439 in 1950 to \$3,583 in 2001, being an increase of 716 per cent. This contrasted with the Western European average of \$4,579 in 1950 rising to \$19,256 in 2001, being a 321 per cent increase, and the US average of per capita GDP was \$9,561 in 1950 to \$27,948 in 2001, an increase of 192 per cent. These regions and countries all benefited but China's real increases in average per capita GDP in the post-Second World War period, starting from a low base, were far higher after the 1970s.

Bringing the picture more up to date, Graham Allison highlighted his concerns about the rise of China in the first chapter of his book. He produced a table replicated below to illustrate how China had been catching up with the United States between 1980 and 2015.

TABLE E5

CHINA, AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1980 – 2015

	1980	2015
	%	%
GDP	7	61
Imports	8	73
Exports	8	151
Reserves	16	3,140

*Note:* Figures as measured in US dollars.

*Source:* Graham Allison, Destined for War (Scribe, 2020), p. 6 citing World Bank.

Allison highlighted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual report in 2014 which estimated that the size of China's economy had (narrowly) surpassed that of the United States. Previously the United States economy had been the world's largest since about 1870.

The latest IMF annual report, published in October 2021, provides the following data:

TABLE E6

IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 2020<sup>(i)</sup>

(Percent of total for group or world)

	GDP		Export of Goods and Services		Population	
	Advanced Economies	World	Advanced Economies	World	Advanced Economies	World
<b>Advanced Economies</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>42.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>14.0</b>
United States	37.3	15.8	15.3	9.6	30.7	4.3
<b>Emerging Market and Developing Economies</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>37.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>86.0</b>
China	31.8	18.3	33.3	12.3	21.5	18.5

*Note (i):* The GDP shares are based on the purchasing-power-parity valuation of economies.

*Source:* World Economic Outlook: Recovery During a Pandemic (IMF, October 2021), Statistical Appendix, p. 88.

This table confirms that China now accounts for 18.3 per cent of global GDP on a purchasing-power-parity basis whereas the United States accounts for 15.8 per cent. Moreover, as the United States is the largest advanced economy (with the Euro area next with 28.4 per cent), so China is the biggest of the emerging market and developing economies. It is also the single largest exporter in the world (12.3 per cent) though the Euro area accounts for 26.7 per cent.

Looking at the IMF's economic growth projections from the base year of 2020, Table E7 shows that China's projected growth is 8.0 and 5.6 per cent in 2021 and 2022 respectively, compared to 6.0 and 5.2 per cent for the United States over the same period. However, such are the uncertainties amidst the current pandemic, global supply chain issues and inflation trends that these estimates should be treated with more than usual caution.

TABLE E7

IMF OVERVIEW OF THE *WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK* PROJECTIONS FOR THE ECONOMIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 2021-2022

(Per cent change)

	Year over Year		
	2020	Projections 2021	2022
<b>World Output</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>4.9</b>
<b>Advanced Economies</b>	<b>-4.5</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>4.5</b>
United States	-3.4	6.0	5.2
<b>Emerging Market and Developing Economies</b>	<b>-2.1</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>5.1</b>
China	2.3	8.0	5.6

Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF, October 2021) downloaded data on 30 December 2021.

#### E5.1 China's Relations with Multilateral Financial Institutions

In 2021 the World Bank published a report celebrating its 40-year partnership with China. Axel van Trotsenburg, its Managing Director for Operations, opened with these observations:

China's economic and social development transformation over the past forty years has been a remarkable achievement, with huge global significance. Since joining the World Bank in 1980, China developed from an IDA [International Development Association] recipient to an Upper Middle-Income IBRD [International Bank of Reconstruction and Development] borrower, an important contributing partner to IDA, and a critical contributor to global public goods. The scale and pace of China's transformation have shaped the unique partnership between the China and the World Bank, including continuous adaptation. The partnership has also become a valued source of inspiration and lessons for many other World Bank clients.<sup>63</sup>

While not necessarily reflecting the official views of the World Bank or its members there seems no reason to question its factual accuracy. This report contains details of how the relationship evolved over each decade and a list of projects totalling US\$64,443.40 million.<sup>64</sup>

Similarly, the IMF produces regular Country Reports on China analysing its economic position and prospects in depth.<sup>65</sup>

## E5.2 China's Belt and Road Initiative

President Xi Jinping announced the initiative of building both the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road on his visit to central and southeast Asia in 2013. Since referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has developed into a series of major infrastructure projects, not only in central and southeast Asia, but in central and eastern Europe and across various parts of Africa.<sup>66</sup>

The list of participants has grown to involve, it is said, over 130 nations. Various analyses have been conducted on the BRI which acknowledge its immense scale though without any clear and systematic data being available.<sup>67</sup> Its potential relevance to the US-China rivalry is frequently mentioned although, as a Chatham House study suggests, other nations' interests may also be affected. The doubts of the major Western democracies about BRI coalesced at the G7 summit in 2021 when a communique proposing 'Build Back Better' was announced as an alternative infrastructure project initiative.<sup>68</sup> However, the long-term future of both initiatives remains uncertain in the face of the global coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing economic fallout.

## E6 The Environment

When it comes to the environment, there is one work that might have sufficed as the main resource for the purposes of this Briefing: Robert B. Marks' China: An Environmental History. It provides a comprehensive account of human interaction with their environment from China's pre-history to the present day. Revised in 2017, it is also reasonably up to date. This second edition was prompted by, inter alia, the 2014 bilateral agreement between the presidents of the United States and China on capping and decreasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions which was important because these two countries together account for almost half of all GHGs. Moreover, that bilateral agreement led on directly to the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015 that was widely regarded by environmentalists as a breakthrough in achieving a common commitment of all countries to addressing this global challenge. A further factor was the translation of the first edition of the book into Chinese.<sup>69</sup>

Marks' concluding words on 'China and its Environment in World Historical Perspective' are:

China's long environmental history does not raise high hopes for China's – or the world's – being able to grapple with our common environmental challenges. However, in light of the limitations of our knowledge of the past, and of our powers of prediction, we should have humility in the face of great unknowns. Only time will tell if the Paris 2015 climate agreement was a turning point in our ability to limit greenhouse gases and halt global warming, and whether creating an 'ecological civilization' was a realistic option for China and the world...<sup>70</sup>

The reason that this work's factual evidence and findings are not otherwise summarised here is that the consequences for the environment, and irreversible man-made climate change, of a major nuclear missile exchange would dwarf the impact of GHGs and shorten the timescale from decades to months or days. This Briefing addresses the one to give time for the other.

## E7 Economic Dependencies and Peaceful Relations

The extent to which economic interdependence may contribute to a state of peace or of war has been a matter of controversy amongst academics for generations. More recently, an article by a postgraduate student then at the School of International Studies, Peking University in Beijing has examined the issue in relation to a case comparison between the US-China, and earlier US-Japan, trade disputes. His article in the East Asia journal was published in 2018 as the trade war between the United States and China got underway<sup>71</sup> (Table E1 above.)

Yaechan Lee's paper limits its focus to the economic realm and claims a direct correlation between increased economic interdependence and trade conflict, based on a comparative empirical analysis of the two trade conflict cases underpinned by Dale Copeland's 'trade expectations theory'. This theory takes a contrasting view to liberalists' claims that economic interdependence advances peace by arguing that states reduce interdependence to achieve peace.<sup>72</sup> However, this theory and the criticisms of it are not summarised in this Appendix as it is the empirical evidence in the paper which is more relevant. There is, though, a brief review of the application of this theory to the two case studies.

As part of its anti-communist strategy in Asia during the Cold War, the United States helped Japan become strong economically by fixing Japan's currency rate, mostly depreciated against the US dollar, and by opening the US market to Japanese products. On the other hand, Japan's economic posture was generally protectionist and its domestic consumption mostly favoured domestic products, too. Furthermore, the greater competitiveness of Japanese companies, arising from improved productivity along with technological innovations, resulted in a vast expansion in Japanese exports to the United States. Beginning with textiles in the 1960s, then steel in the 1970s and colour televisions in the 1980s, Japan increased its annual trade surplus with the United States from the late 1960s. This growing economic interdependence did not prevent the US waging non-military conflicts with its close Japanese ally, whose Constitution (article 9) was pacifist [though that did not prevent Japan from having military forces in practice, as outlined in Appendix D of this Briefing]. The empirical evidence on US-Japan trade conflicts between 1970 and 1993 suggests that the frequency of trade conflicts increased as interdependence or trade volumes increased but did not develop into a military conflict.<sup>73</sup>

The US-Japan Framework Talks on Bilateral Trade in 1993 was a turning point after which the proportion of the US trade deficits attributable to Japan rapidly fell:

The US only ceased its aggressions when Japan's share of US trade deficits finally fell to levels similar to that of other states, and soon eclipsed by China...<sup>74</sup>

Indeed, as those trade deficits decreased the two countries began to achieve economic reconciliation culminating in an agreement on US-Japan's economic partnership for development in 2001 which proclaimed an end to US economic antagonism against Japan and work towards deregulation. In this case, Yaechan Lee argues, there appeared to be an inverse relationship between interdependence and conflict contrary to liberalists' claims. Trade conflicts had threatened the stability of the US-Japan military alliance so economic interdependence was a destabilizer, he argues, rather than a source of peaceful relations.<sup>75</sup>

The background to the US-China trade dispute has already been related, in section E3 above and in Appendix A. As in the case of Japan, China resisted opening-up its economy, even after joining the WTO in 2001. The US course of cordiality towards China began to change to one of dissatisfaction as China's proportion of the total US trade deficit surpassed Japan's in the late 1990s and proceeded thereafter to rise to levels Japan had enjoyed before US retaliation. Yaechan Lee notes that, despite China's appreciation of its currency – at US behest – by 40 per cent between 2005 and 2012 the trade asymmetry did not improve between the two countries, rather it deteriorated further. He notes the rise in economic interdependence, albeit from a trade imbalance, provided overall trade volume is also rising. While no direct military conflict has yet arisen the narrowing of the US-China military spending gap by 2016, and an incident the previous year between a US surveillance plane and the Chinese navy in the South China Sea, illustrated the potential for traditional conflict. President Trump's initiative [in 2018] to tackle the US-China trade imbalance is much like the earlier US-Japan case. As in that example, the author suggests that the US-China trade dispute also shows an inverse relationship between interdependence and conflict frequency and '... the claim that interdependence leads to peace seems invalid once again.' What is different in this case, though is that Trump also targeted traditional trade partners and allies with whom it has trade deficits. So, the author seeks to explain US motivations in the US-China trade war, based on trade expectations theory, with the aim of making meaningful predictions.<sup>76</sup>

#### E7.1 Case Comparison of US-Japan and US-China Trade Disputes

Yaechan Lee sets out the basis of trade expectations theory as follows:

Copeland had argued that state leaders care about economic relationships mainly because of their contribution to national power rather than the overall wealth that trade provides to their societies. When they expect increasing benefits from a relationship, leaders will pursue cooperative policies towards their international partner. On the other hand, when they expect the benefits of commercial interaction to decline, they may adopt aggressive policies to avoid the costs associated with this outcome.<sup>77</sup>

There are external (or 'exogenous') factors that, in Copeland's theory, may change states' trade expectations as well as internal (or 'endogenous') factors.

In Japan's case, due to their security alliance with the United States, exogenous factors have played little role. Conversely, in China's case, US criticisms of China's reluctance to participate in imposing sanctions on North Korea [over its nuclear weapons programme] has often been linked to trade. Likewise, there was the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996. However, these were both longstanding issues and therefore '...it would be far stretched to attribute the current trade war to exogenous factors as well.'<sup>78</sup>

What really mattered, in the analysis of both cases, was the endogenous factor of overall economic growth for each of these countries. The growing economic strength of first, Japan, then China, combined with rapidly growing US trade deficits were sufficient to raise domestic concerns about the sustainability of these bilateral trade relationships. In China's case,

though, domestic dissonance in the USA about the efficacy of a trade war seemed to be a factor in raising the temperature of the trade dispute.<sup>79</sup>

The fundamental difference between the two cases, though, is to be seen in the retaliatory measures taken by China in response to Trump's trade sanctions. In terms of Copeland's theory, the United States applied a 'trade security spiral' whereby it aimed to reduce interdependence as trade expectations with China turned adverse. The differing reactions of China and Japan were to be explained by the latter's desire not to destabilise the military security alliance. China was free from such concerns. In relation to the traditional partners of the United States, such as Canada or Germany, their large trade surpluses could be handled in a similar manner to the protectionism shown against China but with less aggression, especially as their trade surpluses were less substantial than China's. Yaechan Lee expected that, in view of the asymmetrical security relationships they have with the United States, these traditional allies would submit, as Japan ultimately did, to US demands.<sup>80</sup>

His overall conclusion is that:

...when the definition of conflict is expanded to non-traditional realms such as economy, economic interdependence showed an inverse relationship with peace in the bilateral trade conflicts between the US and Japan and the US and China.<sup>81</sup>

In terms of general theory, Yaechan Lee accepts that the liberalists' claim to a positive relationship between economic interdependence and peace is still well established but only when limited to military conflicts. Whereas in the two case studies these have not escalated to that point. Nevertheless, as various scholars have claimed, economic attacks can be as effective as military ones so economic interdependence can promote peace and conflict at the same time as the Chinese and Japanese trade disputes have done.

How the conflict between the US and China will weave out in the future is yet unclear, but considering the high level of relative interdependence, conflicts will persist, with China being more aggressive than Japan which may indeed lead to a higher intensity of conflicts in the future.<sup>82</sup>

## E8 Conclusion

Before turning to the answers to Qs 1 and 2 in the Introduction, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of this Appendix due to the lack of impartial information on certain relevant topics affecting internal socio-economic and political matters in the PRC during 1990-2020.

Then the overall conclusion in relation to Q3 can be presented against the backdrop of section E7.1 above on economic interdependence and peaceful relationships. The key aspect of this is incorporated into the main chapter of this Briefing in section 4.3.6 at Part III. However, unlike the historical and military balance Appendices (A and D), it should become clear that the economic dimension on its own is unlikely to be the main factor behind any future war with foreign governments, although it could be as a result of the collapse of North Korea or within what China regards as its own territory and maritime exclusion zone.

### E8.1 Limitations of this Economic Analysis

The internal socio-economic and political matters in the PRC from 1990 to the present time on which little or no impartial and readily accessible data is available include, in particular:

- Labour and social unrest, e.g. in mainland China including Hong Kong.  
Generally, mainland trade unions are under the control of the CPC but Hong Kong has independent unions though under tighter control since the protests, sometimes violent, in 2019.<sup>83</sup>
- Regional and ethnic issues, e.g. in:
  - Tibet;
  - Xinjiang including terrorism and human rights;
- The impact of environmental damage on local communities. (See section E6 above.)

IPP has only a limited research capacity of its own and relies for its conflict analyses on academic articles or books. Quantitative information in the PRC on labour conditions and party-controlled unions, is either not readily available or is censored, no doubt rightly from a CPC perspective though unhelpfully for this author.

Similarly, the plight of Uyghurs, a mainly Muslim ethnic group which makes up about 40 per cent of the population of Xinjiang province, has been the subject of concern in the West with economic sanctions against companies and officials thought to be responsible. These criticisms are rejected by China which has emphasised the region's economic development while claiming that there have been no terrorist incidents since 2017. Three of the six trade corridors that form part of China's BRI pass through Xinjiang.<sup>84</sup> However, on this topic too, the lack of easily available quantitative data hampers any systematic analysis from an irenical perspective. Similar issues affect the longstanding dispute over the governance of Tibet.

What, then, is the impact of this data limitation on this Briefing's conclusions? It simply restricts the ability of this analyst (and, he would argue, independent analysts generally) in being able to forecast when internal conditions may increase the risks of societal collapse. This, it should be emphasised, would be very difficult to do anyway and the timing of such an event is almost impossible to predict. Moreover, it does not substantially affect the benefit of this China Briefing for reasons briefly explained in the section 4.3.6, Part I of the analysis.

### E8.2 Balances of Economic Coercion

The opening-up of the Chinese command economy to the market in the late 1970s and early 1980s was not regarded by the Chinese Communist Party then or ever since as a convergence on market capitalism. Hence the difficulty in defining non-market economies when China applied to join GATT/WTO. Yet that opening-up to foreign competition and global market forces was made possible by US cooperation with the PRC in the 1970s and, with some brief interludes, up to China's accession to the WTO in 2001.

In answer to Q1, the relationship between the USA and China had swung decisively towards a balance of economic coercion even before the trade war between the two countries erupted in 2018. The evidence for this includes:



- Weaknesses in the multilateral trade dispute mechanisms especially at the WTO.
- Increased use of unilateral measures, particularly in the period 2018-2019 (Table E1).
- Lesser capacity of China to retaliate against US trade tariffs due to the much lower level of US imports into China compared to Chinese exports to the USA.
- The outcome of the Phase One deal between the United States and China is awaited, especially regarding whether the commitment of China to buying an additional \$200 billion of US goods and services has been achieved in the two years, 2020-2021.
- The relevance of US Section 301 investigations in assessing the prevalence of unilateral versus multilateral actions by state parties, i.e.
  - o With respect to the US Trade Representative's final investigation report on 22 March 2018 under Section 301(b), the discretionary action provision, it appeared that, as a threshold matter, the USTR had determined that this Section 301 investigation, or parts of it, did not involve a trade agreement. So unilateral action to resolve at least some of China's trade practices was permitted; and
  - o With respect to President Trump's directions thereafter, only one of three aspects related to the WTO dispute mechanism rather than aiming at bilateral resolution.

In the case of relations between China and Taiwan, the economic balance has also moved in a more coercive direction, particularly since the elections on the island of Taiwan in 2016. However, in this instance, especially in relation to their joint interest in ASEAN, the balance of economic cooperation provides a significant counterweight to be taken into account.

### E8.3 Balances of Economic Cooperation

In answer to Q2, the East Asian region has enjoyed 'tiered convergence' in terms of stages of economic development varying only in degree and timing, with the sole exception of North Korea. Since the late 1990s China has generally led the way in annual per capita growth in GDP but with some other countries not far behind. The link between economic development and democratisation, which some academics identified in the 1990s, has been replaced in more recent decades by a stronger correlation between economic development and authoritarianism. The region remains very diverse, both economically and politically, and resistant to great power interventions.

Within China itself progress has been made in reducing income inequality since 2010 and, in 2020, the Chinese government announced that extreme poverty had been eliminated within its territory. Moreover China-ASEAN and Taiwan-ASEAN relations provide a revealing case study of how a balance of cooperation and a balance of coercion can coexist in the economic sphere without recourse to war... so far:

- Highlighting the value of gradualism in negotiating trade relations around the one-China policy recognised by all ASEAN members.
- China remains (according to statistics available at the time of writing) Taiwan's largest trading partner.
- Huge but fluctuating trade surpluses for Taiwan and deficits for ASEAN members indicate the vulnerability of Taiwan to cross-Strait relations with mainland China.

Looked at globally and historically, China's relations with Western Europe and the United States can be seen as a return, or attempt to return, to the size and weight that the Chinese economy enjoyed in 1820, according to the OECD study cited previously.<sup>85</sup> The rate of growth of China's real GDP in the period 1950 to 2001 is exceeded only by that of the United States in the period 1820 to 1913, albeit a longer time-period and under very different conditions.

China's relations with multilateral institutions like the World Bank remain cooperative after 40 years and have been further enhanced with many developing countries by China's Belt and Road Initiative, albeit attendant by all the financial and political risks that come with major infrastructure projects. China's cooperation on matters relating to the Paris climate agreement in 2015, and more recently the United Nations COP26 conference held in Glasgow in 2021, is omitted in this Briefing due to the more immediate risks of a great power war and potential escalation to the strategic nuclear level.

#### E8.4 Economic Dependencies and Future Peace or War

Yaechan Lee's article at section E7 above provides a useful backdrop against which to clarify certain definitional and conceptual issues before answering Q3 in the Introduction.

- (i) *Distinguish between economic 'interdependence' and 'imbalance'.* It is the latter which is more likely to generate conflict that may, in certain circumstances, be harder to resolve by peaceful, rather than military, means. The member states of the European Union, for example, have close economic interdependence with each other, bound as they are by the Treaty of Rome and the regulations arising therefrom. That, however, has not made them more prone to conflict, especially of the military kind.<sup>86</sup> Quite the contrary, as the European Economic Community was conceived as means of binding a group of European countries together in peace after the Second World War. Instead, it is very large imbalances in trade and services, as in the US-Japan and US-China case studies, which tends to produce conflict between the entities concerned.
- (ii) *There is no necessary correlation between economic interdependence and a state of peace.* The classic example, often invoked, is that of Norman Angell's book, The Great Illusion, published a few years before the outbreak of World War I, arguing that the integration of the European economies made war futile and militarism obsolete.<sup>87</sup> No doubt it could be claimed, two world wars later, that the founding of the EEC/EU has contributed to a more lasting state of peace at least up to the end of the Cold War. Yet even that thesis is being put to the test in the expansion eastwards of the EU towards other states, especially Russia, who are not part of it.
- (iii) *There may be an inverse relationship between economic imbalance and conflict but not necessarily between economic imbalance and a state of peace.* Economic conflict can be resolved through peaceful bilateral or multilateral negotiation that does not lead, or threaten to lead, to war. Thereby, as Yaechan Lee affirms, it is indeed possible to advance conflict and peace simultaneously. In the language of peace research, this is 'positive peace' as opposed to 'negative peace' or the absence of war. Positive peace has been variously defined but essentially concerns achieving greater cooperation

between entities in dispute and attempting to address the structural causes of deprivation and oppression that may lead to violence.

This conceptual clarification naturally progresses to a consideration of the relationship between the economic and military dimensions of a conflict, which are referred to in the case studies by Yaechan Lee as the non-traditional and traditional realms respectively:

(iv) *In analysing the propensity for a state of peace or war in any given international conflict, it is necessary to treat each relevant dimension of security separately. What this means is that like can only be compared with like, i.e. military relationships are considered separately from economic ones. Take the implications for each case study:*

a. The US-Japan trade dispute, post-1945

The trade imbalances arising from the late 1960s reached a major turning point in the US-Japan Framework Talks on Bilateral Trade in 1993 but there was no prospect at any stage of this turning into a military conflict because:

- I. The military environment at the time was conditioned by the ending of the Cold War and the aftermath of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990, despite no military provocation whatsoever. The latter conquest resulted in a near-unanimous international, and United Nations-backed, multinational coalition to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, which US-led forces did in 1991.
- II. It was unthinkable (whatever mutterings may have been heard by US officials on the side of economic negotiations) to have launched, or threatened to launch, any kind of unprovoked military attack on its ally Japan to achieve US economic objectives because this would have created international uproar and internal dissent within the United States that no democratic government could reasonably expect to survive.
- III. Within Japan itself, based on a pacifist constitution albeit with self-defence forces that could not hope to match the United States' military supremacy, such a US military assault would have risked provoking a resurgence of Japanese militarism unseen since 1945 and generated, in turn, alarm amongst its neighbours especially China...

There is no need to go further. The US-Japanese military alliance was at no stage in danger; rather the economic conflict could be, and was, resolved in a peaceful way.

b. The US-China trade dispute, late 1990s on

The trade imbalances arising from the late 1990s reached a major turning point in the US-China trade war of 2018-19 and the resulting Phase One deal. Neither this economic conflict nor any of the many others in East Asia are, in principle, incapable of resolution through bilateral and multilateral negotiations. However,

- I. Economic conflicts can involve increasingly coercive relationships between States but remain peaceful in the sense of avoiding violence ('negative peace'); but

- II. If the US-China economic conflict moves in a more coercive direction and there is a military imbalance between them then the risks of war increase and are not limited to economic issues though they may be exacerbated by them.
- III. If the US-China economic conflict moves in a more cooperative direction (as it did in the late 1970s and early 1980s), where rules are agreed and kept to by both parties, and foster peaceful relations ('positive peace'), as with US-Japan in early 2000s, then there is a favourable balance of peace to help offset any military imbalance.

Hence the answer to Q3 in the main part of this Briefing,<sup>88</sup> is underpinned by the overall conclusion that both external and internal relationships – allowing for more limited data on the latter – point towards less cooperation and more coercion with fewer countervailing factors. In the case of economic factors generating internal chaos at any future point, the likely consequence would be severe countermeasures to ensure stability, reinforced by historical memory and experience.

## References

- 
- <sup>1</sup> . Lawrence C. Reardon, A Third Way: The Origins of China's Current Economic Development Strategy (Harvard University Asia Center, 2020), p. 1.
  - <sup>2</sup> . Ibid, pp. 1-2.
  - <sup>3</sup> . Ibid, p. 2.
  - <sup>4</sup> . Ibid, pp. 31-32.
  - <sup>5</sup> . Ibid, p. 33.
  - <sup>6</sup> . Ibid, pp. 248-49.
  - <sup>7</sup> . See also Appendix A of this China Briefing at section A7.7.1 and Appendix C at p. 125.
  - <sup>8</sup> . Ibid. See Reardon's full Conclusion at pp. 248-59
  - <sup>9</sup> . Ibid, pp. 258-59.
  - <sup>10</sup> . James J. Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Nature Singapore, 2018), Introduction: 1 – this is a non-print edition accessed via the British Library where page numbers do not print; hence only short chapter divisions are given here.
  - <sup>11</sup> . Non-Market Economies, Introduction: 2.
  - <sup>12</sup> . Ibid, Introduction: 3 quoting from GATT, 'Global Multilateral Trading System: The Role of the PRC', (address by Peter D. Sutherland), GATT Doc. GATT/1633, (10 May 1994) at 4.
  - <sup>13</sup> . Non-Market Economies, Introduction: 3.
  - <sup>14</sup> . Ibid, Introduction: 4.
  - <sup>15</sup> . Ibid.
  - <sup>16</sup> . Ibid.
  - <sup>17</sup> . Ibid, Introduction: 5 citing a Memorandum from Leah Wils-Owens to Gary Taverman, 'China's Status as a Non-Market Economy' (US Department of Commerce, 26 October 2017).
  - <sup>18</sup> . Non-Market Economies, Introduction: 5.
  - <sup>19</sup> . Summarised from Tao Liu and Wing Thye Woo, 'Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War', China Economic Journal, vol. 11, no. 3 (2018), pp. 319-40.
  - <sup>20</sup> . Ming Wan, The Political Economy of East Asia: Wealth and Power, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Edward Elgar, 2020), pp. 159-60.
  - <sup>21</sup> . See Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China (15 January 2020); and a Fact Sheet on the same date produced by the Office of the United States Trade Representative.
  - <sup>22</sup> . See US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart | PIIE downloaded 23 December 2021.
  - <sup>23</sup> . See announcement of the customs tariff commission of the state council on the exclusion of market-based procurement of commodities subject to tariffs on the united states and canada (mof.gov.cn) on the website of

the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China (17 February 2020) – accessed via PIIE; and note 21 above for the legal agreement between the USA and PRC.

<sup>24</sup> . Brandon J. Murrill, Tricks of the Trade: Section 301 Investigation of Chinese Intellectual Property Practices Concludes (Part I), LSB10108 (Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 29 March 2018), p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> . Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> . Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup> . Ibid, pp. 3-4.

<sup>29</sup> . Section 301 Investigation (Part II), pp. 1-2.

<sup>30</sup> . Ibid, pp. 2-3.

<sup>31</sup> . The list is identical to that of Ming Wan, The Political Economy of East Asia (2020), p. 4 except in describing the relationship between China and Taiwan and in not creating sub-lists of mainland and maritime regions.

<sup>32</sup> . Ibid, pp. 2-3 citing World Bank, World Development Indicators.

<sup>33</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> . Ibid, pp. 22-23.

<sup>36</sup> . Ibid, p. 23 citing James M. Morley (ed.), Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, revised edition (M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1999).

<sup>37</sup> . The Political Economy of East Asia (2020), p. 28.

<sup>38</sup> . Ibid, p. 23.

<sup>39</sup> . Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>40</sup> . Ibid, p. 29.

<sup>41</sup> . Ibid, p. 117.

<sup>42</sup> . Ibid, pp. 113 and 117 citing World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, (Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 2-4.

<sup>43</sup> . The Political Economy of East Asia (2020), p. 117 citing UNDP, Human Development Report 2001 (UNDP, New York, 2001), p. 183.

<sup>44</sup> . The Political Economy of East Asia (2020), p. 117 citing Yu Xie and Xiang Zhou, 'Income Inequality in Today's China', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) 111, no. 19 (13 May 2014), 6928-33.

<sup>45</sup> . The Political Economy of East Asia (2020), p. 117 citing Sonali Jain-Chandra, et al, 'Inequality in China – Trends, Drivers and Policy Remedies,' IMF Working Paper (June 2018); Ravi Kanbur, Yue Wang and Xiaobo Zhang, 'The Great Chinese Inequality Turnaround', Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 11892 (2017).

<sup>46</sup> . 'The Fruits of Growth', The Economist (2-8 January 2021), pp. 41-42.

<sup>47</sup> . Pasha L. Hsieh, 'Rethinking Non-Recognition: Taiwan's New Pivot to ASEAN and the One-China Policy', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2 (2020), pp. 204-28 at 205.

<sup>48</sup> . Ibid, pp. 206-07.

<sup>49</sup> . Ibid, p. 209.

<sup>50</sup> . Ibid, p. 210.

<sup>51</sup> . Hsieh uses the old term 'Kuomintang' or KMT which I have replaced with Guomindang under the most commonly used system of transliteration from Chinese today.

<sup>52</sup> . Hsieh, pp. 210-11 citing Bureau of Foreign Trade, '[Taiwan's] Trade Situation Across Various Continents for the Months January-August 2018' (Economic and Trade Issues, International Trade Situation Analysis, China Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade) – accessed by Hsieh on 25 December 2018.

<sup>53</sup> . Hsieh, p. 217.

<sup>54</sup> . Truong Quang Hoan, Dong Van Chung and Nguyen Huy Hoang, 'Taiwan-ASEAN Trade Relations: Trade Structure and Trade in Value Added', China Report, vol. 55, no. 2 (2019), pp. 102-24 at 104.

<sup>55</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> . Ibid. p. 105.

<sup>57</sup> . Ibid, p. 120.

<sup>58</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> . Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Development Centre, OECD, Paris, 2003), especially tables on pp. 261-62.

<sup>60</sup> . The Political Economy of East Asia (2020), pp. 73-76.

<sup>61</sup> . Ibid, p. 74 citing Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, table on p. 259.

<sup>62</sup> . Ibid.

- 
- <sup>63</sup> . At the Front Line: Reflections on the Bank's Work with China Over Forty Years 1980 -2020 (IBRD/World Bank, 2021), Foreword.
- <sup>64</sup> . Ibid, p. 147.
- <sup>65</sup> . See People's Republic of China, IMF Country Report No. 21/6 (IMF, Washington DC, January 2021).
- <sup>66</sup> . For the background to BRI, see the official China website at: [beltAndRoad \(www.gov.cn\)](http://www.gov.cn/beltAndRoad)
- <sup>67</sup> . See Jonathan E. Hillman, The Emperor's New Road: China and the Project of the Century (Center for Strategic and International Studies/Yale University Press, 2020). This assessment is mainly qualitative although the author is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, which is described as 'one of the most extensive databases tracking China's Belt and Road Initiative.'
- <sup>68</sup> . See [What is China's Belt and Road Initiative \(BRI\)? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/01/what-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/)
- <sup>69</sup> . Robert B. Marks, China: An Environmental History, second edition (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), pp. xvii-xix. The translators of the first edition into Chinese are Professors Guan Yongqiang and Gao Lijie of Nankai University in Tianjin, China.
- <sup>70</sup> . Ibid, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 409-10.
- <sup>71</sup> . Yaechan Lee, 'Economic Interdependence and Peace: A Case Comparison Between the US-China and US-Japan Trade Disputes', East Asia, no. 35 (2018), pp. 215-32.
- <sup>72</sup> . Ibid, p. 217.
- <sup>73</sup> . Ibid, pp. 219-20.
- <sup>74</sup> . Ibid, p. 220.
- <sup>75</sup> . Ibid, pp. 220-22.
- <sup>76</sup> . Ibid, pp. 224-26.
- <sup>77</sup> . Ibid, p. 226.
- <sup>78</sup> . Ibid, pp. 226-28.
- <sup>79</sup> . Ibid, p. 228.
- <sup>80</sup> . Ibid, pp. 229-30.
- <sup>81</sup> . Ibid, p. 230.
- <sup>82</sup> . Ibid, p. 231.
- <sup>83</sup> . See 'Trade Unions: Teaching Them a Lesson', The Economist, 21 August 2021, pp. 41-42.
- <sup>84</sup> . See 'Xinjiang's Economy: Controlled Growth', The Economist, 7 August 2021, pp. 45-46.
- <sup>85</sup> . See section E5 and note 59 above.
- <sup>86</sup> . It is true that there was a severe Eurozone crisis, arising from the banking crisis in 2008-2009, which might have affected its future viability for one or more member countries but at no point did a military conflict seem likely or threatened.
- <sup>87</sup> . See [Norman Angell - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Angell) for a brief summary.
- <sup>88</sup> . See section 4.3.6 Part III.

## APPENDIX F – MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ALLIANCES IN EAST ASIA, 1990 - 2020

### F1 Introduction

The aim of this analysis is to draw together relevant facts to help answer two questions relating to the People's Republic of China ('China' or 'PRC'):

- Q.1 What political and military alliances exist affecting China in current, or future potential, areas of conflict in the period to 2021?
- Q.2 What economic alliances exist affecting China in current, or future potential, areas of conflict in the period to 2021?

'Conflict' is defined as a material area of disagreement between State and/or non-State entities that has the potential for peaceful or violent resolution.

These questions are focused on the institutional relationships that China has with other countries in the East Asia (and Pacific) region and whether they are tending towards a more coercive or a more cooperative climate.

This will then lead on to a third question:

- Q.3 What institutional factors in the future foreign relationships of China are likely to have the greatest effect in taking that country towards a state of peace or war?

The answer summarises the institutional dimension of conflict analyses relating to the propensity for a state of peace or war in China.

### F2 Military Alliances in East Asia

As far as can be ascertained from published sources, China's only known military alliance is with North Korea.<sup>1</sup> By that term is meant a group of states bound by treaty to come to each other's defence if any one of them is militarily attacked from outside the alliance.

Nor, until recently, was it apparent that any political and military alliance was necessarily directed against China (though one has its ally in mind). The security alliance between the United States and Japan binds the former to come to the assistance of the latter, if attacked. However, the obligation is not reciprocal because Japan has a pacifist constitution dating back to 1946 in which Chapter II, headed 'Renunciation of War', states in Article 9:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.<sup>2</sup>

In practice, though, Japanese self-defence forces do exist (see Appendix D of this Briefing). However, the US-Japan Mutual Security Pact of 1952, enhanced by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual

Cooperation and Security, recognises that while the US is obligated to defend Japan in certain circumstances, these terms do not apply vice versa to Japan.<sup>3</sup> A permanent US military presence has been stationed in Japan from the end of the Second World War to this day.

Likewise, in 1953, at the conclusion of the Korean War a Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), that has been maintained ever since. It has involved stationing US troops on the southern part of the peninsular, operating in coalition with ROK military forces.<sup>4</sup>

One new military security development in East Asia and the Pacific was the signing of an agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) on 15 September 2021. It envisages a broad range of collaboration on diplomatic and technological matters including cyber security and artificial intelligence. These three countries are already involved with the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing pact which includes Canada and New Zealand. However, the biggest item of the AUKUS pact was the arms deal in which at least eight nuclear-powered (but not nuclear missile-carrying) submarines are to be acquired by Australia.<sup>5</sup> This is to be done, according to the UK government, in line with its non-proliferation obligations.<sup>6</sup> Many details remain to be worked out including where the boats would be built and what combination of US and UK technology would be involved.

Naturally, there are numerous political alliances in the East Asia and Pacific region which also involve varying degrees of military cooperation. For China, two of the most significant at the present time are those with Russia and Pakistan.

### F3 Economic Alliances in East Asia and the Pacific Region

A complex set of economic alliances has emerged in recent years for this region of which the main contours need to be briefly sketched. The oldest grouping is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) whose role was discussed in Appendix E. Its members are also listed in Table F1 below in relation to two other major trading partnerships.

In 2012 negotiations began to establish a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) centred on the ASEAN members but including a wider range of countries. As at 2 November 2021 the ASEAN secretariat had received Instruments of Ratification/ Acceptance (IOR/A) from six ASEAN members (out of ten) and four non-ASEAN signatory States, as shown in Table F1. In accordance with the RCEP Agreement, this met the minimum number of IOR/A for the Agreement to enter into force sixty days later. Thus, the RCEP Agreement became effective on 1 January 2022.<sup>7</sup>

On 5 October 2015 the Ministers of the 12 Trans-Pacific Partnership countries announced the conclusion of their negotiations which, it was envisioned, would eventually lead to their goal of open trade and regional integration. However, the United States withdrew from this agreement in 2017 so the 11 remaining parties, led by Japan, amended selected provisions and concluded the revised pact in 2018, now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Australia became the sixth nation to ratify the CPTPP in October 2018 and the pact came into effect on 30 December 2018.<sup>8</sup>



TABLE F1

## MEMBERSHIP OF TRADING PARTNERSHIPS IN THE EAST ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, JANUARY 2022

Country	ASEAN member	RCEP member	CPTPP member
Australia		✓	✓
Brunei Darussalam	✓	✓	(P)
Cambodia	✓	✓	
Canada			✓
China		✓	
Chile			(P)
Indonesia	✓		
Japan		✓	✓
Lao PDR	✓	✓	
Malaysia	✓		(P)
Myanmar	✓		
Mexico			✓
New Zealand		✓	✓
Peru			✓
Philippines	✓		
Singapore	✓	✓	✓
Thailand	✓	✓	
Vietnam	✓	✓	✓

(P) = Prospective member dependent on completion of ratification process.

Sources: See: [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership \(RCEP\) agreement to enter into force on 1 January 2022 – RCEP \(rcepsec.org\)](#) and [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\) | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade \(dfat.gov.au\)](#) – both documents accessed on 12 January 2022. For ASEAN, see [Member States - ASEAN Main Portal](#)

On examining the lists in Table F1 it is apparent that China belongs to RCEP, which is the larger of the two East Asia-Pacific trading partnerships. RCEP is also the world's largest Free Trade Agreement (FTA) accounting for some 30 per cent of global gross domestic product, twice that of CPTPP. It is, though, reported that China has recently applied to join the CPTPP.<sup>9</sup> While a detailed comparison of the two FTAs is not required here, it is evident that CPTPP has more demanding standards on trade and economic rules. Two ASEAN members – Singapore and Vietnam – have already become members of both FTAs.

The United States is a member of neither RCEP nor CPTPP although it has its own FTA with Canada and Mexico who have both joined CPTPP. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was replaced by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in July 2020.

That China is not, or not yet, a party to CPTPP and its provisions open to 'any State or separate customs territory' means that Taiwan may be able to join this FTA in a way that it has not been capable of agreeing a FTA with ASEAN, nor likely to achieve by seeking RCEP membership. However, a referendum in Taiwan in 2018 which supported an on-going ban on food imports from prefectures that were affected by the Fukushima nuclear accident has so far undermined Japan's support for Taiwan becoming a CPTPP member. While the RCEP does allow 'any ASEAN partner' or 'other external economic partners' to accede to the agreement, the conditions and processes for accession depend on the unanimous consent of all parties, which is unlikely to be forthcoming in view of the key role played by China in RCEP.<sup>10</sup>

#### F4 Conclusion

The forecast for the institutional dimension of China's security in the East Asia region mirrors that of the military and economic dimensions.

Taking the answer to Q1 in the Introduction first, the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 is significant because it introduces into the region a political and military alliance that is directed, by necessary implication, against other States in the region having nuclear-powered submarines including China. While it has no immediate impact on the military balance of power in the region because the boats do not exist and may only begin to enter service in the 2030s, the AUKUS pact establishes a new coercive institution in the region of a kind which, as far as is publicly known, did not exist before. That is not to pronounce any adverse judgement on this development but simply to report an undoubted fact. Moreover, even when Australia presumably acquires the nuclear technology to build the submarines, or some part thereof, the number under construction is likely to be dwarfed by those nuclear-powered submarines under the control of China, Russia and the United States – all of whom also possess ballistic-missile, nuclear-fuelled submarines that can carry nuclear warheads.

In terms of Q2, a similar picture emerges where two recently created economic alliances, RCEP and CPTPP, reflect competing visions of the future of the Asia-Pacific region. While the fact that membership overlaps to a degree shows that there is no necessary incompatibility, it is likely that the more conflictual environment in the region will be reinforced by this

institutional rivalry, particularly on contentious issues like any FTA with Taiwan. If there were no fundamental disagreements between RCEP and CPTPP, two such bodies might not exist.

Thus, the answer to Q3, based on the answers to the two preceding questions, is that the overall direction of travel for political, military and economic institutions in East Asia is towards more coercive relationships, rather than cooperative ones.

## References

- 
- <sup>1</sup> . This is the 'Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea' signed on 11 July 1961 published in [Peking Review](#), vol. 4, no. 28, at p.5. Before discovering the alliance with North Korea, Peter Southwood wrote to the Defence Attaché in the Chinese Embassy in the UK on 11 January 2022 to try to clarify this point but did not receive a response.
  - <sup>2</sup> . [Japan's Constitution of 1946](#) from [constituteproject.org](#) generated 26 August 2021. Although sections of the Japanese polity have sought to have Article 9 amended, it has not been to date.
  - <sup>3</sup> . Yaechan Lee, 'Economic Interdependence and Peace: A Case Comparison Between the US-China and US-Japan Trade Disputes', [East Asia](#), vol. 35, no. 3 (2018), p. 219 citing E.C. Avery, [The U.S. Japan Alliance](#) (Congressional Research Service, 2016).
  - <sup>4</sup> . 'U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea' Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State, 22 September 2020), at [U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea - United States Department of State](#)
  - <sup>5</sup> . 'The New Geopolitics of Asia: Enter AUKUS', Briefing [The Economist](#) (25 September 2021), pp. 21-26.
  - <sup>6</sup> . See [PM Statement on AUKUS Partnership: 15 September 2021 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#) This statement did not refer to the number of nuclear-powered boats Australia might acquire.
  - <sup>7</sup> . See [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership \(RCEP\) agreement to enter into force on 1 January 2022 – RCEP \(rcepsec.org\)](#) – accessed on 12 January 2022.
  - <sup>8</sup> . Pasha L. Hsieh, 'Rethinking Non-Recognition: Taiwan's New Pivot to ASEAN and the One-China Policy', [Cambridge Review of International Affairs](#), vol. 33, no. 2 (2020), pp. 205 and 220-21; and [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\) | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade \(dfat.gov.au\)](#) – accessed on 12 January 2022.
  - <sup>9</sup> . Hsieh, p. 221; and Zoey Zhang, 'Joining CPTPP: What China Needs to Do and Comparison with the RCEP', China Briefing (Dezan Shira & Associates, 13 October 2021) at: [China's Bid to Join the CPTPP: What it Must Overcome and Other Issues \(china-briefing.com\)](#) - accessed on 12 January 2022.
  - <sup>10</sup> . Hsieh, p. 221.

## APPENDIX G – CHINA: DESTINED FOR PEACE OR WAR?

### G1 Introduction

It is rare for a political scientist to offer an in-depth analysis about the prospects for war or peace with a major power which, in this case, is China. Professor Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs who has advised the United States secretaries of defense under Reagan, Clinton and Obama, produced such an analysis first published in 2017 although this Appendix G is based on the 2018 edition: Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?<sup>1</sup>

In his preface, Allison explains the book's Big Idea captured by the phrase 'Thucydides's Trap':

When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound: danger ahead. China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war – unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it.<sup>2</sup>

Independently, IPP launched its Peace Games 2020 (PG2020) offering an annual International Peace Prize totalling GB£10,000 over 2021 to 2023 for predicting peace or war in answer to these questions:

Which country or region in the world possessing, or thought to possess, nuclear weapons is at greatest risk of collapse into civil conflict or war? By what means can a state of peace be secured there?<sup>3</sup>

Three of the four 'mega-threats' identified by Allison, listed below, overlap with these questions while the fourth – on climate change – is implicit. For a nuclear exchange would potentially dwarf in scale and rapidity of effect anything currently envisaged by global efforts to counter the harmful consequences of man-made climate change.

Yet, despite extensive marketing to English and Welsh Universities and two in Hong Kong, aimed at postgraduates in the political and social sciences but open to all who could meet the quality standards, there were no bids. Consequently the Prize had to be withdrawn and replaced with the Advanced Trials focused, initially, on China, the subject of this Briefing.

This Appendix provides a comparison between Allison's analysis, and Southwood's, as summarised in Table G1. Ideally, they would have been published simultaneously so that neither had the benefit of hindsight but since no war has yet broken out between the USA and China the timing makes little difference. Moreover, both authors have 'an irenical perspective', i.e. generally preferring peace to war and thus emphasising peaceful rather than military methods of resolving international disputes. In Allison's case this is implicit and without giving any attention to the balance of peaceful methods of conflict resolution between China and the West, which is the unique contribution of Southwood's work. To this end the summary of his findings is based not on China, which will be found in this Briefing's conclusions, but on his analysis in the 1990s of Western handling of the end of the Cold War. Their relevance now is obvious in view of Allison's own emphasis on its peaceful ending. Nor can their significance be denied to the prospects for a peaceful end to the US-China dispute.

TABLE G1

## A COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS FOR ANALYSING CHINA'S PROSPECTS FOR WAR OR PEACE

Allison	Southwood
<p>1. <u>Organising Principle</u></p> <p>His underlying principle for analysis is called Thucydides's Trap:</p> <p>"It was the <i>rise</i> of Athens and the <i>fear</i> that this instilled in Sparta that made [the Peloponnesian] war inevitable" [Allison's emphasis]</p> <p>'As a rapidly ascending China challenges America's accustomed predominance, these two nations risk falling into a deadly trap first identified [above] by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides.'<sup>4</sup></p> <p>So, Allison asks: '... the defining question about global order is whether China and the US can escape Thucydides's Trap?'<sup>5</sup></p>	<p><u>An Alternative</u></p> <p>His underlying principle for analysis is a (legally defined) 'irenical perspective':<sup>6</sup></p> <p>Instead of comparing an objective <i>fact</i> (the rise of Athens in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC) with a subjective <i>emotion</i> (the fear instilled in Sparta), this principle relies on:</p> <p>(i) A like-for-like comparison of all material facts on (a) cooperative and (b) coercive relationships between state and non-state entities involved in a regional conflict across each relevant dimension of security; and (ii) The degree of reciprocity between each entity across each such security dimension.</p> <p>This produces an assessment of <i>the propensity for peace or war</i> in that region? See 'Method' section 3.3 at page 14.</p>
<p>2. <u>History: Thucydides's Trap Case File</u></p> <p>Reviewing the past five hundred years, the Harvard Thucydides's Trap Project identified (in 2015) 16 cases in which an ascending power challenged an established power. Twelve of these rivalries resulted in war.<sup>7</sup></p> <p>Of the four cases which did <u>not</u> lead to war one – the United States v Soviet Union (1940s to 1980s) – stands out.</p> <p>As Allison acknowledges: '<i>Though often tense, the Cold War stands as one of history's greatest successes in escaping Thucydides's Trap. By developing vehicles for competition outside of armed conflict, the two powers peacefully managed the highest-stakes great power competition in history.</i>'<sup>8</sup> [Southwood's emphasis underlined]</p>	<p>Southwood's work (in the period 1993-95) focused, instead, on the ending of the Cold War and its consequences, especially for US-Soviet/Russian relations, and why the West was '<u>on the road to war</u>'. [His emphasis]<sup>9</sup></p> <p>As it turned out, this choice highlighted the most important Harvard Project case but written with foresight, rather than hindsight.</p> <p>Southwood (1995): 'The dismantling of the Soviet Empire broke the historic tradition of Great Power rivalry leading to war. Yet the post-Cold War peace settlement, after initial enthusiasm, has fuelled resentment and hostility in Russia against the West. Are we returning to the era of Great Power politics and, if so, can anything be done to avoid future military disaster?'<sup>10</sup></p>

Allison	Southwood
<p>2. <u>History: Thucydides Trap Case File (cont'd)</u></p> <p>Was war inevitable?</p> <p>As regards Athens v Sparta, Thucydides identified three primary drivers fuelling this dynamic that led to war: interests, fear, and honour:<sup>11</sup></p> <p>‘National interests are... The survival of the state and its sovereignty in making decisions in its domain free from coercion from others...’</p> <p>“Fear” is Thucydides’ one-word reminder that facts about structural realities are not the whole story. Objective conditions have to be perceived by human beings – and the lenses through which we see them are influenced by emotions. In particular, ruling powers’ fears often fuel misperceptions and exaggerate dangers, as rising powers’ self-confidence stimulates unrealistic expectations about what is possible and encourages risk-taking.’</p> <p>‘[Honour] encompasses what we now think of as a state’s sense of itself, its convictions about the recognition and respect it is due, and its pride...’</p> <p>Ultimately, the leaders of Athens and Sparta were undermined by their own domestic politics. Allison states that Pericles [for Athens] and the Spartan King Archidamus prefigured the insight that America’s greatest presidential scholar Richard Neustadt recognized in characterizing the American presidency: “<u>Weakness</u>” he observed, “<u>remains the word from which to start</u>”<sup>12</sup> [Southwood’s emphasis.]</p> <p>Allison concludes that Thucydides was not literally right in claiming that the rise of Athens made war inevitable but ‘His point was that as Athens grew more powerful and Sparta grew more anxious, the two countries chose paths that made it increasingly difficult to avoid war.’<sup>13</sup></p>	<p>His method focuses on <i>future</i> war or peace?</p> <p>The meaning of this important insight, as understood by Allison, is not clear in the book. However, for Southwood’s, see the second highlighted bullet point on pages 99-100 and penultimate paragraph of ‘Appendix A – Historical Background’ of this China Briefing.</p>

Allison	Southwood
<p data-bbox="261 226 695 258">3. <u>CCP and the Clash of Civilisations</u></p> <p data-bbox="261 300 802 510">Allison asks ‘What Xi’s China Wants’ and answers that President Xi Jinping wants to ‘Make China Great Again’.<sup>14</sup> This author’s assessment contains a brief history of modern China and its current President and his bold ‘China Dream’.</p> <p data-bbox="261 552 802 804">He then refers to ‘Xi’s Nightmare’: ‘... the apparition he sees is Mikhail Gorbachev. Shortly after taking power, Xi asked his close colleagues a rhetorical question: “Why did the Soviet Union collapse?” As he never tires of reminding them, “It is a profound lesson for us.”... ‘Xi could see that in the years since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had been walking a path dangerously close to Gorbachev’s...’ ‘Xi knows that the supreme leader’s credibility ultimately depends on a chain of command in which his order will cause a soldier to shoot his fellow citizens...’ ‘The first imperative in realizing Xi’s China Dream is to relegitimize a strong Party to serve as the vanguard and guardian of the Chinese state...’ ‘In contrast to Gorbachev’s glasnost – openness to ideas – Xi has demanded ideological conformity, tightening control over political discourse... At the same time, Xi has moved to cement the Party’s centrality in China’s governance.’<sup>15</sup></p> <p data-bbox="261 1497 802 1892">Then Allison goes on to consider the clash of cultures between America and China derived from Samuel Huntington’s essay ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ which claimed that the fundamental cause of conflict in the post-Cold War world would be cultural rather than ideological, economic or political.<sup>16</sup> While heavily criticised at the time, this hard-to-define concept has been built into studies of war e.g., on jihadist terrorism, and the risk of violence in US-China relations.</p>	<p data-bbox="826 300 1367 552">Southwood’s method of analysis does not focus on national leaders but on the evaluation of policies in terms of: (i) the balance of power (or coercion); and (ii) the balance of peace (or cooperation) These are the structural factors which decide the conditions or ‘climate’ for peace or war.</p> <p data-bbox="826 594 1367 762">The four out of six Briefings of the Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem), edited and largely written by Southwood, major on Western handling of the end of the Cold War – a subject mostly neglected by Allison.</p> <p data-bbox="826 804 1367 1266">Southwood (1993): ‘The Gorbachev administration attempted the seemingly impossible task of simultaneously democratising a country with hardly any experience of democracy and decentralising an economy where private enterprise had manifestly failed in the past. If this did not deserve the West’s support – politically, ideologically [sic] and financially – it is hard to understand why. For whilst Western aid could not guarantee success failure would be almost inevitable without it.’<sup>17</sup> [Cf. US support of PRC in 1980s and 1990s]</p> <p data-bbox="826 1455 1367 1892">Southwood examined ‘War as Culture’, drawing on the thesis of John Keegan, a military historian, to ask how future wars could be conducted with rational restraint: ‘... Policy makers will argue that the Western way of war might still be used by powerful states even if wars of aggression now risk human annihilation. Moreover, only the Chinese way of war developed by Mao, which appears far less restrained than the original strategy devised by Sun Tzu, has proved successful against it...’<sup>18</sup></p>

Allison	Southwood
<p data-bbox="248 226 797 258">3. <u>CCP and the Clash of Civilisations</u> (cont'd)</p> <p data-bbox="248 300 797 842">According to Huntington, China and a few other states form the 'Confucian' civilization while the United States fits into a group of states collectively known as 'Western' civilization. Unlike Francis Fukuyama, whose 1989 article 'The End of History?' predicted a convergence toward the liberal world order,<sup>19</sup> Huntington foresaw that, in the post-Cold War world, civilizational fault lines would become more pronounced. While conceding that differences do not necessarily result in violent conflict "Over the centuries... differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts."<sup>20</sup></p> <p data-bbox="248 884 797 1461">Huntington wanted to correct any notion Western readers might have of universal values, which he thought naïve, and an affront to Confucian civilization especially. Allison contends that the differences Huntington identifies do offer indicators of the ways it is not only distinct from, but incompatible with, Western cultures: 'Being overtaken by a rival who shares common values – such as Britain grudgingly watching an upstart America surpass its power but largely preserve its cultural, religious, and political beliefs – is one thing. It would be quite another to be surpassed by an adversary whose values are so strikingly different.'<sup>21</sup></p> <p data-bbox="248 1503 797 1892">Allison then identifies various ways in which he considers American and Chinese cultures clash before concluding that the US-China gap most relevant for Thucydides Trap comes from competing perspectives on world order. While Americans aspire to an international rule of law... 'they recognize the realities of power in the global Hobbesian jungle, <i>where it is better to be the lion than the lamb.</i>'<sup>22</sup> Chinese point out they were absent when those rules were made.</p>	<p data-bbox="813 258 1372 726">That the (mostly) peaceful ending of the Cold War was 'one of history's greatest successes' was challenged by Southwood in 1995: 'The contrast between the dismantling of the Soviet empire and previous empires over the last five hundred years is brought home by [historian Paul] Kennedy's own earlier assessment. Writing in the latter half of the 1980s his forecast for the Soviet Union, based on existing trends, is telling because it now compels a questioning of his basic premise. For a short time the broad trends of Great Power rivalry did <i>not</i> continue...'<sup>23</sup></p> <p data-bbox="813 768 1372 1272">Southwood offered his own assessment (in 1995) of Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis: 'To summarise: Western triumphalism after the Cold War is incompatible with the liberal idea; its policy consequences have led to a new imperialism which could not be acceptable to Russia; this, in turn, has effected a massive swing in public opinion against the West and contributed to a revival of nationalism and Great Power politics in Russia; while domestic economic pressures there also go against liberal democracy and strengthen moves towards a "market-oriented authoritarianism."<sup>24</sup></p> <p data-bbox="813 1314 1372 1892">Southwood concluded (1995): 'The cultural transformation of the Soviet Union from militarism to peace, as the Cold War ended, provided a world-historic opportunity to break for ever with the tradition of Great Power rivalry leading to war... Western triumphalism made impossible a genuine cooperation with the East let alone with the South... the doctrine of realism... was sustained despite its obvious and immense flaws... cultural differences between East and West may undermine the assumption that republican states do not make war on one other. For on this hinges the relevance for peace of the worldwide progress towards democracy.'<sup>25</sup></p>



Allison	Southwood
<p data-bbox="256 226 609 258">4. <u>Current Conflict Scenarios</u></p> <p data-bbox="256 300 805 474">After reviewing four historical cases in which China launched a limited war, Allison summarises four concepts which are used in war games to understand the sources of conflict</p> <ul data-bbox="256 478 805 877" style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>sparks</i> that start a war (examples below);</li> <li>- <i>background conditions</i>, which often determine which sparks become wars, e.g. geography, culture and history;</li> <li>- <i>accelerants</i> that can turn an accident or provocation into war, e.g. uncertainties arising from imperfect information, use of antisatellite weapons, and cyberweapons;</li> <li>- <i>escalation ladders</i> that might bring about a stalemate or willingness to accept defeat by one state or, instead, mutual destruction.<sup>26</sup></li> </ul> <p data-bbox="256 919 805 1024">The specific war scenarios, Allison posits as possible between the USA and China, are the result of these ‘sparks’:</p> <ol data-bbox="256 1029 805 1318" style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) An accidental collision at sea.</li> <li>(ii) Taiwan moves towards independence.</li> <li>(iii) War provoked by a third party, e.g. such as might have arisen from the North Korean sinking of a South Korean warship in 2010 – though denied by N. Korea and China.</li> <li>(iv) Collapse of North Korea as a state.</li> <li>(v) A trade conflict leading to a hot war.<sup>27</sup></li> </ol> <p data-bbox="256 1360 805 1892">While stressing again that war is not inevitable, Allison uses these scenarios to illustrate how accidental, seemingly inconsequential events might trigger large-scale conflict between the US and China. Leaders on both sides, in making choices in the face of the relentless advance of new military technologies whose effects cannot be fully understood before their actual use, may fall into a trap they both know exists but believe they can avoid: ‘On current trajectories, a disastrous war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than most of us are willing to allow.’<sup>28</sup></p>	<p data-bbox="821 300 1372 474">Although Allison’s book does not make any claims about predicting future US-China war or peace, the associated website is clear: ‘... the point of <u>Destined for War</u> is not to predict the future but to prevent it.’<sup>29</sup></p> <p data-bbox="821 516 1372 842">In contrast, the point of applying an irenical perspective is to predict the propensity (or conditions) for a state of peace or war and, thereby, contribute to prevention by an assessment of the balances of cooperation and of coercion across each relevant security dimension (e.g. military, economic, institutional). Southwood believes this can, in future, be done much more quantitatively.</p> <p data-bbox="821 884 1372 1167">Southwood’s method, therefore, takes account of background conditions, accelerants and escalation ladders but in a systematic way that does not rely on political judgement but verifiable facts and measured reciprocity between entities in conflict. These factors would decide whether ‘sparks’ or catalysts are likely to start a war or not.</p> <p data-bbox="821 1209 1372 1314"><i>Like Allison’s war scenarios, these catalysts, are often unpredictable – only the propensity for war or peace is potentially measurable.</i></p> <p data-bbox="821 1356 1372 1682">In 1995 Southwood advocated Yergin and Gustafson’s scenario planning technique as a structured and disciplined method for thinking about the future, which they applied to Russia. It doesn’t predict either, but it does create plausible ‘stories of the future’. These authors present four such scenarios as might be found in a history book written in 2020, looking back on 2010.<sup>30</sup></p> <p data-bbox="821 1724 1372 1892">Today it is obvious that the ‘Two-Headed Eagle’ has prevailed: ‘The central government reasserts its power... [It] is heir to Russia’s Great Power traditions...’<sup>31</sup> In line with Southwood’s analysis (1993-1995).</p>

Allison	Southwood
<p data-bbox="248 226 808 262">5. <u>Twelve Clues for Peace</u></p> <p data-bbox="248 296 808 436">Allison then seeks to draw lessons from the four historical cases in the Harvard case file, which did not lead to war, for escaping Thucydides' Trap in the US-China conflict:</p> <p data-bbox="248 470 808 583"><u>Clue 1</u> (from Spain v Portugal in late 15<sup>th</sup> C.) <i>Higher authorities can help resolve rivalry</i> – in that case, it was an appeal to the Pope.</p> <p data-bbox="248 590 808 653"><u>Clue 2</u> (from Germany v Britain and France in the 1990s and to the present) <i>States can be entrenched in supra-national institutions that constrain prior (aggressive) behaviour.</i></p> <p data-bbox="248 659 808 772"><u>Clue 3</u> (from USA v Britain in early 20<sup>th</sup> C.) <i>Wise statesmen distinguish needs from wants and face facts</i> (in cost-benefit terms).</p> <p data-bbox="248 779 808 877"><u>Clue 4</u> <i>Timing is crucial</i> (for often unexpected windows of opportunity).</p> <p data-bbox="248 884 808 997"><u>Clue 5</u> <i>A common culture (language, politics) may help avoid conflict.</i><sup>32</sup></p> <p data-bbox="248 1003 808 1117"><u>Clue 6</u> (from Soviet Union v United States between 1940s – 1980s) <i>There is nothing new – apart from nuclear weapons.</i></p> <p data-bbox="248 1123 808 1264"><u>Clue 7</u> <i>Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) makes all-out war madness...</i> 'Both the US and Russia retain superpower nuclear arsenals. Thus, however evil, however demonic, however dangerous, however deserving to be strangled Russia is, the US must struggle to find some way to live with it – or face dying together.'<sup>33</sup></p> <p data-bbox="248 1270 808 1383"><u>Clue 8</u> <i>Hot war between nuclear superpowers is, therefore, an unjustifiable option...</i></p> <p data-bbox="248 1390 808 1503"><u>Clue 9</u> <i>Despite this, leaders of nuclear superpowers must be ready to risk an unwinnable war.</i><sup>34</sup></p> <p data-bbox="248 1509 808 1608">The Cold War yields 4 of these 9 clues.</p>	<p data-bbox="816 260 1377 436">Southwood took a fundamentally different approach to conflict prevention and resolution in 1995, albeit one still committed to 'Learning from the Past – Looking to the Future'. His framework had this objective:</p> <p data-bbox="816 470 1377 653">'In comparison with the natural sciences, the extent to which a given theory of international relations or peace can be rigorously tested against the facts is much more limited...'</p> <p data-bbox="816 659 1377 1241">'It can, though, be argued that the outbreak of war is the ultimate test of whether a theory of peace has failed. Even then it depends on whether that war can be contained. No state or faction can prevent another which is determined to go to war from doing so but a successful theory of peace will lead to policies that minimise the risks of that happening and increase the prospects of restraining any armed conflict that might occur. On the other hand, a theory of peace which leads to military adventurism – resulting from a tendency to take risks in foreign policy – would threaten a major regional or global war in which rational restraint might be impossible.'</p> <p data-bbox="816 1247 1377 1457">'The objective of this framework is to try to forestall so drastic an eventuality by comparing the explanatory and predictive power of two contrasting theories, viz. common security and realism, associated with military security...'<sup>35</sup></p> <p data-bbox="816 1499 1377 1562">Allison's statement on Russia is not objective or impartial, let alone scientific.</p> <p data-bbox="816 1604 1377 1745">Southwood's proposed application of the scenario planning technique in 1995 used mainly Russia '...but, naturally, the framework could be applied to any region.'<sup>36</sup></p> <p data-bbox="816 1787 1377 1892">Allison does not give any information or data on the role of Gorbachev's 'peace offensive' in ending the Cold War.<sup>37</sup></p>

Allison	Southwood
<p>5. <u>Twelve Clues for Peace</u> (cont'd)</p> <p>Drawing on all non-war cases, Allison offers:  <u>Clue 10</u>  <i>Deep economic interdependence raises the cost, and so reduces the probability, of war.</i>  <u>Clue 11</u>  <i>Alliances (or treaties) can provide a false sense of security, i.e. maintain a balance of power but run the risk of a breakdown.</i>  <u>Clue 12</u>  <i>Intra-state performance is decisive. What states do within their borders is at least as consequential as external relations.</i><sup>38</sup></p>	<p>Southwood asked (1995):  ‘Why might the common security perspective prove more insightful? On <i>conflict prevention</i>, it gives far greater weight to the significance of internal factors within Russia rather than just its place within the wider state system. Consequently the basic causes of conflict can be highlighted before violence erupts... At an early stage peaceful means of resolving disputes can be proposed and, in the absence of such action, the effect on military risks, especially for intervention, can be evaluated...’<sup>39</sup></p>
<p>6. <u>Where Do We Go From Here?</u></p> <p>Allison does not argue for a new US strategy but ‘... a serious pause for reflection’. He ‘...offers a set of principles and strategic options for those seeking to escape Thucydides’s Trap and avoid World War III.’</p> <p>(i) <i>Start with structural realities.</i>  Allison refers to the Nixon/Kissinger opening to China in the early 1970s and the unexpected part that played in creating the powerful Chinese economy to rival the United States today. Another structural feature is the US defense budget which, in 2016, exceeded that of China, Russia, Japan and Germany.</p> <p>(ii) <i>Apply historical precedents and analogies</i> including how foreign counterparts understand that history.</p> <p>(iii) <i>Recognize a fundamental contradiction in the US post-Cold War China strategy.</i>  In particular, Allison criticizes:  - the ‘pivot to Asia’ as largely rhetorical.  - the assumption that China would follow Germany and Japan and accept an US-led rules-based international order.  - the triumphalism as the Cold War ended and declarations of a unipolar world.</p> <p>Citing Lee Kuan Yew, China would not become a democracy or ‘it would collapse.’<sup>40</sup></p>	<p>Southwood (in 1995) proposed a future briefing series focused on ‘National or ethnic conflicts affecting major powers or strategic territory... e.g. Russia, Ukraine, China...’<sup>41</sup></p> <p>‘Ideally each briefing would be written by three persons. One would draw up the appendices containing the scenario planning information for the region or country in question. The main text would consist of two contrasting analyses, one person offering a common security perspective and another a realist military security perspective. If the analysts were to be of similar ability, then over time and across regions it may become evident which analytical approach is proving superior in terms of foreseeing the dangers of military adventurism and proposing a path to peace.’</p> <p>‘In short, the reader could decide whether the military aspects of security are being emphasised out of all proportion to the non-military and thus to the detriment of security as a whole. Or, in other words, is the drive for power balanced by, or does it dominate, the will for peace...’<sup>42</sup></p> <p>In Allison’s terms (s. 3, p. 211, last para. above), <i>does the lion dominate the lamb?</i><sup>43</sup></p>

Allison	Southwood
<p data-bbox="248 220 810 258">6. <u>Where Do We Go From Here?</u> (cont'd)</p> <p data-bbox="248 296 810 510"><i>(iv) Review all options – even ugly ones.</i> In place of the existing strategy (at the time of writing) – called by President Obama ‘engage but hedge’ – Allison sets out a range of strategic options to stimulate fresh thinking:</p> <p data-bbox="248 548 810 657">a.) <i>Accommodate</i>: a serious attempt to come to terms with a new balance of power by adjusting relations with the challenger.</p> <p data-bbox="248 659 810 768">b.) <i>Undermine</i>: a strategy to encourage regime change within a country or even promote internal divisions.</p> <p data-bbox="248 770 810 879">c.) <i>Negotiate a long peace</i>: such as US-Soviet détente during the Cold War including agreements on arms control.</p> <p data-bbox="248 882 810 1096">d.) <i>Redefine the relationship</i>: regarding four ‘mega-threats’ faced by China and the USA: - nuclear Armageddon; - nuclear anarchy; - global terrorism especially jihadism; and - climate change.<sup>44</sup></p>	<p data-bbox="812 220 1377 258"><u>A Provisional Answer</u> (1995)</p> <p data-bbox="812 296 1377 436">In place of Allison’s political options, Southwood offered an educational one (in 1995) but focused on a similar set of ‘mega-threats’ which Allison had identified: ‘In this complex environment a common security framework has the opportunity to demonstrate its superior qualities, over realism and military security, in foreseeing the dangers of military adventurism... the findings from common security analyses may well be ignored until some military disaster forces a reconsideration of the Western theory of peace, based on political and military domination and Clausewitzian war. By then it may be too late for a change, depending on whether the momentum of a regional conflict proves unstoppable. Yet while Great Powers continue with traditional politics no approach based on UN internationalism offers much prospect that it can overcome their nationalistic foreign policies...’<sup>45</sup></p>
<p data-bbox="248 1131 810 1169">7. <u>Conclusion</u></p> <p data-bbox="248 1207 810 1348">Allison uses the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, especially, to illustrate the most enduring lesson for current Sino-US problems (derived from John F Kennedy): “‘Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert confrontations that force an adversary to choose between a humiliating retreat and nuclear war.’”<sup>46</sup></p> <p data-bbox="248 1575 810 1789">In concluding, Allison suggests US leaders start with four core ideas: (i) Define vital US interests; (ii) Comprehend what China seeks to do; (iii) Craft a strategy; (iv) Focus on domestic challenges.<sup>47</sup></p>	<p data-bbox="812 1207 1377 1276">Southwood, using the end of the Cold War, drew this most enduring lesson in 1995 on</p> <p data-bbox="812 1314 1377 1352">‘The Impossibility of Peace?’:</p> <p data-bbox="812 1390 1377 1715">‘Too often and too easily false lessons are drawn from history. A classic example is the use made of Winston Churchill’s opposition to appeasement during the 1930s in justifying an unbending position against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. For his lone condemnation of the Munich Agreement in 1938 could also be aptly applied to the post-Cold War peace settlement:</p> <p data-bbox="812 1753 1377 1862">“‘We have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat... We are in the midst of a disaster of the first magnitude.’”</p>

<p>Allison ends with an unsourced quote from Shakespeare: our destiny lies 'not in our stars, but in ourselves.'</p>	<p>'Exactly the opposite policy, pursued in entirely contrary circumstances, has produced not a "victory" for the cause of peace but a defeat – perhaps the worst in history. The Soviet Union had broken with the historic tradition of Great Power rivalry leading to war; its reward was a peace settlement that bred resentment and humiliation. The difference this time is that whereas the illusion of Chamberlain's 'peace in our time' was quickly dispelled by the evidence of war the scale of Western failure today, as a result of dispelling the reality of the Gorbachev "peace offensive", may not manifest itself in a Great Power war for years to come. Even so the end of the negative peace in Europe, that existed during the Cold War, has already led to an amalgam of "small wars" on the periphery and an attempt at positive peace so bad that it could not work and will not last. Indeed, the "cold peace" to which President Yeltsin [of Russia] has referred is the start of a return to an unstable, mainly negative East-West peace which could lead or contribute to war in any one of several strategic regions of the world.'<sup>48</sup></p> <p>Today, Southwood says, 'our destiny lies not in ourselves but in the unadorned facts interpreted according to the Golden Rule.'</p>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

## G2 A Difference of Method

Allison's method of analysis is not based on prediction but prevention. If war comes between the USA and China he can say he warned of it; if not, he underlined it was not inevitable. No hypothesis is being tested and whether war is prevented depends on political wisdom: 'Ah, if we only knew', he quotes the man who had been German chancellor when the Great War broke out, in answer to a colleague's question after its end as to how his, and other European statesmen's, choices had unleashed such devastation.<sup>49</sup>

Conversely Southwood's method, by a factual assessment of the balance of peaceful methods of conflict resolution ('balance of peace'), did make accurate predictions, as it turned out, on the likelihood of war arising from the way the Cold War ended. This much-to-be-regretted success was repeated in IPP Briefing No. 1 on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict forecasting

periodic war.<sup>50</sup> Since publication in January 2006, five armed conflicts have occurred between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Such forecasts are conditional but unless the conditions are met war is the expected result. We are presenting probabilities, but the hypotheses are testable.

### G3 Conclusion

The A-B-C of forecasting peace or war in this Briefing, analogous to weather forecasting, is:

#### A. *Foresight v Hindsight*

Allison's key no-war case from the Harvard Thucydides's Trap Project in 2015 is the United States v Soviet Union Cold War between the 1940s and 1980s.

Twenty years earlier, Southwood's analysis on the ending of the Cold War and its likely consequences, contained in the four out of six Briefings constituting his editorial of the Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem) in the period 1993-1995, highlighted the world-historical significance of this event for all future conflicts in the decades ahead, varying only in degree, including a possible break-up of China.

#### B. *Weakness v Strength*

While both Allison and Southwood give attention to the traditional concept of the balance of power, the superiority of Southwood's method of analysis arises from his systematic and methodical treatment of the 'balance of peace'. The supreme example of the latter, as brought out in Appendix A of this Briefing, and given some weight by Allison, is the Sino-Chinese rapprochement of the 1970s. This was the moment of *greatest weakness* of Communist China, in the throes of the Cultural Revolution and emerging from border conflicts that might have escalated to nuclear confrontation with the USSR, but also of the USA seeking a way out of the Vietnam War and facing internal dissent while fearing a weakened position against the Soviet Union.

Southwood's method, but not Allison's, allows testable hypotheses, as explained in G2 above, because it takes account of how, historically, *strength can and does emerge from weakness*. Modern Chinese history is an exemplar of that.

#### C. *Education v Politics*

Yet the objective of both Allison and Southwood is plainly a state of peace, rather than war, between the USA and China, as well as other states in East Asia. The main difference in applying an irenical perspective is that Allison and his colleagues believe this in the hands of statesmen despite their evidence from the history of war that it is not. Still less a state of peace, which also requires *impartial* education on an irenical perspective, as defined in the Prodem legal case of 1998 in England drawing on a US case in 1917.<sup>51</sup> Liberal democracies failed to create conditions for peace after the Great War and failed again after the Cold War, despite having overwhelming military strength. Fail again, by driving China (or Russia) into chaos by seeking to impose Western values on them, and there may be no peace left on earth.

## References

- <sup>1</sup> . Graham Allison, [Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?](#) (Scribe, 2018 reprinted 2020).
- <sup>2</sup> . Ibid, p. vii.
- <sup>3</sup> . See the Peace Games 2020 website at: [Peace Games 2020 \(ipp2000.org\)](http://www.ipp2000.org) and select the 'Learn More' button to find further explanations and the bid documents. An A5 flyer was also produced and widely circulated to postgraduate students in relevant disciplines and their tutors in the UK and Ireland and also Hong Kong.
- <sup>4</sup> . Allison, p. vii.
- <sup>5</sup> . Ibid, p. xvii.
- <sup>6</sup> . See Carnwath J. in [Southwood & Parsons v H M Attorney General](#), High Court Case No: CH 1995 S No. 5856 concerning the Project on Demilitarisation (9 October 1998), especially para. 26 which was influenced by the US case of [Parkhurst v Burrill](#) [1917] 117 NE 39 in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. On appeal see Chadwick LJ in [Southwood & Parsons v H M Attorney General](#), Court of Appeal No: CHANF 98/1405/CMS3 concerning the Project on Demilitarisation (28 June 2000), especially paras 25-31. For copies of the Prodem judgments, see: <http://www.ipp2000.org/ipplaw.html>
- <sup>7</sup> . Allison, p. 41.
- <sup>8</sup> . Ibid, p. 281.
- <sup>9</sup> . See Peter Southwood, General Editor and Editor Series A, Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem): [The Triumph of Unilateralism: The Failure of Western Militarism](#), Briefing No. 1 (Prodem, March 1993), 69pp ISBN 1-898079-00-5 (The quote is from the 'Statement of Purpose' on page iii.); [NATO's Military Supremacy: What is It For?](#) Briefing A/1 (Prodem, September 1993), 44pp ISBN 1-898079-10-2; [Western Generals: The Dangers from British and American Military Success](#), Briefing A/2 (Prodem, School of Business and Economic Studies, University of Leeds, April 1994), 53pp ISBN 1-898079-20-X; [Military Adventurism: Learning From the Past – Looking to the Future](#), Briefing A/3 (SBES, University of Leeds, October 1995), 79pp ISBN 1-898079-25-0. All available through Legal Deposit libraries in the UK and Ireland. (Details of the Series B and C Prodem Briefings, edited by Steve Schofield, are omitted here but available on the back cover of the Series A Briefings.)
- <sup>10</sup> . [Military Adventurism](#), Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), 'Statement of Purpose', p. iii.
- <sup>11</sup> . Allison, p. 39.
- <sup>12</sup> . Ibid, p. 40.
- <sup>13</sup> . Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> . Ibid, 107.
- <sup>15</sup> . Ibid, pp. 119-21.
- <sup>16</sup> . Ibid, p. 136 citing Huntington's essay in [Foreign Affairs](#), 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 22.
- <sup>17</sup> . [The Triumph of Unilateralism](#), Prodem Briefing No. 1 (March 1993), p. 7.
- <sup>18</sup> . [Military Adventurism](#), Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p. 7. To be clear, this conclusion is Southwood's not Keegan's.
- <sup>19</sup> . Allison, pp. 136-37 citing Fukuyama's article in [The National Interest](#), no. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.
- <sup>20</sup> . Ibid, p. 137 citing Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', p. 25. (Full details in note 16 above.)
- <sup>21</sup> . Ibid, pp. 137-39.
- <sup>22</sup> . Ibid, pp. 146-47. Emphasis added by Southwood.
- <sup>23</sup> . [Military Adventurism](#), Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p. 7 [Southwood's emphasis] citing Paul Kennedy, [The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000](#) (Fontana Press, 1989), especially p. 664.
- <sup>24</sup> . [Military Adventurism](#), Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p. 12.
- <sup>25</sup> . Ibid, p. 17.
- <sup>26</sup> . Allison, pp. 156 and 160-67.
- <sup>27</sup> . Ibid, pp. 167-84.
- <sup>28</sup> . Ibid, p. 184.
- <sup>29</sup> . See [Thucydides Trap: An Overview | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs](#) – downloaded 9 December 2021.
- <sup>30</sup> . [Military Adventurism](#), Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), pp. 38-39 and Appendix E, esp. pp. 74-76.
- <sup>31</sup> . Ibid, p. 76.
- <sup>32</sup> . Allison, pp. 190-200.
- <sup>33</sup> . Ibid, pp. 206-08.
- <sup>34</sup> . Ibid, pp. 208-10.

- 
- <sup>35</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), Appendix E, p. 74. The definition of common security is given on p. 45. fn 4: 'Common security means a recognition that in the nuclear age national security cannot be achieved unilaterally and by military means. It differs from the military security concept in that it also involves economic, social and environmental aspects of security.'
- <sup>36</sup> . *Ibid.* p. 77.
- <sup>37</sup> . Compare with the Prodem Briefings edited by Peter Southwood, as listed in note 9 above, especially Briefing No. 1.
- <sup>38</sup> . Allison, pp. 210-13.
- <sup>39</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), Appendix E, p. 77.
- <sup>40</sup> . Allison, pp. 214-20.
- <sup>41</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), Appendix E, p. 78.
- <sup>42</sup> . *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
- <sup>43</sup> . See note 22 above.
- <sup>44</sup> . Allison, pp. 221-28.
- <sup>45</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3, p. 44.
- <sup>46</sup> . Allison, pp. 234-35.
- <sup>47</sup> . *Ibid.*, pp. 233-40.
- <sup>48</sup> . Military Adventurism, Prodem Briefing A/3 (October 1995), p. 43.
- <sup>49</sup> . Allison, p. xi; and see note 29 above for his acknowledgement that his method does not predict.
- <sup>50</sup> . See section 3.1 in the 'Method of Analysing the Conflict' of this China Briefing for a detailed account of this claim.
- <sup>51</sup> . See note 6 above.



## SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Explanatory Note

Generally, in academic bibliographies, scholars aim to demonstrate the depth of their knowledge of a subject by the breadth of their reading of the most relevant works. Here the objective is different. The Advanced Peace Games depend on the public benefit of the forecasts made on the direction of a conflict towards a state of war or peace. This, in turn, depends on the reliability and completeness of the facts used by the analyst in applying their predictive model. Such a requirement may not demand many references because there is often a substantial body of generally agreed military, economic, and institutional facts that can be taken from a few authoritative sources, or even one, in each category. Hence the layout below seeks to show what titles this author has relied on for each part of his analysis although, naturally, these sources have no responsibility for the use he has made of them.

### **Method of Analysis**

*Southwood, Peter, General Editor and Editor Series A, Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem) Briefings written by:*

Southwood, Peter, with Steve Schofield & Ian Davis, The Triumph of Unilateralism: The Failure of Western Militarism, Briefing No. 1 (Prodem, March 1993), 69pp ISBN 1-898079-00-5

Southwood, Peter, NATO's Military Supremacy: What is It For? Briefing A/1 (Prodem, September 1993), 44pp ISBN 1-898079-10-2

Southwood, Peter, with Ian Davis, Western Generals: The Dangers from British and American Military Success, Briefing A/2 (Prodem, School of Business and Economic Studies, University of Leeds, April 1994), 53pp ISBN 1-898079-20-X

Southwood, Peter, Military Adventurism: Learning From the Past – Looking to the Future, Briefing A/3 (SBES, University of Leeds, October 1995), 79pp ISBN 1-898079-25-0

*All available through Legal Deposit libraries in the United Kingdom and Ireland including Prodem Briefings Series B and C, edited by Steve Schofield.*

Southwood, Peter (ed.), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Briefings on the Prospects for Peace, Briefing No. 1 (International Peace Project, January 2006), available at <http://www.ipp2000.org/index.html> (bottom of home page)

### **History of Modern China**

Bickers, Robert, Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination (Penguin Books, 2018)

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 4 vols (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967-69)

Moore Jr, Barrington, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Penguin Books, 1979)

Roberts, J M, The Pelican History of the World (Penguin Books, 1981)

Westad, Odd Arne, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (Vintage Books, 2013)

### **Confucianism and Education in the People's Republic of China**

Communist Party of China, 'Constitution of the Communist Party of China', Revised and Adopted at the 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 24 October 2017 – downloaded from Xinhua state news agency website on 16 August 2021.

Filler, Lukas, 'Chinese Views of the Role of Morality in International Relations and the Use of Force' (electronic doctoral thesis, Department of War Studies, King's College London, United Kingdom, September 2016). Accessed through the British Library.

Gardner, Daniel K., Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Hu Xuyang and Song Shanming, 'The Governance of Higher Education According to the Marxist View of Fairness' in Social Sciences in China, vol. 39, no. 3 (2018), pp. 171-186.

Peters, Michael A., and Tina Besley, 'China's Double First-Class University Strategy' in Michael A. Peters, The Chinese Dream: Educating the Future, An Educational Philosophy and Theory Chinese Educational Philosophy Reader, Vol. VII (Routledge, 2020), Chapter 6 – accessed as an e-book in the British Library.

### **China and the Balance of Military Power in Asia, 1990 - 2020**

International Institute for Strategic Studies:

The Military Balance 1990-1991 (Brassey's for The IISS, Autumn 1990)

The United States, 90: 1, pp. 12-27

The Soviet Union, 90: 1, pp. 28-43

Asia and Australia, 90: 1, pp. 148-181

The Military Balance 1995-1996 (Oxford University Press for The IISS, October 1995)

The United States, 95:1, pp. 13-32

Russia, 95:1, pp. 102-120

Central and Southern Asia, 95:1, pp. 151-167

East Asia and Australasia, 95:1, pp. 168-198

The Military Balance 2000-2001 (Oxford University Press for The IISS, October 2000)

United States, 100:1, pp. 12-34

Russia, 100:1, pp. 109-126

Central and South Asia, 100:1, pp. 158-177

East Asia and Australasia, 100:1, pp. 178-218

The Military Balance 2005-2006 (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, October 2005)

Chapter One: North America, 105:1, pp. 13-44

Chapter Three: Russia, 105:1

Chapter Five: Central and South Asia, 105:1, pp. 223-258

Chapter Six: East Asia and Australasia, 105:1, pp. 259-314

The Military Balance 2011 (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, March 2011)

Chapter Three: North America, 111:1, pp. 41-72

Chapter Five: Russia, 111:1, pp. 173-194

Chapter Six: Asia, 111:1, pp. 195-292

The Military Balance 2015 (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, February 2015)

Chapter Three: North America, 115:1, pp. 29-56

Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, 115:1, pp. 159-206

Chapter Six: Asia, 115:1, pp. 207-302

The Military Balance 2021 (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group for The IISS, February 2021)

Chapter Three: North America, 121:1, pp. 30-65

Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, 121:1, pp. 164-217

Chapter Six: Asia, 121:1, pp. 218-313

Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda, 'World Nuclear Forces' in SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021), Chapter 10

Lopes da Silva, Diego, Nan Tian and Alexandra Marksteiner, 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020', SIPRI Fact Sheet (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2021)

Tian, Nan, and Fei Su, A New Estimate of China's Military Expenditure (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, January 2021)

### **China and the Balance of Economic Power in East Asia, 1990 - 2020**

Bown, Chad P., 'US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart'. Originally published on 20 September 2019 by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). <https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart>

Economist, (The), various articles cited in the references section of Appendix E.

Hillman, Jonathan E., The Emperor's New Road: China and the Project of the Century (Center for Strategic and International Studies/Yale University Press, 2020)

Hoan, Truong Quang, Dong Van Chung and Nguyen Huy Hoang, 'Taiwan-ASEAN Trade Relations: Trade Structure and Trade in Value Added', China Report, vol. 55, no. 2 (2019), pp. 102-24

Hsieh, Pasha L., 'Rethinking Non-Recognition: Taiwan's New Pivot to ASEAN and the One-China Policy', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2 (2020), pp. 204-28

International Monetary Fund, People's Republic of China, IMF Country Report No. 21/6 (IMF, Washington DC, January 2021)

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Recovery During a Pandemic (IMF, October 2021)

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (IMF, October 2021) downloaded data on 30 December 2021

Lee, Yaechan, 'Economic Interdependence and Peace: A Case Comparison Between the US-China and US-Japan Trade Disputes', East Asia, no. 35 (2018), pp. 215-32

Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Development Centre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2003)

Marks, Robert B., China: An Environmental History, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017)

Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China website: [announcement of the customs tariff commission of the state council on the exclusion of market-based procurement of commodities subject to tariffs on the united states and canada \(mof.gov.cn\)](https://www.mof.gov.cn) (17 February 2020) – accessed via Peterson Institute for International Economics

Murrill, Brandon J., Tricks of the Trade: Section 301 Investigation of Chinese Intellectual Property Practices Concludes (Part I), LSB10108 and (Part II), LSB10109 (Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 29 March 2018)

Nedumpara, James J., and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Nature Singapore, 2018)

Office of the United States Trade Representative, Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China (15 January 2020); and a Fact Sheet on the same date.

Reardon, Lawrence C., A Third Way: The Origins of China's Current Economic Development Strategy (Harvard University Asia Center, 2020)

Royal Institute of International Affairs, [What is China's Belt and Road Initiative \(BRI\)? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/02/what-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/)

Tao Liu and Wing Thye Woo, 'Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War', China Economic Journal, vol. 11, no. 3 (2018), pp. 319-40

Wan, Ming, The Political Economy of East Asia: Wealth and Power, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Edward Elgar, 2020)

World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017 (World Bank, Washington DC, 2017)

World Bank, At the Front Line: Reflections on the Bank's Work with China Over Forty Years 1980 -2020 (IBRD/World Bank, 2021)

### **Military and Economic Alliances in East Asia, 1990 - 2020**

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, [Member States - ASEAN Main Portal](#) – as at 12 January 2022

[Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\) | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade \(dfat.gov.au\)](#) – accessed on 12 January 2022

Japan's Constitution of 1946 from constituteproject.org generated 26 August 2021

Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street and Rt Hon. Boris Johnson MP, [PM Statement on AUKUS Partnership: 15 September 2021 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#)

[Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership \(RCEP\) agreement to enter into force on 1 January 2022 – RCEP \(rcepsec.org\)](#) – accessed on 12 January 2022

United States Department of State, 'U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea' Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State, 22 September 2020), at [U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea - United States Department of State](#)

Zhang, Zoey, 'Joining CPTPP: What China Needs to Do and Comparison with the RCEP', China Briefing (Dezan Shira & Associates, 13 October 2021) at: [China's Bid to Join the CPTPP: What it Must Overcome and Other Issues \(china-briefing.com\)](#) - accessed on 12 January 2022

### **China: Destined for Peace or War?**

Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Scribe, 2018 reprinted 2020)

Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, [Thucydides Trap: An Overview | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs](#)